For half a century, Lebanon lived under the long rule of the two Assads in Syria. Damascus held Lebanon’s fate in its hands, shaping its political landscape by producing and eliminating presidents and leaders alike. Former Lebanese MP and minister Marwan Hamadeh shares his experience with both regimes.
On December 22, a Lebanese Druze delegation, led by Walid Jumblatt, visited “the new Syria.” Marwan Hamadeh was part of that delegation, and the scene struck him. President Ahmad Sharaa now sat in the chair once occupied by Hafez al-Assad, then his son Bashar, in the People’s Palace, which had been built with the help of Rafik Hariri’s company.
The trip reminded Hamadeh of the fate of men who had defied one or both Assads, including Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, René Moawad, Rafik Hariri, and many others. The memories were even more intense because Hamadeh himself had narrowly survived an assassination attempt on October 1, 2004—an attack that left him wounded, killed his bodyguard, and injured his driver. At the time, the attempt was widely seen as a message to both Walid Jumblatt and Rafik Hariri.
Asharq Al-Awsat visited Hamadeh at his office at An-Nahar newspaper, where he has been based since the mid-1980s, to discuss Lebanon’s turbulent relationship with the Assad regimes. He recalled Hafez al-Assad’s chilling words in his presence: “Forget Bachir Gemayel.” Just four days later, the newly elected Lebanese president was assassinated. The perpetrator, Habib Shartouni, was a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which had close ties to the Syrian regime. Hamadeh holds Syria responsible not only for Gemayel’s assassination but also for the killing of President René Moawad, the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, and the assassination of Rafik Hariri.
When asked if he had expected Bashar al-Assad’s downfall or flight from Syria, Hamadeh replied: “I thought there might be a coup—a rebellion from within the Syrian army, perhaps by the Fourth Division breaking away from the command of its leader, Bashar’s brother Maher al-Assad. I believed this could happen out of concern for Syria’s sovereignty, which had fallen under Iranian influence. However, I did not anticipate the complete collapse we are seeing now, which has been evident in Syria’s failure to respond to Israeli attacks for more than a year. There hasn’t even been a statement about Gaza or anything before that. Daily airstrikes on Syria, and no reaction.”
He emphasized that the problem did not start with Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian regime has always sought to control two key decisions—if not two entire territories: Lebanon’s independent decision-making and Palestine’s independent decision-making. This, he argues, is why Syria has persistently opposed the establishment of a strong, unified Lebanese state. The dream of making Lebanon a Syrian province or western governorate predates the Assads and was not just a Ba’ath Party ambition.
Hamadeh explained: “There has always been something within Syrian political thinking that resents the separation of these districts from Syria in 1920 by France to establish Greater Lebanon. This sentiment is not just found among the Alawites. In fact, the Alawites might have accepted division, with one part for the Druze and another for different groups. But deep within Syrian national identity, this remains an unresolved issue. Even among those who see Damascus as the beating heart of Arabism and Syria as the embodiment of Arab identity on the frontiers of the Arab empire, there is this feeling. I sensed it especially during discussions about the Taif Agreement, and even before that, during the so-called ‘Tripartite Agreement,’ which I helped negotiate.”
Hamadeh recounts that the agreement was brokered between him and some of his fiercest adversaries at the time: Elie Hobeika, who represented the Lebanese Forces; Michel Samaha, later notorious for his involvement in smuggling explosives from Syrian intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk; and Assaad Shaftari, the intelligence chief of the Lebanese Forces under Hobeika. Also involved was Mohammad Abdul Hamid Beydoun, a key figure in Nabih Berri’s Amal Movement, who had previously been a leftist before shifting alliances. This shift was part of a broader migration from the Lebanese left, which had traditionally aligned with Fatah and the Palestinian resistance, towards Amal and later Hezbollah.
The Tripartite Agreement emerged after the failure of the Geneva and Lausanne conferences, which had attempted national dialogue. Those conferences only succeeded in overturning the May 17, 1983, Lebanese-Israeli agreement, which Hafez al-Assad had called an “agreement of submission.” This reversal led to a coordinated offensive against the Lebanese government, President Amin Gemayel, and the multinational peacekeeping forces, with support from the Soviet Union under Yuri Andropov.
Hamadeh explained: “The core issue was the refusal of the Lebanese establishment—particularly the Maronites—to relinquish the powers of the presidency and distribute them between the legislative and executive branches, meaning the cabinet. This focus continued until we reached the Tripartite Agreement, which was the first joint initiative between Rafik Hariri—who was not yet prime minister and was acting as a Saudi mediator—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.”
He noted that the agreement sought to broker a deal between militias rather than parliamentarians. It effectively proposed a confederation with ministers of state from six sects, rotating leadership similar to the Swiss model. In reality, this meant a permanent Syrian presence, as the fragile sectarian balance required a strong external force to keep it from unraveling.
Elie Hobeika had by then chosen the Syrian camp. At the time, there were rumors that he had maintained intelligence ties with both Israel and Syria, which might explain why his role in Bachir Gemayel’s assassination was overlooked before he fully aligned with Syrian intelligence. Eventually, intelligence maneuvers brought Hobeika over to the pro-Syrian National Forces alliance, which included Amal Movement and other factions. However, this broad coalition later collapsed under its own contradictions. As the internal conflicts intensified, Hezbollah gradually overtook Amal and effectively eliminated the National Resistance Front, replacing it with what became known as the Islamic Resistance.
The Lebanese Resistance Against Both Assads
Asked about those who resisted Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, Hamadeh said: “The Lebanese people resisted both Assads at different times and to varying degrees, depending on the sectarian composition of different regions. However, in the end, no area was spared from the oppression of either Assad. No sect avoided their brutality, not even the Shiite at certain points. The case of Imam Musa al-Sadr is worth revisiting, along with Syria’s role amid the rise of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.”
He added: “I have both a strong feeling and information suggesting that the Syrian regime was involved in sidelining and making him disappear. Perhaps they feared an independent Shiite leadership that was more Lebanese, more aligned with the Arab world, and rebellious against the Palestinians—particularly the rejectionist front close to Syria. What I want to emphasize is that no one was spared from the wrath of either Assad. Take Kamel Jumblatt, whom we consider a mentor. He captivated us with his socialist ideas, his belief in Lebanese national independence, and his support for an independent Palestinian decision. He was ultimately punished for his positions—especially after telling Hafez al-Assad in their famous final meeting: ‘I will not lead Lebanon into your big Arab prison.’”
When Hafez al-Assad Said: “Forget Bashir Gemayel”
Hamadeh continued: “The hostility between us was well known, but let me take you back to the period after the siege of Beirut and the departure of Yasser Arafat and his comrades to Tunisia. Israel had Beirut under siege, and we were trapped inside. The city had little access to water, food, and electricity—until Saudi Arabia, through US President Ronald Reagan, secured minimal aid. That was when Rafik Hariri played his first role as a mediator.
“We warned the Americans that if Israel entered Beirut, we would be wiped out. The Israelis saw us as allies of ‘terrorists’ and supporters of the Palestinian resistance. In response, the Americans, through their envoy Philip Habib, arranged for us to leave Beirut safely via Sofar and then to Damascus, using vehicles from the US embassy and the Lebanese Sixth Bureau.
On September 10, 1982, we met with President Hafez al-Assad at 9 am Walid Jumblatt and I were there, along with Mohsen Dalloul, Abdullah al-Amin, and Hikmat al-Eid. At the time, I was still serving as a minister in Elias Sarkis’s government. During our discussion, Assad spoke about his ties to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and his plans for a counteroffensive against the US and the multinational forces. He assured us that he would provide weapons to help defend the Chouf region.”
“At one point, Walid Jumblatt remarked that Lebanon had a political system and that a new president, Bashir Gemayel, had been elected. He suggested that we should deal with this new reality, as had always been the case in previous transitions.
Hafez al-Assad responded sharply: ‘Who are you talking about? Bashir Gemayel?’
We said: ‘Yes, of course, he was elected.’ Assad waved his hand dismissively and said, ‘Forget Bashir Gemayel. Forget him.’”
Hamadeh said that the conversation took place on September 10, 1982. Bashir had been elected just days earlier and was still celebrating his victory. Four days later, Gemayel was assassinated.
“We were still in Damascus at the time, while Walid Jumblatt had traveled to Amman to visit his family. That’s how we learned of Bashir’s assassination,” he stated.
The Wave of Assassinations
Hamadeh added that a wave of assassinations followed. Grand Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled was targeted, along with several Palestinian leaders. While Israel was responsible for many of these killings—pursuing Palestinian figures even as far as Tunisia—the Syrian regime also played its part, particularly in Tripoli and elsewhere.
Lebanese political figures were also targeted. Mohammad Shuqair, an advisor to President Amine Gemayel, was assassinated, as were Sheikh Sobhi al-Saleh and MP Nazem al-Qadri, who was gunned down while at a barber shop. Later, President René Moawad was killed.
Asked if he directly accused the Syrian regime of killing René Moawad, Hamadeh replied: “I do not absolve them at all,” he replied. “Others may have been involved alongside the Syrian regime—assassinations like these are often joint operations. This was also the case with the assassination of Rafik Hariri.”
The Trap Set for Samir Geagea
Regarding the church bombing, Hamadeh explained that Geagea had nothing to do with it. At the time, Hamadeh was Minister of Health and had accompanied Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to the site.
“We were among the first to arrive, and it was clear that everything had been premeditated—not just the bombing itself, but also an attempt to block the Nahr al-Kalb Bridge and tunnel to frame the attack as part of a larger terrorist operation, possibly to create a pretext for partitioning Lebanon,” he recounted.
Shortly after, an assassination attempt targeted Deputy Prime Minister Michel El Murr, and Geagea was falsely accused. Many, including President Elias Hrawi, warned him that he should leave Lebanon for his safety, but he refused, according to Hamadeh.
The bombing was orchestrated by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence, and Rafik Hariri knew this well. That’s why some people advised Geagea to leave the country—they were planning something against him. He refused, and as a result, he spent 11 years in prison.
