Crisis Looming between Sudan, Two Neighbors

Sudanese Assistant Deputy Commander in Chief General Yasir al-Atta. (SUNA)
Sudanese Assistant Deputy Commander in Chief General Yasir al-Atta. (SUNA)
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Crisis Looming between Sudan, Two Neighbors

Sudanese Assistant Deputy Commander in Chief General Yasir al-Atta. (SUNA)
Sudanese Assistant Deputy Commander in Chief General Yasir al-Atta. (SUNA)

South Sudan and Chad have condemned threats made by a top Sudanese general, warning of the risk of regional escalation.

In a speech on Sunday evening, Sudanese Assistant Deputy Commander in Chief General Yasir al-Atta, said that Chad's airports in N'Djamena and Amdjarass were "legitimate military targets" and accused South Sudan of harboring "traitors".

Juba in a statement on Monday denounced the remarks as a "blatant violation of international law", reaffirming its commitment to peace but warning it would take all necessary steps to defend its sovereignty.

Chad, in a similar statement on Sunday, said that Atta's statement "could be interpreted as a declaration of war", vowing a "firm and proportionate" response to any attack.

The comments come amid Sudan's accusations that Chad and South Sudan were supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

In November 2023, Atta said Chad was using its Amdjarass to deliver supplies to the RSF. He also accused Uganda, Central Africa and Kenya of helping the group.

The war between Sudan's army and the RSF, which erupted in April 2023, has displaced millions and strained relations with neighboring countries.

Despite Chad's and South Sudan's efforts at mediation, Sudanese military leaders have increasingly accused them of aiding the RSF.

In November, Sudan filed an official complaint against Chad at the African Union's African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights over its support to the RSF by providing it with military gear and fighters.



Conflicting Reports on Two Iraqi Factions Giving Up Their Weapons

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda
Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda
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Conflicting Reports on Two Iraqi Factions Giving Up Their Weapons

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda
Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

Reports have diverged over whether the faction Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, and Kataib al-Imam Ali, affiliated with Shibl al-Zaidi, have handed over their weapons to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The move is seen as a partial response to US conditions calling for disarming factions and placing all arms under the authority of the Iraqi state. However, it may be largely symbolic, while informed sources speak of a “theoretical framework” gaining traction that could eventually allow the factions file to be resolved.

The reports come just days after Coordination Framework forces succeeded in nominating Ali al-Zaidi for prime minister, and President Nizar Amidi tasked him with forming a government. The assignment appears relatively straightforward given the continued US support for Zaidi, as well as a call from President Donald Trump inviting him to visit the White House.

In mid-April, the US Treasury Department designated seven leaders of Iraqi factions responsible for planning, directing, and carrying out attacks against US personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq, including figures linked to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

Al-Sudani mediates between the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Faleh Al-Fayyad, and his Chief of Staff, Abu Fadak (Government media)

Disarmament

For months, there has been ongoing discussion about the possibility of disarming factions, particularly those with significant weight inside the Coordination Framework, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali. This contrasts with repeated rejection from factions such as Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah.

By end of March, the Services Alliance, which holds around six seats in parliament, announced it was severing ties with Kataib al-Imam Ali, despite Shibl al-Zaidi leading both the alliance and the armed faction. The alliance said it sought to present itself as a “comprehensive national political alliance based on the principle of national partnership, bringing together multiple political forces and currents that collectively bear responsibility for governing the state and serving society,” according to a statement at the time.

Amid the talk of weapons handovers, neither Asaib Ahl al-Haq nor Kataib al-Imam Ali has issued an official statement on the reports. The supposed mechanism of such a transfer is also surrounded by major questions, as it would effectively mean “moving what you hold in your right hand to your left,” according to sources close to the PMF and the factions.

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Asaib Ahl al-Haq has three main brigades within the PMF (41, 42, and 43), deployed in northern Baghdad and Salah al-Din province, while Kataib al-Imam Ali has the 40th Brigade, led by Shibl al-Zaidi. If they were to hand over their weapons to the PMF, they would in practice be transferring them to their own brigades already embedded within the PMF structure.

A theoretical framework

The same sources said they were unaware of any serious move at this stage to disarm the factions or even to carry out the reported transfer to the PMF. Instead, they referred to what could be described as a “theoretical framework” that may later translate into a possible settlement addressing weapons held outside the state.

They suggested that circulating such reports may serve as an early test of the prime minister-designate’s intentions and his responsiveness to US pressure regarding factional arms. It could also be a way to secure ministerial positions in the next government.

The sources added that Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which holds 27 seats in parliament and secured the position of first deputy speaker in the current term, may be genuinely seeking to avoid potential US anger. It is attempting to shed its factional past and aims to obtain ministerial portfolios, as it did in the previous term, but appears unable to convince Washington.

For this reason, the sources believe that a vague announcement of this kind about handing over weapons is insufficient to persuade Washington that the factions are disarming. More substantive steps would likely be required, potentially involving restructuring the PMF and integrating it into the regular armed forces.

Many observers point to the need to restructure leadership within the PMF as a first step toward resolving the issue of factional weapons. They also highlight the need to change key positions within the organization by redeploying some brigades to distant sectors, integrating selected units into the army or federal police, and retiring or sidelining undisciplined commanders.


Israeli Airstrikes on Southern Lebanon Kill 7 Amid Fragile Ceasefire

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)
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Israeli Airstrikes on Southern Lebanon Kill 7 Amid Fragile Ceasefire

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)

Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon kill at least seven people and wounded others on Saturday as hostilities continue between Israel and Hezbollah despite a ceasefire.

The Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon Saturday came as Israel’s military issued a new warning for residents of nine southern villages to evacuate.

Israel’s military and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have kept up their attacks despite a ceasefire in place since April 17.

Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency reported an airstrike on a car in the village of Kfar Dajal that killed 2 people, while another hit a home in the village of Lwaizeh killing three. NNA also reported a strike on the village of Shoukin that killed two people.

Israel’s military Arabic-language spokeswoman, Lt. Col. Ella Waweya, posted on X that the Israeli air force carried out about 50 airstrikes over the past 24 hours, saying that they targeted Hezbollah infrastructure and members.

Hezbollah said that it attacked on Saturday Israeli troops who gathered inside a house in the coastal village of Bayed with a drone.

The latest war between Israel and Hezbollah began on March 2, when Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel two days after the United States and Israel launched a war on its main backer, Iran. Israel has since carried out hundreds of airstrikes and launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, capturing dozens of towns and villages along the border.

Since then Lebanon and Israel have held their first direct talks in more than three decades. The two countries have formally been in a state of war since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948.

A 10-day ceasefire declared in Washington went into effect on April 17. The ceasefire was later extended by three weeks.


Why Does Trump Favor Iraq’s Al-Zaidi?

New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).
New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).
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Why Does Trump Favor Iraq’s Al-Zaidi?

New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).
New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).

Iraq’s ruling Coordination Framework has been on an intriguing journey that started with the United States’ adamant rejection of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki being appointed to head a new government and that ended with President Donald Trump personally congratulating Ali al-Zaidi on his appointment as PM-designate earlier this week.

On January 27, Trump threatened to cut US support to Iraq if Maliki returned to power. After 93 days, the Shiite forces in Iraq were surprised when Trump congratulated al-Zaidi and urged him to form a government that is free of “terrorism”. He even received an invitation to visit Washington.

Iran has yet to comment on any of these developments.

Trump’s envoy to Syria Tom Barrack had telephoned al-Zaidi on Tuesday ahead of Trump’s telephone call to the PM-designate, a banker who, with Shiite consensus, has become the face of a potential and still ambiguous American deal.

Normally, pro-Iran factions in Iraq don’t let such friendly American contacts go without a fierce wave of criticism against any attempt to normalize ties with Washington, the perceived great enemy. That did not happen.

On the contrary, the hawks of the so-called “Resistance Axis” are preoccupied with giving the new PM-designate advice over including “strong” figures in his cabinet lineup to ensure its success. They have already sent him numerous possible candidates.

Al-Zaidi was named to his post just two hours after his name was floated in the media. His name appeared out of nowhere just days after commander of Iran’s Quds Force Esmail Qaani visited Baghdad. It remains to be seen if Qaani had imposed his conditions or surrendered to a deal that is beyond Iran’s control.

Al-Zaidi's designation took place as Iraq finds itself caught between the US-Iran conflict with each country trying to impose its influence over Baghdad. The appointment could have been a victory of one party against the other.

The American veto over Maliki had limited the Coordination Framework’s options and forced it into a battle of wills with Washington. With the eruption of the conflict with Iran, al-Zaidi's name was floated as a possible candidate and way out. An evident deal was reached that led to his designation and it continues to raise questions.

Observers believe that the appointment is the beginning of a broader deal that may have intrigued Trump.

Sources said that al-Zaidi did not appear out of nowhere in the Framework and that he was actually always there as a “winning card” that can be used by influential parties.

Other sources said that al-Zaidi now faces two possibilities: His proposed cabinet lineup will fail to receive the parliament’s vote of confidence, giving the Framework room to catch its breath in the political impasse and line up other options.

This is viewed as a scenario that outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani could come up with.

The second possibility would be for the lineup to win the vote of confidence and for al-Zaidi to lead a transitional phase of two years or less. Observers have suggested that early elections could be held during this period. This scenario favors influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

There also lies a third possibility that al-Zaidi was indeed designated through an American deal amid rumors that the US is seeking to limit China’s influence in the region.

The way Trump congratulated al-Zaidi suggests that Washington may have won something major in return from Baghdad. Or it could mean that Iran’s influence in Iraq had gotten so weak that it allowed major players in Baghdad to seize the reins and do what was necessary, including appointing al-Zaidi, to avoid US economic sanctions that would only further isolate Iraq and Iran.