Israeli Arms Quietly Helped Azerbaijan Retake Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Dismay of Region's Armenians

An Azerbaijani serviceman on patrol on Tuesday, Oct. 3, 2023, near Khankendi, Azerbaijan, also known as Stepanakert to Armenians. (AP Photo/Aziz Karimov)
An Azerbaijani serviceman on patrol on Tuesday, Oct. 3, 2023, near Khankendi, Azerbaijan, also known as Stepanakert to Armenians. (AP Photo/Aziz Karimov)
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Israeli Arms Quietly Helped Azerbaijan Retake Nagorno-Karabakh, to the Dismay of Region's Armenians

An Azerbaijani serviceman on patrol on Tuesday, Oct. 3, 2023, near Khankendi, Azerbaijan, also known as Stepanakert to Armenians. (AP Photo/Aziz Karimov)
An Azerbaijani serviceman on patrol on Tuesday, Oct. 3, 2023, near Khankendi, Azerbaijan, also known as Stepanakert to Armenians. (AP Photo/Aziz Karimov)

Israel has quietly helped fuel Azerbaijan’s campaign to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh, supplying powerful weapons to Azerbaijan ahead of its lightening offensive last month that brought the ethnic Armenian enclave back under its control, officials and experts say.
Just weeks before Azerbaijan launched its 24-hour assault on Sept. 19, Azerbaijani military cargo planes repeatedly flew between a southern Israeli airbase and an airfield near Nagorno-Karabakh, according to flight tracking data and Armenian diplomats, even as Western governments were urging peace talks.
The flights rattled Armenian officials in Yerevan, long wary of the strategic alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan, and shined a light on Israel’s national interests in the restive region south of the Caucasus Mountains, The Associated Press said.
“For us, it is a major concern that Israeli weapons have been firing at our people,” Arman Akopian, Armenia’s ambassador to Israel, told The Associated Press. In a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, Akopian said he expressed alarm to Israeli politicians and lawmakers in recent weeks over Israeli weapons shipments.
“I don’t see why Israel should not be in the position to express at least some concern about the fate of people being expelled from their homeland," he told AP.
Azerbaijan's September blitz involving heavy artillery, rocket launchers and drones — largely supplied by Israel and Turkey, according to experts — forced Armenian separatist authorities to lay down their weapons and sit down for talks on the future of the separatist region.
The Azerbaijani offensive killed over 200 Armenians in the enclave, the vast majority of them fighters, and some 200 Azerbaijani troops, according to officials.
There are ramifications beyond the volatile enclave of 4,400 square kilometers (1,700 square miles). The fighting prompted over 100,000 people — more than 80% of the enclave's ethnic Armenian residents — to flee in the last two weeks. Azerbaijan has pledged to respect the rights of ethnic Armenians. Armenia calls the exodus a form of ethnic cleansing.
Israel’s foreign and defense ministries declined to comment on the use of Israeli weapons in Nagorno-Karabakh or on Armenian concerns about its military partnership with Azerbaijan. In July, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited Baku, the Azerbaijan capital, where he praised the countries' military cooperation and joint “fight against terrorism.”
Israel has a big stake in Azerbaijan, which serves as a critical source of oil and is a staunch ally against Israel’s archenemy Iran. It is also a lucrative customer of sophisticated arms.
“There’s no doubt about our position in support of Azerbaijan’s defense,” said Israel's former ambassador to Azerbaijan, Arkady Milman. “We have a strategic partnership to contain Iran.”
Although once resource-poor Israel now has plenty of natural gas off its Mediterranean coast, Azerbaijan still supplies at least 40% of Israel's oil needs, keeping cars and trucks on its roads. Israel turned to Baku’s offshore deposits in the late 1990s, creating an oil pipeline through the Turkish transport hub of Ceyan that isolated Iran, which at the time capitalized on oil flowing through its pipelines from Kazakhstan to world markets.
Azerbaijan has long been suspicious of Iran, its fellow Shiite Muslim neighbor on the Caspian Sea, and chafed at its support for Armenia, which is Orthodox Christian. Iran has accused Azerbaijan of hosting a base for Israeli intelligence operations against it — a claim that Azerbaijan and Israel deny.
“It's clear to us that Israel has an interest in keeping a military presence in Azerbaijan, using its territory to observe Iran,” Armenian diplomat Tigran Balayan said.
Few have benefited more from the two countries' close relations than Israeli military contractors. Experts estimate Israel supplied Azerbaijan with nearly 70% of its arsenal between 2016 and 2020 — giving Azerbaijan an edge against Armenia and boosting Israel’s large defense industry.
“Israeli arms have played a very significant role in allowing the Azerbaijani army to reach its objectives,” said Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks arms sales.
Israeli long-range missiles and exploding drones known as loitering munitions have made up for Azerbaijan’s small air force, Wezeman said, even at times striking deep within Armenia itself. Meanwhile, Israeli Barak-8 surface-to-air missiles have protected Azerbaijan’s airspace in shooting down missiles and drones, he added.
Just ahead of last month's offensive, the Azerbaijani defense ministry announced the army conducted a missile test of Barak-8. Its developer, Israel Aerospace Industries, declined to comment on Azerbaijan's use of its air defense system and combat drones.
But Azerbaijan has raved about the success of Israeli drones in slicing through the Armenian defenses and tipping the balance in the bloody six-week war in 2020.
Its defense minister in 2016 called a combat drone manufactured by Israel’s Aeronautics Group “a nightmare for the Armenian army," which backed the region's separatists during Azerbaijan’s conflict with Nagorno-Karabakh that year.
President Ilham Aliyev in 2021 — a year of deadly Azerbaijan-Armenian border clashes — was captured on camera smiling as he stroked the small Israeli suicide drone “Harop” during an arms showcase.
Israel has deployed similar suicide drones during deadly army raids against Palestinian militants in the occupied West Bank.
“We’re glad for this cooperation, it was quite supportive and quite beneficial for defense,” Azerbaijani’s ambassador to Israel, Mukhtar Mammadov told the AP, speaking generally about Israel's support for the Azerbaijani military. “We’re not hiding it.”
At a crucial moment in early September — as diplomats scrambled to avert an escalation — flight tracking data shows that Azerbaijani cargo planes began to stream into Ovda, a military base in southern Israel with a 3,000-meter-long airstrip, known as the only airport in Israel that handles the export of explosives.
The AP identified at least six flights operated by Azerbaijan's Silk Way Airlines landing at Ovda airport between Sept. 1 and Sept. 17 from Baku, according to aviation-tracking website FlightRadar24.com. Azerbaijan launched its offensive two days later.
During those six days, the Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76 military transport lingered on Ovda's tarmac for several hours before departing for either Baku or Ganja, the country’s second-largest city, just north of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In March, an investigation by the Haaretz newspaper said it had counted 92 Azerbaijani military cargo flights to Ovda airport from 2016-2020. Sudden surges of flights coincided with upticks of fighting in Nagorno-Karabkh, it found.
“During the 2020 war, we saw flights every other day and now, again, we see this intensity of flights leading up to the current conflict,” said Akopian, the Armenian ambassador. “It is clear to us what’s happening.”
Israel's defense ministry declined to comment on the flights. The Azerbaijani ambassador, Mammadov, said he was aware of the reports but declined to comment.
The decision to support an autocratic government against an ethnic and religious minority has fueled a debate in Israel about the country's permissive arms export policies. Of the top 10 arms manufacturers globally, only Israel and Russia lack legal restrictions on weapons exports based on human rights concerns.
“If anyone can identify with (Nagorno-Karabakh) Armenians' continuing fear of ethnic cleansing it is the Jewish people," said Avidan Freedman, founder of the Israeli advocacy group Yanshoof, which seeks to stop Israeli arm sales to human rights violators. “We're not interested in becoming accomplices."



Mounting Pressure on Iran Revives the Specter of the 2000 Aden Attack

US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush
US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush
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Mounting Pressure on Iran Revives the Specter of the 2000 Aden Attack

US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush
US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush

US author Anne-Marie Slaughter argues in The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World that the world no longer operates or interacts according to the logic of a traditional chessboard.

The old model was linear and two-dimensional, centered on a single objective: toppling the king by controlling territory.

That logic no longer defines 21st-century conflict. Today’s world operates across overlapping, interlocking layers that interact and often collide simultaneously, within a continuously evolving network that includes military, economic, political, alliance, and informational dimensions.

As this network evolves, it generates both solutions and complications so rapidly that they outpace the ability of leadership to make timely decisions. Improvisation comes to dominate decision-making, errors multiply and accumulate, feeding back into the system and further deepening its complexity.

On the escalation ladder

Escalation depends on strategic flexibility and the tools available. In practical terms, the greater the flexibility, the greater the ability of actors to climb the escalation ladder, from low-intensity conflict to higher levels, until reaching a peak where one side yields, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.

But this climb is inherently a trap. Each step builds on the last. As these steps accumulate over time, the cost compounds, making it increasingly difficult to step back without incurring significant losses.

The US blockade

This is not the first time the US Navy has imposed a maritime blockade. The most notable case was Cuba in the 1960s during the Cuban Missile Crisis, labeled a “quarantine,” a term deliberately used to indicate a measure short of full wartime blockade. Cuba’s geography made it relatively easy to encircle.

A similar approach was later applied to Venezuela. Today, the focus has shifted to Iranian ports, both inside and outside the Gulf.

Direct comparisons are limited by differing contexts. Still, one constant remains: the US Navy possesses the capability to enforce such blockades, particularly given its dominance over global seas and oceans.

In Cuba, Soviet missiles targeted major US cities and the world was divided between two superpowers. In Venezuela, President Donald Trump invoked the Monroe Doctrine and implemented a national security strategy prioritizing the Western Hemisphere and America’s immediate sphere.

The Strait of Hormuz, however, is fundamentally different. Other waterways can be bypassed; Hormuz cannot. It is a closed corridor through which oil, gas, petrochemicals, helium, fertilizers, and other critical goods must pass. There is no alternative route; all shipments must transit Hormuz in both directions.

Iran’s strategy

Since the Shah’s era, aligned with the Nixon Doctrine, Tehran has pursued control over Gulf waters and influence over the Strait of Hormuz. The continued occupation of the UAE islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa since the 1970s underscores this long-standing strategic objective.

More than 30 islands are scattered across the Gulf’s deep waters, precisely along the routes used by oil tankers that require significant depth to pass safely. If linked together as part of a military-security network, they reveal long-term planning for scenarios such as the current one.

Iran’s naval doctrine relies on both the Revolutionary Guards and the regular navy, employing small submarines, torpedoes, fast attack boats, naval mines, drones, and ballistic missiles.

At its core lies an anti-access strategy designed to deny adversaries freedom of movement in Gulf waters.

Centers of gravity

Qeshm Island is critical for controlling access to the Strait of Hormuz. Kharg Island follows, serving as the hub for more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, supplied by the oil fields of Khuzestan.

Beyond the islands, the South Pars gas field in Bushehr province is central to Iran’s energy system, providing more than 70 percent of the country’s domestic electricity needs.

These key sites have already been targeted during the conflict by US or Israeli airpower. To expand the scope of escalation and increase pressure, Trump deployed additional forces, including Marine units and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, aimed at broadening military options and forcing Iran to soften its negotiating position. After talks in Pakistan failed, he moved to announce the blockade.

The current US approach

By declaring the blockade, Trump effectively altered the existing rules of engagement in the Gulf, imposing an asymmetric approach that avoids Iran’s strengths and prevents it from dictating the battlefield dynamics.

Instead, the US leverages distance, operating from the Arabian Sea, along with its technological superiority and strategic flexibility.

This effectively turns Iran’s own strategy against it. What once constrained US freedom of movement inside the Gulf is now being used to impose external pressure on Iran from the Arabian Sea.

If successful, the strategy could deprive Iran, according to The Wall Street Journal, of roughly $435 million per day, or $13 billion per month, while avoiding the costs of direct military action such as seizing islands like Kharg.

It would also confine Iran’s asymmetric capabilities within the Gulf and strip it of its most effective operational tools.

The central question now is how Iran will respond. How will it adapt its strategy in the face of this pressure? Will escalation continue? And could that escalation take the form of a maritime attack similar to the 2000 strike on the US destroyer USS Cole near Aden?


Iran Can Go up to Two Months without Oil Exports Before Cutting Output, Analysts Say

A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)
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Iran Can Go up to Two Months without Oil Exports Before Cutting Output, Analysts Say

A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)

Iran can withstand a complete halt in oil exports of up to two months before being forced to curb production, analysts said, after the US began blocking shipping in and out of the country's ports on April 13.

The blockade could prevent roughly 2 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian crude from reaching its main buyer China.

Any Iranian production shutdowns would add to more than 12 million bpd of supply already disrupted by the regional war, tightening markets further and ‌lifting oil ‌prices.

With its exports blocked, Iran faces having to ‌divert ⁠crude into onshore storage ⁠tanks. Once those tanks are filled, the OPEC member would be required to curb upstream output.

Consultancy FGE NextantECA estimates Iran has about 90 million barrels of available onshore crude storage capacity, out of total capacity of roughly 122 million barrels.

"Iran can sustain current production of around 3.5 million bpd for roughly two months without exports, extendable to around three months with a modest ⁠500,000 bpd production cut," FGE NextantECA said in a ‌note.

Iranian domestic refineries process about 2 million ‌bpd of oil, they added.

The relevant Iranian authorities were not immediately available for comment.

Energy ‌Aspects assumes significantly lower available onshore storage of about 30 million barrels, ‌based on data from Kayrros.

Under that scenario, Iran could maintain current export levels for about 16 days before storage capacity runs out, based on export levels of 1.8 million bpd.

"The blockade may not have a significant impact on Iranian production in ‌April, but if it continues into May then output would need to be reduced substantially," said Richard ⁠Bronze, co-founder of Energy ⁠Aspects.

He said the consultancy assumes Iran cannot utilize its full nameplate storage capacity, adding that historic data show stocks peaked at 92 million barrels in May 2020, which likely marks a realistic ceiling.

Bronze also said Iran will likely deploy available oil tankers in ports as floating storage, delaying production cuts.

The US military said more vessels were being turned back under the blockade, including the Chinese-owned tanker Rich Starry, which is under US sanctions and which was seen heading back through the Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday.

Eight Iran-linked oil tankers have been intercepted since the blockade began on Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported. A US destroyer stopped two tankers attempting to leave Iran's Chabahar port on the Gulf of Oman on Tuesday, a US official said.


World Bank Announces Water Security Plan for One Billion People

 A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)
A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)
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World Bank Announces Water Security Plan for One Billion People

 A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)
A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)

The World Bank announced a plan Wednesday that aims to improve secure water access for a billion people within the next four years.

The new "Water Forward" program aims to "expand reliable water services and strengthen systems against droughts and floods."

The Bank said its own funds and technical advice would help improve water supplies to some 400 million people by 2030, with the balance coming from partners.

Regional development banks, OPEC's development fund, and the BRICS-aligned New Development Bank are among institutions that will participate, the World Bank said.

The global lender did not specify how much capital it would commit to the initiative.

Some four billion people -- half the world's population -- face water scarcity, due in part to "unclear policies, weak regulations, and financially unsustainable utilities that have slowed progress and deterred investment," the Bank said.

The global lender said that 14 countries had already voluntarily committed to reform and strengthen their water sectors under the new program.

The focus on governance issues -- not simply physical water infrastructure -- is promising, David Michel, senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said.

"In many countries, the water sector fails to fully deploy the funds already allocated to it."

However, the Bank's initiative "faces a long and difficult road ahead," he warned.

The issue of access to safe drinking water, in particular, has been highlighted during the war in the Middle East, with desalination plants in Iran and across the region damaged in bombardments.

Beyond conflicts and immediate drinking water needs, the World Bank said that better water security was needed to grow the global economy.

"Strong water systems are foundational to healthy economies that can attract private investment and create jobs," the Bank said.