Questions have been raised about Iran’s strategy in the region as Israel intensified its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon after it killed the party’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, one of Tehan’s most important allies in its Axis of Resistance.
Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli raid on Beirut’s southern suburbs on Friday. An Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) deputy commander, Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, was also killed in the attack.
Nasrallah’s death was another major blow to Iran’s regional strategy. Its biggest blow was in January 2020 when the US killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport. Soleimani was the mastermind of Iran’s foreign operations.
The country had never really recovered from his death, in terms of regional or internal strategy, even though it tried to paint a different picture under the term of late President Ebrahim Raisi and especially after the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation by Hamas in Gaza.
Raisi’s Iran tried to demonstrate that it had a cohesive regional policy, whether in terms of supporting the activities of the Axis of Resistance or improving relations with neighbors.
Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president after Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash in May. He seemed to adopt a different approach than his predecessor by demonstrating an openness to working with the West. This approach was confirmed when he formed his foreign policy team which included members of the delegation that succeeded in striking the 2015 nuclear deal with the West that led to the suspension of sanctions on Iran.
Going forward, Pezeshkian will have to face major challenges if he wants to lift more sanctions off his country or ease tensions with European powers, especially if Donald Trump were to be elected president of the United States in November.
Trump may restore his maximum pressure on Tehran if it refuses his conditions to reach a new nuclear deal that would include changes to its behavior in the region and limit its ballistic missile and drone program.
At any rate, Iran’s nuclear file will be at the top of priorities in any talks between it and the West, regardless of who wins the American elections on November 5.
Other challenges in the past year included the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July hours after he attended Pezeshkian’s swearing in ceremony.
The assassination cast a shadow on the new president’s term amid fears that the IRGC would carry out a strike in retaliation to the killing. Ultimately, the Guard did not carry out any major response, leaving Tehran’s supporters somewhat disappointed.
Pezeshkian said in New York last week that the retaliation would have impacted negotiations to reach a ceasefire in Gaza and that Iran had come under pressure to show restraint. He was criticized inside Iran for saying that Tehran wanted to ease the regional tensions, including with Israel.
The Iranian government fears that any new confrontation between Iran and Israel would fuel Trump’s chances of winning the election, which is something Tehran wants to avoid. Trump had approved Soleimani’s killing and pulled the US out of the nuclear deal, imposing new sanctions against Tehran in the process.
With Nasrallah’s assassination last week, what will the IRGC do to avenge the killing of one of Iran’s top allies? Iranian government officials warned Pezeshkian against falling into Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “trap” to drag his country to war.
The IRGC boasts major economic, political and cultural influence in Iran and it is relying on its proxy war in the region without having to embroil Iran in a direct confrontation with its foes.
So, the most likely is option is that Iran will mobilize its proxies on several fronts to retaliate against Israel for the latest blow it has been dealt.
The second option is the IRGC launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones against Israel just to save face.
The decision to avenge Nasrallah and Nilforoushan’s killing will be taken at the highest levels, said vice president for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, a reference to the Supreme National Security Council, whose decisions are approved by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Failure to retaliate against the killings will cast doubt among the IRGC’s supporters about its ability to act in times of crises.
The third option could see the IRGC carry out a wide rocket attack against Israeli facilities and infrastructure. This is unlikely with the US elections around the corner and because such an attack could lead to an American attack on Iran, possibly on its nuclear facilities. Moreover, the Iranian people are strongly opposed to the idea of Iran being dragged to a destructive war.
The fourth option would see Iran getting involved in a limited confrontation with Israel in an attempt to justify why it needs strategic deterrence weapons, such as ballistic missiles. Such a move would effectively allow Iran to alter its nuclear program and lead it to produce nuclear weapons.
