Moscow’s ‘Tactical’ Retreat in Syria, Shift in Priorities

A billboard in the streets of Damascus for President Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2022. (Reuters)
A billboard in the streets of Damascus for President Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2022. (Reuters)
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Moscow’s ‘Tactical’ Retreat in Syria, Shift in Priorities

A billboard in the streets of Damascus for President Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2022. (Reuters)
A billboard in the streets of Damascus for President Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2022. (Reuters)

The recent successive withdrawals of Russian military forces from observation points near the frontlines with the occupied Syrian Golan have raised questions about Russia’s positioning in the context of the escalating confrontation in Lebanon, which has quickly spilled over into Syrian territory. These withdrawals also prompt inquiries about Russia’s priorities in the coming phase regarding the anticipated developments, particularly in light of what Israel and the United States call the “rearrangement of the regional situation and the curbing of Iranian influence in the region.”
In recent days, reports have surfaced of Russian military forces unexpectedly evacuating sites described by Israeli sources as strategic. One of the most notable locations was an observation point on Tel al-Hara in northern Daraa province, followed by similar withdrawals from Tel al-Shaar and Tel Mashara in the Quneitra countryside. Russian forces collected their equipment and took down their flag before departing.
It is now evident that the Russian move followed military activities by Israeli forces a few days earlier near the border between Quneitra province and the occupied Syrian Golan.
These movements involved the deployment of a significant number of Israeli tanks and military vehicles in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. Additionally, over recent months, Israel has been opening pathways in the Syrian Golan and detonating minefields near the ceasefire line multiple times, coinciding with increasing strikes within Syrian territory and reports from the Israeli side about the arrival of elite Iranian militia forces in southern Syria.
Moscow had previously established 17 military observation points in the area and patrolled the frontlines to maintain de-escalation between Hezbollah forces and Israel. Thus, the current withdrawals leave the region vulnerable to further escalation.
This indicates that Moscow is unwilling to engage in confrontation or keep its forces in the line of fire. It also appears unable to stop the ongoing deterioration.
Two hypotheses have emerged to explain these successive Russian withdrawals. The first suggests that Moscow received a warning from Israel about upcoming military operations in the region and that Israeli forces intend to target Hezbollah positions and other Iran-backed militias. The second hypothesis, which comes from Russian diplomats speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, claims that Russia is not yielding to Israeli threats and that these withdrawals do not signal a green light for Israel to expand its operations in Syria. On the contrary, the move might aim to give Iran and its allied groups more room for military engagement against Israel.
In both cases, Moscow seems to prefer distancing its forces from potential developments. Some estimates suggest that Russian forces will continue to withdraw from observation points in areas experiencing heightened tensions. However, these “tactical withdrawals,” as described by Russian observers, do not indicate that Russia is planning more drastic actions. Instead, the increased significance of Russia’s military presence in Syria, in light of its escalating confrontation with the West, shows that Moscow is unlikely to reassess its strategic presence in the region in the near future, according to a Russian analyst who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.
This analysis, however, depends on the nature of future developments, particularly regarding Israel’s potential plans to expand its operations in Syria.
The Kremlin’s warnings on Thursday pointed to the possibility of wider deterioration in Syria. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that any potential expansion of Israel’s military actions in Syria could have catastrophic consequences for the Middle East. However, he refrained from answering questions about Russia’s potential response should Israel launch a ground offensive in Syria to pursue Iranian and Hezbollah forces. He only remarked that it is “not appropriate to speculate on future developments at this time.”
Simultaneously, Moscow appears to have escalated its rhetoric criticizing Israeli military actions in Syria. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s angry response, describing recent Israeli strikes as an “aggression targeting civilians and a blatant violation of international laws,” marked a significant shift in Russia’s tone.
Commonly recognized is the fact that Moscow began reducing its forces in Syria in the summer of 2022, a few months after the war in Ukraine began. At that time, Russia provided extensive support to Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias in Syria, including facilitating the transfer of weapons and equipment to these groups after Syrian airports under Iranian control were bombed. Moscow also turned a blind eye to Hezbollah’s redeployment in southern Syria, despite this violating a previous agreement that required Hezbollah and its allies to stay 80 kilometers away from the Golan.
Russia has withdrawn thousands of soldiers and officers, moving them to Ukraine, where the front is more pressing and crucial at this time. Russian military circles explained this move by stating that Russian ground forces no longer have specific missions in Syria after accomplishing their main task of fighting terrorism and reinforcing the Syrian government’s control.
However, reducing the number of troops does not mean Moscow is deprioritizing Syria. According to a military analyst, the strategic importance of Russian air and long-range capabilities has grown beyond Syria’s borders, reflecting Russia’s broader interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.
This reassessment of priorities predates the Gaza conflict, which has now spread to Lebanon and is seriously threatening Syria. It’s important to recall President Vladimir Putin’s remarks roughly two months ago when he warned, during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Moscow, that the region was on the brink of very dangerous developments, with Syria not exempt from them.
Experts note that Moscow values its strategic military presence in Syria, but seeks to maintain it at minimal cost. Last year, Putin said that Russian forces’ presence in Syria is “temporary and will continue as long as it serves Russia’s interests in this vital region, which is very close to us.” He emphasized that Moscow is not planning to withdraw these units from Syria yet.
However, it was notable that Putin referred to Russian deployments in Syria as “points” rather than “bases,” indicating that Moscow is not constructing long-term structures there. He added that Russia could withdraw its military personnel “quickly and without material losses” if necessary.
Experts believe that Putin’s remarks precisely define the levels of Russian engagement should the situation worsen, particularly if Russian forces lose their strategic advantage in Syria. Nevertheless, according to some experts, Moscow is likely to continue complicating the situation for Washington by supporting the escalation of various forces against US interests in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq. This could also apply to Israel’s actions in and around Syria in the coming phase.
According to analysts, this policy will persist until Moscow formulates new strategies based on how the situation evolves.



US Still Believes Iran Has Not Decided to Build a Nuclear Weapon

This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's nuclear site in Isfahan, Iran, April 4, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's nuclear site in Isfahan, Iran, April 4, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
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US Still Believes Iran Has Not Decided to Build a Nuclear Weapon

This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's nuclear site in Isfahan, Iran, April 4, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows Iran's nuclear site in Isfahan, Iran, April 4, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)

The United States still believes that Iran has not decided to build a nuclear weapon despite Tehran's recent strategic setbacks, including Israel's killing of Hezbollah leaders and two largely unsuccessful attempts to attack Israel, two US officials told Reuters.
The comments from a senior Biden administration official and a spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) added to public remarks earlier this week by CIA Director William Burns, who said the United States had not seen any evidence Iran's leader had reversed his 2003 decision to suspend the weaponization program.
"We assess that the Supreme Leader has not made a decision to resume the nuclear weapons program that Iran suspended in 2003," said the ODNI spokesperson, referring to Iran's leader Ali Khamenei.
The intelligence assessment could help explain US opposition to any Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear program in retaliation for a ballistic missile attack that Tehran carried out last week.
President Joe Biden said after that attack he would not support an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites, but did not explain why he had reached that conclusion. His remarks drew fierce criticism from Republicans, including former President Donald Trump.
US officials have long acknowledged that an attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear weapons program might only delay the country's efforts to develop a nuclear bomb and could even strengthen Tehran's resolve to do so.
"We're all watching this space very carefully," the Biden administration official said.
Iran's mission to the United Nations in New York did not immediately respond to a request for comment but Tehran has repeatedly denied ever having had a nuclear weapons program.
KEY IRAN ALLY WEAKENED
In the past weeks, Israel's military has inflicted heavy losses on Hezbollah, the most powerful member of the Iran-backed network known as the Axis of Resistance. The group's setbacks have included the killing of its leader Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli airstrike last month.
The weakening of a key Iranian ally has prompted some experts to speculate that Tehran may restart its efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb to protect itself.
Beth Sanner, a former US deputy director of national intelligence, said the risk of Khamenei reversing his 2003 religious dictum against nuclear weapons is "higher now than it has been" and that if Israel were to strike nuclear facilities Tehran would likely move ahead with building a nuclear weapon.
That would still take time, however.
"They can't get a weapon in a day. It will take months and months and months," said Sanner, now a fellow with the German Marshall Fund.
Iran is now enriching uranium to up to 60% fissile purity, close to the 90% of weapons grade, at two sites, and in theory it has enough material enriched to that level, if enriched further, for almost four bombs, according to a yardstick of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN watchdog.
The expansion in Iran's enrichment program has reduced the so-called breakout time it would need to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb to "a week or a little more," according to Burns, from more than a year under a 2015 accord that Trump pulled out of when president.
Actually making a bomb with that material would take longer. How long is less clear and the subject of debate.
POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK
Israel has not yet disclosed what it will target in retaliation for Iran's attack last week with more than 180 ballistic missiles, which largely failed thanks to interceptions by Israeli air defenses as well as by the US military.
The United States has been privately urging Israel to calibrate its response to avoid triggering a broader war in the Middle East, officials say, with Biden publicly voicing his opposition to a nuclear attack and concerns about a strike on Iran's energy infrastructure.
Israel, however, views Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat.
The conflicts in the Middle East between Israel and Iran and Iran-backed groups in Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen have become campaign issues ahead of the Nov. 5 presidential election, with Trump and his Democratic rival, Vice President Kamala Harris, positioning themselves as pro-Israel.
Speaking at a campaign event last week, Trump mocked Biden for opposing an attack on Iran's nuclear sites, saying: "That's the thing you wanna hit, right?"
Avi Melamed, a former Israeli intelligence officer and government official, said Iran still had space to compensate for setbacks dealt to its proxies and missile force without having to resort to developing a nuclear warhead.
"The Iranians have to recalculate what's next. I don't think at this point they will rush to either develop or boost the (nuclear) program toward military capacity," he said.
"They will look around to find what maneuvering space they can move around in."