BDL Acting Governor: I Will Not Use People’s Deposits to Lend to the State

Wassim Mansouri, Acting Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank (BDL), speaks during a press conference. (AP)
Wassim Mansouri, Acting Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank (BDL), speaks during a press conference. (AP)
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BDL Acting Governor: I Will Not Use People’s Deposits to Lend to the State

Wassim Mansouri, Acting Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank (BDL), speaks during a press conference. (AP)
Wassim Mansouri, Acting Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank (BDL), speaks during a press conference. (AP)

It may not be fair to compare the 30 years that the former Governor of the Banque du Liban (BDL), Riad Salameh, spent in managing the country’s financial policy, with the 30 days that his deputy, Wassim Mansouri, spent in the post.

The Lebanese political forces announced their inability to appoint a successor for Salameh, who faces judicial procedures in Lebanon and Europe, as well as US sanctions, all of which pertain to his management of financial files.

But Mansouri, who came to the world of finance from a legal background, quickly began to “eradicate” the financial policies of the former governor.

He was faced with the test of controlling the exchange rate of the lira against the dollar, which seemed to have succeeded to a significant extent, with a remarkable note related to the transparency of the numbers that began to appear in the bank’s semi-monthly statements.

Contrary to warnings that the Lebanese currency would sharply collapse after Salameh’s departure, Mansouri was able to control the exchange rate. But this success is temporary and needs to be supported by governmental and parliamentary measures that contribute to restoring balance to the state’s public finances.

Mansouri is currently working on completing a new, “more transparent” platform for currency transfer. Many are optimistic about the external response to his policies, the most expressive of which is the return of many correspondent banks to dealing with the BDL, including Citibank and Morgan Stanley.

Mansouri's first measures were against the Lebanese state, which was initially scooping money from the BDL, then from its cash reserves belonging to depositors in Lebanese banks, which caused a major financial collapse in late 2019 from which the country has not emerged until today.

In the first press conference, which Mansouri held a day before the end of Salameh’s term, he said that he was ready to give the state a grace period, so as not to cut off funding for it permanently. He proposed providing the state with its last loan for 3 or 6 months, within a defined mechanism. However, the government and political forces failed to issue the relevant laws, pushing the acting governor to resort to an alternative plan.

This month, the central bank paid public sector salaries in dollars by purchasing dollars from the market with Lebanese pounds transferred by the government for this purpose. Thus, the BDL did not print additional money, nor was it later forced to withdraw reserve funds to restore calm to the market, as was happening previously.

The idea was to cover the deficit, on the basis of giving the government time to obtain funds from the IMF or any other source suggested by the state, while the BDL ensured financial order in exchange for securing reform laws and guarantees for the depositor.

But Mansouri asserted that as long as all these demands are not met, he would not lend to anyone.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that there was absolutely no return to the time of state funding, “because I am seeking to restore order to the state’s finances.”

“This decision is crucial and not easy, but I will not back down from it,” he said.

He went further by stressing that even if a law on borrowing was passed in Parliament, and there were no reform laws in return for it, “I will not release the money.”

“No law obliges me to pay,” he said. “There is a law that allows me to use people’s deposits to lend to the state, but... I refuse to use it for a simple reason because if it is not accompanied by reforms, it will be thrown into the air.”

In fact, it is not possible to restore order to the state’s finances without relying on external sources of financing. The problem is that in the past, the state relied on BDL funds in foreign currencies to cover the budget deficit.

The biggest problem is that the size of the credit was so large that it depleted the central bank’s hard currency reserves, reaching the people’s deposits.

The state’s general budget for 2023, up to this point, has come out with a declared deficit of LBP 46 trillion, or $500 million. Mansouri believes that the deficit will exceed this amount.

The acting governor’s visitors quote him as saying that this deficit must be covered, within the framework of a new law and a reform program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Cash economy and its risks:

Since the beginning of the crisis and the freezing of depositors’ funds in banks, the Lebanese people have lost confidence in this sector and moved towards a cash economy that involves many risks.

Mansouri told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The cash economy that the country is experiencing cannot and must not continue. The central bank cannot keep buying dollars from the market indefinitely. It must verify all of its sources. In the end, the cash economy will destroy the country. We need help. But if we don’t help ourselves, who will help us?”

In an attempt to get out of this crisis, the BDL issued Circular No. 165, which allowed the opening of “fresh” accounts in dollars and pounds, to transfer the parallel market to the banking sector, allowing the bank to monitor and confirm the source of funds in the country and activate anti-money laundering procedures.

But if no radical legal solutions are implemented to allow the banking sector to work effectively, it will remain hostage to the cash economy.

All matters are interconnected. Mansouri said: “If reform laws are implemented and state finances are regulated, the depositors will know how and when they will receive their money. Thus, confidence in the banks will be restored, which will encourage people to return part of their money to the banks, allowing the central bank, as a regulator of the banking sector, to set stronger regulations to limit the cash economy.”

Foreign Relations

Mansouri underlined that Lebanon cannot thrive and develop without relations with its Arab and Gulf surroundings.

He tells his visitors: “Friendly countries call on us to find a political solution, and they will support us. This file is not in my hands, but it is my duty to call on them to implement the laws related to currency and reforms to rebuild the economy... I think that if this sector is rebuilt, the rest will be solved.”

New platform

Among Mansouri’s various policies is the suspension of work on the Sayrafa platform, and the implementation of a new transparent mechanism, in cooperation with Bloomberg.

The new trading platform will be an item at Wednesday's Cabinet meeting for approval.

The acting governor confirmed that from a monetary standpoint and the size of the monetary mass in lira, it can be said that the exchange rate is controlled in the foreseeable future.

“As long as I control the monetary supply at the central bank, there is no fear of a fluctuation in the dollar exchange rate,” he remarked.

Mansouri’s measures to control the currency began with refraining from “excessive buying of dollars from the market, in exchange for reducing the size of the monetary supply,” which decreased from LBP 80 trillion to LBP 60 trillion on the first of August (about half a billion dollars).

The BDL also asked banks not to disburse more than LBP 50 billion per day to their customers. As for the Ministry of Finance, it does not pump liras into the market before coordinating with the central bank, noting that the minister has collected about LBP 20 trillion liras in August, including more than LBP 11 trillion in cash.

But can the government manage its affairs with the amount secured by the BDL? Mansouri replied: “Here lies the big question. If we don’t achieve reforms, we cannot maintain this situation with students returning to school and the supply of dollars in the market declining.”

He stressed, however, that the monetary situation was controlled on scientific foundations.

“What I use are traditional monetary means that do not cost the central bank a single cent, and perhaps this makes a big difference compared to what was happening before,” he noted.

In response to accusations thrown at Mansouri and the rest of the governor’s deputies, about their involvement in Salameh’s previous policies, he said that the deliberations of the BDL’s Central Council members clearly show that they were protesting against much of the spending taking place. But the law gives the governor executive authority. Thus, lending to the state continued despite their disapproval of the policies.



Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
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Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)

A hundred days after Ahmed al-Sharaa was sworn in as Syria’s president, US officials are still proceeding with caution regarding his administration. There are concerns about the potential for chaos, which could create fertile ground for extremist groups and allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the country.

Additionally, there are growing anxieties over Türkiye’s expanding influence across Syria and its implications for Israel.

These points were highlighted in discussions with Robert Wood, a former US ambassador who held various positions at the State Department and served at the US Mission to the United Nations; Robert Ford, former US ambassador to Syria; Henri Barkey, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former government official; and Ayman Abdel Nour, a Syrian-American political analyst and journalist.

While caution is urged in evaluating al-Sharaa’s leadership, it remains unclear whether his actions will translate into meaningful governance.

According to Wood, the current situation in Syria can be described as highly complex, especially considering recent violence, and experts are watching closely to see how al-Sharaa navigates these challenges. While his hosting of a national unity conference has drawn some positive attention, concerns remain about the broader implications of his leadership.

Ford shares a similar perspective, acknowledging that Shara's actions often align with what one would expect from a head of state. Notably, his agreement with Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is seen as a potential step toward greater internal stability, provided it is properly implemented.

However, Barkey emphasizes that Abdi controls a much larger force than other groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which likely made it necessary for al-Sharaa to strike a deal with him. If Abdi forms alliances with other minority groups, such as the Druze, he could become a key figure of opposition to al-Sharaa’s rule. Additionally, al-Sharaa faces the challenge of reducing his reliance on Turkish support, while also proving his ability to act independently on the international stage.

US diplomats, however, remained cautious about al-Sharaa's leadership, with some expressing skepticism about his ability to lead effectively. While he appears to be acting presidentially, concerns persist regarding his control over extremist factions within his government, as well as recent security violations in Latakia and Tartus. Experts note that despite his ascent to power, Sharaa has yet to unite the country, with some pointing to the collapse of the regime’s military as a key factor in his rise.

A significant point of criticism from Barkey is al-Sharaa’s appointment of former jihadists as governors in key areas, including Latakia and Tartus, as well as his reliance on family members and loyalists within his government.

While some US officials argue that Sharaa’s government may not be directly involved in recent incidents, uncertainty remains about who in his administration might be complicit.

For his part, Abdel Nour highlights a shift in public perception of al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Initially, Syrians—including Alawites—were relieved by Assad's ousting, but nearly 100 days into Sharaa's presidency, tensions have risen due to discrepancies between al-Sharaa’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground, particularly in relation to key figures like Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and mid-level officials.

Key Questions Raised on Accountability and Rule of Law

Ford echoed concerns about al-Sharaa’s ability to address critical issues, including accountability and the rule of law, especially following the unrest in Latakia and Tartus.

Despite al-Sharaa’s formation of a committee to investigate the incidents, Ford questions whether those responsible for violations will be held publicly accountable, stressing that such actions are crucial for maintaining trust within security forces and the broader public.

Wood acknowledged the significance of al-Sharaa’s national unity conference yet remains deeply concerned about the potential agreements Sharaa may strike with the SDF. While he sees positive signs, he underscores the importance of thorough investigations into recent killings, as the identities of those responsible remain unclear.

US Perspectives on al-Sharaa’s Leadership

Abdel Nour describes two prevalent perspectives in Washington regarding al-Sharaa’s leadership. One, held by military and security figures with experience in Iraq, doubts that the new Syrian leadership will bring significant change, regardless of its outward appearance. The other viewpoint suggests giving al-Sharaa several months to adjust to the new reality.

Fears Over ISIS Prisoners and Regional Stability

A significant concern raised by Wood is the potential release of approximately 9,500 ISIS fighters currently held in over 20 prisons across Syria, should Sharaa reach a deal with the SDF. These fighters could pose a serious security threat not only to Syria but to Iraq and the broader region.

Ford added that al-Sharaa’s past, particularly his involvement with jihadist factions like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, raises questions about his true political motivations. Ford wonders whether al-Sharaa used these groups for political leverage.

Iran’s Influence and Regional Dynamics

Both Wood and Ford emphasize the importance of monitoring Iran’s role in Syria. Ford warns that further instability could provide Iran with opportunities to rebuild its influence in certain Syrian communities, which he believes would not align with US national security interests.

Wood stresses that neighboring countries, including Israel and Türkiye, have a strong interest in a unified Syria to avoid further regional instability.

Professor Barkey cautions that while Iran's influence in Syria has not been eliminated, Tehran will likely continue to pursue ways to reassert its presence.

Türkiye-Israel Tensions and the Future of Syria

Concerns over a potential Turkish-Israeli confrontation in Syria are growing. Ford points out that Türkiye, a key player with growing ties to al-Sharaa’s government, could play a significant role in Syria’s future. He worries that a direct conflict between Turkish and Israeli forces, potentially involving airstrikes or proxy engagements, could escalate tensions in the region.

However, Barkey believes that such a scenario is unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation. Instead, he suggests that the Turkish-Israeli rivalry will remain largely political, with both countries focusing on strategic interests in the region, particularly in Syria’s south where Israel is concerned about the resurgence of Hezbollah or other new actors.

In discussions surrounding Syria’s new constitution, Ford sees little value in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee led by UN Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen. Similarly, Barkey shares Ford’s skepticism, noting that he sees limited potential for the UN to bring about meaningful change unless Arab countries step in with support.

Barkey also echoes the view held by many that US President Donald Trump was unpredictable in his decision-making. He added that Trump had a deep admiration, though not fascination, for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, viewing him as one of the “strongmen” capable of shaping the future of their countries as they see fit.

Looking ahead, Barkey remains uncertain about Syria’s future, acknowledging that the situation is highly unpredictable. He suggests that if Syria were to experience another war or a severe collapse of law and order, it is highly probable that ISIS could resurge.

The US government, Barkey speculates, is likely deeply concerned that without American forces acting as a buffer or deterrent, the stability of the region could be further jeopardized in the event of a breakdown in Syria.