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Iraqi Parliament 2025: New Map for Shiite Seats, Sudani Set to Win Sizable Share

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is seen at Davos in January. (AFP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is seen at Davos in January. (AFP)
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Iraqi Parliament 2025: New Map for Shiite Seats, Sudani Set to Win Sizable Share

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is seen at Davos in January. (AFP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is seen at Davos in January. (AFP)

The ruling coalition in Iraq has started drawing up the political scene that will be established from the upcoming parliamentary elections, three sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Asharq Al-Awsat received a copy of a study, completed by the ruling Coordination Framework alliance, that showed that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will emerge with a powerful coalition that makes up a third of Shiite seats in parliament.

The elections are expected to be held in 2025, but no official date has been set for them yet.

The Framework based its study on the results of the provincial elections that were held in October, a source, who had taken part in the study, told Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity.

The coalition now views Sudani as a potential rival and heavyweight in the Shiite political scene, said another source.

The PM is expected to win some 60 seats in the elections, even though he had not taken part in the October polls, it noted.

The study acknowledged that Sudani had in recent months forged “flexible” alliances with Shiite powers. The source said the Framework had not fully understood his ability to form such alliances given the deep rivalry between the parties that make up the coalition.

Sudani has effectively emerged as a figure to reckon with in the Shiite equation and could emerge as a stronger player in parliament after next year’s elections, said the source.

Sudani’s new alliance

The study said Sudani’s new alliance includes three provincial governors who had emerged victorious in the October elections. It also includes rising Shiite forces and other traditional ones.

The study identified the three figures as Basra Governor Asaad al-Eidani, Karbala Governor Nassif al-Khattabi and Wasit Governor Mohammed al-Mayahi.

The Framework had tried and failed to form alliances that would have prevented the winning governors from renewing their terms at the heads of local governments in their cities.

The governors have since distanced themselves from the Framework, revealed the sources.

A third source said Sudani’s other allies are comprised of political forces that emerged from the October 2019 popular protests, rising local forces that are not represented in parliament, and traditional parties that are close to Iran and that have achieved noticeable results in the elections, such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and al-Fadila party.

In total, these powers won 25 seats in the provincial elections.

The three sources predicted that Sudani alone will win some ten seats, while his allies would win 60 in the parliamentary elections, reaping more than a third of the 180 Shiite seats, according to Framework estimates.

New Shiite shift

The source said the political map drawn by the study showed to Framework leaders that they would be confronted with a new shift in the Shiite equation in Iraq that could even lead to the breakup of the coalition itself and form a new equation altogether.

The study predicted that former PM Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition is set to gain 25 seats in the parliamentary elections, Ammar al-Hakim's Hikma movement and former PM Haidar al-Abadi's Nasr coalition 21, and leader of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq party Qais al-Khazali and leader of the Badr organization Hadi al-Ameri 24, while the remaining seats will be won by other Shiite forces.

The study ruled out the possibility of the Sadrist movement, led by influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, winning more than 70 seats in the elections, should he decide to take part in the vote. Sadr quit political life in 2022. He had won over 70 seats in the 2021 elections.

The Framework expects Sadr to win 60 seats “at best”, said the sources. They noted that Sadr was no longer the sole figure in Iraq with the ability to mobilize the masses. Maliki and others had decided to adopt this approach since the provincial elections.

Alarming figures

On Sudani’s political future, the sources stated that the number of seats the PM could win as revealed by the study have alarmed the Framework.

They predicted that the premier could be offered another term in office in return for withdrawing from the polls and perhaps allowing his allies to run uncontested so that they could rejoin the Framework.

Sudani did not run in the local elections to avoid a clash with the Framework. The PM is the leader of the Al-Furatayn party that he founded in 2019 after splitting with Maliki’s State of Law coalition in wake of the popular protests that erupted late that year.

The leaders of the Framework are seriously dealing with the outcomes of the study. It remains to be seen how it will deal with Sudani’s chances in the parliamentary elections and if Iran will not object to the suggestion to offer him a second term as PM, said the sources.

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Kurdish Silence over Negotiations Paves Way for Conflict in Syria

Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).
Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).
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Kurdish Silence over Negotiations Paves Way for Conflict in Syria

Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).
Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are facing limited options as they grapple with increasing pressure from Türkiye and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to disarm and transition into a political entity.
At the same time, the SDF is dealing with tensions involving rival Kurdish factions, raising fears of a potential escalation into armed conflict. Clashes are already threatening a fragile ceasefire in northeastern Syria.
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the balance of power in Syria has shifted significantly. Today, the SDF is facing an existential threat, despite US efforts to buy time and mediate agreements between the SDF and other actors in Syria.
Interviews conducted by Asharq Al-Awsat reveal that the SDF has so far failed to establish a negotiation channel with HTS or its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, who now heads the transitional government in Damascus.
Recently, SDF envoys were sent to Damascus in an attempt to hold meetings with members of the transitional government, but they were unsuccessful. These efforts have led the SDF to the conclusion that HTS has become the “de facto authority” in Syria.
A source involved in the transitional process told Asharq Al-Awsat that communication between the SDF and HTS was abruptly halted following the visit of Ibrahim Kalin, Türkiye’s intelligence chief, to Damascus on December 12, 2024. Before this, the contact between the two parties was reportedly exploratory in nature.
Sources close to the SDF believe that Ankara pressured the transitional government in Damascus to avoid engaging with the Kurdish faction, likely anticipating a policy shift when Donald Trump assumes the US presidency in January 2025. Türkiye appears determined to block the Biden administration’s attempts to normalize the SDF’s status, assuming that Trump will prioritize regional players—particularly Türkiye—in Syria.
A member of the Syrian transitional government confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that a short-term ceasefire was recently agreed upon between the SDF and other conflicting parties in areas such as Manbij, Kobani, and others. However, he warned that the situation remains precarious, with fears that fighting could erupt at any moment. He added that HTS is seeking to disarm the SDF peacefully, noting that HTS itself is expected to lay down its weapons within the next two months as part of ongoing arrangements to form a unified Syrian army. The source emphasized that the SDF must follow suit.
Syrian activists warn that the issue of disarmament is likely to become a major flashpoint in Syria, not only with the SDF but also with other factions reluctant to surrender their weapons to either HTS or the still-forming Syrian state.
Clashes of varying intensity have already been reported in areas of contact between the SDF and the Turkish-backed National Army. Field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that skirmishes have occurred in Manbij, near the Tishrin Dam, in Tall Tamr, and at various points along the M4 highway.
Ankara has increased its pressure on the SDF to disarm. On December 19, the Turkish Ministry of Defense reiterated its commitment to “taking measures to force terrorist organizations to lay down their weapons.”
Members of the SDF fear that the current escalation, coupled with the absence of political dialogue with the new Damascus government, could lead to major clashes, particularly in Kobani. Kurdish sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the SDF is willing to make concessions to Türkiye, such as maintaining only its internal security forces, known as Asayish, in Kobani.
In northeastern Syria, two key international players are actively involved: France and the United States. France is working to unify Kurdish factions under a proposed framework, while the US is focused on extending the fragile ceasefire until a regional agreement can determine the SDF’s role in the new political order.
An earlier US-brokered agreement allowed the SDF to retain positions east of the Euphrates while ceding areas west of the river to Arab tribes. However, reports suggest that the SDF has withdrawn from some areas due to pressure from Arab tribes.
French delegations have visited SDF-controlled areas to encourage Kurdish factions to draft a unified agreement. On December 18, representatives from the SDF, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), and self-described “independent” Kurdish groups met to negotiate. However, according to sources in Hasakah, Qamishli, and Erbil (in Iraqi Kurdistan), the meeting failed to yield an initial agreement.
Kurdish activists have proposed three key measures for aligning the SDF with the new phase in Syria: renaming the SDF as a military force under the new Ministry of Defense, severing ties with Qandil (northern Iraq) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and repatriating non-Syrian Kurdish fighters to their home countries.
However, the SDF reportedly opposes these conditions, preferring to negotiate directly with Türkiye or HTS rather than make concessions to other Kurdish factions within Syria. This stance could lead to internal conflicts over which group will represent Kurdish interests in the evolving Syrian political landscape.
When asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about potential dialogues with the KNC or their proposals, SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami declined to comment.
Members of the factions now in power in Damascus suggest that the SDF’s challenges extend beyond disarmament. One issue is its prior alignment with the ousted Assad regime, which undermines its position in the transitional phase.
A senior Kurdish official in Iraq, speaking anonymously, noted that the SDF’s options have significantly diminished following the withdrawal of Shiite factions and the defection of Arab allies from its ranks. These developments have reduced the SDF’s territorial control.
The official argued that while the SDF continues to rely on US support, Türkiye has become the dominant player in the Syrian arena. Many Kurds fear that escalating tensions in northeastern Syria could result in infighting among Kurdish groups, particularly as they struggle to find a unified approach.
Although Ankara appears poised to make further moves into Kurdish areas, such actions would likely provoke a direct challenge to US interests in the region.