Crisis in French-Algerian Relations Opens the Door to the Unknown

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and French President Emmanuel Macron (Algerian Presidency)
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and French President Emmanuel Macron (Algerian Presidency)
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Crisis in French-Algerian Relations Opens the Door to the Unknown

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and French President Emmanuel Macron (Algerian Presidency)
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and French President Emmanuel Macron (Algerian Presidency)

Three questions are raised by the decision of French President Emmanuel Macron to adopt the Moroccan approach to the Sahara issue, which is included in the Rabat Plan proposed in 2007: the first is the timing, the second is the reasons and motivations, and the third is the consequences and results.
Macron, along with French diplomacy, are aware of how sensitive the Sahara issue is to Algeria, and they know that the Algerian side will not be able to absorb the radical change in the French position.
French political sources said that the French president wanted to achieve two goals: the first is to take advantage of the occasion of Morocco’s celebration of the ascension of King Mohammed VI to the throne “to offer him a diplomatic and political gift in a file that the latter had made a compass for his country’s foreign policy.” Macron went further than Spain when it largely adopted the Moroccan solution plan in 2022.

The second reason for the timing of Macron’s initiative is linked, according to the political sources, to the internal political situation in France, where the government has resigned, parliament is on vacation and the country is busy with the Olympics.
It is likely that Macron wanted to benefit from the current institutional “vacuum” before forming a new government, which may have a different approach to the Sahara issue, despite the fact that the French Constitution entrusts the President of the Republic with drawing up the country’s foreign and defense policy.
Press reports revealed that French diplomats began working on the new approach in the spring of 2023, and that many meetings were held between diplomatic officials from the two sides.
These reports also referred to the pressure exerted by Moroccan diplomacy on France, and one of the arguments, according to French “L’Opinion”, was to remind Paris that former President Jacques Chirac, who was a great friend of Morocco, was the one who called on Rabat, since 2003, to present its autonomy plan, in order to bypass a Sahrawi referendum that would decide on the fate of the Sahara.
L'Opinion pointed to another factor: the departure of Bernard Emie, the former ambassador to Algeria and director of French foreign intelligence, from the scene last spring. Emie was one of the strongest advocates for the establishment of a special relationship between Paris and Algeria, and his absence left the door open for those who continued to assert that Algeria did not respond to the initiatives of Macron, who during the past three years made major efforts to close the controversial files with Algiers.
Another French political source added that Paris saw today that Algeria’s ability to influence its immediate surroundings, especially in the Sahel region, has declined significantly after its dispute with two neighboring countries, Mali and Niger. On the other hand, Morocco’s return to the African Union could constitute a “platform” for joint French-Moroccan action at the political, economic, and investment levels.
Politics cannot be separated from economic, trade and investment interests. France has major interests in Morocco, which may have played some role in pushing the French authorities to change their approach, and causing a “heavy” crisis with Algeria.
In response to Algeria’s decision to immediately withdraw its ambassador to Paris, Said Makousi, a French diplomatic source said that France “took note of Algeria’s decision, which is a sovereign decision.”
He added: “We are determined to strengthen our bilateral relations with Algeria; we look to the future, and our great ambition is to work for the benefit of our two peoples.”

 

 

 



Sudanese Stakeholders Hold Roundtable Talks in Geneva

A previous meeting of the coordination of Tagadum with the officials of the African Mechanism in Addis Ababa. (Tagadum on Facebook)
A previous meeting of the coordination of Tagadum with the officials of the African Mechanism in Addis Ababa. (Tagadum on Facebook)
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Sudanese Stakeholders Hold Roundtable Talks in Geneva

A previous meeting of the coordination of Tagadum with the officials of the African Mechanism in Addis Ababa. (Tagadum on Facebook)
A previous meeting of the coordination of Tagadum with the officials of the African Mechanism in Addis Ababa. (Tagadum on Facebook)

Geneva has hosted a third “roundtable” of meetings involving Sudanese political and civil groups aimed at bridging the gap between the country’s warring parties. These talks, coordinated by the French organization Promediation, follow similar meetings held previously in Cairo and Geneva. The primary goals are to negotiate a ceasefire and facilitate humanitarian aid to civilians.

The two-day meetings, which began on Monday, include representatives from the Coordination of Democratic Civil Forces (Tagadum), the pro-army Democratic Bloc coalition, and armed movements aligned with the bloc. However, some groups have announced their boycott of the meetings.

The Democratic Bloc has shown conflicting stances on attending the Geneva talks. Mohammed Zakaria, spokesperson for the bloc and a member of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), announced his group’s decision not to participate.

Omar Khalafallah, a leader in the Democratic Unionist Party and another bloc spokesperson, refuted Zakaria’s statement, insisting that the bloc would attend the meetings to promote a national vision.

A source within the Democratic Bloc told Asharq Al-Awsat that the meetings revealed significant internal divisions in the coalition. The JEM, led by current Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, appears to be charting its own course, which the source described as a form of defection.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sharif Mohammed Osman, a leader in Tagadum and the political secretary of the Sudanese Congress Party, explained that the meetings seek to achieve consensus on ending the war through negotiated solutions, starting with a humanitarian truce to ensure aid delivery and the opening of safe corridors.

These measures are considered preliminary steps toward a ceasefire and a peaceful resolution to the conflict, he underlined.

A wide array of civilian leaders are participating in the talks, including key figures from Tagadum, such as Sudanese Congress Party leader Omar Al-Dukair, Federal Gathering Party leader Babiker Faisal, and head of the Sudan Liberation Movement – Transitional Council Al-Hadi Idris.

Osman expressed optimism that the participants would issue a unified final statement addressing the peaceful resolution of the war and agreeing on a humanitarian truce to facilitate aid delivery.

In October, Cairo hosted a similar meeting, which resulted in a final statement signed by the participating groups, except for the Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi faction and the JEM – Jibril Ibrahim faction, which refused to endorse the Cairo declaration despite attending the discussions.

Promediation, a French organization supported by the French and Swiss foreign ministries, has played a consistent role in Sudanese affairs. Since June 2022, it has organized roundtable discussions, initially focusing on negotiations between Darfuri armed movements before expanding its scope to include Sudanese political and civil forces in the wake of the war.