Tetteh: All Libyan Institutions Outlived their Legitimate Mandates

UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya Hannah Tetteh (UN)
UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya Hannah Tetteh (UN)
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Tetteh: All Libyan Institutions Outlived their Legitimate Mandates

UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya Hannah Tetteh (UN)
UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya Hannah Tetteh (UN)

UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Libya, Hannah Tetteh, warned on Tuesday of the growing “substantial divisions” in the North African country, saying all institutions have outlived their legitimate mandates.

In an interview with UN News, Tetteh stressed the need to hold general elections in Libya and to form a government that has the strong support of the Libyan people which is necessary to address some of the challenges they face at the moment, mainly the de facto fracturing between the East and the West and the continuing fracturing of national institutions.

The UN envoy said that after engaging with key political figures, she heard different views and different perspectives. “All of them agreed on the need for elections but the variations were how to get there,” she said.

On the western side, Tetteh said: “It is not just about establishing a government that would move the country towards elections but addressing particular issues, such as drafting an agreed constitution before elections could be held.”

Also, some figures in the West of Libya spoke about unifying institutions and specially creating operation readiness in institutions that would be responsible for managing elections, she said.

On the eastern side, Tetteh said most of the feedbacks were towards establishing a new government that would prepare the country for elections.

“Of course, these are completely divergent views except for the fact that they all agreed that the end goal should be elections,” she noted.

From Tetteh’s perspective, it is important to know that all of Libya’s institutions have outlived their original mandate regarding legitimacy, without exception. She said it is important for officials to allow for the election process to take place.

The UN has formed a new committee of advisors to review the challenges surrounding the electoral process and to make recommendations on how those issued could be addressed as part of how to establish a new roadmap towards getting the country out of this transition phase towards elections and to a government that has the strong support of the Libyan people.

“We established the committee of advisors to give us proposals towards being able to organize elections. But elections take a number of elements in order to ensure that they are successful,” she said.

Asked whether the UN has received a commitment from Libyan parties that they will agree on the proposals regarding elections, Tetteh said the issue is in the hands of key political actors who are responsible and at the helm of leadership of the government institutions, like the House of Representatives.

She spoke about the dispute at the High State Council, saying the organization itself has issues regarding its effectiveness.

Tetteh also said there is the issue of engaging with the LNA, engaging with the Government of National Unity, recognizing that there are other armed groups that also hold considerable sway.

“Some of these actors may not necessarily think that having an election has benefits for them. So, you have to look at what the main concerns are and in preparing this roadmap find a way in addressing those concerns so that they can come onboard for elections to take place,” she said.

Concerning the UN engagement with the joint military commission, known as the 5+5, to ensure that the ceasefire will hold, Tetteh said: “As you know, we have colleagues in UNSMIL, the security institution service, that work very closely with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC). They continue to engage them and as a result of their efforts they have been able to build some areas of consensus. But I will be the first to concede that much more work needs to be done in order to be able to have those joint security institutions.”

Also, Tetteh affirmed that “the political will is necessary to move away from having a government in the west and then having de facto authorities in the east.”

She said that not being able to check the fracturing of institutions would lead to more substantial divisions in the country.

“That is why we emphasize that political agreement is necessary in order to be able to move forward, get a government with a mandate, a mandate of the Libyan people so that it has their support to be able to take the key decisions that are necessary to restructure the security services, strengthen the public financial management and have a better oversight of the economy and to deliver the aspirations of the Libyan people,” she said.

Tetteh also said it is always important to have the support of the UN Security Council, which has a stronger act with one voice.

“And when actors, both national and international, who have influence on what happens in Libya, know that there is a united Council, they know that there is little room for maneuver and that the UN has the support of Council members and other member states to be able to progress its initiatives,” she added.



Iraqis Queue for Fuel as Regional War Disrupts Imports

An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)
An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)
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Iraqis Queue for Fuel as Regional War Disrupts Imports

An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)
An Iraq's traffic police officer controls the queues at a petrol station in the Iraqi capital Baghdad on September 5, 2026. (AFP)

Drivers formed long lines outside fuel stations in Baghdad on Saturday as gasoline supplies dropped in oil-rich Iraq due to import disruptions caused by the Middle East war.

Despite being OPEC's second largest oil producer, Iraq imports oil derivatives because its refineries do not produce enough gasoline to meet domestic demand.

In recent weeks, as regional hostilities drag on, long queues have been reappearing every few days, mostly outside government-run fuel stations in Baghdad and other provinces.

Baghdad resident Ibrahim Hashem waited for two hours outside a fuel station on Friday without any luck, only to return early the next day hoping to fill his car.

"It is unreasonable that we produce so many barrels of oil a day, yet still do not have enough gasoline to meet our daily needs," Hashem told AFP outside a fuel station in central Baghdad.

"We already suffer from traffic congestion because of the roads and lack of services. Now, it has become worse due to the gasoline shortage," he added.

Iraq's average daily consumption of gasoline is 33 million liters, but demand rises to 38 million when people panic over shortages, according to authorities.

The oil ministry said Friday that "regional events and the ongoing conflict are causing logistical challenges to tanker traffic, delaying their arrival at Iraqi ports."

It urged citizens to buy only the quantities they need and avoid crowding fuel stations for small amounts of gasoline.

Oil Minister Bassem Mohammed Khudair said on Friday that his ministry was addressing the "temporary shortage of gasoline" and that new shipments will arrive soon to help stabilize supplies.

Like other oil producers, Iraq has been greatly affected by the US-Iran conflict, which has choked off the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Iraq is hugely dependent on oil exports, which make up about 90 percent of its budget revenues.

Before the war erupted in February, Iraq produced around four million barrels per day, and exported an average of 3.4 million bpd, mostly via Hormuz.

After a significant drop, Iraqi oil exports recovered to more than 2.2 million bpd in August, according to the oil ministry.

Last month, Iran's state news agency IRNA said that over the past six months, Tehran has granted permission to "a number of Iraqi oil tankers" to pass through Hormuz.


US Ambassador Calls for ‘Severe Consequences’ to Stop Israeli Settler West Bank Violence

US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)
US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)
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US Ambassador Calls for ‘Severe Consequences’ to Stop Israeli Settler West Bank Violence

US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)
US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee (C-L) meets residents as he visits the West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, near Ramallah, West Bank, 05 September 2026. (EPA)

The US ambassador to Israel on Saturday called for "severe consequences" to stop violence in the occupied West Bank as he met Palestinian-Americans who have reported attacks from Israeli settlers.

"Our clear message is that crime is crime, terror is terror. When people do it they should have an expectation that they will have severe consequences," Mike Huckabee told reporters as he visited the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, which has a high number of US citizens, but he declined to criticize Israel.

Settler violence in the West Bank has risen sharply since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition government, the most right-wing in Israel's history, took office in late 2022.

Several settlements have been ‌established around Turmus Ayya, ‌the Palestinian town near Ramallah that Huckabee was visiting ‌on ⁠Saturday. Its residents ⁠say that harassment by militant Israeli settlers is common and that they are unable to stop them from entering the town and damaging their homes.

"We have many issues that we will address," Nawwaf Zaghoul, the town's mayor, told reporters ahead of the meeting, describing what he said were constant attacks by settlers.

He said that the town's residents would be asking the ambassador to help secure ⁠their safety and security. About 80% of the town's roughly ‌3,000 residents were Palestinian Americans, he said.

Huckabee, ‌a Baptist minister and longtime supporter of Israeli settlements, has called for violent settlers ‌to be prosecuted, while saying he believes their actions represent a minority of the ‌wider settler community, which numbers around 750,000. Israeli settlers accused of carrying out attacks in the West Bank targeting Palestinians are rarely prosecuted.

"We are hoping that (the ambassador) will do something for us regarding these lawless settlers," Turmus Ayya resident Sameer Hazama said ‌ahead of the meeting with the ambassador.

Huckabee visited Taybeh, one of the only Christian villages remaining in the West ⁠Bank, in ⁠June 2025 after a church there was vandalized. Huckabee said at the time that the desecration of a place of worship was an act of terror and a crime.

Netanyahu's government has also overseen an expansion of settlements across the West Bank, further entrenching Israeli control over territory that Palestinians seek for a future state.

Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal under international law, with the United Nations and most countries deeming the territory to be occupied. Israel's government says that the land is disputed, not occupied.

Huckabee refers to the West Bank by its biblical name, Judea and Samaria, a term used by the Israeli government but not adopted by the US government. He has visited Shiloh, a settlement near Turmus Ayya, at least twice since 2025.


Could Sudan’s Conflict Become a Regional War?

Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)
Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)
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Could Sudan’s Conflict Become a Regional War?

Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)
Members of the Sudanese army take part in a military parade in Gedaref in August. (AFP)

Fears that Sudan’s war could turn into a regional conflict are no longer merely assessments raised by observers following cross-border strikes and mutual accusations between Sudan and Chad, alongside troubling military movements near the border with Ethiopia.

Massad Boulos, senior adviser to the US president for Arab and African affairs, conveyed those concerns to the UN Security Council, warning that the repercussions could fuel the conflict and threaten to draw neighboring countries more deeply into the war.

The US warnings do not appear to have emerged in a vacuum. They are difficult to separate from Washington’s extensive intelligence capabilities, which allow it to monitor military movements, weapons and drone routes, and cross-border networks.

Raising the level of concern to the Security Council therefore reflects a US assessment that the risks are real and growing, even if the administration has not publicly disclosed all the information on which that assessment is based.

The warning was reinforced by a call Boulos held with Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby following reports of a military strike inside Chadian territory.

Boulos said the two expressed “deep concern about the war in Sudan spilling across its borders, fueling further escalation and threatening regional peace and stability,” while calling for an end to external support for the warring parties.

More than three years after the war began, it is no longer simply an internal confrontation between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. As fighting has moved into areas bordering Chad and Ethiopia and the use of sophisticated weapons has expanded, Sudan has become the center of a conflict in which the calculations of neighboring countries intersect with the interests of regional and international powers.

Growing internationalization

Evidence of the war’s internationalization can be seen in the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s finding that weapons, military technology, fighters and external supply networks are helping prolong the conflict and strengthen the capabilities of both sides.

The mission described a cross-border network linked to individuals, entities and countries that it said had provided the RSF with weapons, equipment, logistical support and foreign personnel. The countries concerned have denied the accusations, saying they remain neutral and support peace efforts.

The mission, meanwhile, said its investigations into sources of external support for the army were still at a preliminary stage.

Sudanese researcher Kholood Khair, director of Confluence Advisory, told the Financial Times in April that the war had “spread across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel,” and that none of Sudan’s seven neighbors was entirely removed from its effects.

Alan Boswell, director of the Horn of Africa project at the International Crisis Group, has similarly argued that the war is dividing the region and increasing polarization among surrounding countries over the two sides.

He considers Chad and South Sudan the most exposed to its repercussions, while also pointing to the need to watch Ethiopia and tensions in Somalia.

A prolonged conflict, he has warned, could drag the region into a “spiral of violence.”

Amin Ismail Majzoub, an expert on crisis management and negotiation at the Center for Research and Strategic Studies, ruled out the conflict developing into a direct military confrontation between Sudan and neighboring countries.

He said the more likely scenario was an escalation of “proxy warfare,” through continued financial and military support and the use of mercenaries and armed groups, which would prolong the war.

Majzoub told Asharq Al-Awsat that Khartoum’s accusations against Chad and Ethiopia were, according to Sudanese authorities, based on evidence submitted to the African Union, IGAD and the Security Council, in addition to reports that bases and airports had been used in support of the RSF.

He added that if those parties moved from indirect support to declared military intervention, Sudan’s regional allies could step in to back it, at which point the conflict could expand to include the Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

Majzoub nevertheless dismissed that scenario, saying: “This will not happen,” because a comprehensive regional war would not be welcomed by the countries of the region.

At the same time, he noted that the conflict’s repercussions were already becoming visible inside neighboring countries, citing increasingly vocal opposition groups in Chad that reject what they say is support being provided to Arab groups aligned with the RSF.

Retired Sudanese army Maj. Gen. Kamal Ismail, for his part, warned that the intersection of regional interests was gradually pushing the conflict beyond Sudan’s borders.

“We have repeatedly warned that the conflict could move from inside Sudan into the region, and the indicators point to that direction,” Ismail told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He added that the widening scope of the fighting could lead to a broader civil war and further complicate the situation.

Ismail said intensifying competition over regional interests could push some actors toward direct intervention under the pretext of protecting their interests, warning that “the longer the war continues, the more its parties lose the ability to control its course or stop it.”

He urged Sudanese to unite to halt the fighting and preserve what remains of the country.

Ethiopia and Chad

The movement of military operations into Blue Nile state near the Ethiopian border is among the most worrying developments.

Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab has published reports based on satellite imagery and open-source analysis pointing to the assembly of brigade-size military support inside an Ethiopian National Defense Force base in Asosa and linking it to RSF activity.

Asosa is significant because of its proximity to Blue Nile and the town of Kurmuk. Any military presence in the area connected to the war, if confirmed, could therefore lay the groundwork for a new border front.

To the west, Chad stands at the center of the storm because of its long border with Darfur and the tribal ties spanning both sides.

Tensions escalated after Sovereignty Council Chairman and army commander Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan accused N’Djamena of facilitating support to the RSF, while Chad denies that its territory or airports are being used to transfer weapons.

Cameron Hudson, a former US official and Sudan expert, says the repercussions of strikes inside Chad are no longer confined to the battlefield but have developed into a diplomatic confrontation.

Countries affected by the war

South Sudan may be the country most exposed to the consequences of the war. Its economy depends on exporting oil through Sudanese facilities and ports, while it has received more than 1 million Sudanese and returning South Sudanese since the fighting began.

A halt in oil exports or the spread of fighting to the border could threaten Juba’s fragile stability.

Kenya, although it does not share a border with Sudan, is exposed to the spillover of political polarization, financing and fighter networks, as well as trade disruption and damage to the role of IGAD, of which Nairobi is a key pillar.

Uganda faces similar risks through South Sudan. Any renewed eruption of instability in Juba could trigger a new refugee influx into Uganda, which already hosts more than 1 million South Sudanese refugees. In this way, the effects of the war could spread from Sudan to South Sudan and then to Uganda and Kenya without regular armies ever crossing borders.

Egypt, for its part, faces repercussions related to refugees, security along its southern border, Nile waters and the balance with Ethiopia. Eritrea fears instability spreading into eastern Sudan and the Red Sea coast.

IGAD Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu has said that peace and security challenges have become too interconnected for any single country or institution to confront alone, describing Sudan as one of the clearest examples of the convergence of military confrontation, humanitarian catastrophe, institutional fragmentation, regional spillover and geopolitical rivalry.

Sudan’s war has not yet become a full-fledged regional confrontation, but it long ago moved beyond the confines of an internal conflict. As the different strands become increasingly intertwined, the question in the future may no longer be: Will the war spread into the region? But rather has it already begun?