Damascus Gov’t on Alert to Prevent ISIS Resurgence

Emergency services work at the scene of a suicide bombing at Mar Elias Church on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, 22 June 2025. EPA/MOHAMMED AL RIFAI
Emergency services work at the scene of a suicide bombing at Mar Elias Church on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, 22 June 2025. EPA/MOHAMMED AL RIFAI
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Damascus Gov’t on Alert to Prevent ISIS Resurgence

Emergency services work at the scene of a suicide bombing at Mar Elias Church on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, 22 June 2025. EPA/MOHAMMED AL RIFAI
Emergency services work at the scene of a suicide bombing at Mar Elias Church on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, 22 June 2025. EPA/MOHAMMED AL RIFAI

A suicide bombing that targeted the Mar Elias church in the Dweila district of Damascus has reignited debate over ISIS’s activity inside Syria, amid growing concerns that extremist groups are intensifying efforts to destabilize the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Although a lesser-known faction, Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, claimed responsibility for the attack, multiple sources say various radical groups, despite differing ideologies, are now pursuing parallel strategies to undermine the Syrian state.

A senior commander in the New Syrian Army warned of a looming ISIS plan to stage a large-scale, surprise assault on Damascus. They said the group was seeking to infiltrate cities by moving militants from the vast Syrian desert into urban areas, while other factions were launching attacks driven by resentment and anger towards the authorities.

“ISIS’s current strategy is based on relocating from the desert into cities, embedding itself within civilian populations, and forming new sleeper cells,” the commander, who spoke under the condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“We have the capabilities to confront the threat and dismantle their networks. We know them better than anyone else,” they added.

According to the commander, the new Syrian army has disclosed sensitive intelligence on ISIS’s renewed push to infiltrate urban centers, warning that the extremist group is adapting its tactics as it regroups across Syria.

The commander also said the army uncovered key details of ISIS’s plans after dismantling a sleeper cell in Homs several months ago.

The militants had reportedly travelled from the Syrian desert, or al-Badiya, highlighting what the commander described as “a clear strategy” by ISIS to move from remote regions into population centers.

“The cell was part of a broader effort to penetrate cities from the desert,” the commander said, adding that the group appeared to be shifting its operational base closer to Damascus and other strategic urban areas.

The revelations come in the wake of the suicide bombing that struck the Mar Elias church.

One day after the June 22 attack, Syria’s Interior Ministry announced it had carried out a “precision operation” in coordination with the General Intelligence Directorate to track and dismantle ISIS hideouts in and around Damascus, including those believed to be directly linked to the church bombing.

ISIS was preparing to launch a wide-scale, coordinated assault on several Syrian cities, starting from Homs, revealed the commander, adding that the terror group’s strategy involved seizing control of multiple neighborhoods in key urban centers simultaneously, in a surprise offensive designed to destabilize the country.

“Dismantling the sleeper cells was crucial,” the commander told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“We reinforced our military presence in Homs and its surrounding areas. It was a major preemptive blow that disrupted ISIS’s plans and helped bolster stability in Syria.”

The group's tactical goals also included targeting religious sites belonging to Alawites, Murshidis, and Christians in an attempt to embarrass the Syrian government and project a sense of insecurity across the country.

“It’s a familiar ISIS tactic used in both Syria and Iraq to inflame sectarian tensions, undermine state authority, and recruit new followers through chaos,” the commander added.

The June 22 bombing of the Orthodox Saint Mar Elias church in Damascus, which killed and injured many civilians, appears to fit this pattern. Syria’s Interior Ministry quickly blamed ISIS for the attack and later announced the arrest of several individuals it said were affiliated with the group.

While local media have reported that ISIS is stepping up efforts to rebuild its networks after a period of dormancy, independent verification of these claims remains limited.

However, intelligence gathered by the Syrian army suggests that ISIS is prioritizing urban operations and symbolic attacks on religious sites, a strategy consistent with the government’s swift attribution of the church bombing to the group.

The bombing of the Mar Elias church, the first attack of its kind targeting worshippers inside a church in the capital since 1860, has triggered both shock and competing interpretations about who was behind the deadly blast.

While many Syrians and analysts have aligned with the government’s accusation that ISIS was responsible, citing the group’s enduring threat, some well-informed sources remain skeptical. They argue that despite similarities in method, the operation does not fully align with ISIS’s known tactics or ideological playbook in Syria, particularly at this stage of its insurgency.

“ISIS has never targeted churches in this manner within its areas of influence in Syria,” a source familiar with the group’s activity told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Such attacks do not serve its goals while it's engaged in a broader war against al-Sharaa’s government.

Historically, ISIS has defiled and desecrated churches, destroying crosses, smashing altars, and raising its black flags above Christian sites. These acts were documented in parts of Deir Ezzor, rural Homs, and Idlib over the past decade.

However, the group typically targeted religious symbols in already-conquered territory, rather than staging suicide bombings in government-controlled urban centers.

Further complicating the narrative is the fact that churches have also been struck by shelling or airstrikes carried out by the previous Syrian regime, undermining the notion that religious sanctuaries were ever fully protected during the war.

Syrian authorities are stepping up efforts to sever ISIS from its former support networks, using a mix of security operations and reconciliation initiatives aimed at individuals who once backed or belonged to the group.

Mediators involved in government-led reconciliation efforts told Asharq Al-Awsat that more than 150 former ISIS affiliates who were not found to have committed crimes against civilians have renounced the group and been granted amnesty.

“These individuals chose to walk away from ISIS, and the state responded by offering a path back through forgiveness,” one mediator said, describing the initiative as part of a broader strategy to drain the group’s residual influence in previously sympathetic communities.

Another mediator, a respected tribal elder who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, revealed that many of those pardoned had joined the state’s reconciliation efforts after receiving endorsements from local religious and tribal figures.

Observers say the policy signals a strategic shift aimed at rehabilitating former ISIS affiliates who played no direct role in civilian bloodshed. The goal, they argue, is to detach these individuals from the group’s ideological grip, strip ISIS of its remaining support base, and stem future recruitment.

“We asked the government to settle the status of former ISIS members who had no blood on their hands, to encourage others to walk away from the group,” the mediator said. “The authorities understand that continued pursuit of these individuals could push them back into ISIS’s arms.”

However, he clarified that the state remains resolute in pursuing key ISIS operatives responsible for violence against civilians and rival factions such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. “There is no clemency for those who’ve committed acts of terror,” he said.

The reconciliation initiative runs parallel to ongoing military and intelligence operations targeting ISIS cells, as Damascus attempts to contain the group’s underground resurgence and prevent a return to widespread insurgency.



EU Committed to Sudan’s Territorial Integrity, Rejects Parallel Governance

Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
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EU Committed to Sudan’s Territorial Integrity, Rejects Parallel Governance

Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)

The European Union has hinted at imposing additional sanctions aimed at Sudan’s war economy, and rejected what it called “parallel governance” in the country.

A statement issued by the High Representative on behalf of the EU reiterated the European Union’s “commitment to Sudan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

It strongly rejected any unilateral attempt to establish parallel governance that could risk the partition of the country, and said that preventing the conflict from escalating into a full-scale regional war remains also paramount.

Now in its fourth year, the war between Sudan's army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has killed tens of thousands.

The statement reminded that The Sudan Conference in Berlin held on April 15 demonstrated the international community’s determination to exert pressure on the belligerents to end the conflict.

At the Conference, international donors pledged €1,5 billion in aid, including €812 million from the EU and its member states.

Recalling the October 2025 Council Conclusions on Sudan, the European Union renewed its call on all actors to engage in negotiations towards an immediate and lasting ceasefire.

On Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe, the statement warned that the disaster is “deepening.”

“Civilians are targeted, famine conditions persist, and displacement continues to destabilize communities and the region,” it said, calling on attacks on civilians, healthcare, aid workers, humanitarian convoys and civilian infrastructure to stop.

“All parties must guarantee unimpeded, safe and sustained humanitarian access across Sudan; obstruction and attacks on relief efforts and personnel are unacceptable and may constitute war crimes,” the statement said.

"The EU supports the work of the UN Fact-Finding Mission, the ICC and robust accountability for all perpetrators. The EU will use all tools available – including diplomacy and restrictive measures – to press for peace, including examining additional sanctions aimed at the war economy," the statement added.


ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
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ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)

Syria has moved since early this year from internal unrest in the northeast, the coast, and the south to relative calm and attempts to impose a new security and political order, most clearly seen in the security file and in an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces.

But the shift has set up an undeclared race with ISIS across multiple regions and social environments.

ISIS has re-emerged as a destabilizing force, seeking to regain a foothold by exploiting gaps in security control. It is leaning on an aggressive narrative and targeted attacks that intensified from mid-February, eased in early March, then picked up again.

The Jazira region, spanning Deir al-Zor, Raqqa and Hasaka, is the main test ground for the group in 2026. Damascus’s takeover of areas east of the Euphrates in late January, after a US troop repositioning and full withdrawal, along with the earlier pullback of SDF forces, created a new security landscape that ISIS is trying to exploit.

The US withdrawal and repositioning at bases such as Kharab al-Jir and Rmelan caused temporary disruption along control lines.

ISIS’s weekly al-Nabaa newsletter reported a rise in attacks on government checkpoints and positions, using roadside bombs and direct assaults. The group carried out about 22 attacks across Syria in March 2026 alone, targeting military sites and civilians.

Ability to hit high-value targets

An attack on Syria’s 86th Division in Deir al-Zor, and on its positions near the Panorama area at the city’s southern entrance, underscored ISIS’s ability to strike deep inside government-held territory and hit sensitive targets.

The group has fully shifted to guerrilla warfare, deploying small, mobile units across vast desert areas that still offer cover despite heavy US airstrikes.

Its messaging, including a Feb. 5 speech by spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, signals an effort to recast itself as the “only legitimate resistance” to the new order. Content in al-Nabaa shows a shift from monitoring to a broad ideological offensive.

The spokesman declared a “new phase of operations” targeting governance in Damascus, signaling a move from defending desert pockets to a war of attrition in cities. Al-Nabaa has stepped up attacks on the new government, branding it an “updated version of apostasy,” and focusing on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, still referred to by his former nom de guerre.

Undermining military credibility

ISIS casts al-Sharaa’s shift from jihadist leader to head of state as a “great betrayal.” It is trying to draw in fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other factions frustrated by integration into the “new Syrian army” or by perceived leniency toward former regime officials.

It also questions Syria’s role in the US-led coalition, framing it as a concession.

By escalating attacks since mid-February, ISIS appears intent on undermining the government’s ability to enforce security and stability, while casting doubt on the military effectiveness of newly formed forces. It promotes a narrative that al-Sharaa serves US interests, presenting itself as a more ideologically rigid alternative.

Exploiting fault lines

ISIS is betting on social tensions as Damascus reasserts control over areas once run by autonomous authorities or foreign-backed factions, especially in the northeast and parts of the north.

It taps into tribal concerns over central rule, positioning itself as a fallback or covert ally against perceived abuses. At the same time, the state’s focus on remnants of the former regime and opposition militias on the coast and in Sweida gives ISIS more room to move in the east.

Despite losing territory, ISIS retains the ability to survive through flexibility, continued recruitment and enough funding to sustain operations.

Its strength lies in decentralization. Regional branches now operate with autonomy after the weakening of central leadership following the killing of its fourth “caliph,” Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashimi. Cells can recruit and act without waiting for orders.

The group has also rebuilt small support hubs in rugged parts of the Homs desert, some hit by US strikes this year, including raids on Jabal al-Amour near Palmyra, making full clearance difficult.

The United States said it carried out 10 airstrikes between Feb. 3 and 12 on more than 30 targets across Syria, many in Homs province, including the Sukhnah desert and gas field areas, raising fresh concerns after the US withdrawal.

Recruiting a new generation

ISIS is targeting teenagers and young men raised in displacement camps or economic hardship, using encrypted platforms to avoid detection. It also exploits sectarian and political narratives to reinforce a sense of marginalization among Sunni communities.

But it faces mounting pressure. Coordination between Damascus and the international coalition has tightened, limiting ISIS’s ability to exploit divisions. Advances in surveillance and drone technology have also reduced the advantage of desert terrain.

Still, the group is betting on potential economic failure or weak public acceptance of the government in newly retaken areas. It is also trying to destabilize tribal dynamics in Deir al-Zor by exploiting arrests of local figures or disputes over oil resources.

Momentum shifts

A security campaign launched in late February by the Interior Ministry, with army support, shifted the balance on the ground. Operations swept eastern Hama, the central desert, and areas around Aleppo and the coast.

In early March, authorities said they foiled a major attack targeting military sites in Aleppo and dismantled three sleeper cells on the coast and in the Homs countryside, disrupting ISIS’s internal networks and communications.

By mid-March, attacks had dropped to levels not seen since late 2024. Small groups were seen moving to the rural edges of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor to regroup.

Some fighters reportedly sought settlements with authorities amid funding shortages and a lack of basic supplies.

Researcher Zain al-Abidin al-Akeidi said ISIS had previously exploited Arab tribal resentment toward the SDF, but areas still under SDF control are now mostly Kurdish, limiting the group’s reach.

He warned of continued recruitment despite the government's experience in tracking ISIS cells, noting that resolving the al-Hol camp issue and restoring state control east of the Euphrates could weaken ISIS propaganda.

But he said security conditions in the Jazira region remain “very difficult,” citing poor living conditions, weak services and drug trade as factors ISIS exploits.

A Syrian army colonel, Mohammed al-Amer, said “tribal fronts” in eastern Syria have links to ISIS and have mediated with some fighters to leave the group after ideological reviews.

He said some were detained and others monitored, adding, “We use all methods to end ISIS’s presence in Syria, especially through security and intelligence work.”

Harassment over control

ISIS no longer aims to seize territory, but to raise the cost of governing. It retains the ability to harass Damascus, even if at a limited level.

Attacks in late March were largely defensive, targeting small patrols or abandoned positions on desert fringes, reflecting weaker planning capacity and a shift toward symbolic presence.

Lying low

By early April, ISIS appeared to enter a “dormancy” phase, pulling back from frontlines, reorganizing and reassessing. This likely precedes a familiar strategy of hiding and rebuilding after losses, as seen in Iraq in 2007.

Worsening economic conditions could aid recruitment, but Damascus's progress in building a unified army and stabilizing living conditions could undermine the group.

ISIS may have lost its aura of dominance in 2026, but not its will to fight. Its attacks on the president and government reflect recognition of the threat posed by the new state.

A dual test

The drop in ISIS activity reflects a mix of security, military and economic pressures. Campaigns have disrupted its structure, forced a partial withdrawal, and triggered internal reorganization and a shift away from direct attacks.

Small cells remain active along desert edges and at the frontlines between Deir al-Zor and Raqqa, suggesting a temporary phase of regrouping.

Past patterns show ISIS exploits downturns to reposition and capitalize on instability. Regional conditions could help it reopen supply lines or reconnect with affiliates.

The coming months will test whether Syrian forces can hold recent gains, and whether ISIS can endure sustained pressure. It may either fade into a marginal threat or re-emerge through sporadic, targeted attacks to signal its presence without entering open conflict.

Either way, the next phase will be decisive in shaping the security landscape in northern and central Syria and defining the trajectory of the fight between the state and ISIS.


Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)

Deir al-Balah in central Gaza will hold the enclave’s first local elections in nearly two decades, with voting set to begin on Saturday alongside municipal polls in the occupied West Bank.

A decree by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas designated Deir al-Balah as the only voting site in Gaza, citing its relatively limited damage from the Israeli war and better-preserved infrastructure compared with other areas.

Gaza last held local elections in 2005, when Hamas secured a majority. It followed with a legislative election win a year later and in 2007 consolidated control of the enclave after a conflict with rival Fatah. From 2005 to 2023, Hamas appointed members of local councils and municipalities across Gaza.

This vote comes after a two-year war that has reshaped the enclave and added political and operational challenges.

Who can vote?

The Central Elections Commission said about 70,449 registered voters in Deir al-Balah are eligible to cast ballots at 12 polling centers. These include open areas fitted with tents, while schools remain shelters for displaced residents.

The figure excludes many displaced people now living in the city, as only original residents are allowed to vote.

The commission has accredited 292 observers from 10 local monitoring groups and 45 journalists. Around 675 staff will run polling operations to ensure compliance with legal and professional standards.

Jamil al-Khalidi, the commission’s regional director in Gaza, told Asharq Al-Awsat the system uses closed lists. Voters select one list and cast votes for five candidates from it. A 15-member municipal council will be formed from the candidates who get the most votes, with at least four seats reserved for women.

Khalidi said ballot boxes and papers were ready ahead of Saturday, with 12 centers prepared across nine tents and three civil society facilities. Each center will include eight polling stations.

Preliminary results are expected on Sunday morning. All competing lists are independent and clan-based, with competition driven largely by geographic and family ties.

Who will secure the vote?

Khalidi said the Palestinian civil police, effectively the Hamas-run force, will secure the process.

He added that officers will keep their distance from polling centers due to the risk of Israeli strikes. They will deploy without weapons and intervene only if needed, before returning to positions outside the sites.

A private security company had been considered to handle the task, but Gaza’s civil police insisted on taking responsibility, and a plan was agreed with all parties, Khalidi said.

Commitment to the PLO program

Four lists are competing and campaigning has been more visible online than on the ground, with limited posters. Observers say the lists are self-funded, without factional backing.

Candidates were required to sign a pledge committing to the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization and recognizing it as the legitimate representative.

This requirement is contentious for Hamas, as it implies adherence to positions including recognition of Israel. The Palestinian Authority is seeking to enforce the pledge in line with its commitment to a two-state solution.

A local source said some candidates have past ties to Fatah and Hamas but are running as independents. No faction has publicly endorsed any of the competing lists.