Tehran Loses Ground to Najaf’s Rising Influence in Baghdad

PMF fighters patrol northern Baghdad in archived photo – PMF Media
PMF fighters patrol northern Baghdad in archived photo – PMF Media
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Tehran Loses Ground to Najaf’s Rising Influence in Baghdad

PMF fighters patrol northern Baghdad in archived photo – PMF Media
PMF fighters patrol northern Baghdad in archived photo – PMF Media

Iran’s sway over Iraq’s Shiite political landscape is weakening as the Najaf religious establishment, led by Cleric Ali al-Sistani, asserts greater influence, challenging Tehran’s efforts to preserve its armed proxies and obstruct state-led reforms.

Despite pressure from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to resist internal reforms – particularly those aimed at disarming rogue militias and integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the state – sources close to the Shiite clergy say Najaf has grown increasingly alarmed by what it views as a political system on the brink of collapse.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat since late July, political insiders described a “silent confrontation” between two competing visions for Iraq's Shiite community. One is backed by the pro-Iran Coordination Framework that dominates government.

The other is quietly advanced by Najaf, which sees urgent need for reform amid regional volatility.

“The system is facing its most serious test since 2003,” one religious source said. “It is losing its ability to sustain itself,” they added.

Hezbollah Brigades Threaten Government

Tensions flared in late July when Kataib Hezbollah, a powerful Iranian-backed militia, lashed out at Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, accusing him of provoking a confrontation with security forces.

The group released a video showing its field commander, Jamal Mahlel, warning the premier that his hopes for re-election were doomed.

“You will not have a second term,” Mahlel said, echoing threats once directed at former PM Haider al-Abadi.

The video, reportedly leaked by the group itself, followed a rare armed clash on July 27 between Kataib Hezbollah and Iraqi security forces over alleged land seizures near Baghdad. While details remain murky, the confrontation prompted the group to declare the end of its security operations in the capital’s southern belt – a symbolic retreat from areas long used as power bases by Iran-backed factions.

The fallout was significant. In a lengthy statement, militia spokesman Abu Ali al-Askari condemned the government’s actions, accusing the army of attacking “a group of youths” with heavily armed forces and armored vehicles.

“These areas were part of what was once called the Baghdad Belt,” said Askari, acknowledging a loss of ground. “A mistake was made, and the cost was high.”

Tehran Calls for Readiness, Sees Another War Looming

At the same time, Iranian officials warned allied factions to prepare for “imminent danger.” According to two militia sources, senior figures from the Revolutionary Guards – including Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani – urged Iraq’s groups to resist disarmament, describing it as a critical moment while Iran rebuilds its military capabilities.

One of the sources said Tehran’s message was unequivocal: “Every weapon will matter in the next war.” The same warning, he added, was also conveyed to Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

On July 29, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared that Iran would take “great strides in deepening religious faith and advancing scientific knowledge” – a statement widely interpreted as reaffirming Iran’s ideological commitment to regional influence, including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

An internal document leaked from Kataib Hezbollah appeared to confirm preparations for “escalation – either internally or externally.” Analysts believe the leak was deliberate, part of a coordinated campaign to send a message to both Baghdad and Washington amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.

A senior Coordination Framework leader acknowledged that the US stance was becoming increasingly aggressive.

“Washington is playing brinkmanship,” he said. “This isn’t just about the factions anymore – the entire ruling coalition is under pressure.”

US Pushback on PMF Law Raises Stakes

Tensions rose sharply in late July after US Senator Marco Rubio warned that a proposed Iraqi law formalizing the PMF would entrench Iranian influence. During a call with Sudani, Rubio voiced concerns about legitimizing militias the US deems a threat.

Days later, acting US Ambassador Steven Fagin told deputy parliament speaker Mohsen Al-Mandalawi that the law would “empower terrorist groups.” On August 5, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce described the legislation as a “hostile act” that could trigger harsh sanctions.

The Coordination Framework official admitted US pressure could become “suffocating,” especially as Washington appears to treat the Iraqi political system as a battlefield where some actors have become unacceptable.

Najaf Reemerges as a Counterweight

As Iran struggles with the fallout from its confrontation with Israel and a weakened proxy network post-October 7, the Najaf religious establishment has quietly regained influence in Baghdad. Sources close to the clerical leadership said Najaf views the current trajectory as dangerous for Iraq’s Shiites.

A senior cleric close to Sistani’s office said the religious leadership believes “the fate of Iraq’s Shiites should not be tied to rogue militias,” especially amid fears of renewed ISIS activity spilling over from Syria.

On July 17, Sistani’s representative, Abdul Mahdi al-Karbalai, appeared publicly for the first time in five years, calling for an end to militia activity and stronger state institutions.

According to officials familiar with behind-the-scenes discussions, a senior government figure met Karbalai shortly after the speech and was given a clear message: disarmament of militias and PMF integration must proceed in a way that respects fighters’ dignity and protects their livelihoods.

The message also included fiscal warnings – urging the government to curb chaotic spending and rethink Iraq’s foreign alignments to shield the country from external shocks.

From Soleimani to Sistani: Power Shifts in Baghdad

For years, key decisions in Baghdad were shaped by visits from Qasem Soleimani, the late Quds Force commander. But one Coordination Framework leader noted that the balance of power has shifted.

“Today, those kinds of strategic meetings are happening between Najaf and Baghdad – not Tehran,” he said.

He added that while Iran is desperate to retain its Iraqi foothold amid setbacks in its nuclear program, Najaf’s growing assertiveness is changing the rules of the game.

Sudani Under Pressure to Act

Caught between American opposition, Iranian expectations, and Najaf’s reform push, Sudani faces a narrowing path. His political survival may depend on how he handles the future of the PMF – a sensitive issue with no easy solutions.

Sources involved in high-level discussions say the US recognizes the risks of disbanding tens of thousands of fighters, many of whom were instrumental in the fight against ISIS. But Najaf insists that Iraq must not delay legal and institutional reform any longer.

“This is a historic responsibility,” one clerical source said. “If political leaders fail to act, the consequences will be severe.”

Analysts warn the PMF file has become a political time bomb ahead of elections. As Sudani weighs his next move, even his allies admit he must navigate a shifting regional landscape – or risk not just his office, but the future of Iraq’s post-2003 political order.



Israeli Strikes in Southern Lebanon Kill Lebanese Journalist

This photo released by the Lebanese Civil Defense, show Lebanese Red Cross volunteers and Civil Defense workers carrying the body of the Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil killed in an Israeli airstrike, in al-Tayri village, south Lebanon, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (Lebanese Civil Defense via AP)
This photo released by the Lebanese Civil Defense, show Lebanese Red Cross volunteers and Civil Defense workers carrying the body of the Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil killed in an Israeli airstrike, in al-Tayri village, south Lebanon, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (Lebanese Civil Defense via AP)
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Israeli Strikes in Southern Lebanon Kill Lebanese Journalist

This photo released by the Lebanese Civil Defense, show Lebanese Red Cross volunteers and Civil Defense workers carrying the body of the Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil killed in an Israeli airstrike, in al-Tayri village, south Lebanon, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (Lebanese Civil Defense via AP)
This photo released by the Lebanese Civil Defense, show Lebanese Red Cross volunteers and Civil Defense workers carrying the body of the Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil killed in an Israeli airstrike, in al-Tayri village, south Lebanon, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (Lebanese Civil Defense via AP)

Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon on Wednesday killed Lebanese journalist Amal Khalil and wounded a photographer while they were working near the border with Israel, according to a senior Lebanese military official.

Earlier, the Israeli military said in a statement it had received reports that two journalists were injured as a result of its strikes.

The death of Khalil, 43, brought the death toll on Wednesday to five people. It was the deadliest day since a 10-day ceasefire was announced on April 16 to halt hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.

Khalil and freelance photographer Zeinab Faraj were covering developments near the town of al-Tayri when an Israeli strike hit the vehicle in ⁠front of them.

⁠They ran into a nearby house, which was then also targeted by an Israeli strike, Lebanon's health ministry, the senior Lebanese military official and press advocates said.

Lebanese rescuers were able to retrieve Faraj, who had suffered a head wound.

When rescuers returned to help Khalil, the Israeli military dropped a sound grenade, blocking their access to the damaged building, the senior military official said.

Lebanon's Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the targeting of journalists and the ⁠obstruction of relief efforts constituted "war crimes."

"Lebanon will spare no effort in pursuing these crimes before the relevant international bodies," he said on X.

Information Minister Paul Morcos said Khalil "was targeted by the Israeli army while carrying out her professional duty"

"The targeting of journalists is a grave crime and a blatant violation of international humanitarian law," he added on X.

The health ministry said Israel's military "prevented the completion of the humanitarian mission by firing a sound grenade and live ammunition at the ambulance."

Rescuers were able to return to the site about four hours after the initial strike. After another three hours of searching through the rubble, they were able to retrieve her lifeless body, the senior military official said.

Two people were killed in the first strike on the car, Lebanese state media reported.

The ⁠Israeli military said it ⁠identified two vehicles that left a military structure used by Hezbollah and crossed the "forward defense line," the term Israel's military uses to refer to the delineation of the zone of southern Lebanon that Israeli troops are occupying.

It said the cars "approached the troops in a manner that posed an immediate threat to their safety" and that it struck one of the vehicles, then a nearby building.


EU Committed to Sudan’s Territorial Integrity, Rejects Parallel Governance

Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
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EU Committed to Sudan’s Territorial Integrity, Rejects Parallel Governance

Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)
Customers buy vegetables at a local market in Sururab, near Khartoum, Sudan, Wednesday, April 22, 2026. (AP Photo/Bernat Armangue)

The European Union has hinted at imposing additional sanctions aimed at Sudan’s war economy, and rejected what it called “parallel governance” in the country.

A statement issued by the High Representative on behalf of the EU reiterated the European Union’s “commitment to Sudan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

It strongly rejected any unilateral attempt to establish parallel governance that could risk the partition of the country, and said that preventing the conflict from escalating into a full-scale regional war remains also paramount.

Now in its fourth year, the war between Sudan's army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has killed tens of thousands.

The statement reminded that The Sudan Conference in Berlin held on April 15 demonstrated the international community’s determination to exert pressure on the belligerents to end the conflict.

At the Conference, international donors pledged €1,5 billion in aid, including €812 million from the EU and its member states.

Recalling the October 2025 Council Conclusions on Sudan, the European Union renewed its call on all actors to engage in negotiations towards an immediate and lasting ceasefire.

On Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe, the statement warned that the disaster is “deepening.”

“Civilians are targeted, famine conditions persist, and displacement continues to destabilize communities and the region,” it said, calling on attacks on civilians, healthcare, aid workers, humanitarian convoys and civilian infrastructure to stop.

“All parties must guarantee unimpeded, safe and sustained humanitarian access across Sudan; obstruction and attacks on relief efforts and personnel are unacceptable and may constitute war crimes,” the statement said.

"The EU supports the work of the UN Fact-Finding Mission, the ICC and robust accountability for all perpetrators. The EU will use all tools available – including diplomacy and restrictive measures – to press for peace, including examining additional sanctions aimed at the war economy," the statement added.


ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
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ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)

Syria has moved since early this year from internal unrest in the northeast, the coast, and the south to relative calm and attempts to impose a new security and political order, most clearly seen in the security file and in an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces.

But the shift has set up an undeclared race with ISIS across multiple regions and social environments.

ISIS has re-emerged as a destabilizing force, seeking to regain a foothold by exploiting gaps in security control. It is leaning on an aggressive narrative and targeted attacks that intensified from mid-February, eased in early March, then picked up again.

The Jazira region, spanning Deir al-Zor, Raqqa and Hasaka, is the main test ground for the group in 2026. Damascus’s takeover of areas east of the Euphrates in late January, after a US troop repositioning and full withdrawal, along with the earlier pullback of SDF forces, created a new security landscape that ISIS is trying to exploit.

The US withdrawal and repositioning at bases such as Kharab al-Jir and Rmelan caused temporary disruption along control lines.

ISIS’s weekly al-Nabaa newsletter reported a rise in attacks on government checkpoints and positions, using roadside bombs and direct assaults. The group carried out about 22 attacks across Syria in March 2026 alone, targeting military sites and civilians.

Ability to hit high-value targets

An attack on Syria’s 86th Division in Deir al-Zor, and on its positions near the Panorama area at the city’s southern entrance, underscored ISIS’s ability to strike deep inside government-held territory and hit sensitive targets.

The group has fully shifted to guerrilla warfare, deploying small, mobile units across vast desert areas that still offer cover despite heavy US airstrikes.

Its messaging, including a Feb. 5 speech by spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, signals an effort to recast itself as the “only legitimate resistance” to the new order. Content in al-Nabaa shows a shift from monitoring to a broad ideological offensive.

The spokesman declared a “new phase of operations” targeting governance in Damascus, signaling a move from defending desert pockets to a war of attrition in cities. Al-Nabaa has stepped up attacks on the new government, branding it an “updated version of apostasy,” and focusing on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, still referred to by his former nom de guerre.

Undermining military credibility

ISIS casts al-Sharaa’s shift from jihadist leader to head of state as a “great betrayal.” It is trying to draw in fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other factions frustrated by integration into the “new Syrian army” or by perceived leniency toward former regime officials.

It also questions Syria’s role in the US-led coalition, framing it as a concession.

By escalating attacks since mid-February, ISIS appears intent on undermining the government’s ability to enforce security and stability, while casting doubt on the military effectiveness of newly formed forces. It promotes a narrative that al-Sharaa serves US interests, presenting itself as a more ideologically rigid alternative.

Exploiting fault lines

ISIS is betting on social tensions as Damascus reasserts control over areas once run by autonomous authorities or foreign-backed factions, especially in the northeast and parts of the north.

It taps into tribal concerns over central rule, positioning itself as a fallback or covert ally against perceived abuses. At the same time, the state’s focus on remnants of the former regime and opposition militias on the coast and in Sweida gives ISIS more room to move in the east.

Despite losing territory, ISIS retains the ability to survive through flexibility, continued recruitment and enough funding to sustain operations.

Its strength lies in decentralization. Regional branches now operate with autonomy after the weakening of central leadership following the killing of its fourth “caliph,” Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashimi. Cells can recruit and act without waiting for orders.

The group has also rebuilt small support hubs in rugged parts of the Homs desert, some hit by US strikes this year, including raids on Jabal al-Amour near Palmyra, making full clearance difficult.

The United States said it carried out 10 airstrikes between Feb. 3 and 12 on more than 30 targets across Syria, many in Homs province, including the Sukhnah desert and gas field areas, raising fresh concerns after the US withdrawal.

Recruiting a new generation

ISIS is targeting teenagers and young men raised in displacement camps or economic hardship, using encrypted platforms to avoid detection. It also exploits sectarian and political narratives to reinforce a sense of marginalization among Sunni communities.

But it faces mounting pressure. Coordination between Damascus and the international coalition has tightened, limiting ISIS’s ability to exploit divisions. Advances in surveillance and drone technology have also reduced the advantage of desert terrain.

Still, the group is betting on potential economic failure or weak public acceptance of the government in newly retaken areas. It is also trying to destabilize tribal dynamics in Deir al-Zor by exploiting arrests of local figures or disputes over oil resources.

Momentum shifts

A security campaign launched in late February by the Interior Ministry, with army support, shifted the balance on the ground. Operations swept eastern Hama, the central desert, and areas around Aleppo and the coast.

In early March, authorities said they foiled a major attack targeting military sites in Aleppo and dismantled three sleeper cells on the coast and in the Homs countryside, disrupting ISIS’s internal networks and communications.

By mid-March, attacks had dropped to levels not seen since late 2024. Small groups were seen moving to the rural edges of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor to regroup.

Some fighters reportedly sought settlements with authorities amid funding shortages and a lack of basic supplies.

Researcher Zain al-Abidin al-Akeidi said ISIS had previously exploited Arab tribal resentment toward the SDF, but areas still under SDF control are now mostly Kurdish, limiting the group’s reach.

He warned of continued recruitment despite the government's experience in tracking ISIS cells, noting that resolving the al-Hol camp issue and restoring state control east of the Euphrates could weaken ISIS propaganda.

But he said security conditions in the Jazira region remain “very difficult,” citing poor living conditions, weak services and drug trade as factors ISIS exploits.

A Syrian army colonel, Mohammed al-Amer, said “tribal fronts” in eastern Syria have links to ISIS and have mediated with some fighters to leave the group after ideological reviews.

He said some were detained and others monitored, adding, “We use all methods to end ISIS’s presence in Syria, especially through security and intelligence work.”

Harassment over control

ISIS no longer aims to seize territory, but to raise the cost of governing. It retains the ability to harass Damascus, even if at a limited level.

Attacks in late March were largely defensive, targeting small patrols or abandoned positions on desert fringes, reflecting weaker planning capacity and a shift toward symbolic presence.

Lying low

By early April, ISIS appeared to enter a “dormancy” phase, pulling back from frontlines, reorganizing and reassessing. This likely precedes a familiar strategy of hiding and rebuilding after losses, as seen in Iraq in 2007.

Worsening economic conditions could aid recruitment, but Damascus's progress in building a unified army and stabilizing living conditions could undermine the group.

ISIS may have lost its aura of dominance in 2026, but not its will to fight. Its attacks on the president and government reflect recognition of the threat posed by the new state.

A dual test

The drop in ISIS activity reflects a mix of security, military and economic pressures. Campaigns have disrupted its structure, forced a partial withdrawal, and triggered internal reorganization and a shift away from direct attacks.

Small cells remain active along desert edges and at the frontlines between Deir al-Zor and Raqqa, suggesting a temporary phase of regrouping.

Past patterns show ISIS exploits downturns to reposition and capitalize on instability. Regional conditions could help it reopen supply lines or reconnect with affiliates.

The coming months will test whether Syrian forces can hold recent gains, and whether ISIS can endure sustained pressure. It may either fade into a marginal threat or re-emerge through sporadic, targeted attacks to signal its presence without entering open conflict.

Either way, the next phase will be decisive in shaping the security landscape in northern and central Syria and defining the trajectory of the fight between the state and ISIS.