Iraq’s Ruling Alliance Backs Down on PMF Legislation

A widely circulated image shows a military parade by one of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ factions. (Social media/handout via X)
A widely circulated image shows a military parade by one of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ factions. (Social media/handout via X)
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Iraq’s Ruling Alliance Backs Down on PMF Legislation

A widely circulated image shows a military parade by one of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ factions. (Social media/handout via X)
A widely circulated image shows a military parade by one of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ factions. (Social media/handout via X)

Iraq’s ruling Shi’ite alliance has suspended efforts to pass legislation granting sweeping institutional powers to the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in a move aimed at easing tensions with Washington and buying time until the outcome of the standoff over Hezbollah’s weapons in Lebanon becomes clearer, political sources said.

The draft law, opposed by the United States, would have formalized the PMF – a coalition of mostly Shi’ite armed groups with more than 200,000 fighters – as a parallel structure to the Defense Ministry.

It included independent funding and a military academy, as well as a proposed “doctrinal guidance directorate” that critics said risked embedding sectarian ideology.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior security officials have repeatedly defended the PMF since the last war with Israel, warning against any attempt to disband it. But within the Shi’ite “Coordination Framework” coalition that dominates the government, divisions have deepened over the law.

“The armed wing that was supposed to shield key actors has become a burning coal no one can hold for long,” a senior coalition figure told Asharq al-Awsat.

While some leaders, including Badr Organisation chief Hadi al-Amiri and Islamic Supreme Council head Humam Hammoudi, pushed to put the law to a vote, others warned it risked provoking US retaliation ranging from sanctions to threats of military action. Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani even hinted at the possibility of a US-led invasion if the law passed.

Washington’s position, conveyed to Iraqi officials in recent weeks, is that enshrining the PMF would strengthen Iran’s hand in Baghdad and destabilize Iraq’s fragile constitutional order, an Iraqi official briefed on the talks said.

Instead of passing the law, the coalition is now exploring a compromise that would fold PMF command positions more tightly into government structures without requiring a parliamentary vote – a formula insiders describe as largely cosmetic. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is reluctant to champion even that, fearing a backlash from Washington and political rivals ahead of elections in November.

“It is like standing on a buried landmine,” a veteran Shi’ite politician said. “Any movement risks an explosion.”

The debate has become a no-win scenario for Iraq’s rulers: pushing the law through risks of US punishment, while shelving it angers powerful armed factions who view legal recognition as essential to preserving their influence. Some lawmakers have floated theatrical solutions, such as convening a session with Shi’ite MPs in military uniform but without enough quorum to pass the law.

For now, the coalition has opted for delay, tying the PMF’s fate to Lebanon, where Hezbollah faces unprecedented pressure over its weapons.

“Everything depends on whether Hezbollah can reposition itself, with or without arms,” said a Shi’ite leader. “If they strike a deal, you will see the impact in Baghdad.”

 



Yemen Information Minister: Restoring Public Trust Starts With Honest, Effective State Media

The information minister stressed that restoring public trust requires media that address people's concerns (Saba)
The information minister stressed that restoring public trust requires media that address people's concerns (Saba)
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Yemen Information Minister: Restoring Public Trust Starts With Honest, Effective State Media

The information minister stressed that restoring public trust requires media that address people's concerns (Saba)
The information minister stressed that restoring public trust requires media that address people's concerns (Saba)

Yemen's Minister of Information Salem Thabit al-Awlaki said the biggest challenge facing his ministry is restoring the influence of state media, stressing that rebuilding public trust requires news outlets that address people's concerns, communicate honestly and avoid presenting an idealized picture of a reality the public knows firsthand.

In his first interview since assuming the portfolio, al-Awlaki told Asharq Al-Awsat that the ministry would focus in the coming period on strengthening its operations from the interim capital, Aden, improving the performance of state media institutions and enhancing coordination among government agencies to ensure information reaches journalists and the public more quickly and consistently.

He said covering Operation Yemen Dawn was a fundamental responsibility, emphasizing that media organizations must exercise discipline and responsibility under such circumstances. Coverage, he explained, should keep pace with developments on the ground without prematurely disclosing sensitive information, report facts without exaggeration and maintain public trust by avoiding inflated claims and unrealistic predictions.

Al-Awlaki also warned against what he described as Houthi attempts to rewrite the history of Yemen's conflict through misleading narratives, saying countering them requires presenting facts and evidence and demonstrating the nature of the Houthi project through its actions and consequences.

Information Before Rumors

The minister warned that delays in releasing official information allow rumors to spread and create impressions that can be difficult to correct.

He said some government institutions still handle information through slow procedures or take too long to explain developments, even as the media operates around the clock.

Al-Awlaki said the ministry would prioritize better coordination among government agencies, strengthen the role of official spokespersons and establish more effective mechanisms for sharing information, ensuring that journalists and citizens have clear, reliable sources to consult when events occur.

He explained that maintaining a consistent government message does not mean requiring every media outlet to use identical language. Rather, it means ensuring that the state's positions are clear, its information is consistent and its institutions do not issue conflicting accounts of the same event.

The minister also stressed the importance of transparency with the public, saying that when certain details remain unverified, authorities should acknowledge this openly rather than leave people facing conflicting accounts or present incomplete information as established fact.

He recognized that military and security circumstances may sometimes require withholding certain details to protect personnel and operations. However, he said such considerations should not justify a lack of official clarification about information that can safely be disclosed.

Restoring Public Trust

Al-Awlaki said the relationship between audiences and the media has changed significantly. Citizens can now access multiple sources through their phones, compare reports and quickly identify inconsistencies.

As a result, he said, information no longer commands public trust simply because it comes from an official media outlet.

He argued that credibility, quality content and attention to people's everyday concerns are what encourage audiences to follow and trust a news organization.

"If we talk about the government's achievements, citizens also have the right to know what has failed, why it failed and what is being done to address it," he said.

The minister stressed that government media should represent state institutions and their policies while fulfilling their professional responsibility to report facts, discuss public issues and provide room for responsible criticism.

He said rebuilding trust requires clear editorial standards, giving qualified journalists the freedom to perform their duties, distinguishing news from opinion and upholding accuracy, balance, the right of reply and the correction of errors.

"I cannot imagine the public placing its trust in media that ignores its problems or presents an idealized picture of a reality people know for themselves," he said.

"People want media that deals with them honestly and respects their intelligence."

Covering Operation Yemen Dawn

Al-Awlaki said Operation Yemen Dawn forms part of the national campaign to end the Houthi rebellion and restore state institutions, making its coverage a central responsibility of the Ministry of Information.

He explained that the ministry would coordinate with the relevant military and security authorities to improve media coverage in line with developments on the ground and strengthen public understanding of the campaign's objectives and broader implications.

The minister emphasized that reporting during military operations requires considerable discipline and responsibility. The pursuit of breaking news, he said, must not lead journalists to publish information that could endanger troops, reveal their movements or compromise operational security.

At the same time, he cautioned that a lack of official information should not leave the field open to rumors and psychological warfare.

"We need media that keeps pace with developments on the ground without getting ahead of them by revealing sensitive information, reports facts without sensationalism and preserves public trust without exaggeration or reckless predictions," he said.

Al-Awlaki added that coverage should highlight the sacrifices of fighters, draw attention to the suffering of civilians in Houthi-controlled areas, expose violations and strengthen engagement with Arab and international media to communicate what is happening.

He said the success of media coverage should not be measured by the volume of reports or the intensity of its rhetoric, but by its ability to provide reliable information, strengthen cohesion on the home front and reach audiences both inside and outside Yemen.

Countering the Houthi Narrative With Facts

Al-Awlaki warned against what he described as Houthi attempts to rewrite the history of the conflict and portray the group as a movement defending national sovereignty against foreign powers.

He argued that this narrative overlooks the origins of the conflict, the course of the armed rebellion and subsequent military expansion, culminating in the group's seizure of Sanaa in 2014 and the undermining of state institutions.

He said countering this account requires more than repeatedly stating the government's political position. It demands presenting facts and evidence and demonstrating the nature of the Houthi project through its practices and consequences.

The minister highlighted the need to address the siege of Taiz, attacks on civilians, the detention of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, threats to international shipping and the humanitarian, economic and social suffering resulting from the group's policies.

Al-Awlaki also emphasized the importance of distinguishing between domestic and international audiences.

Yemeni citizens, he explained, need reporting that connects their daily suffering with the underlying causes of the crisis. Reaching international audiences, meanwhile, requires communicating in their languages through documented information, testimonies, reports and independently verifiable material.

He acknowledged that the government had sometimes devoted more attention to responding to Houthi propaganda than to presenting its own account in a sustained and organized manner.

"We have a just cause and many facts that the world needs to hear. But having a just cause alone is not enough to convince others if we fail to present it properly, document it and communicate it effectively," he said.

Strengthening Fact-Checking

The minister warned against conflating criticism with disinformation or treating every opinion that differs from the government's position as part of a campaign targeting the state.

He stressed that journalists have the right to criticize the government's performance and institutions, while citizens are entitled to express their views, even when those views are harsh or contradict official positions.

Efforts to combat rumors, he said, must not become a pretext for restricting these rights.

Al-Awlaki drew a distinction between journalists who unintentionally publish inaccurate information that can be corrected and those who deliberately fabricate facts or manipulate content to deceive the public.

He said deliberate disinformation should be addressed through legal procedures that respect rights and freedoms.

The ministry, he explained, would focus on strengthening fact-checking mechanisms, making information available through official sources, promptly correcting inaccurate reports and working with the journalistic community to develop professional methods of identifying disinformation without compromising press freedom.

"Respecting press freedom serves the state itself, because professional journalism helps expose mistakes early, creates room for public debate and gives institutions an opportunity to correct their performance," he said.

Facilitating Journalists' Work

Al-Awlaki said journalists often have to make considerable efforts to obtain even basic information from government institutions, sometimes without receiving any response to their inquiries.

Yet media outlets are subsequently blamed when they publish incomplete reports, he observed.

He said the ministry would work with government agencies to improve communication with journalists, strengthen the role of media offices and official spokespersons, and develop clear procedures for responding to inquiries to ensure timely access to information.

The minister also acknowledged the longstanding financial and professional difficulties facing media workers.

Some journalists, he said, are living under harsh conditions, while media institutions suffer from shortages of resources and equipment.

He explained that the ministry would begin identifying and prioritizing these problems, following up with the relevant authorities on outstanding payments and entitlements, improving working conditions and seeking to expand training and professional development opportunities.

Al-Awlaki reaffirmed the ministry's commitment to journalists who have faced violations because of their work, as well as to issues involving press freedom and professional protection.

He stressed that the ministry should maintain close relationships with journalists working across state, private, community and independent media, based on cooperation and mutual respect while preserving the independence of media institutions.

The ministry would pursue these matters seriously and transparently, he said, while recognizing that some solutions would require decisions and resources beyond its authority.


Yemen Law Criminalizes Houthi Activities, Opens Door to Domestic and International Prosecution

 A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB
A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB
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Yemen Law Criminalizes Houthi Activities, Opens Door to Domestic and International Prosecution

 A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB
A digital billboard features Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Sana'a, Yemen, 08 November 2026. EPA/YAHYA ARHAB

Yemen's government has moved beyond designating the Houthi group a terrorist organization to establishing a broad legal framework aimed at criminalizing its activities and prosecuting its leaders, financiers and affiliated entities.

The legislation brings the group's financing, recruitment and arms supply networks, as well as attacks on civilians and international shipping, within the scope of criminal accountability. It also gives authorities legal tools to trace assets and funds both inside Yemen and abroad.

On Wednesday, Rashad al-Alimi, Chairman of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council, issued Law No. 1 of 2026 on the designation of the Houthi group as a terrorist organization and the criminalization of its activities and financing, following approval by the Cabinet and Parliament.

The legislation puts the terrorist designation into effect across the group's political, military, security and administrative structures, establishing a series of criminal, financial and administrative measures alongside mechanisms for international judicial cooperation.

The law goes beyond criminalizing direct military actions to encompass the organizational, economic and media structures operating on the group's behalf. It establishes individual and institutional responsibility according to the nature of their roles and proven connections, while introducing legal safeguards to prevent the designation from imposing collective liability on civilians or legitimate activities in Houthi-controlled areas.

Under Article 4, the law designates the Houthi group, which calls itself Ansar Allah, a terrorist organization in all its organizational structures and formations, including individuals and groups.

The designation extends to affiliated entities, including political, military, security and administrative leadership, as well as partisan, civil, cultural, social, media and economic organizations, where organizational links to the group have been established.

The legislation extends beyond the official names and front organizations the Houthis may use to conduct their activities or reorganize their structures.

An entity is considered affiliated with the group if evidence establishes that the Houthis created, manage or exercise direct or indirect organizational control over it, or that it operates in their name or on their behalf as part of their organizational structure.

However, the law places an important restriction on the scope of liability. It states that the designation does not constitute a conviction of any particular individual or eliminate the requirement to prove the elements of an alleged offense.

Nor does the designation automatically extend to individuals or entities merely because they maintain commercial or social relationships with the group or its members, or reside in areas under its control.

The law therefore distinguishes between proven organizational affiliation and legitimate civil and economic dealings. Decisions to list affiliated entities, along with measures taken against them, are subject to objections and appeals before the competent courts.

Severe Penalties

The legislation defines a broad range of acts as terrorist offenses, including using armed force to seize state authority or undermine constitutional institutions, besieging cities and villages, starving populations, targeting civilians, public facilities and private property, planting landmines, and attacking or disrupting international shipping.

Penalties for these offenses range from 20 to 30 years in prison to the death penalty. Under the law, the death penalty applies when offenses specified in Articles 5 through 10 result in death or permanent disability.

Criminal liability is not limited to actions carried out on the ground. The law also criminalizes membership in or joining the Houthi group, prescribing prison sentences of 10 to 15 years.

Those exercising effective leadership within the group face the death penalty, whether they hold a publicly declared leadership position or exercise significant authority over issuing orders, managing resources, supervising personnel or making organizational decisions.

The legislation also prohibits providing, collecting or making available funds and economic resources with knowledge that they will be used to finance the group. Violations are punishable by death or imprisonment for 15 to 25 years.

Criminalized activities also include supplying or smuggling weapons, military equipment and dual-use materials, facilitating access to such items, and providing logistical support or intelligence. These offenses can carry the death penalty.

In relation to recruitment, the law criminalizes recruiting, training, arming and enrolling individuals in Houthi military and security formations, prescribing the death penalty.

It provides for particularly severe treatment of cases involving child recruitment, coercion, threats or deception, as well as the exploitation of schools, educational and religious institutions, summer centers and care facilities for recruitment and military or security training.

The legislation includes specific protections for children, defining a child as anyone under the age of 18.

It provides safeguards against their recruitment, training, arming or use in military and security activities, while prioritizing the rehabilitation and reintegration of children who have been exploited and ensuring they are not held to the same standards of criminal responsibility as adults.

Cutting Off Funding and Reversing Confiscations

Disrupting the group's sources of financing is a central pillar of the legislation, which goes beyond criminalizing financial support to target entities established or reconstituted to represent the Houthis or provide legal, political, financial or media cover for the continuation of their organizational activities.

The law also criminalizes providing premises, facilities, equipment and services to the group and its affiliates.

It prohibits circumventing asset seizure and freezing orders by transferring, selling or concealing assets, changing their ownership or allowing third parties to benefit from them with the intention of obstructing enforcement.

To implement these measures, the legislation provides for the establishment of a permanent technical unit within the Office of the Prosecutor General to oversee the terrorist designation and related lists.

The unit will include representatives from the Public Prosecution, the ministries of Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Industry and Trade, the Central Bank of Yemen, the Central State Security Apparatus and the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Its responsibilities will include gathering information, verifying sources, examining organizational ties and command-and-control relationships, preparing files on individuals and entities proposed for terrorist listing, and submitting recommendations to the Prosecutor General.

The Prosecutor General will issue reasoned listing decisions after reviewing the files, while the relevant authorities will implement financial measures, including freezing funds and assets proven to be linked to designated individuals and entities.

These measures cover assets held directly or indirectly or controlled by the beneficial owner, while safeguarding the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

The legislation draws a clear distinction between freezing and confiscation. Permanent confiscation requires a final court ruling, and the inclusion of an individual or entity on a terrorist list does not, by itself, result in the confiscation of their assets.

At the same time, the law invalidates the legal, financial and administrative effects of rulings issued by the Houthis against state leaders, political parties, opposition figures, activists, journalists and human rights advocates, including the confiscation of their funds and property.

The provisions also cover amendments the group has introduced to laws, educational curricula and institutions, as well as confiscation orders issued under the authority of the so-called "judicial custodian."

The law requires the return of funds, property and rights to the state or their rightful owners where ownership is established, while allowing claims for compensation before the competent courts.

Protecting Trade and Humanitarian Aid

In a country where millions of people depend on the movement of goods and humanitarian assistance, the legislation dedicates a separate chapter to protecting economic activity and humanitarian operations.

It establishes restrictions on the application of measures that could harm civilians or disrupt access to essential supplies.

The law states that engaging in legitimate commercial, industrial, agricultural or service activities, including transporting food, medicine and fuel, does not in itself constitute a crime or evidence of financing or cooperating with the Houthis, even when such activities take place in areas under the group's control.

It requires the government, central bank and relevant authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure the continued flow of essential goods, facilitate humanitarian assistance and prevent legal measures from harming civilians or legitimate economic activities.

The legislation also exempts neutral humanitarian, medical and relief operations conducted by the United Nations and its agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and licensed international and local organizations.

It emphasizes that providing food, medical treatment or humanitarian assistance to people in need does not constitute financing the group merely because the recipients reside in Houthi-controlled areas.

However, these exemptions do not provide immunity for activities used as a cover to finance the group or supply it with prohibited support. Criminal liability remains applicable where the elements of an offense are established.

International Prosecution

The legislation also expands the scope of cooperation with judicial, security and financial authorities outside Yemen.

It directs the Public Prosecution and relevant agencies, in coordination with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior, to pursue legal action against suspects and convicted individuals residing abroad.

This includes requesting their arrest and extradition and seeking enforcement of relevant judicial rulings and orders.

International cooperation will encompass the exchange of information and evidence, requests for legal and judicial assistance, and coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), foreign law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities.

It also provides for requests to trace, seize, freeze, confiscate or recover funds and assets located outside Yemen in accordance with applicable legal procedures.

The law further requires the government to activate the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and relevant international treaties to cut off the group's sources of financing and prevent it from obtaining weapons.

On the political front, the legislation stipulates that no future political settlement may grant criminal immunity to Houthi leaders or members implicated in crimes and serious violations.

However, it explicitly excludes authorized official negotiations and communications conducted for the purposes of peace, ceasefires, prisoner exchanges and addressing humanitarian issues from criminalization.


Lebanon Steps Up Action Against Hezbollah Without Moving Toward Direct Confrontation

Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026.  (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026. (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
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Lebanon Steps Up Action Against Hezbollah Without Moving Toward Direct Confrontation

Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026.  (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)
Supporters of Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah wave flags of the group as they attend a ceremony commemorating the Iran-backed group's annual Martyrs' Day in Beirut's southern suburbs on November 11, 2026. (Photo by Joseph EID / AFP)

Three recent security operations in Lebanon have raised significant questions about the nature of the targets involved and the areas where the operations took place, bringing renewed attention to the issue of placing all weapons under state control.

The developments have also raised questions about whether Lebanese authorities have begun changing their approach toward Hezbollah amid mounting domestic and international pressure to implement government decisions on the group's weapons.

The operations included the seizure of a shipment of explosives belonging to Hezbollah at an Internal Security Forces checkpoint in Dahr al-Baidar in early October, the arrest of five Hezbollah members carrying maps and written plans in the northern Bsharri area, and an army raid on a weapons and ammunition warehouse in Musharrafieh, in Beirut's southern suburbs.

Although differing in scope, all three operations represent a departure, to varying degrees, from the authorities' traditional approach to dealing with Hezbollah, its members, its weapons and areas under its influence.

The ongoing judicial proceedings against Hezbollah members in the Dahr al-Baidar explosives case and the Bsharri case are considered unprecedented in the history of relations between the Lebanese authorities and the group.

Hezbollah had long enjoyed political, security, military and judicial protection, with successive governments classifying its activities as acts of "resistance."

While these developments may suggest the beginning of a new phase of tighter security measures against Hezbollah, several officials and experts familiar with the security situation say they are not yet sufficient to indicate a fundamental shift in state policy.

They point to the absence of a clear official decision to pursue and arrest Hezbollah members for their affiliation with its military wing, or to launch systematic operations targeting the group's weapons depots beyond the area south of the Litani River.

Limited Measures

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Hisham Jaber, director of the Middle East Center for Strategic Studies, said the government had wasted considerable time implementing its decision to establish exclusive state control over weapons.

He argued that, unable to enforce its decisions concerning Hezbollah, the government was seeking a way to contain domestic and international pressure while saving face through limited measures targeting the group.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Jaber said the current actions fall short of a broad security operation or a genuine change in how the authorities deal with Hezbollah.

Instead, he described them as limited measures intended to demonstrate that the state is taking action and implementing its decisions without entering into a direct confrontation with the group.

Jaber dismissed concerns that implementing government decisions would necessarily push Lebanon toward civil war, arguing that there was little reason to fear such a conflict as long as the army remained cohesive and capable of fulfilling its responsibilities.

However, he warned of what he described as Israeli attempts to fuel internal strife, suggesting that the coming period could witness security incidents and assassinations.

He also interpreted campaigns targeting Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal as attempts to undermine his position and pressure him into leaving office, potentially leading to his dismissal.

Government Decisions

The Lebanese government has adopted a series of decisions aimed at placing all weapons under the exclusive control of the state and its legitimate military and security institutions.

Among the most significant was an August 5, 2025, decision instructing the army to prepare a phased plan to withdraw unauthorized weapons and place them under state control.

The government subsequently approved and welcomed the plan on September 5 of the same year.

On March 2, 2026, the government went further, announcing a ban on all Hezbollah military and security activities, declaring them illegal and demanding that the group surrender its weapons to the state and restrict its activities to politics.

The government also instructed the army and security agencies to take the necessary measures to prevent unauthorized military or security activities and pursue violators.

'Individual Initiatives'

Security and defense researcher and writer Dr. Riad Kahwaji said the government and relevant security agencies had failed to implement any of these decisions.

He argued that all the recent incidents had occurred by chance rather than as part of an organized security operation or comprehensive plan.

He also said there had been no systematic raids on Hezbollah weapons depots or storage facilities outside the area south of the Litani River.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Kahwaji said the government decisions remained largely unimplemented because President Joseph Aoun and Army Commander General Haykal were unwilling to proceed with their enforcement, citing the need to preserve civil peace and avoid internal confrontation.

He pointed out that the arrest of the five Hezbollah members in Bsharri and the interception of the explosives shipment at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint were carried out by Internal Security Forces personnel rather than through a centrally coordinated security operation backed by a clear political decision to pursue Hezbollah members.

Kahwaji argued that the incidents highlighted the considerable freedom of movement and protection Hezbollah had traditionally enjoyed, allowing its members to operate and travel throughout Lebanon without significant restrictions.

He concluded that what had been uncovered so far was merely the tip of the iceberg, suggesting that numerous other security-related cases had yet to be exposed or investigated.