Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s first visit to Moscow - nearly ten months after the sweeping political upheaval that reshaped Syria’s policies and overturned its long-standing alliances - has underscored a new reality in Russian-Syrian relations.
Over the decades, these ties have seen repeated cycles of tension and rapprochement, reaching moments of deep strategic alliance before sliding into visible coolness at other times.
While the full implications of the visit will unfold gradually, its course and outcomes are set to redraw the contours of this relationship and chart its future path.
What remains constant is that both sides are recalibrating their priorities amid Syria’s new political landscape and evolving decision-making mechanisms, despite repeated affirmations of the importance of preserving their long history of close cooperation.
President Vladimir Putin opened his talks with his exceptional guest at the Kremlin by invoking the “historic relationship” between the two countries, a phrase he used deliberately to frame the dialogue.
The partnership dates back to 1944, when Syria first established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
Emphasizing the “historic” nature of the relationship was not only a nod to the enduring strategic interests shared by both states but also a reflection of Moscow’s desire to mitigate the losses it may have suffered amid Syria’s turbulent transformations.
Russia’s Interests Before 2011
Russia’s interests in Syria have long been strategic — political, military, and economic in essence. Although bilateral trade mattered, it was never significant enough to justify the high costs Moscow was willing to bear to defend its position there.
The Tartus Naval Facility
For decades, Russia’s top priority has been to retain its naval facility in the Syrian port of Tartus, its last military outpost on the Mediterranean.
The base, established under a 1972 agreement, served as a Soviet-era logistics and maintenance point during the Cold War to support the Soviet Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet. Over the years, Moscow sought to expand and modernize the facility to reinforce its presence in the region, especially as Washington pushed ahead with plans to deploy a missile shield in Poland.
During former President Bashar al-Assad’s 2008 visit to Moscow, he approved converting part of Tartus into a permanent base for Russia’s nuclear-powered vessels in the Middle East. By 2009, Moscow had begun gradual upgrades to the port to accommodate larger warships.
Arms Sales and Debt Relief
Around the same period, Moscow wrote off more than $10 billion of Syria’s Soviet-era debt, which had totaled $13.4 billion.
Soon after, Russia ramped up arms exports to Damascus, making Syria one of the region’s top buyers of Russian weapons. The deals included advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems that significantly boosted Syria’s combat capabilities.
In 2008, Damascus signed contracts to purchase MiG-29 fighter jets, Pantsir and Iskander defense systems, Yak-130 multirole aircraft, and two Amur-1650 submarines. Moscow said the arms sales were intended to promote stability and security near its borders.
By 2011, Syria had signed $4 billion worth of arms contracts with Russia, ranking seventh among Russia’s global weapons customers.
Investments in Energy, Aviation, and Telecommunications
By 2009, Russian investments in Syria reached an estimated $20 billion, mainly in oil, gas, and energy projects. Russian companies such as Tatneft and Soyuzneftegaz held key exploration licenses that remain frozen today.
In 2008, The North Western Group won a contract to build a petroleum processing plant near Deir al-Zour, while GeoResurs, a Gazprom subsidiary, prepared to bid for oil exploration tenders.
Russia’s direct intervention in Syria in 2015 revived many of these projects, granting its firms sizable stakes in energy-rich areas.
Other Russian companies, including Rosatom, Technopromexport, RusHydro, and Sovintervod, were involved in power, nuclear, and irrigation projects.
Industrial and aviation firms such as Uralmash, Tupolev, and AviaStar-SP also signed supply and service deals with Syrian entities.
In 2010, Tractor Plants Group announced a joint venture for agricultural machinery, while Sinara Group began building a hotel complex in Latakia.
Sitronics signed a contract in 2008 to develop a nationwide wireless network.
This was the state of Russian presence in Syria on the eve of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad.
Interests Over Alliances
Despite these extensive ties, Moscow was initially reluctant to intervene directly in Syria’s civil war and did not regard Bashar al-Assad as a key ally. Putin once remarked that Assad had not visited Moscow for five years after taking power, focusing instead on courting the West.
Moscow’s eventual military involvement stemmed from the same mix of geopolitical and domestic calculations that drove Assad’s eastward pivot: countering US dominance and combating extremist groups viewed as a direct threat to Russia, especially given its painful experiences in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.
Though Putin first spoke to Assad by phone only in 2013, ensuring Assad’s survival ultimately served Moscow’s broader strategic interests. Syria became a testing ground for Russia’s challenge to US military interventionism and an arena to assert its global standing.
Preventing regime change by foreign powers was another core objective, as Moscow feared the precedent could destabilize post-Soviet states and Muslim-majority regions within Russia itself.
These geopolitical imperatives, coupled with the strategic value of Tartus, solidified Moscow’s transformation from a cautious observer to Assad’s staunchest backer.
The Libya Lesson
Moscow’s stance hardened after the 2011 Libya intervention. Its decision to abstain from vetoing the UN Security Council resolution imposing a no-fly zone paved the way for NATO’s campaign to oust Muammar Gaddafi, a precedent Russia vowed never to repeat in Syria.
Having concluded that Assad could survive without foreign intervention - given the opposition’s fragmentation - Moscow built channels to Syrian rebel groups to gauge their strength while betting on the regime’s endurance.
Its direct military intervention in September 2015 was driven by both the fear of Assad’s collapse and the fallout from the 2014 Ukraine crisis, which saw Western sanctions and Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Despite concerns about a “second Afghanistan,” Russia assessed that neither the United States nor regional powers had the appetite for deep involvement in Syria, a calculation that proved correct.
Russia’s Current Interests and the Lack of Alternatives
Maintaining a military foothold in Syria remains central to Moscow’s Middle East strategy. The Hmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval facility are vital hubs for Russia’s operations across North Africa and the Sahel. Without access to Hmeimim, Russian aircraft would struggle to supply bases in Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Alternative routes, such as Libya’s Tobruk and Benghazi, face legal and political hurdles, while the 2016 experiment of using Iran’s Hamadan Air Base proved short-lived and controversial. Other options - Egypt, Algeria, or Sudan - are equally fragile, leaving Syria as Moscow’s only reliable Mediterranean anchor and a vital logistical bridge to Africa.
Reordering Priorities
Still, Russia now faces the need to rethink its Syria policy, particularly after the limits of its coordination with Türkiye and Iran became evident.
Ankara’s priorities in conflicts such as Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus often diverge sharply from Moscow’s, while Tehran’s escalating confrontation with Israel and the United States threatens to drag Syria into further instability, outcomes Russia seeks to avoid.
Syria has exposed both the weaknesses of Russia’s alliance model in the Middle East and the logic of its “military investments.”
Having spent heavily to preserve Assad’s rule since 2015, Moscow now looks to reap the returns of that wager, something the upcoming agreements between the two countries may soon reveal.
