The designation of Sudan’s Islamists as a terrorist entity places the country’s military leadership before difficult and narrowing choices, particularly as these currents are deeply embedded within the ruling system and wield growing influence in decision-making circles, including inside the military itself.
That reality makes any potential confrontation highly risky at a time when Sudan is already facing a fragile and volatile situation on all fronts.
The development raises key questions about what comes next: Could army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan move to curb the Islamists’ influence or remove them from the military? And how might they respond if targeted and the confrontation escalates?
The United States announced last Monday that it had designated the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan a terrorist organization, accusing it of receiving support from Iran. To avoid confusion over the name, the US State Department specified the “Sudanese Islamic Movement” and included its military wing, the al-Baraa bin Malik Corps, citing links to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since the fall of ousted president Omar al-Bashir after the 2019 popular uprising, Islamists and their dissolved National Congress Party have split into several civilian and military factions. When war erupted in April 2023, they regrouped in new military formations to fight alongside the Sudanese army against the Rapid Support Forces.
Ali Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and a former foreign minister, is accused of acting as the real driver behind the army through Islamist elements within its ranks in a bid to return to power. The army and Burhan have repeatedly denied those accusations.
Some Islamist leaders say the movement has regained influence inside the institutions of the “deep state” and that confronting it would require extensive intelligence and security efforts. They also acknowledge that Islamists have become a heavy burden on the army, while Burhan appears hesitant to take a decisive stance against them.
Sources familiar with the matter say the administration of US President Donald Trump had earlier decided to designate the group but delayed announcing the move to allow time for efforts to secure a ceasefire between the army and the Rapid Support Forces.
Rising regional tensions, particularly the US-Israel confrontation with Iran, and statements by Islamist leaders fighting alongside the army declaring support for Tehran, accelerated the decision.
Those statements reportedly embarrassed Burhan before regional allies, prompting him to deny any official ties between the army and the groups and to vow to be held accountable.
Sources say the designation explicitly linked “Islamist battalions” in Sudan to training and military support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, potentially making them a target of US policies as the regional conflict widens.
At the same time, activists circulated an old video of Sovereignty Council member and assistant commander-in-chief Yasser al-Atta speaking about six Islamist battalions fighting within the army’s ranks.
Possible scenarios
Circles close to the Islamists expect the movement to “bend with the storm,” avoiding public positions that could trigger direct confrontation with the military authorities, particularly as any battlefield setback could allow the Rapid Support Forces to advance.
Despite that caution, those circles say Islamists remain influential, holding sway within security agencies, intelligence services and military intelligence. Their reach also extends into state institutions, including the judiciary and the public prosecution, making their removal costly and complex.
Opponents of the Islamic Movement say the army may struggle to implement the requirements of the US designation - such as freezing accounts or restricting the movement of leaders - because of the movement’s ideological penetration within the officer corps. That infiltration dates back to the 1970s and persisted for three decades under Bashir’s former “Salvation” government.
In this view, the army could try to navigate the sanctions through political maneuvering and continued cooperation with Islamists to soften their impact. But such an approach may test the international community's patience.
Babiker Faisal, head of the executive office of the Federal Gathering, says the army faces three main choices: deny the presence of Islamists within its institutions, a line Burhan has consistently taken; maneuver between the international community and the Islamists by reassuring both sides; or take a decisive step to exclude them and confront them directly.
Faisal believes Burhan is likely to pursue the maneuvering option, pointing to the Sudanese Foreign Ministry’s silence over the designation while calling instead for the Rapid Support Forces to be labeled a terrorist organization.
But he warns the approach may only buy time. The most significant aspect of the designation, he says, is its direct military link between the Islamic Movement and Iran — an issue that has become a top priority for the US administration.
A direct confrontation, he argues, would be extremely difficult given the Islamists’ grip on key state institutions and security bodies. That could push them to fight to the end in what they would see as an existential battle, especially after the decline of Brotherhood-linked movements in several regional countries.
Civilian forces opposed to the war say all possibilities remain open, including the direct targeting of Islamists, depending on regional developments or giving the army time to distance itself from them gradually.
They argue that excluding the Islamic Movement from any future political process is the shortest path to ending the war and restoring stability in Sudan.
