Syria: Pending Issues, Including Arrests Delay SDF Integration

Protest by families of SDF detainees held by the Syrian government outside the Democratic Union Party building in Qamishli (Ronahi)
Protest by families of SDF detainees held by the Syrian government outside the Democratic Union Party building in Qamishli (Ronahi)
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Syria: Pending Issues, Including Arrests Delay SDF Integration

Protest by families of SDF detainees held by the Syrian government outside the Democratic Union Party building in Qamishli (Ronahi)
Protest by families of SDF detainees held by the Syrian government outside the Democratic Union Party building in Qamishli (Ronahi)

The exchange of prisoners and detainees between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has stalled since mid-April after becoming tied to political issues, hampering efforts to integrate the SDF and implement an agreement reached last January.

Abdulkarim Omar, a senior official in the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, told Asharq Al-Awsat that several issues still require “further discussion and consensus.”

He said the top priority remains the detainees file and the return of displaced people, stressing that both the Autonomous Administration and the SDF are fully committed to the agreement.

The remarks came as families of SDF detainees held by the Syrian government staged a protest demanding the release of their sons, according to Kurdish media, amid reports of reciprocal arrest campaigns in Hasakah and Raqqa provinces.

Omar said the detainees and prisoners file was still receiving “careful attention and follow-up” from the SDF and the Autonomous Administration.

“This reflects our commitment to fully implementing the provisions of the Jan. 29 agreement, which represents an important framework for cooperation and understanding between the Autonomous Administration and the transitional government,” he said.

He said the Autonomous Administration and the SDF were committed to implementing all provisions of the agreement, including the integration of military, security and administrative institutions, while taking into account the particularity of Kurdish areas.

He said there was “full awareness that the integration process requires building trust and a genuine will from all parties, in addition to overcoming any rhetoric that could obstruct this path.”

According to the Kurdish news agency Hawar, families of SDF detainees held by the Syrian government complained that they had been prevented from seeing their sons in detention centers in Aleppo.

Families of detainees also staged protests in Hasakah city to demand their release. Video clips aired by Kurdish media showed a group of families demonstrating outside the Hasakah governorate building on Tuesday.

“We are seeking urgent solutions that ensure the release of all detainees in order to ease the suffering of their families,” Omar said.

He added that the return of displaced people to their original areas remained a top priority. About 1,400 families have so far returned to Afrin, while around 7,000 families in Jazira and Kobani are still waiting to return to their hometowns.

Work is also continuing to allow other families displaced from Ras al-Ain, Tal Abyad and other areas to return “with dignity and safety,” he said.

Outstanding Issues

Omar said several issues require further discussion and agreement. These include integrating the Women’s Protection Units into the Syrian Defense Ministry and developing mother-tongue education in Kurdish areas.

He added that other issues include accrediting certificates issued by Autonomous Administration institutions on par with other areas, as well as matters related to courthouses and other technical and administrative issues.

“We are confident that through shared will, continued and transparent dialogue and trust-building, tangible progress can be achieved on these files in a way that serves the interests of all Syrians and strengthens national stability,” he said.

He said progress on these files represented “a real opportunity to strengthen trust among all parties,” adding that commitment to agreements was the best path toward “solid national unity, lasting stability and a shared future marked by security and dignity for all Syrians.”

The prisoner and detainee exchange file had made notable progress in March and April under understandings aimed at “emptying prisons” and building confidence as part of the implementation of the agreement.

In the latest batch, around 400 SDF detainees were released in exchange for 91 detainees held by the Syrian government.

That followed earlier batches in March that saw 300 detainees released in exchange for 300 others, and before that, 159 detainees were released in exchange for 100.

Sipan Hamo, also known as Samir Oso, assistant defense minister in Syria’s interim government for eastern region affairs, described linking the detainees issues to political pressure as “immoral.”

In an interview with Hawar, he said the mechanism used in recent exchanges was “wrong,” adding that all prisoners should have been released on the day integration was announced, without batches.

Ahmed al-Hilali, spokesman for the presidential team tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Jan. 29 agreement, said in press remarks that the delay in taking over courthouses, especially in Qamishli, had negatively affected other files, most notably detainees.

He said the issue had shifted from an exchange approach to release procedures after the Syrian government took over prisons in Hasakah, but that the process was still facing delays.

Hilali said the integration track was linked to several overlapping issues, including the detainees, whom he described as “non-negotiable.”

But he said it was still affected by progress in implementing the agreement, while expressing optimism that a breakthrough could be achieved in the coming days.

Reciprocal arrests

In a parallel development, local media said SDF forces carried out an arrest campaign on Monday in Hasakah city and its surroundings.

The Hasakah Media Center said the campaign took place in the city’s Salihiya neighborhood and in the village of al-Fahd near Panorama roundabout, leading to the arrest of a young man in Hasakah and several residents of the village.

Syrian security forces had earlier arrested a number of people affiliated with the SDF in Raqqa. Asharq Al-Awsat sought details from government and Kurdish sources on the nature of those arrests but received no response.



Sisi Seeks to Boost Strategic Cooperation During Asia Tour

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received his South Korean counterpart in Cairo last November. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received his South Korean counterpart in Cairo last November. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Sisi Seeks to Boost Strategic Cooperation During Asia Tour

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received his South Korean counterpart in Cairo last November. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received his South Korean counterpart in Cairo last November. (Egyptian Presidency)

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has begun an Asian tour taking him to South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia as Cairo seeks to deepen strategic cooperation with Asian countries amid turmoil in the Middle East.

The trip will focus heavily on strengthening economic partnerships, according to experts, who point to presidential diplomacy as an important tool in attracting major foreign investment to Egypt in recent years. Cairo is also seeking to draw high-tech industries from the three countries.

Sisi headed to South Korea on Tuesday on the first leg of his tour, which will also take him to Malaysia and Indonesia.

The Egyptian presidency said Sisi would hold talks with his South Korean counterpart, Lee Jae Myung, and take part in a roundtable with executives and representatives of major Korean companies.

Lee visited Cairo last November, his first trip to Egypt since taking office in June of that year.

Egypt has sought to strengthen ties with East Asian countries through bilateral visits and participation in multilateral forums. Among those efforts was Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty’s participation in meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Manila in late July.

At the time, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry described the participation as part of a diplomatic drive to develop relations with ASEAN members and broaden political, economic and development cooperation.

Former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister Gamal Bayoumi views Sisi’s visit to Asia as an extension of Egypt’s foreign policy approach of diversifying relations with international partners.

“The visit has political and economic objectives, particularly in light of regional developments and their repercussions for the economies of countries in the region,” Bayoumi told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He expects the trip to bolster economic partnerships with East Asian countries, whose large markets offer significant trade opportunities. Their advanced manufacturing technologies also create scope for investment partnerships with Egypt, he added.

Bayoumi pointed to Al-Azhar as another asset in Cairo’s relations with the region, given the ties many citizens of these countries have with education at the Egyptian institution.

Official figures show trade between Egypt and South Korea reached $995.3 million from January through September 2025, down from $1.2 billion during the same period in 2024.

South Korean investment in Egypt totaled $413.8 million in the 2024/2025 fiscal year, compared with $288.3 million the previous year.

The Egyptian government is seeking to attract more industrial investment from Asian countries, including South Korea, according to Walid Gaballah, a member of the Egyptian Society for Political Economy, Statistics and Legislation.

While Cairo enjoys political coordination with these countries, Gaballah argued that economic cooperation has yet to match the level of political ties.

He stressed that a country such as South Korea possesses advanced manufacturing technology that could be localized in Egyptian industrial zones, including the Suez Canal Economic Zone.

Gaballah told Asharq Al-Awsat that Egypt’s presidential diplomacy had played a significant role in attracting major investments in recent years.

He added that economic issues are therefore expected to take priority during Sisi’s visits to the three Asian countries, particularly given the potential of their economies as Cairo looks to diversify its partnerships.


Khalil al-Hayya: Hamas’ Unexpected Leader at a Turning Point

Hamas political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya (File photo/AP)
Hamas political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya (File photo/AP)
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Khalil al-Hayya: Hamas’ Unexpected Leader at a Turning Point

Hamas political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya (File photo/AP)
Hamas political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya (File photo/AP)

Before Oct. 7, 2023, Khalil al-Hayya, now about 65, was a prominent figure in Hamas. But few inside or outside the movement saw him as a leading contender for its top job.

“Al-Aqsa Flood” changed that.

The attack reshaped the roles and fortunes of Hamas leaders, along with Gaza and the landscape beyond it. Hayya now heads the movement’s political bureau, steering it through one of the most sensitive turning points in its history.

His victory over Khaled Meshaal, a former Hamas leader and one of its best-known figures, was announced in July. It surprised some outside the movement. Others inside had seen it coming, as leaders from Gaza tightened their hold on key portfolios and senior posts.

When “Al-Aqsa Flood” began, Hayya was deputy to Hamas’ Gaza leader, Yahya Sinwar. He handled contacts with Palestinian factions, UN bodies and mediators over conditions in Gaza and its recurring rounds of escalation with Israel.

Hayya first rose to prominence when Hamas contested the 2006 parliamentary election, before seizing military control of Gaza in 2007.

He moved through leadership posts in Gaza City, then across the territory, before joining the movement’s wider leadership. Along the way, he drew sustained support from commanders of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, including Ahmed al-Jaabari and Izz al-Din al-Haddad.

Where was he — and what did he know?

Before the Oct. 7 attack, Sinwar asked Hayya and other members of Hamas’ Gaza political bureau to leave the territory to handle specific matters abroad. None knew the full extent of his plans.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hayya knew more about some aspects of the attack than other political bureau members.

“But his information was neither complete nor precise. Only Sinwar knew the full details, while commanders in the military wing knew specific elements of the attack,” one source said.

In an interview published in April 2024 by the Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center, Hayya said “the Oct. 7 attacks that ignited the Gaza war were intended to be a limited operation by Hamas to capture a number of soldiers and exchange them for Palestinian prisoners.”

“The Gaza Division of the Zionist army collapsed completely,” he added, referring to the Israeli military.

A senior Hamas source abroad told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hayya knew a relatively large-scale attack was being prepared, but did not know its timing or all its details.

“He was among the leaders who voted in favor of the attack. But everyone who voted believed it would be a limited operation, including Ismail Haniyeh, who was then head of the political bureau,” the source said.

Haniyeh was preparing to travel from Türkiye to Iraq with Hayya, Meshaal and other leaders on their first visit to the country.

Personal losses, a depleted leadership

The bloodshed since Oct. 7 has reached deep into Hayya’s family. Three years of fierce Israeli war have inflicted devastating losses on Gaza — and on Hayya, even while he was abroad.

In May, he mourned his son Azzam, following the death of another son, Hammam, in September. Israel killed them in separate attacks. Two other sons, Hamza and Osama, were killed by Israel in 2008 and 2014, respectively.

A Hamas source inside Gaza said repeated Israeli attacks on Hayya’s home, and the killing of several of his sons, particularly during the latest war, had strengthened his standing and positioned him to lead the movement ahead of other longstanding figures.

Another Hamas source pointed to the gaps left by the killing or absence of senior leaders.

“The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri, then Yahya Sinwar’s unexpected death in fighting inside Gaza, the assassination of figures such as Rawhi Mushtaha and Osama al-Mazini, and the absence of others for health reasons, including Mahmoud al-Zahar — all of this made Hayya the most prominent figure available to take on responsibility,” the source said.

Leaders from Gaza also held key posts in the political bureau and Shura Council, the source added.

“This does not diminish Hayya’s own standing. He proved his ability to lead and shoulder responsibility in the many portfolios and posts he held,” the source said.

“He became very close to Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza, and later when he joined him abroad. He also faced previous assassination attempts, most notably in Doha in September 2025, while reviewing a US ceasefire proposal with other leaders.”

Hayya’s consistent backing for Sinwar’s plans, inside and outside the movement, also broadened his support, the source said — particularly among Sinwar’s close associates and supporters, and the leadership of the Qassam Brigades.

The Qassam leadership in Gaza backed Hayya for the top job and pushed for his election.

“They saw him as an important choice representing Gaza’s leadership, which they believed should be honored and continue to lead the movement after leading the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ battle and sacrificing its senior leaders,” the source said.

Ties with Iran

Within Hamas and among Palestinian factions, Hayya is known for backing Sinwar’s drive, supported by the Qassam leadership, to rebuild ties with the so-called “axis of resistance,” particularly Iran.

That appears to have been a key factor in his growing influence. He handled contacts with Syria’s former government and visited Damascus to meet Bashar al-Assad in October 2022 — the first visit by a Hamas official since the movement left in 2012 amid mounting popular protests against Assad’s rule.

A senior source from Gaza said the territory’s political and military leaders agreed on the need to restore relations with Iran.

Hayya and Sinwar threw their weight behind renewed ties with Tehran, backed overwhelmingly by the Qassam Brigades’ longstanding leadership, from Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar to all members of its military council.

Some within Hamas supported the move with reservations, a source abroad said.

“There were voices that backed this step cautiously, given the difficulties the movement had faced in its relationship with Iran at certain times, and demands that it support Iran-aligned parties in other arenas,” the source said.

“The movement rejected this and insisted on the independence of its positions.”

Hayya’s path as Hamas leader is strewn with thorns.

In Gaza, he must work to end the war and confront immense humanitarian pressures after the killing of more than 70,000 people and the occupation of more than 60% of the territory.

That task carries a price. He is negotiating through mediators with Israel, which says it will not compromise on disarming Gaza — a demand that would mark one of the most consequential shifts in Hamas’ history.

Hayya and Hamas face a difficult equation: preserving the movement’s existence and cohesion while confronting the possible loss of its weapons, one of its strongest sources of leverage.

The path to political participation is also obstructed. Hamas would need to abide by the Palestinian Authority’s agreements with Israel, a red line for the movement.

Hayya’s rise was a striking and unexpected shift. His tenure now brings a further test, one likely to determine his own fate and the course of the movement he leads.


Stability in Southern Lebanon Tops Agenda for Next Round of Talks with Israel

Smoke rises from Mansouri in southern Lebanon after Israeli detonations on Sept. 28. (Reuters)
Smoke rises from Mansouri in southern Lebanon after Israeli detonations on Sept. 28. (Reuters)
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Stability in Southern Lebanon Tops Agenda for Next Round of Talks with Israel

Smoke rises from Mansouri in southern Lebanon after Israeli detonations on Sept. 28. (Reuters)
Smoke rises from Mansouri in southern Lebanon after Israeli detonations on Sept. 28. (Reuters)

Preparations for the next round of Lebanese-Israeli talks in Tampa, Florida, have stirred debate in Lebanon: Do they mark a shift from political negotiations over withdrawal and sovereignty to military administration of the south?

Lebanese sources following the talks reject that interpretation, saying the focus is on resolving outstanding military and security issues.

A ministerial source told Asharq Al-Awsat that those issues require decisions and action on the ground before other tracks can advance.

“We have not moved to military administration of the south. Most issues that remain unresolved are military matters on the ground: halting bulldozing, house demolitions, gunfire and combat operations; securing Israeli withdrawal; identifying new model areas; addressing the issue of prisoners; and returning residents to their villages,” the source said.

“These are not political, economic or legal issues for specialists in those fields. We are discussing details on the ground: where withdrawal takes place, where operations stop, how the Lebanese army deploys and which areas residents can return to. It is natural for military personnel to discuss these details.”

Combat operations continue, though at a lower intensity, the source said. Other steps cannot advance seriously until a minimum level of security and stability is achieved.

“How can the Lebanese army deploy without an Israeli withdrawal or an end to gunfire? How can residents return to their villages while demolitions, bulldozing and military operations continue?”

Resolving military issues

The United States is focused at this stage on resolving outstanding military and security issues with Israel, the source said. These include completing the withdrawal, identifying model areas and halting bulldozing, demolitions and gunfire so other issues can move forward.

“This does not mean a military track is replacing the political track,” the source said.

“Negotiations have followed two tracks from the outset, political and military. But progress on political issues has remained closely tied to conditions on the ground. No political process can be built upon without a degree of stability and an effective ceasefire.”

That explains the military and security focus of the current meetings, the source said.

“What is needed is decisions on the ground. That is why this stage involves a meeting focused on military and security matters, to resolve outstanding points through US pressure on Israel.”

The US role, according to the ministerial source, is to press Israel to resolve those issues, rather than establish an alternative military administration for the south.

A shift in direction

Lawmaker Ashraf Rifi sees a broader shift. In his view, the growing military emphasis is more than a temporary technical measure: It reflects a change in how the situation is being managed.

Rifi told Asharq Al-Awsat he expected “a very violent round” of fighting in the south, with escalation potentially concentrated in Rihan, Soujoud and surrounding areas.

“I do not think the escalation will extend to Beirut unless assassinations take place,” he said.

Asked whether negotiations over Israeli withdrawal were giving way to a military approach to managing the south, Rifi said the region was heading toward “military, intelligence and security administration under US supervision.”

The process, he said, had moved beyond negotiating Israeli withdrawal to broader military and security administration of the south. Withdrawal would remain part of that process, under US supervision.

“We have moved from negotiating withdrawal to military, intelligence and security administration of the south under US supervision. This administration naturally includes Israeli withdrawal, but places it within broader arrangements overseen by the United States,” he said.

“The military dimension has come to the fore at this stage,” Rifi added. The arrangements would become clearer as conditions on the ground developed and the anticipated round of fighting ended.

No separate military track

Lebanon’s former ambassador to Washington, Antoine Chedid, disputed that reading. A greater military emphasis, he said, does not change the process or its political authority, given the limits of the Lebanese army’s powers.

“Lebanon has not moved from political negotiations over withdrawal and sovereignty to military negotiations or military administration of the south,” Chedid told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The Tampa discussions continue the existing process, he said, even if the venue and participants suggest a military character.

“Tampa is a military hub, but that does not mean Lebanon has entered military negotiations with Israel,” he said.

“The Lebanese army implements decisions made by the government, the political authorities and the president. It cannot independently enter military negotiations with the Israelis, even under US mediation, or make decisions that fall within the authority of Lebanon’s political leadership.”

The talks, Chedid said, continue the political framework and discussions that began in Washington and Rome.

“The Tampa talks are not strictly military discussions. They are a continuation of the political framework and the discussions that began in Washington and Rome, but in a different format. The venue and those present may give the impression of military negotiations.”

“The Lebanese army cannot decide in Tampa on matters that fall within the authority of Lebanon’s political leadership,” he added.

“The army operates under political authority, as it should. I therefore do not see what is happening in Tampa as a shift to a separate military track.”