Hadi’s Death Ends a Journey Through Transformation in Yemen

 Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)
Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)
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Hadi’s Death Ends a Journey Through Transformation in Yemen

 Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)
Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)

Former Yemeni President Field Marshal Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi died on Thursday in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, at the age of 81, closing one of the most complex political and military chapters in Yemen’s history since unification in 1990.

Hadi’s name became closely associated with Yemen’s transitional period, the National Dialogue Conference, and the prolonged war that erupted after the Houthis overthrew the state in late 2014.

He was neither a confrontational leader nor a populist figure. Throughout his career, he was seen as a quiet institutional figure who preferred to work behind the scenes and avoided sharp confrontations, even while at the center of some of the gravest crises in Yemen’s modern history.

That left his legacy divided between two contrasting views. Supporters regarded him as a consensus figure who spared the country an even deeper collapse, while critics held him responsible for failing to confront the Houthis’ expansion as most of northern Yemen fell under their control.

Hadi was born on Sept. 1, 1945, in the village of Dhakin in Al-Wadea district of Abyan province in southern Yemen. He grew up in a modest rural setting before turning to a military life early.

He received military training at several foreign academies, most notably Britain’s Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, where he graduated in 1966. He also pursued higher military studies at Egypt’s Nasser Military Academy and took specialized courses in the former Soviet Union.

Hadi rose through the ranks of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (formerly South Yemen) and held command posts in the armored corps. The bloody events of January 1986 became the defining turning point in his political and military path.

After the faction of former Southern President Ali Nasser Mohammed lost those confrontations, Hadi left for Sanaa with thousands of southern military personnel. There, he began a new phase inside the northern Yemeni state before Yemen’s two parts united in 1990.

Hadi’s profile rose during the summer war of 1994, when the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh appointed him defense minister to fight the attempted secession led by the then vice president, the late Ali Salem al-Beidh.

After the war ended and unity was consolidated, Saleh named Hadi vice president in October 1994. He remained in the post for about 18 years, one of the longest vice presidential tenures in Yemen’s history.

During those years, Hadi became known inside the ruling establishment as the “silent man.” He rarely entered battles among centers of power or became a visible party to the tribal and military rivalries surrounding Saleh.

He kept the image of a disciplined administrative and military official, making him acceptable to domestic and foreign players as a non-confrontational figure.

President of the transition

When protests erupted in 2011 against Saleh’s rule, Yemen entered a period of deep political turmoil that ended with the Gulf initiative, which transferred power to Hadi as a consensus president for the transition.

In February 2012, Hadi was elected Yemen’s consensus president with broad local, regional, and international backing, amid hopes he could rescue the country from collapse and rebuild the state on new foundations.

The main early milestone of his rule was the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference between 2013 and 2014. The conference brought together political and social forces, including the Houthis and the Southern Movement, to draft a project for a modern federal state.

Many Yemenis saw the National Dialogue as a historic chance to end chronic conflicts and build a new state. But later events pushed the country in a completely different direction.

In September 2014, the Houthis swept into the capital Sanaa, and seized state institutions before placing Hadi under house arrest.

Although he submitted his resignation under pressure, Hadi fled to Aden in February 2015 and said he remained committed to his constitutional legitimacy. Expanding Houthi attacks later drove him to Riyadh.

From the Saudi capital, Hadi led the internationally recognized government throughout the years of war. He relied on broad support from the Saudi-led Arab coalition and on the political and legal cover provided by UN Security Council Resolution 2216.

During those years, his government retained the recognition of the United Nations and the international community. Hadi continued to represent Yemen abroad despite losing effective authority over the seized capital, Sanaa, and large parts of the north.

A contested legacy

Hadi’s personality and governing style divided Yemenis and observers.

Critics said his calm temperament and tendency to wait weakened state institutions at decisive moments. They said his slow decision-making allowed the Houthis to expand and take Sanaa. He was also criticized for relying on partisan and tribal networks that failed to settle the battle.

Supporters said he inherited an exhausted country and a divided army, and faced an armed project backed by a regional power in highly exceptional circumstances.

They argue that Hadi preserved the legal legitimacy of the Yemeni state and prevented its complete slide into international isolation.

People close to him also say his commitment to dialogue and consensus was not a weakness, but a political conviction that spared Yemen wider wars in the early stages of the crisis.

Throughout his rule, Hadi enjoyed exceptional regional and international support. Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, backed the transfer of power in Yemen through the Gulf initiative.

After the Houthi takeover, Hadi became the face of the only internationally recognized Yemeni legitimacy. He received broad political and military support from the Arab coalition, as well as backing from the United States and European countries.

During the war years, Yemen kept its seat at the United Nations and other international organizations in the name of Hadi’s government. That was seen as one of his most important political achievements, especially as the Houthis sought international recognition.

Leaving power quietly

In April 2022, Hadi announced he was transferring all his powers to the Presidential Leadership Council headed by Rashad al-Alimi, a move widely seen as a pivotal shift inside the internationally recognized camp.

The decision followed Yemeni-Yemeni consultations hosted by Riyadh, amid pressure to reorganize anti-Houthi forces and unite their political and military components.

The step drew a broad regional and international welcome as a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. Hadi then chose to withdraw almost completely from politics during his final years.

The Yemeni presidency announced on Thursday that Hadi had died after health problems, praising what it described as his “national positions” and his role in preserving legitimacy and Yemen’s unity.

With his death, Yemen loses the last president to lead the unified country under full international recognition before state institutions fragmented and the open war was triggered by the Iran-backed Houthis.

He leaves behind a political and military legacy that will remain the subject of long debate among Yemenis.

The man who came to power as the “consensus candidate” found himself leading a country collapsing under divisions and the Houthi takeover. He remained committed to the legitimacy of the state until he left office, then departed quietly, drawing the curtain on one of the most complex chapters in Yemen’s contemporary history.



Sudan's Famine Risk Worsened by Conflict, Drought and Funding Shortages

A Sudanese farmer plants seeds in an agricultural field in Gedaref State, eastern Sudan, on July 18, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
A Sudanese farmer plants seeds in an agricultural field in Gedaref State, eastern Sudan, on July 18, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
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Sudan's Famine Risk Worsened by Conflict, Drought and Funding Shortages

A Sudanese farmer plants seeds in an agricultural field in Gedaref State, eastern Sudan, on July 18, 2026. (Photo by AFP)
A Sudanese farmer plants seeds in an agricultural field in Gedaref State, eastern Sudan, on July 18, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

Conflict and drought are worsening food insecurity across parts of Sudan’s Darfur and Kordofan regions, a global food crisis monitor warned on Monday.

There is a “deteriorating humanitarian situation” across greater Darfur and Kordofan, including areas identified as at risk of famine, as well as other locations, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC.

Severe drought linked to El Niño is affecting more than half of Sudan, causing localized crop failures and depriving households of food and income, it said.

In May, nearly 19.5 million people — more than 40% of the population — were facing high levels of acute food insecurity, according to an IPC assessment. Of those, 135,000 were in Phase 5, the most severe classification, characterized by extreme food shortages, starvation, very high levels of malnutrition and deaths from disease or acute malnutrition.

Sudan’s war erupted in April 2023 when tensions between the military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, escalated into open fighting in the capital, Khartoum, before spreading across the country. The conflict has killed at least 150,000 people, according to conflict monitor ACLED, though aid groups say the true toll is likely higher.

The war has also displaced about 13 million people and pushed parts of the country into famine.

Farmers’ livelihoods have been affected, and they're now relying more on assistance, the IPC said. Without a quick and significant increase in assistance to Sudan, “food insecurity, acute malnutrition, and excess mortality will likely intensify," the group said.

Poor levels of growth have affected 64% of croplands in North Darfur and about half in South Darfur, West Kordofan and South Kordofan.

The IPC reported worsening acute malnutrition in additional areas, including Nyala, where children accessing nutrition services who were admitted for severe acute malnutrition doubled from approximately 5% to 11% between January and August. Two displacement camps in South Darfur also recorded global acute malnutrition above famine thresholds.

In North Darfur, delayed rains that impacted crop cultivation and “critically low” food stocks have worsened food insecurity. Meanwhile, Western Kordofan is experiencing one of its worst droughts since 2004, the IPC said, citing rainfall levels.

Humanitarian organizations have repeatedly said that ending the conflict and ensuring safe, sustained humanitarian access are essential to improving conditions across Sudan. But repeated efforts to achieve peace have yet to bring the war to an end.

In the latest bout of violence, an airstrike killed at least 72 civilian miners in a border area between Sudan and Egypt where artisanal and small gold mining is widespread, local rights group Emergency Lawyers said Sunday.

The group, which tracks violence across Sudan, said without providing evidence that Egyptian warplanes targeted the miners in Sudan’s North Wadi area.

The Egyptian Armed Forces released a statement late Monday saying that they had launched the latest wave of a "large-scale campaign to confront illegal mining in the Eastern Desert” by dropping “warning leaflets” on citizens. They did not provide any further details or explanation.

In June, Egyptian security forces detained hundreds of people, including foreigners, on the border with Sudan, accusing them of illegal gold mining and smuggling.

Separately, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry also announced the death of two Egyptian truck drivers in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum after a gunman opened fire. The statement said the shooter has been apprehended by the authorities.


Tetteh Affirms ‘Broad Support' For Libyan Agreement … Warns of Disrupting Elections

A session of the UN Security Council on Libya (UN Security Council)
A session of the UN Security Council on Libya (UN Security Council)
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Tetteh Affirms ‘Broad Support' For Libyan Agreement … Warns of Disrupting Elections

A session of the UN Security Council on Libya (UN Security Council)
A session of the UN Security Council on Libya (UN Security Council)

UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya (UNSMIL), Hanna Tetteh, told Security Council members on Wednesday that a deal she brokered to break the political deadlock in the North African country enjoys broad support. However, she warned that rejection by either of Libya’s two legislative bodies could derail elections scheduled to take place within the next two years.

‘Viable Pathway’

In a briefing to the UN Security Council in New York on Wednesday, Tetteh said that following four months of deliberations, on 30 August, the parties to the Smaller Convening signed an Agreement in Tripoli marking a break in the prolonged political and institutional deadlock.

The agreement established a viable pathway for legislative and presidential elections under a single unified executive authority within a period of 24 months.

Also, it provides for the reconstitution of the board of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) and for resolving long-standing contentious issues in the constitutional and legal framework that could negatively impact efforts to conduct peaceful credible and inclusive elections.

According to the UN representative, the Agreement was welcomed by the Government of National Unity, the Libyan National Army, the House of Representatives, and Vice President of the Presidential Council Mousa Al-Koni, among others.

However, she said, the High Council of State rejected the Agreement on 5 October along with the laws and decisions communicated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, citing approaches that would bypass the constitutional, legal and consensual frameworks governing the political process or undermine the prerogatives assigned to the two institutions.

“Their rejection continues to reflect the limited willingness of some of its members to engage constructively in this process, which has been a feature of the ongoing engagement with this chamber,” Tetteh warned.

In this regard, the UN representative revealed that several HCS members have indicated their willingness to engage in the Agreement and have requested additional time to consult amongst themselves on moving the process forward.

“I will further consult the parties to the Smaller Convening in our meeting later this month, including by examining the option of proceeding to a national mechanism of broad representation as provided for in Article 5 of the Agreement and in consultation with this Council,” she said.

Impact of Political Fragmentation

Tetteh said that institutional and political fragmentation have continued to impact negatively on the economic and security situation in the country.

While global oil prices should have generated a significant windfall for public revenues to benefit all, many Libyans are instead seeing their purchasing power eroded by rising food prices, a weaker dinar and inflation right now above 14%, while access to essential public services remain unreliable.

Also, food prices alone further rose by 3.8% in August, with the pressure particularly acute in the West and South, where food costs increased sharply over the summer.

Tetteh noted that between January and September 2026, fuel imports totalled 8.15 million metric tons, at a cost of $8.9 billion, of which between 30 and 50% of these imports are estimated to be lost to smuggling, worth between $2.4 and $4.4 billion.

She said the recent disruptions to oil infrastructure demonstrate the wider economic cost of political and security fragmentation to impact strategic national assets.

Petroleum Facility Guards from Zintan blocked the Hamada-Zawiya pipeline from 15 to 20 September, followed by the Sharara-Zawiya pipeline from 21 to 26 September reportedly due to disputes over appointments from within that region.

“The disruptions resulted in around one million barrels of lost production, worth approximately $100 million, and risked affecting salary payments and electricity generation,” she said.

At the security level, Tetteh said the overall situation remains fragile.

She welcomed positive steps toward enhanced military cooperation between Eastern and Western military and security institutions, adding the Mission continues to encourage confidence-building measures at the technical level between both sides.

Tetteh also referred to the follow-up meeting of the Eastern and Western maritime, air force and air defense commanders in Sirte on 9 September to discuss practical cooperation towards reunifying these sectors.

Elsewhere, the UN representative expressed concern over the execution over the last two months, in Benghazi of 58 individuals convicted of prior crimes related to terrorism offenses, including alleged membership in proscribed terrorist groups or involvement in the killing of military and civilian personnel.

She also condemned the ongoing wave of misinformation, disinformation, hate speech and incitement targeting refugees, migrants, including those with an irregular status, humanitarian actors and UN agencies and personnel in Libya, including colleagues who are Libyan nationals.

Tetteh asked the Security Council’s continued support to the UNSMIL-facilitated political roadmap and to ensure Libyan leaders promptly meet their obligations to fulfil their people’s ultimate aspirations for peace, stability, inclusive and democratic governance that they so deserve.

“The path to a stable, unified, and prosperous Libya remains long, but our destination remains within reach,” she said.

 


Tunisian Journalists Fear Jail Again as Freedoms Erode

Tunisian journalists participate in a rally called by the Tunisian journalists' union to demand the release of journalist Mohamed Yousfi, a vocal critic of President Kais Saied, in Tunis, Tunisia. September 8, 2026. REUTERS/ Jihed Abidellaoui
Tunisian journalists participate in a rally called by the Tunisian journalists' union to demand the release of journalist Mohamed Yousfi, a vocal critic of President Kais Saied, in Tunis, Tunisia. September 8, 2026. REUTERS/ Jihed Abidellaoui
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Tunisian Journalists Fear Jail Again as Freedoms Erode

Tunisian journalists participate in a rally called by the Tunisian journalists' union to demand the release of journalist Mohamed Yousfi, a vocal critic of President Kais Saied, in Tunis, Tunisia. September 8, 2026. REUTERS/ Jihed Abidellaoui
Tunisian journalists participate in a rally called by the Tunisian journalists' union to demand the release of journalist Mohamed Yousfi, a vocal critic of President Kais Saied, in Tunis, Tunisia. September 8, 2026. REUTERS/ Jihed Abidellaoui

In the garden of the independent outlet ‘Nawaat,’ about half a dozen journalists sit smoking, trading jokes and discussing investigations they plan to publish on subjects ranging from the quality of drinking water to conditions of prisons.

They know that any of the stories ⁠could lead to prosecution.

A Hard Test

Journalists in Tunisia who enjoyed a burst of press freedom after the 2011 Arab Spring are once again looking over their shoulders in the knowledge their work may land them in prison.

The 2011 overthrow of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali unshackled Tunisia's media, but a decade later President Kais Saied's seizure of sweeping powers began eroding those gains.

Some 20 journalists face criminal charges over their reporting or social media posts, with four already imprisoned, according to Zied Dabbar, head of the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists, who called the situation unprecedented.

In return, Saied has said he is not a dictator and that journalists are free to criticize authorities and frequently do.

Authorities say prosecutions are impartial judicial matters and that no one is above the law.
The Tunisian prime minister's press office did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.

Now, independent media face a full-on crackdown, rights groups say, and Tunisia has tumbled more than 50 places in the past five years to 137th in Reporters Without Borders' press freedom index.

Shifting Minefield

“We are living in a grey area, as if we were in a shifting minefield, and we pay the price every day,” said Aymen Rezgui, editor-in-chief of Nawaat, reflecting on how at least limits were clear pre-2011 versus current uncertainty.

Rezgui said Nawaat regularly receives threats — anonymously or from government supporters on social media branding him a traitor — over reporting on issues ranging from prisons to power cuts and water shortages.

The outlet has also faced judicial restrictions, including a government order suspending activities for a month last year.

Journalists in Jail, Others Choose Exile

Many other journalists report similar pressures.

Last month, Mohamed Yousfi, editor-in-chief of independent news website Al-Qatiba, was arrested on his way to a private radio station for a live program. A judge has charged him with illicit enrichment, which he says is a fabrication.

Other jailed journalists and media figures include prominent broadcasters Mourad Zeghidi and Borhen Bsaies, who were first convicted of spreading false news and insulting the president, and later of tax evasion. ⁠They deny the charges and say they have been framed.

For some, leaving Tunisia has become the only option to avoid a similar fate, despite the personal cost.

In December 2025, Khaoula Boukrim, founder of independent website Tumedia and a prominent critic of the president, left for France fearing imminent arrest.

Months later, she was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison over writings critical of the judiciary and a system of governance she described as authoritarian.

Journalist Haythem Mekki has also left Tunisia after receiving a prison sentence following public comments he made denouncing conditions in a hospital morgue.

Beyond prosecutions, journalists are frequently prevented by police from working in public and are sometimes detained for hours, the journalists' syndicate says.

Most ministries no longer have press offices, while several international correspondents have been denied accreditation, further restricting independent coverage.

Political and critical programs have disappeared from many private radio stations. State media has ⁠increasingly marginalized dissenting voices, the syndicate says, though the TAP state news agency remains a rare exception, continuing to cover protests, opposition activities and civil society initiatives.