Hadi’s Death Ends a Journey Through Transformation in Yemen

 Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)
Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)
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Hadi’s Death Ends a Journey Through Transformation in Yemen

 Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)
Former Yemeni president during his address to the UN annual meeting (United Nations)

Former Yemeni President Field Marshal Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi died on Thursday in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, at the age of 81, closing one of the most complex political and military chapters in Yemen’s history since unification in 1990.

Hadi’s name became closely associated with Yemen’s transitional period, the National Dialogue Conference, and the prolonged war that erupted after the Houthis overthrew the state in late 2014.

He was neither a confrontational leader nor a populist figure. Throughout his career, he was seen as a quiet institutional figure who preferred to work behind the scenes and avoided sharp confrontations, even while at the center of some of the gravest crises in Yemen’s modern history.

That left his legacy divided between two contrasting views. Supporters regarded him as a consensus figure who spared the country an even deeper collapse, while critics held him responsible for failing to confront the Houthis’ expansion as most of northern Yemen fell under their control.

Hadi was born on Sept. 1, 1945, in the village of Dhakin in Al-Wadea district of Abyan province in southern Yemen. He grew up in a modest rural setting before turning to a military life early.

He received military training at several foreign academies, most notably Britain’s Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, where he graduated in 1966. He also pursued higher military studies at Egypt’s Nasser Military Academy and took specialized courses in the former Soviet Union.

Hadi rose through the ranks of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (formerly South Yemen) and held command posts in the armored corps. The bloody events of January 1986 became the defining turning point in his political and military path.

After the faction of former Southern President Ali Nasser Mohammed lost those confrontations, Hadi left for Sanaa with thousands of southern military personnel. There, he began a new phase inside the northern Yemeni state before Yemen’s two parts united in 1990.

Hadi’s profile rose during the summer war of 1994, when the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh appointed him defense minister to fight the attempted secession led by the then vice president, the late Ali Salem al-Beidh.

After the war ended and unity was consolidated, Saleh named Hadi vice president in October 1994. He remained in the post for about 18 years, one of the longest vice presidential tenures in Yemen’s history.

During those years, Hadi became known inside the ruling establishment as the “silent man.” He rarely entered battles among centers of power or became a visible party to the tribal and military rivalries surrounding Saleh.

He kept the image of a disciplined administrative and military official, making him acceptable to domestic and foreign players as a non-confrontational figure.

President of the transition

When protests erupted in 2011 against Saleh’s rule, Yemen entered a period of deep political turmoil that ended with the Gulf initiative, which transferred power to Hadi as a consensus president for the transition.

In February 2012, Hadi was elected Yemen’s consensus president with broad local, regional, and international backing, amid hopes he could rescue the country from collapse and rebuild the state on new foundations.

The main early milestone of his rule was the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference between 2013 and 2014. The conference brought together political and social forces, including the Houthis and the Southern Movement, to draft a project for a modern federal state.

Many Yemenis saw the National Dialogue as a historic chance to end chronic conflicts and build a new state. But later events pushed the country in a completely different direction.

In September 2014, the Houthis swept into the capital Sanaa, and seized state institutions before placing Hadi under house arrest.

Although he submitted his resignation under pressure, Hadi fled to Aden in February 2015 and said he remained committed to his constitutional legitimacy. Expanding Houthi attacks later drove him to Riyadh.

From the Saudi capital, Hadi led the internationally recognized government throughout the years of war. He relied on broad support from the Saudi-led Arab coalition and on the political and legal cover provided by UN Security Council Resolution 2216.

During those years, his government retained the recognition of the United Nations and the international community. Hadi continued to represent Yemen abroad despite losing effective authority over the seized capital, Sanaa, and large parts of the north.

A contested legacy

Hadi’s personality and governing style divided Yemenis and observers.

Critics said his calm temperament and tendency to wait weakened state institutions at decisive moments. They said his slow decision-making allowed the Houthis to expand and take Sanaa. He was also criticized for relying on partisan and tribal networks that failed to settle the battle.

Supporters said he inherited an exhausted country and a divided army, and faced an armed project backed by a regional power in highly exceptional circumstances.

They argue that Hadi preserved the legal legitimacy of the Yemeni state and prevented its complete slide into international isolation.

People close to him also say his commitment to dialogue and consensus was not a weakness, but a political conviction that spared Yemen wider wars in the early stages of the crisis.

Throughout his rule, Hadi enjoyed exceptional regional and international support. Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, backed the transfer of power in Yemen through the Gulf initiative.

After the Houthi takeover, Hadi became the face of the only internationally recognized Yemeni legitimacy. He received broad political and military support from the Arab coalition, as well as backing from the United States and European countries.

During the war years, Yemen kept its seat at the United Nations and other international organizations in the name of Hadi’s government. That was seen as one of his most important political achievements, especially as the Houthis sought international recognition.

Leaving power quietly

In April 2022, Hadi announced he was transferring all his powers to the Presidential Leadership Council headed by Rashad al-Alimi, a move widely seen as a pivotal shift inside the internationally recognized camp.

The decision followed Yemeni-Yemeni consultations hosted by Riyadh, amid pressure to reorganize anti-Houthi forces and unite their political and military components.

The step drew a broad regional and international welcome as a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. Hadi then chose to withdraw almost completely from politics during his final years.

The Yemeni presidency announced on Thursday that Hadi had died after health problems, praising what it described as his “national positions” and his role in preserving legitimacy and Yemen’s unity.

With his death, Yemen loses the last president to lead the unified country under full international recognition before state institutions fragmented and the open war was triggered by the Iran-backed Houthis.

He leaves behind a political and military legacy that will remain the subject of long debate among Yemenis.

The man who came to power as the “consensus candidate” found himself leading a country collapsing under divisions and the Houthi takeover. He remained committed to the legitimacy of the state until he left office, then departed quietly, drawing the curtain on one of the most complex chapters in Yemen’s contemporary history.



Field Escalation in Lebanon as Israel Seeks to Entrench Security Belt Ahead of Washington Talks

A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
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Field Escalation in Lebanon as Israel Seeks to Entrench Security Belt Ahead of Washington Talks

A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)

The map published by the Israeli army showing the areas where its forces are deployed in south Lebanon has raised questions about the implications of the US-Iranian agreement, as military operations continue and the issues of withdrawal and redeployment remain tied to anticipated Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Washington.

While Israel speaks of a “security zone” inside Lebanese territory, Israeli army spokesman Avichay Adraee said Israeli forces are deployed “based on operational necessity” within an area extending roughly 10 kilometers into Lebanon, with the aim of removing what he described as threats and improving the defense of residents in northern Israel.

On the ground, two people were killed and another wounded in an Israeli drone strike that targeted a vehicle at the Kfar Tebnit roundabout. Drones also struck Hadatha without causing casualties, while another drone dropped a bomb on Beit Yahoun, wounding two people. An Israeli drone also dropped a stun grenade on a family inside a house in Nabatieh al-Fawqa near the teachers’ college.

Artillery shelling struck the outskirts of Nabatieh al-Fawqa, while the Israeli army carried out bulldozing operations in Khiam.

As Lebanese army troops and members of the Al-Risala Health Emergency Association entered Hadatha, Israeli forces opened fire toward civilians and Lebanese soldiers in the town. Villages in the eastern sector and the Marjayoun district remained relatively calm compared with other parts of southern Lebanon.

A field source in south Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat that the map “effectively reflects an attempt to impose a new reality on the ground following the US-Iranian understanding by treating vast areas of south Lebanon as zones under Israeli security and military control.”

The source said the boundaries shown on the map extend beyond what is known in some places as the “Yellow Line” and include areas where the Israeli army was unable to establish a permanent presence during the war, such as Ali al-Taher Hill and the southeastern outskirts of Hadatha.

The source noted that the Lebanese army is deployed inside Hadatha itself, while Israeli forces continue attempting to advance toward the surrounding high ground.

According to the source, “including these areas on the Israeli map has heightened residents’ fears and slowed the return of displaced people to Nabatieh and its surroundings.”

The concern, the source added, extends beyond Nabatieh city to include Dweir, Jibshit, Harouf, Zebdine, Mifadoun, Shoukine, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. These areas still lack basic living conditions, while near-daily artillery shelling continues, prompting many residents to delay their return.

The source said, “The boundaries Israel is drawing today closely resemble those that existed before its withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, stretching from the western sector through the central sector and into large parts of the eastern sector toward Khiam.”

Israel did not include in its current map some areas it previously occupied as far as the outskirts of Jezzine, the source said. In practice, however, it has treated the entire western and central sectors, together with the highlands extending east of Nabatieh toward the Marjayoun-Khiam axis, as falling within its security sphere of control.

The source said the most significant outcome of the period following the US-Iranian understanding has been Israel’s effort to draw what it described as “occupation boundaries” and establish them as a fait accompli on the ground by effectively turning these areas into an undeclared security belt.

According to the source, the line Israel is seeking to consolidate runs through the central sector along the Bint Jbeil and Wadi al-Salouqi axes, reaching Hadatha, Baraachit and Beit Yahoun.

Although Israeli forces are not physically deployed inside these towns, the source said they are treated as part of an advanced security zone and a new line of contact in south Lebanon.

No Signs of Israeli Withdrawal

Retired Brig. Gen. Bassam Yassin told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US-Iranian agreement has not yet translated into any tangible changes on the ground in south Lebanon.

The situation on the ground, he said, still reflects continued Israeli deployment in the areas under its control, while issues related to withdrawal and post-war arrangements remain under discussion in negotiations currently taking place in Washington.

Yassin said the map recently published by the Israeli army suggests that Israel views the areas it marked as territory under its military control, “as though it is saying these areas are under Israeli occupation, should not be approached, and that any movement within them will be treated as a security threat.”

He said one of the most important of these areas is Ali al-Taher. Many people, he noted, reduce it to a hill or small elevation, “when in fact Ali al-Taher is a mountain ridge extending between three and four kilometers from the area around Kfar Tebnit toward Kfar Rumman. Including large parts of it in what Israel considers an area under its control therefore carries important operational implications.”

“The Israeli occupation is currently consolidating the positions where it is deployed, while attempts to advance toward Ali al-Taher are still continuing,” he said.

Artillery and rocket fire in the Nabatieh area has also continued in recent weeks, he added, stressing that “there are still no real indications of Israeli withdrawals, contrary to what some believe.”

Yassin said the issues related to an Israeli withdrawal, redeployment or the deployment of the Lebanese army “are not decided on the ground but are being discussed within the framework of ongoing Lebanese meetings and negotiations in Washington.”

Any talk of withdrawal or new arrangements, he added, “remains premature at this stage.”

No Withdrawal

Meanwhile, Israel’s Channel 14 reported that “the future of the Israeli deployment in south Lebanon will be discussed during negotiations with the Lebanese side in Washington.”

Israel’s public broadcaster also reported that the issue of withdrawing from positions where Israeli forces remain deployed inside Lebanon will be raised during the next round of negotiations.

Yedioth Ahronoth reported that “the Israeli army has demanded that it retain a buffer zone inside south Lebanon while insisting on the dismantling of weapons in the south.”


Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
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Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)

The resignation of Fares al-Nur, a senior figure in the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), from all his posts in the Rapid Support Forces and the political bloc backing it has revived questions about a wave of defections from the force in recent months and what they may mean for its military and political cohesion.

The move comes as Sudan’s war enters its fourth year with no clear sign that either side is close to a decisive military victory.

Al-Nur told Asharq Al-Awsat on Wednesday that he had left all positions of responsibility within the RSF and Tasis. He said he acted because of what he described as a deepening political deadlock, the continuation of the war and the vast humanitarian suffering it has caused.

He said his resignation was intended to open space for a broad Sudanese dialogue that brings together different parties, away from political and military polarization, and helps reach a settlement to end the crisis.

The importance of the step lies not only in al-Nur’s position inside the alliance, but also in its nature. He is not a battlefield commander with troops on the ground.

He is instead viewed as one of the most prominent political figures associated with the project that the RSF sought to build alongside its military campaign. That gives his resignation political weight beyond any immediate military effect.

Al-Nur was a member of the Tasis presidential council and had been appointed “governor of Khartoum Region” in the parallel government announced by the alliance. He had previously served for years as an adviser to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and was one of the most prominent members of the RSF negotiating delegation at the 2023 Jeddah talks.

What makes this different?

This type of departure differs from earlier splits within the RSF over the past two years. Most of those involved were field commanders with military influence or fighters on the ground.

In May, Bashara al-Huweira, who was responsible for military operations on the Bara axis in North Kordofan State, announced his defection from the RSF. Before him, field commander Al-Nour Adam, known as Al-Nour al-Qubba, said he had withdrawn from the RSF and joined the Sudanese army after his forces left their positions in North Darfur.

Before them all, Abu Aqla Keikal, one of the RSF’s most prominent commanders and the governor of Gezira State while it was under RSF control, announced his cooperation with the Sudanese army.

File photo showing the defecting commander Abu Aqla Keikal (third from left) with Rapid Support Forces elements before joining the army.

That was seen as one of the most consequential defections because of his influence in central Sudan. Most recently, field commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as Al-Savannah, announced his defection and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The political and military weight of these figures varies. But the pace of defections over a short period has raised a sharper question: do they point to growing pressure inside the RSF camp, or are they still individual moves that do not affect the force’s core structure?

The RSF has tried to project a different picture. In recent days, it broadcast video clips that it said, according to its Telegram platform, showed groups from the Joint Force of armed movements allied with the army joining its ranks.

The message was clear: movement between the camps is not going in one direction only.

Such messages are part of a propaganda and media war running alongside the fighting, with each side trying to prove its cohesion and its ability to attract leaders and fighters.

Shartai Samir, a prominent RSF supporter on social media, played down the importance of Fares al-Nur’s departure. He said the political and military project represented by Tasis had moved beyond individuals, and that the departure of leaders or groups would not affect its continuity.

He also said the developments were part of attempts to attract political and military figures from the RSF camp after its opponents, as he put it, failed to achieve their goals militarily.

But the key question is not how many people leave. It is what effect they have.

Political researcher Mohamed Latif says it is important to distinguish between political and military defections.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudanese politics has seen repeated splits inside parties and alliances over many decades, but that they have rarely produced a radical shift in the balance of power.

Latif said most political splits are driven by personal disputes or ambitions rather than ideological or programmatic differences. For that reason, their impact often remains limited.

He said the impact of “military defections” is measured by how far they affect a party’s fighting strength or geographical deployment. In his view, most of the defections from the RSF in the recent period have not had a tangible effect on its basic military structure or its main areas of influence.

That is why he said he did not expect the departure of Fares al-Nur, as a political and civilian figure, to have a major impact on the cohesion of the Tasis alliance.

But not everyone agrees with that assessment.

Commander Al-Savannah, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces, speaking at a press conference in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Jamal al-Shaheed, a strategic expert specializing in security and military affairs, says defections should not be judged by the announcement alone, but by their practical effects on the ground.

Al-Shaheed told Asharq Al-Awsat that defections become significant when they reach middle-ranking and field commanders, or political figures with organizational and social influence. Such figures, he said, are the link between the top leadership and the base.

“The indicators that should be monitored are not limited to the number of defectors, but include whether the phenomenon continues and expands, and its impact on internal discipline, the ability to recruit and mobilize, and the maintenance of field deployments,” he said.

According to al-Shaheed, the decisive test is ultimately military performance.

If defections are accompanied by battlefield retreats, the loss of areas of influence, or a weaker ability to carry out coordinated operations, then they move from being a political or media event to a factor affecting the balance of the conflict.

The retired military expert points to earlier experiences of Sudanese armed movements during the civil war in southern Sudan and the Darfur conflict. Some defections yielded no meaningful strategic results, while others weakened entire factions by stripping them of influential leaders and undermining their organizational cohesion.

All of this raises a broader question about the future of the war itself.

RSF supporters say the latest defections are no more than individual moves that will not affect their political and military project. Others argue that their repetition warrants close attention as a sign of internal pressures and challenges that may extend beyond individuals to the organizational structure itself.

So far, there is no evidence that defections between the parties to the war can, on their own, change the course of the conflict or force a political settlement.

But their persistence and spread among military and political figures make them a phenomenon worth watching in a long, open-ended war. Its final outcome still depends on what the battlefield reveals in the coming months, and on whether the warring parties can preserve both military and political cohesion.


US Issues Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked Targets

A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
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US Issues Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked Targets

A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

Washington has issued new "counter ‌terrorism" ‌sanctions ​targeting ‌individuals ⁠and entities ​linked to ⁠Lebanon’s ‌Hezbollah, details ‌posted ​to ‌the US‌ Treasury Department's ‌website on Thursday showed.

It announced sanctions against several Lebanese officials it said were aligned with Hezbollah and members of the sanctioned ⁠Alaa Hassan Hamieh ⁠business network for obstructing Lebanon’s peace process and delaying the disarmament of Hezbollah.

The Treasury said its Office of Foreign Assets Control was also designating individuals in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, who it said were raising ⁠funds ⁠and operating front companies to generate revenue for Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militant group.