Ghalibaf Discusses Iranian Plan in Baghdad to ‘Hide’ Faction Weapons

This handout photograph taken and released by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on August 19, 2026 shows Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (L) and Iraq's Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during their meeting in Baghdad. (Photo by Iraq's Prime Minister Media Office / AFP)
This handout photograph taken and released by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on August 19, 2026 shows Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (L) and Iraq's Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during their meeting in Baghdad. (Photo by Iraq's Prime Minister Media Office / AFP)
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Ghalibaf Discusses Iranian Plan in Baghdad to ‘Hide’ Faction Weapons

This handout photograph taken and released by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on August 19, 2026 shows Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (L) and Iraq's Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during their meeting in Baghdad. (Photo by Iraq's Prime Minister Media Office / AFP)
This handout photograph taken and released by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on August 19, 2026 shows Iran's Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (L) and Iraq's Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during their meeting in Baghdad. (Photo by Iraq's Prime Minister Media Office / AFP)

Iran is pushing proposals to avert a confrontation between Iraq’s government and Tehran-aligned armed factions over their weapons, with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf taking the effort to Baghdad ahead of a Sept. 30 disarmament deadline.

Iraqi sources said Ghalibaf’s visit to Baghdad on Wednesday goes well beyond its stated parliamentary purpose, with talks focused on political and security issues — chiefly the fate of armed factions’ weapons as the deadline to bring all arms under state control approaches.

The sources said Ghalibaf was carrying Iranian proposals aimed at averting a direct confrontation between the Iraqi government and Tehran-aligned factions.

The ideas include “freezing” or concealing heavy weapons and possibly transferring a large portion of them temporarily to Iran until a political settlement is reached over the future of the factions’ arsenals.

The details of the proposals could not be independently verified, and neither Tehran nor the Iraqi government has announced them publicly.

An Iraqi government source, who asked not to be identified, said the government was “determined to respect its deadlines” and bring weapons under state control by the end of September, coinciding with the completion of the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq under a timetable agreed by Baghdad and Washington.

The Iraqi government has said Sept. 30 marks the end of the timeline for implementing its weapons-control plan.

The government source said the position was reaffirmed during meetings held by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi after his return from Washington, and at the latest meeting of the State Administration Coalition, which backed efforts to bring weapons under state control.

The coalition had previously voiced support for the plan, while the government has taken practical steps including forming a committee to oversee disengagement and integration, creating a weapons database and closing fictitious offices linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Pressure builds with armed factions

Ghalibaf’s visit comes as tensions rise between the government and some armed factions, particularly Kataib Hezbollah, which has rejected handing over what it calls “resistance weapons.”

The government source said the authorities would not be drawn into “wars of words” or “ill-considered confrontations” and would press ahead with enforcing the constitution and the law.

He said the increasingly sharp tone of some faction statements, along with videos and remarks seen as inciting or threatening the prime minister, showed the pressure building around the weapons-control plan.

Statements by Kataib Hezbollah have stirred debate within political circles and among the factions themselves, particularly over the language used against al-Zaidi.

Media outlets and social media platforms have also carried statements and videos containing direct threats or warnings to the prime minister, including the phrase “don’t play with the big boys,” attributed to a local official in Babil province, according to the sources.

The government source said al-Zaidi’s refusal to respond in kind, coupled with his insistence on sticking to the timetable, had put Shiite forces within the Coordination Framework in a difficult position.

They now face, he said, regional and international support for the prime minister on one side and political pressure and corruption cases involving some figures linked to them on the other.

The source said some leaders affected by those cases had left the country, while others had disappeared from public view, prompting factions within the Coordination Framework to look for a settlement that could prevent an inter-Shiite confrontation.

“Freeze,” hide or move the weapons

A well-informed political source told Asharq Al-Awsat that one option under discussion was to extend the deadline implicitly without making a formal announcement.

Under that approach, the prime minister would be persuaded that progress had been made in bringing weapons under state control, while the continued possession of arms by two or more factions whose leaders had their own “convictions and conditions” could be handled through dialogue rather than armed confrontation.

The source said those backing the proposal feared a clash between the government and Shiite factions. But al-Zaidi, he added, remained committed to enforcing the law and was relying on judicial support for the weapons-control effort.

According to the source, the prime minister believes any retreat from the deadline or from the substance of the plan would leave him a prime minister “stripped of authority.”

He believes some faction statements have sought to reinforce that image by questioning his political legitimacy, describing him as still merely “designated” to form a government and criticizing his young age.

The government says the plan is rooted in its ministerial program, which calls for bringing weapons under state control, enforcing the rule of law, unifying security decision-making and placing military resources and capabilities within the official state system.

The political source said one version of the proposal Ghalibaf is believed to be discussing with the factions, al-Zaidi and some Coordination Framework leaders would “freeze” or “conceal” the factions’ heavy weapons.

It would also raise the possibility of moving a large portion of those weapons to Iran as a “deposit” until talks are completed.

The source said the idea was designed to offer a face-saving way out for factions that regard the weapons as “Shiite weapons” that cannot be negotiated away, while allowing them to avoid a complete break with the prime minister and the Shiite forces backing him, as well as Sunni and Kurdish forces that support bringing weapons under state control.

Why Ghalibaf matters

Ghalibaf’s visit carries added weight because of his position within Iran’s political establishment and is not confined to parliamentary ties.

He arrived in Baghdad at the head of a parliamentary delegation but has since held meetings and conducted activities with a wider political and security dimension.

The way he was received at Baghdad airport also carried political significance, according to the sources.

Adnan Fayhan, first deputy speaker of parliament and a senior figure in the Asaib Ahl al-Haq movement, received Ghalibaf instead of Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi.

In his remarks in Baghdad, Ghalibaf openly acknowledged the political and regional dimension of the visit.

He said the “resistance” in Iraq had become a fundamental element of the country’s strength and that ties between Baghdad and Tehran were moving toward consolidating a “new regional order” free from foreign interference.

Ghalibaf said the visit aimed to strengthen cooperation among countries in the region and to build new security and regional arrangements.

His remarks align with a broader Iranian view of the role armed factions play in regional security calculations.

Tehran’s recent moves suggest the factions’ weapons have become part of a wider discussion between Iran and Iraqi political forces, rather than simply an internal dispute over enforcing a government decision.

Ghalibaf’s visit was preceded by an unannounced trip to Baghdad by Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, whose meetings covered the factions’ weapons and regional developments, according to Iraqi sources.



Khaddam Recounts Final Damascus Meeting… Bashar to Hariri: ‘Whoever Defies Me, I Will Break His Bones’

Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam (Reuters)
Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam (Reuters)
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Khaddam Recounts Final Damascus Meeting… Bashar to Hariri: ‘Whoever Defies Me, I Will Break His Bones’

Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam (Reuters)
Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam (Reuters)

Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam reveals new details in his memoirs about a meeting between former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in Damascus in the summer of 2004, describing it as the harshest encounter in the period leading up to Hariri’s assassination.

The memoirs, edited and introduced by Ibrahim Hamidi, are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).

The book cover

According to the memoirs, Assad summoned Hariri in July for a meeting at 7:30 a.m. attended by Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan, Brig. Gen. Rustom Ghazaleh and Col. Mohammed Khallouf. Assad’s harsh words caused Hariri’s blood pressure to rise and his nose to bleed.

The memoirs trace the roots of the crisis to the 1998 election of Lebanese army commander Gen. Emile Lahoud as president. Khaddam recounts that Bashar al-Assad pushed for Lahoud to succeed President Elias Hrawi, persuading his father, President Hafez al-Assad, to back the army commander despite objections from most Lebanese leaders close to Damascus, including Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri and Hariri. Khaddam also says Ghazi Kanaan pressured Lebanese lawmakers to support Lahoud.

Khaddam says he subsequently asked Hafez al-Assad to relieve him of responsibility for the Lebanon portfolio because his opposition to Lahoud was well known. The file then passed to Bashar al-Assad.

“Thus ended the political management of this complicated file, and it fell into the hands of the Syrian security services,” Khaddam writes.

Later that same morning, Khaddam says he was scheduled to meet Assad and found him “agitated and tense.” Assad recounted his meeting with Hariri directly to him.

“Rafik Hariri was here, and I spoke to him clearly and frankly in the presence of the officers,” Khaddam quotes Assad as saying. “I told him he was not allowed to work to bring in a president other than Emile Lahoud. I am the one who chooses who governs Lebanon, and whoever defies me, I will break his bones.”

From right: Fares Boueiz, Rafik Hariri, Farouk al-Sharaa, Elias Hrawi, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and Ghazi Kanaan during a meeting at Baabda Palace (Getty)

Khaddam says he was stunned by the remarks and challenged Assad: “You are speaking to the prime minister of Lebanon, who represents the Sunni Muslims in his country. Have you considered the repercussions if your words reach the media? How can you address Lebanon’s prime minister this way in the presence of these officers?”

According to Khaddam’s account, Assad then calmed down and asked his vice president to invite Hariri to meet him in an effort to “erase the consequences” of the encounter.

The memoirs say Hariri initially refused, telling Khaddam by telephone: “After my last visit, I will not visit Damascus.”

He later agreed to meet Khaddam in Bloudan, northwest of Damascus, where he appeared “hurt.”

“I will never forget my meeting with Bashar al-Assad as long as I live,” Hariri told him.

Bashar al-Assad meeting with Emile Lahoud, Nabih Berri, and Rafik Hariri (Getty)

The memoirs go on to recount the dispute over extending Lahoud’s presidential term. On Aug. 18, 2004, Khaddam says Assad told him he had decided against an extension.

“No one in the world supports Lahoud. The Arab states do not support him, and the majority of Lebanese oppose him,” Assad is quoted as saying, adding that he had been “firm” with the Lebanese president.

Just three days later, however, while Khaddam was in France, Hariri called to tell him that Assad had changed his mind and summoned him to Damascus for a brief and tense meeting.

“You have to decide where you stand. Are you with Syria or against it?” Assad told Hariri, according to Khaddam’s account of what Hariri later told him.

Khaddam writes that Hariri told him Jumblatt had advised him to accept the extension and then resign. Khaddam himself advised Hariri to agree to the extension, leave Lebanon and announce his resignation from abroad.

Hariri subsequently informed Rustom Ghazaleh that he accepted the extension and traveled to Sardinia to join his family. Days later, Khaddam says, Hariri called him and asked: “If I return to Lebanon, will my life be in danger?”

Khaddam reassured him that he had agreed to everything demanded of him and that Assad “still needs him because the constitutional amendment has not yet been completed.”

The memoirs also recount a last-minute attempt, through Spanish mediation, to avert a UN Security Council meeting. After five hours of contacts, Washington, Paris and London agreed to cancel the session in return for a Syrian commitment to abandon the extension.

But Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa told his Spanish counterpart: “Lebanon is an independent state and we have nothing to do with the matter.”

Hafez al-Assad and to his left, Abdul Halim Khaddam in 1999 (Getty)

The Security Council met the following day and adopted Resolution 1559, which called for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and political independence, the withdrawal of remaining foreign forces and a presidential election free from foreign interference.

The memoirs characterize the resolution as having been adopted under Chapter VII and as placing the Syrian regime under Security Council scrutiny.

Khaddam’s testimony carries particular significance because of his position at the heart of Syria’s governance of Lebanon. For decades, he was the Syrian official responsible for the Lebanon portfolio before, as he recounts, responsibility passed to Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian security services.

In his account, a single threat uttered during a deeply personal confrontation becomes a key to understanding a period that culminated in a complete breakdown between Damascus and broad segments of Lebanese society.

The full account of the meeting, as well as the events preceding and following it, appears in the book’s chapter titled “The Assassination of Rafik Hariri.”


Lebanon Hands Assad-era General to Syria in 1st Such Transfer Since Assad’s Fall

Former Syrian Major General Adel Issa. Photo: Syria’s interior ministry
Former Syrian Major General Adel Issa. Photo: Syria’s interior ministry
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Lebanon Hands Assad-era General to Syria in 1st Such Transfer Since Assad’s Fall

Former Syrian Major General Adel Issa. Photo: Syria’s interior ministry
Former Syrian Major General Adel Issa. Photo: Syria’s interior ministry

Lebanese authorities handed a former senior Syrian army officer to Damascus on Wednesday to face charges including murder and torture, Syria’s interior ministry said, marking the first handover of an Assad-era military officer by Lebanon since former President Bashar al-Assad was toppled in 2024.

Major General Adel Issa, a former commander of the Syrian army’s 17th Division and later ground forces in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor, was transferred to Syrian custody after Lebanese authorities detained him earlier this month.

The ministry said Issa was wanted under an arrest warrant on charges including intentional homicide, facilitating a felony, killing more than two people, torture leading to death, and crimes aimed ⁠at inciting civil war ⁠and sectarian strife.

His case is now before a Damascus referral judge before it can be sent to a criminal court for trial, the ministry added.

Issa denied the accusations while held in Lebanon, according to two people familiar with his arrest and extradition.

The transfer could set a precedent for scores of former Syrian security and military officials ⁠believed to have fled across the border after fighters led by now President Ahmed al-Sharaa ousted Assad in December 2024.

Issa, 67, was detained on August 8 after going to the Syrian embassy in Beirut to complete paperwork. Embassy officials alerted Lebanon’s prosecutor’s office that he was wanted in Syria, and Lebanese investigators took him into custody, the people said.

His transfer follows months of pressure by Damascus on Beirut to act against former Assad officers who sought refuge in Lebanon after his government collapsed.

Reuters reported in January that Syrian authorities had given Lebanese security officials ⁠a list ⁠of more than 200 former senior officers wanted by Damascus. A senior Syrian security official had travelled to Beirut in December to discuss their whereabouts, legal status and possible prosecution or extradition.


Sudan: More Than 200,000 People Displaced Since Eruption of Blue Nile Fighting

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Barham Salih meets Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia's Ura camp. AFP
UN High Commissioner for Refugees Barham Salih meets Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia's Ura camp. AFP
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Sudan: More Than 200,000 People Displaced Since Eruption of Blue Nile Fighting

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Barham Salih meets Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia's Ura camp. AFP
UN High Commissioner for Refugees Barham Salih meets Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia's Ura camp. AFP

A Sudanese government official has confirmed that more than 200,000 people have been displaced from the cities of Kurmuk and Qeisan, as well as other areas in the Blue Nile state in southeastern Sudan, as a result of fighting between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Warnings have been issued about the worsening humanitarian and health conditions facing the displaced, amid heavy rainfall, shortages of food and shelter materials, and difficulties in delivering aid.

Last week, forces belonging to the Tasis (Foundation) alliance, led by the RSF, announced that they had taken control of the strategic cities of Kurmuk and Qeisan, located near the Ethiopian border.

This development triggered a large wave of displacement toward safer areas, particularly the cities of Damazin, the regional capital, and Roseires, the state's largest city.

Hashim Orta, Commissioner of Voluntary Return and Displaced Persons in the Blue Nile region, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the number of people displaced from Kurmuk, Qeisan, and other towns had exceeded 200,000 since the outbreak of hostilities.

He stressed that they are living under “extremely difficult humanitarian conditions.”

The Commission of Voluntary Return and Displaced Persons in the Blue Nile is a local government body responsible for monitoring the conditions of displaced persons and refugees, coordinating their return, and supporting their reintegration.

The origins of Sudan’s voluntary return mechanism date back to 2003, when a displacement and voluntary return unit was established under the Humanitarian Aid Commission.

Orta added that pregnant women and elderly men and women died while attempting to flee the fighting, enduring arduous displacement journeys that lasted several days. Many were forced to walk long distances through heavy rain and over difficult terrain.

According to Orta, displacement camps and reception centers around Damazin have received tens of thousands of civilians in recent days, most of them women and children. Their needs for food, drinking water, healthcare, and shelter materials continue to grow.

The total figure provided by the local official could not be independently verified.

The Commission of Voluntary Return and Displaced Persons is not affiliated with the United Nations, but it works in cooperation with UN agencies and international organizations, including the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), on issues related to displacement, return, and humanitarian assistance.

Fears of Disease Outbreaks

The local government official warned of increasing health risks within displacement sites, particularly during the rainy season. He expressed concern about the potential spread of malaria, dengue fever, and other seasonal diseases, amid overcrowded shelters and weak healthcare services.

He said local authorities were making efforts to provide food, water, and shelter materials, but the available resources were far from sufficient to meet the scale of needs and the growing numbers of people arriving each day.

“The need is immense compared to the numbers flowing into the camps,” he said, calling on local, regional, and international organizations to intervene urgently and provide humanitarian assistance to those affected.

The continuing fighting has further complicated the humanitarian response, as insecurity in several areas is preventing aid organizations and supplies from reaching residents and displaced people. At the same time, local authorities are facing mounting pressure to provide basic necessities for the large numbers of people fleeing the violence.

Displacement Journey Amid Heavy Rains

Eyewitnesses described harsh conditions faced by civilians traveling from conflict areas toward Damazin and Roseires. They said heavy rainfall had severely damaged dirt roads and made them difficult to cross, forcing some families to walk long distances under extremely challenging conditions.

The crisis is compounded by the geography of the Blue Nile region, where seasonal rains cause rivers and streams to swell and cut off a number of roads, making civilian movement and the delivery of humanitarian aid even more difficult.