Drone Strikes Hit 15 Power Stations Across Sudan in Days

Damage at the Al-Markhiyat power station north of Omdurman following a drone attack on October 28 (AFP). 
Damage at the Al-Markhiyat power station north of Omdurman following a drone attack on October 28 (AFP). 
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Drone Strikes Hit 15 Power Stations Across Sudan in Days

Damage at the Al-Markhiyat power station north of Omdurman following a drone attack on October 28 (AFP). 
Damage at the Al-Markhiyat power station north of Omdurman following a drone attack on October 28 (AFP). 

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued drone attacks on electricity infrastructure in army-controlled areas, targeting power generation plants and substations across the country, causing widespread electricity and water outages and raising fears of a partial collapse of the national grid.

The escalating strikes have also threatened hospital operations and agricultural projects, with warnings of severe consequences if the attacks continue at their current pace.

Reports indicate that around 15 stations were targeted between October 20 and November 1, while the Emergency Lawyers group said Sunday that 15 facilities had been attacked in October alone.

Early Sunday, drones launched simultaneous strikes on the Abu Hamad substation in River Nile State and the Al-Dabbah station in Northern State, according to eyewitnesses. Local sources said fuel facilities in Northern State were also hit.

River Nile State Governor Mohammed al-Badawi said after inspecting the site that a drone strike had completely destroyed the Abu Hamad substation, cutting electricity supplies across the state.

The attacks came less than 24 hours after drones targeted the Haya substation, still under construction in Red Sea State, along with oil transportation facilities.

Warnings of a Nationwide Blackout

Former Sudanese Energy Minister Adel Ibrahim warned that most major electricity substations had been bombed and taken out of service, leaving, by his estimate, only three principal stations: Merowe Dam and Atbara in northern Sudan, and Maranjan in Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazira State.

“If electricity stations continue to be targeted at this rate, complete darkness will engulf the country,” Ibrahim told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He cautioned that repairing the damage and restoring operations could take considerable time, while replacing destroyed transformers and other equipment would involve substantial costs.

Substations play a critical role in connecting power generation facilities to consumers. Their destruction can therefore leave entire cities and states without electricity even when generating plants remain operational.

Ten States Affected

Reports show that the attacks have spread to 10 of Sudan’s 18 states, with White Nile and Gedaref recording the highest number of targeted facilities, at three each. Five states in Darfur under RSF control were not targeted.

In White Nile State, drones struck the Tendelti, Mashkoor and Um Dabakir thermal power stations. In Gedaref, attacks hit Al-Hawata and Al-Faw, along with other electricity facilities cited in reports.

Al-Jazira State saw strikes on the Al-Junayd and Al-Managil stations, while Shendi and Abu Hamad were targeted in River Nile State.

In Sennar State, the Singa station came under attack. Other strikes hit Al-Markhiyat, northwest of Omdurman in Khartoum State; Haya in Red Sea State; and Al-Dabbah in Northern State.

There were also reports of an attack on an electricity facility in Kadugli, South Kordofan State.

White Nile and Gedaref thus topped the list in terms of sites mentioned in the reports, although the absence of standardized technical data makes it impossible to rank states by the scale of damage or duration of outages.

The wave of attacks began on October 20 with a strike on Tendelti before expanding on October 26 to Singa, Al-Hawata, Al-Faw, Mashkoor and Al-Junayd.

Al-Markhiyat was hit the following day, followed by Al-Managil on October 28, Um Dabakir on October 29, Shendi on October 30 and Haya on October 31.

The latest strikes targeted Abu Hamad and Al-Dabbah early Sunday.

Accusations Against Ethiopia

The Sudanese government has accused the RSF of carrying out the attacks and Ethiopia of allowing its territory to be used to launch drones against facilities inside Sudan.

On Saturday, the Foreign Ministry briefed diplomatic missions on the allegations, identifying locations inside Ethiopia that it said were being used to support drone operations.

During a recent visit to Moscow, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohieddin Salem also accused Ukrainian military personnel of assisting the RSF and training its members to operate drones.

The expanding geographical reach, frequency and precision of some strikes suggest that the paramilitary group possesses substantial numbers of long-range drones and increasingly sophisticated operational capabilities.

Emergency Lawyers said the attacks had disrupted electricity and water supplies and threatened healthcare services, worsening civilian suffering.

On Saturday, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned the escalation of drone attacks by both sides in Sudan’s war, expressing shock at their devastating impact on civilians.

His spokesperson, Stephane Dujarric, said the strikes had killed hundreds of civilians, including women and children, across Sudan and the Abyei region.

Guterres stressed the need to protect civilians and critical infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, and urged both parties to immediately cease hostilities and engage seriously in mediation efforts to end the war.

The attacks have raised growing concerns about hospitals’ ability to operate medical equipment, maintain drinking water supplies and keep irrigation projects running, particularly as the winter agricultural season approaches.

Sudan’s electricity sector has suffered extensive damage since the war erupted in April 2023, affecting thermal generation units, transmission stations, transformers and power lines.

The latest strikes have placed further strain on an already weakened grid struggling with equipment shortages, maintenance difficulties and limited funding.



Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
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Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)

Syrian authorities on Sunday announced the destruction of large quantities of narcotics, including 400 million captagon pills seized by security forces in multiple operations.

"Large quantities of narcotic and psychotropic substances seized during various security operations were destroyed in batches," the drug enforcement department announced in a statement carried by state news agency SANA.

It added that the quantities destroyed included "400 million captagon pills, 12.2 tons of hashish, in addition to 2.3 tons of cannabis plants, six kilograms of heroin, as well as 5.4 million narcotic pills".

"Tools and equipment used in smuggling, concealment, transport, and manufacture, including chemical substances," were also destroyed.

Synthetic stimulant captagon became Syria's largest export after the civil war began in 2011, flooding the region and becoming a key source of illicit funding for now ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Syria's new authorities who took power in December 2024 have been working to combat the captagon trade.

Khaled Eid, the head of the drug enforcement department, announced in June that authorities "carried out 1,550 operations to seize and foil" drug smuggling attempts since Assad's fall, according to SANA.

He said authorities dismantled 90 international smuggling networks, shut down 17 captagon manufacturing plants, and seized 697 million captagon pills and 15 tons of hashish during those operations.


Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
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Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan downplayed advances by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in the Blue Nile region, urging residents not to fear an attack on the regional capital and vowing to fight until what he called the rebellion is defeated.

His remarks came hours after the RSF-aligned Tasis alliance claimed control of five areas in Geissan, a day after announcing the capture of the Bau locality headquarters.

Speaking in Khartoum on Friday evening while offering condolences over the death of Khatmiyya Sufi leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, Burhan sought to reassure residents of Ad-Damazin, the Blue Nile capital.

“Don’t be afraid,” he said, citing the army’s expulsion of RSF fighters from Khartoum as evidence of its ability to prevail.

“They were sitting in the very house where I am speaking,” he added. “Wherever they enter, they will find themselves in a tunnel, in a trap they cannot escape.”

Burhan said that the war remained a priority, acknowledging that much of the state’s resources were being directed toward military operations.

“The army is defending Sudan, its citizens and their right to exist. We will fight until we win, and we will win,” he declared.

The Tasis alliance, comprising the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, announced on Friday that its forces had captured several towns in Geissan, nearly 40 kilometers southeast of Ad-Damazin.

The alliance had claimed control of the Bau locality headquarters the previous day, while conflicting accounts emerged from the warring sides over other towns.

Blue Nile’s regional government stressed that the army still held the initiative and was working to restore security in the southern part of the region.

Burhan also praised the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Mirghani, for supporting the army throughout the war through its members and political positions, describing it as a partner alongside other parties and organizations backing the military and Sudanese people.

While acknowledging what he described as hardships in daily living conditions, he attributed much of the economic pressure to an “economic war” waged by countries he accused of instigating the conflict on April 15, 2023.

He also criticized reports about famine and fuel shortages, describing them as attempts to discourage Sudanese citizens and undermine morale.

Famine warnings

Despite Burhan’s dismissal of the reports, international humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned of worsening food insecurity in parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) identified famine conditions in El Fasher and Kadugli and warned of further deterioration driven by fighting, displacement, drought and insufficient humanitarian funding.

According to a World Health Organization alert issued on October 12, IPC analysis covering February through May 2026 found that around 19.5 million people in Sudan faced acute food insecurity at crisis level or worse, including around 135,000 in the catastrophic category.

The World Food Program (WFP) has documented restrictions on the movement of goods, particularly in areas affected by fighting and displacement.

It attributed rising food prices to disrupted supplies and the depreciation of the Sudanese pound.


Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
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Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 

Years of a devastating war have failed to dismantle Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Gaza, with Israel continuing to uncover underground passages even in areas under its military control.

Recent Israeli announcements have detailed new discoveries on both sides of the Yellow Line, established under the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement. The boundary initially left Israel controlling about 50% of Gaza, a share that has since expanded to more than 65%.

The latest operation, described as the first of its kind since the ceasefire, targeted a Hamas tunnel west of the Yellow Line and Salah al-Din Road, near the southern side of the Netzarim Corridor toward central Gaza.

Israeli forces have also reported destroying several tunnels within areas they control, underscoring the complexity of an underground network that has proved more extensive and resilient than anticipated.

Origins of the Tunnel Network

Hamas first used a tunnel in a military operation on September 26, 2001, a year after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

The group detonated explosives inside a tunnel approximately 150 meters long beneath a military tower at the Termit outpost in Rafah, southern Gaza, killing and wounding several Israeli soldiers.

Israel initially paid limited attention to the tactic, quickly sealing and destroying the tunnel using rudimentary methods rather than the advanced technology employed today.

Hamas subsequently repeated the approach in other operations, including one in 2006 in which Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured.

After taking control of Gaza, Hamas devoted considerable resources to developing tunnels for defensive and offensive operations, as well as smuggling weapons and military equipment.

Commercial tunnels also proliferated along the Rafah border after Israel imposed a sweeping blockade on the territory.

During the 51-day Gaza war in 2014, Hamas surprised Israeli forces with a series of cross-border tunnel operations, allowing its fighters to attack Israeli troops at close range.

The attacks heightened fears among residents of Israeli communities surrounding Gaza and prompted demands for stronger defenses against underground infiltration.

Israel subsequently built a technologically advanced border barrier equipped with aboveground and underground detection and protection systems.

However, during the October 7, 2023, attack, Hamas breached the new barrier using explosives designed to destroy sections of it and aerial means, including paragliders.

Tunnels, meanwhile, remained primarily defensive structures and facilities for command and control, although Hamas field commanders were later forced to abandon some of them after they came under attack.

Israeli Assessments

Israeli Southern Command officers have recently acknowledged that Hamas’ military arsenal, particularly its tunnel network, has not been completely eliminated.

They have also indicated that further measures are needed to address the future of the group’s weapons.

Amichai Mitelman, of the civil engineering department at Ariel University, estimated in a report published recently by Israel’s Maariv newspaper that a substantial portion of Hamas’ tunnels remains intact. He cautioned that no single method could destroy the entire network.

According to Mitelman, estimates of the total length of Gaza’s tunnels before the October 7 attack ranged from 500 to 1,000 kilometers.

Some tunnels were between 30 and 40 meters deep, with branching passages of varying widths, he explained.

Efforts to destroy the network by flooding tunnels with seawater or detonating large quantities of explosives have failed to eliminate it completely.

Filling tunnels with concrete has recently proved more effective, he said, although the method is costly and labor-intensive.

The Qassam Engineers

The underground network has remained a major challenge for Israel throughout the war, which has continued at a limited level despite the ceasefire.

Israel has demanded the complete destruction of Hamas’ tunnels under the ceasefire agreement, subject to monitoring by Israel, the United States and mediating countries.

The fate of Hamas’ other weapons, including rockets, has also become a central issue.

During operations to recover Israeli hostages, particularly the remains of those killed, it emerged that some had been buried in small tunnels and branches that Israeli forces had failed to detect.

Some of these passages remained intact within tunnel systems the military had believed it had destroyed.

Videos released by Hamas’ armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, featuring commanders and fighters killed during the war, have also shed light on the construction of the tunnels and the development of the group’s rocket arsenal.

The footage suggests that much of the work relied on local expertise and manual labor rather than exclusively on weapons smuggled from Iran or elsewhere, as is often assumed.

This has also prompted Israeli demands to dismantle Hamas’ weapons-manufacturing workshops.

The videos indicate that many of those responsible for tunnel construction and rocket development, known within the group as the “Qassam engineers,” did not hold formal engineering qualifications.

While a small number had engineering degrees, most had studied other subjects, and some had no academic qualifications.

Many were construction workers or technicians whose practical skills enabled them to oversee the development of the underground network over many years. They supervised excavation teams largely composed of younger Qassam recruits.

The so-called engineers assessed soil conditions, identified areas of structural strength and weakness, and determined tunnel routes before excavation began.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that tunnel construction and preparation followed what they described as professional engineering practices, using various types of equipment operated by skilled technicians.

The sources credited these workers with playing a central role in developing what Hamas considers a strategic military asset.

They acknowledged that construction had faced serious difficulties over the years, with numerous workers killed during excavation and others suffering paralysis or other injuries following soil collapses and unexpected incidents.

Security challenges also complicated the work, including alleged Israeli attempts to recruit informants from among faction members, tunnel workers and others to identify underground locations.

Other Hamas sources said the group’s rocket industry similarly relied on domestic development. According to these accounts, engineers from Gaza received training and studied relevant subjects at universities and other institutions before returning to train additional personnel, expanding the number of people capable of manufacturing and developing weapons.

The sources maintained that explosives were also manufactured and adapted locally to meet operational requirements, including those used to destroy sections of Israel’s border barrier during the October 7 attack.

They credited the engineers with adapting weapons to changing battlefield conditions.

The same approach, they added, extended to other locally developed weapons, including the Yassin 105 anti-armor projectile, which Hamas used extensively against Israeli forces during the war.