World Bank: Red Sea Crisis Raises Global Shipping Costs by 141%

FILE PHOTO: The oil tanker Cordelia Moon bursts into flames after being hit by a missile in the Red Sea, off Yemen's Red Sea Port of Hodeidah, in this screengrab from a video released on October 1, 2024. Houthi Military Media/Handout via REUTERS
FILE PHOTO: The oil tanker Cordelia Moon bursts into flames after being hit by a missile in the Red Sea, off Yemen's Red Sea Port of Hodeidah, in this screengrab from a video released on October 1, 2024. Houthi Military Media/Handout via REUTERS
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World Bank: Red Sea Crisis Raises Global Shipping Costs by 141%

FILE PHOTO: The oil tanker Cordelia Moon bursts into flames after being hit by a missile in the Red Sea, off Yemen's Red Sea Port of Hodeidah, in this screengrab from a video released on October 1, 2024. Houthi Military Media/Handout via REUTERS
FILE PHOTO: The oil tanker Cordelia Moon bursts into flames after being hit by a missile in the Red Sea, off Yemen's Red Sea Port of Hodeidah, in this screengrab from a video released on October 1, 2024. Houthi Military Media/Handout via REUTERS

The Red Sea crisis has emerged as a critical flashpoint of the conflict in the Middle East, upending global trade and maritime transport, port activity in the MENA region, and ecological balance of the Red Sea.

In a report entitled “The Deepening Red Sea Shipping Crisis: Impacts and Outlook,” the World Bank said that trade diversions have reshaped port trade activity along the Asia-Europe corridor, altering the fortunes of key hubs.

It said Western Mediterranean hubs are thriving on redirected trade, while their Eastern Mediterranean counterparts face steep declines. Meanwhile, the report said, South Asian ports, like Colombo, have seized the opportunity, capturing more regional cargo.

“The disruption has sent shockwaves through global supply chains, resulting in longer supplier delivery times, especially in Europe,” the World Bank said.

However, the report said higher freight rates have had muted effects on inflation so far, partly owing to subdued global demand, lower global commodity prices, and the adequate stock of inventories.

The report said the Drewry World Container Index, a critical gauge of global shipping costs, remains 141% higher than pre-crisis levels as of November 2024.

It said the impact is more pronounced along routes passing through the Red Sea, where shipping rates from Shanghai to Rotterdam and Genoa are, on average, 230% higher than at the end of 2023.

In its detailed report, the World Bank said attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea—a vital corridor for nearly a third of global container traffic—have severely disrupted regional and global maritime operations.

Security threats in the Red Sea have compelled ships on the Asia-Europe and Asia-North Atlantic trade lanes to be rerouted around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope.

In the wake of these disruptions, the once-thriving maritime passage, prized for its role as the most expedient link between Asia and Europe, has witnessed a precipitous drop in vessel traffic.

By end-2024, about a year after the onset of the crisis, vessel traffic through the strategic Suez Canal and Bab El-Mandeb Strait—which used to carry 30% of world container traffic—had plummeted by three-fourths, forcing ships to detour around the Cape of Good Hope, where navigation volumes surged by over 50%.

Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical oil passageway and a chokepoint between the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, has not been immune to the spillover effects, experiencing a 15% reduction in maritime traffic due to its proximity to the conflict zone.

Also, trade diversion around the Cape of Good Hope led a sharp increase in the travel distances and times of vessels that once frequented the Red Sea.

The report said that by October 2024, travel distances for cargo ships and tankers that previously passed through the Red Sea had risen by 48% and 38%, respectively, compared to the pre-conflict baseline of January to September 2023.

It said this has resulted in corresponding increases in travel times of up to 45% for cargo and 28% for tankers, signaling a significant shift in global maritime logistics.

The Red Sea shipping crisis has also profoundly disrupted the global supply chains.

The World Bank’s Global Supply Chain Stress Index, a measure of the delayed container shipping capacity that was held up due to port congestion or closures, rose to 2.3 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEUs) in December 2024—more than double the levels recorded in December 2023.

Over the past year, Eastern Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf ports have accounted for 26% of delayed container shipping capacity, up from 8% a year ago.

Meanwhile, China’s share has dropped to 9% from 38%.

The report additionally showed that Purchasing Managers’ Indices for suppliers’ delivery times have increased in 25 out of 35 surveyed countries globally between November 2023 and October 2024, compared to the pre-crisis baseline of November 2022 to October 2023. The deterioration of supplier delivery times has been particularly pronounced in Europe and some of the Asian countries.

The World Bank said that since November 2023, the majority of Red Sea and Gulf ports and their associated economies have registered reduced sea trade volumes compared to the baseline period of November 2022 to October 2023.

Jordan and Oman saw the steepest declines in shipping exports, with reductions of 38% and 28%, respectively, while Jordan and Qatar experienced the largest declines in shipping imports, at 50 and 27%. Between November 2023 and October 2024, nearly all of the top 20 ports across Red Sea and Gulf countries recorded notable drops in both imports and exports, with an average trade volume decrease of 8% compared to their pre-crisis levels.

Egypt reported an estimated $7 billion loss in Suez Canal revenues for 2024, representing approximately 5% of its GDP.

Nevertheless, a few ports in the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have bucked the trend, showing positive growth.

Their locations in the Mediterranean and the Gulf, away from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory, likely enabled them to benefit from trade diversion from ports located near the conflict’s center and maintain uninterrupted trade routes to Europe and other markets.

From November 2023 to October 2024, global port visits and seaborne trade volumes dropped by 5% for imports and 4% for exports compared to the November 2022 to October 2023 baseline, partly due to the Red Sea shipping crisis.

With the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas taking effect on January 19, 2025, and the Houthis stating they will limit attacks on commercial vessels to Israel-linked ships, the potential for reduced disruptions to global maritime trade has increased, the report showed.

It said a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas took effect on January 19, 2025, unfolding in three phases over several weeks.

More specifically, three scenarios are constructed to assess its potential impact on shipping trade.

First, in the baseline scenario, the crisis is assumed to last until October 2025, with year-on-year shipping trade growth from December 2024 to October 2025 mirroring those observed during the same period from December 2023 to October 2024.

Second, gradual recovery scenario assumes the crisis lasts until May 2025, after which shipping trade growth returns to the pre-crisis levels.

Third, the World Bank said a rapid recovery scenario assumes the crisis ends quickly in February 2025.



Japanese Ambassador to Asharq Al-Awsat: Riyadh, Tokyo in Consultations to Strengthen Energy Supply Chains

Saudi-Japanese ministerial roundtable meeting held in January last year (File photo: X)
Saudi-Japanese ministerial roundtable meeting held in January last year (File photo: X)
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Japanese Ambassador to Asharq Al-Awsat: Riyadh, Tokyo in Consultations to Strengthen Energy Supply Chains

Saudi-Japanese ministerial roundtable meeting held in January last year (File photo: X)
Saudi-Japanese ministerial roundtable meeting held in January last year (File photo: X)

As international trade faces mounting disruptions, Japan's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Yasunari Morino, revealed that Riyadh and Tokyo are engaged in intensive consultations aimed at strengthening the resilience of energy and critical materials supply chains against current regional tensions. He stressed that energy security is no longer merely a conventional issue, but has become a strategic priority requiring greater cooperation and closer coordination.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Morino said Japan highly appreciates Saudi Arabia's leading role in promoting de-escalation across the region and advancing diplomatic solutions to conflicts, as well as its pivotal role in ensuring the stability of the global oil market. He reaffirmed Tokyo's commitment to expanding bilateral ties across various sectors, moving beyond the traditional scope of oil trade and petrochemicals toward broader opportunities in technology and investment.

The Saudi-Japanese Business Council held a meeting in Riyadh several days ago at the Federation of Saudi Chambers to discuss ways to enhance business cooperation between the two countries and review the current business environment.

Morino said the long-standing economic relationship between Saudi Arabia and Japan is a source of shared pride, noting that Saudi crude oil supplies are critically important to Japan, while Japanese investments in the Kingdom's petrochemical sector are substantial.

"As Saudi Arabia embarks on ambitious structural reforms to diversify its economy, Japan is exploring new opportunities to expand our economic relationship in line with the Japan-Saudi Vision 2030 launched in 2017, which complements Saudi Vision 2030," he said.

The ambassador added that bilateral cooperation holds significant promise in advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, healthcare, entertainment, sports, and food. He noted that the strategic importance of the relationship was further strengthened after the two governments agreed in February to establish the Strategic Partnership Council, co-chaired by Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Prime Minister of Japan.

He also expressed Japan's strong interest in contributing to the success of Riyadh Expo 2030, particularly as Japan handed over the hosting torch of the global event to the Kingdom.

Japanese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Yasunari Morino (Embassy)

Trade by the Data

Morino highlighted official data reflecting the depth of trade ties between the two countries.

Trade in December 2025: Saudi exports to Japan reached SAR22.7 billion ($6 billion), accounting for 11.7 percent of the Kingdom's total exports that month. The exports were mainly mineral fuels and organic chemicals. Saudi imports from Japan totaled SAR3.6 billion ($960 million), representing 4.3 percent of total imports, led by vehicles and parts, followed by machinery and mechanical equipment.

Full-year 2025 exports: Saudi exports to Japan totaled SAR133.3 billion ($35.5 billion), led by mineral fuels and oils worth SAR129.8 billion ($34.6 billion), followed by organic chemicals valued at SAR1.2 billion ($320 million), and copper and copper products worth SAR936.1 million ($249.6 million).

Annual imports from Japan: Saudi Arabia imported goods worth SAR38.2 billion ($10.1 billion) from Japan in 2025. Vehicles and parts ranked first at SAR26.6 billion ($7 billion), followed by boilers, machinery, and mechanical equipment at SAR3.9 billion ($1 billion), and electrical equipment at SAR1.8 billion.

Japanese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Yasunari Morino addresses the Saudi-Japanese Business Council meeting last Monday (Japanese Embassy in Riyadh)

Non-oil exports and foreign direct investment

On the growth of non-oil trade, Morino said Saudi non-oil exports to Japan reached SAR47.7 million ($12.7 million) in April 2026. The main exports included base metals and articles thereof worth SAR35.4 million ($9.4 million), plastics and rubber worth SAR5.8 million ($1.5 million), and chemical products worth SAR4.4 million ($1.1 million).

On investment, Morino said Japan's foreign direct investment stock in Saudi Arabia declined slightly to SAR23.1 billion ($6.1 billion) at the end of 2024, compared with SAR23.6 billion ($6.2 billion) in 2023. He said joint investments are expected to expand in the future, supported by new initiatives and agreements between the two countries.


Lebanon Under Pressure to Dismantle the Parallel Economy and Exit the FATF Grey List

A Cabinet session chaired by President General Joseph Aoun at Baabda Palace (Lebanese Presidency).
A Cabinet session chaired by President General Joseph Aoun at Baabda Palace (Lebanese Presidency).
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Lebanon Under Pressure to Dismantle the Parallel Economy and Exit the FATF Grey List

A Cabinet session chaired by President General Joseph Aoun at Baabda Palace (Lebanese Presidency).
A Cabinet session chaired by President General Joseph Aoun at Baabda Palace (Lebanese Presidency).

The decision by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to keep Lebanon on its "grey list" of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in combating money laundering and terrorist financing has not triggered any new repercussions for cross-border financial transactions. Rather, it has served as a warning to the government's executive and monetary authorities that the grace period is nearing its end for completing the legal and procedural measures needed to dismantle the "parallel economy" and curb illicit cash flows operating outside the formal financial sector.

While the devastating consequences of the recent war on the humanitarian, reconstruction and economic fronts have provided mitigating grounds, according to a senior financial official, to explain the slow pace of reforms required from the relevant authorities, particularly administrative, judicial and security bodies, they do not diminish the risks associated with prolonging Lebanon's sovereign stay in an environment of growing suspicion generated by the parallel economy and the continued exploitation of the financial system's persistent fragility.

Intertwined Tracks

The financial official, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, said it is no secret that the political and economic tracks have become deeply intertwined, to the point of running in parallel and perhaps advancing simultaneously. The objectives of establishing the state's exclusive control over arms and restoring the legitimacy of financial and commercial activities now go hand in hand, requiring the authorities to make an explicit commitment to international requirements and conditions that would secure external support to end the war as a first priority and launch the recovery process through the International Monetary Fund, paving the way for Lebanon's safe exit from the catastrophic deterioration of most of its sovereign and financial ratings.

International pressure, from both governments and institutions, continues to emphasize the need to curb illicit financial channels, including designated non-financial businesses and professions as well as certain non-bank financial institutions, particularly those linked to Hezbollah. Foremost among them is Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association, along with similar activities targeted by the international community and international financial institutions.

One of Al-Qard Al-Hasan institution's buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs (file photo- AP)

Positive Assessment of the Legitimate Financial Sector

Despite Lebanon's continued placement on the grey list, the country's legitimate financial sector continues to receive a positive assessment based on an integrated legal and administrative framework that complies with the strictest international standards. Particular recognition has been given to the central bank's measures aimed at rigorously verifying the sources and destinations of funds, restricting cash and electronic payments, financial transactions and transfers to banks and licensed financial companies, and strengthening the judiciary's central role in combating all forms of financial crime.

According to statements by Banque du Liban Governor Karim Souaid, removing Lebanon from the grey list is a top priority because the country cannot play a credible role in the global financial system unless it achieves that objective. He noted that remaining on the list affects not only Lebanon's reputation but also restricts correspondent banking relationships and increases the cost of financial transactions.

Accordingly, the governor stressed that "no honest account of this crisis can ignore the parallel economy, including illicit financial flows, money laundering operations and corrupt practices that have infiltrated and weakened Lebanon's financial system." He also reaffirmed the central bank's firm and non-negotiable commitment to the principles of disclosure, transparency and accountability.

Banque du Liban has already implemented a broad package of measures in line with this approach. These include engaging specialized firms to combat the "parallel economy," deploying advanced financial monitoring tools, strengthening Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, enhancing due diligence procedures, enforcing beneficial ownership transparency requirements, significantly improving the quality of suspicious transaction reports, and strengthening cooperation with relevant regional and international financial bodies.

People walk outside Lebanon's Central Bank building in Beirut, Lebanon April 4, 2025. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

Forensic Audit

In coordination with the Ministries of Finance and Justice, the central bank has also launched a forensic audit conducted by Alvarez & Marsal. The firm's mandate extends well beyond reviewing the funds disbursed by the central bank at the request of previous governments to finance the subsidy program. It covers all payments made up to the end of 2023, funds transferred to commercial banks through international transfers, and payments made by the central bank on behalf of the state.

The governor also affirmed that the central bank is cooperating with Lebanese judicial authorities by providing all information and financial analyses permitted by law in support of judicial proceedings. It is likewise cooperating with judicial authorities in Switzerland, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and other countries where legal proceedings involving illicitly transferred Lebanese funds are underway.

Lebanese President General Joseph Aoun meets with the Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon in Baabda (X)

Lebanon's Commitments

Under the latest FATF assessment issued at the end of last week, Lebanon has committed at the highest political level to work with the organization to strengthen the effectiveness of its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework, despite the country's difficult social, economic and security challenges. This requires continued coordination in implementing the agreed action plan to address the identified strategic deficiencies.

The action plan comprises ten key points identified in the Mutual Evaluation Report. The foremost priority is conducting targeted assessments of money laundering and terrorist financing risks and ensuring that the necessary policies and mitigation measures are in place. It also calls for strengthening mechanisms that ensure the effective and timely execution of requests for mutual legal assistance, extradition and asset recovery.

Without ranking them by importance, the authorities are also required to strengthen designated non-financial businesses' and professions' understanding of money laundering and terrorist financing risks and to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations of AML/CFT obligations. They must also ensure that beneficial ownership information is continuously updated and that adequate sanctions and appropriate measures are in place to mitigate risks associated with legal persons, particularly companies and other legal entities.

In the same context, the authorities are expected to make greater use of financial intelligence, reports and analytical products produced by the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), while demonstrating a sustained increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in money laundering investigations, prosecutions and court judgments in line with the identified level of risk.

The obligations also include improving asset recovery mechanisms and strengthening the ability to detect and intercept the illicit cross-border movement of cash, precious metals and precious stones. Likewise, Lebanon is expected to pursue terrorist financing investigations and strengthen information-sharing with foreign partners regarding such investigations, in accordance with the recommendations of the Mutual Evaluation Report.

In addition, the authorities are required to strengthen the immediate and effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions, particularly among designated non-financial businesses and professions and certain non-bank financial institutions. They must also implement targeted, risk-based oversight of higher-risk non-profit organizations while ensuring that legitimate activities carried out by those organizations are neither disrupted nor discouraged.


Sudan Edges Closer to Currency Split

A 1,000-pound note print (X)
A 1,000-pound note print (X)
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Sudan Edges Closer to Currency Split

A 1,000-pound note print (X)
A 1,000-pound note print (X)

Sudan’s division is no longer confined to geography, administration and public services. It has begun to touch one of the state’s most sensitive institutions.

New 1,000- and 500-pound banknotes, issued by the Central Bank of Sudan in May 2022, have been observed circulating in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, raising questions about the future of the national currency's unity and the central bank’s ability to maintain authority over the country’s cash supply.

The RSF-aligned government, based in Nyala, has allowed the circulation of banknotes bearing the signature of former Central Bank of Sudan governor Hussein Yahia Jangol after reappointing him to the same post as governor of what it calls a parallel central bank.

The Nyala government has banned other denominations bearing the signature of Burai al-Siddiq, who succeeded Jangol at the central bank. Meanwhile, Mohamed Hasan al-Taishi, prime minister of the parallel government, has announced monetary and banking policies that he said are aimed at building an integrated financial system.

Asharq Al-Awsat has learned from a source whose identity has not been definitively established that the circulation of new banknotes in RSF-controlled areas is not the first such case. It remains unclear whether the notes had been stored previously or were newly printed.

Bankers and economists say the danger lies not in the banknote itself, but in the authority controlling its issuance and circulation, and in the possible impact on the effectiveness of economic policy, confidence in the national currency and the stability of the financial system.

Experts say the effectiveness of monetary policy depends mainly on the Central Bank of Sudan’s ability to exercise authority over the money supply, manage liquidity, ease pressure on the foreign exchange market, control inflation and support exchange-rate stability.

If cash circulates outside that authority, measuring the money supply becomes more complicated. It also weakens the monetary authorities’ ability to fight inflation, manage liquidity, contain pressure on the exchange rate, maintain price stability and protect the financial system.

According to data released by the Central Bank of Sudan in April, money supply growth stood at 27.3%, reflecting challenges in liquidity management, especially given the exceptional conditions the country faces.

Experts say the circulation of banknotes in RSF-controlled areas further complicates measuring the money supply, particularly the component of currency circulating outside the banking system.

It also reduces the accuracy of monetary indicators and weakens the design and implementation of monetary policy, leading to lower confidence in the national currency and limiting the ability of institutions to enforce economic policies uniformly across the country.

According to the Central Bank of Sudan’s economic and financial review issued last December, currency held by the public accounted for about 97.4% of total currency in circulation, compared with only 2.6% held by commercial banks.

This high level of cash circulating outside the banking system points to the spread of direct cash transactions, limiting the banking sector’s ability to mobilize savings and making liquidity management more difficult.

Experts say any additional circulation of cash outside the central bank’s authority would deepen economic imbalances and obstruct the management of the money supply and the stability of the monetary and financial systems.

Informal economy

Recent studies indicate that Sudan’s informal economy accounts for about 60% of economic activity, a high level that limits the effectiveness of policy and weakens the state’s ability to measure and manage it.

Sudan’s economy still relies heavily on cash transactions compared with electronic payment methods. Despite recent developments in banking applications, financial inclusion and banking penetration remain below the required level. This strengthens the parallel economy and limits the efficiency of economic policies and their development into a “real” economy.

From the perspective of experts and bankers, the scenario of Sudan moving toward two banking systems appears technically and institutionally unlikely in the near term. Establishing an independent banking system requires more than issuing banknotes.

It requires a central bank capable of carrying out its core functions, including managing monetary policy, operating payment and settlement systems, supervising and regulating banks, managing reserves and establishing banking relationships with foreign correspondent banks. These requirements are difficult to meet under current conditions.

Financial bodies have warned that the continuation of the conflict could lead to the emergence of a parallel financial network carrying out banking functions informally, especially money transfers, cash movement and local trade financing.

Two central banks

Some countries that have suffered prolonged conflicts, such as Somalia, have seen the significant development of private money transfer networks that have effectively performed part of the banking system’s functions, while remaining outside the official regulatory framework. In Sudan’s case, the expansion of such channels could reduce the role of the formal banking sector.

Although Sudan does not yet have a parallel central bank exercising full institutional functions, as is the case in eastern Libya, this may depend on how long the conflict continues.

Sudan could gradually move closer to the Libyan model, with the Sudanese pound remaining one national currency legally, while multiple banknote issues circulate, acceptance levels vary from one region to another and partial cash markets emerge.

Sudanese authorities had previously ruled out the possibility that the RSF would print a new currency through companies or in countries subject to the global banking system.

Former Finance Minister Ibrahim Elbadawi told Asharq Al-Awsat that what happened was natural and expected, given the continuation of a fierce war for more than three years.

Elbadawi said the larger dilemma was the “insistence on war,” despite the difficulty of either side achieving a “decisive victory.” He added: “Most civil conflicts end in political settlements, and this is especially true of the Sudanese war.”

Tasis Prime Minister Mohamed Hasan al-Taishi said in press remarks that his government was moving ahead with monetary and banking policies to build an integrated financial system. He did not comment directly on reports about the introduction of new banknotes in Nyala.

Taishi said citizens in areas administered by his government had faced difficulties obtaining banking services and making money transfers due to conditions imposed by the war and institutional divisions.

The man leading the RSF-aligned government and the Tasis alliance renewed accusations against the army-led government, saying it had targeted citizens in areas under his control by “changing the currency,” draining markets of cash and using liquidity as a pressure card and a tool of war.

He said that all matters related to currency printing fall under the authority of the monetary authorities and relevant technical bodies. Any arrangements related to cash management or liquidity provision, he said, are carried out in accordance with carefully studied technical plans aimed at maintaining economic stability and meeting the needs of citizens and markets.

Taishi announced last May the creation of a “Transitional Currency Council,” defining its role as regulating monetary and banking affairs, managing currency circulation, supervising currency replacement programs and granting banking licenses in coordination with the governor of the Central Bank of Sudan in Nyala.

In recent months, the Tasis government established Future Bank, the first commercial bank to offer several banking services, including foreign currency transfers.

After the war broke out between the Sudanese army and the RSF in April 2023, banks went completely out of service in the western region of Darfur. This led to a severe liquidity shortage in markets and the deterioration of banknotes in circulation, while the Sudanese government continued to tighten controls at crossings to prevent any new currency from entering those areas.