Why Türkiye’s Currency Is Crashing After Erdogan Got Reelected 

People buy simit, Türkiye’s ubiquitous pretzel-like snacks, at Eminonu commercial area in Istanbul, Türkiye, Wednesday, June 7, 2023. (AP)
People buy simit, Türkiye’s ubiquitous pretzel-like snacks, at Eminonu commercial area in Istanbul, Türkiye, Wednesday, June 7, 2023. (AP)
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Why Türkiye’s Currency Is Crashing After Erdogan Got Reelected 

People buy simit, Türkiye’s ubiquitous pretzel-like snacks, at Eminonu commercial area in Istanbul, Türkiye, Wednesday, June 7, 2023. (AP)
People buy simit, Türkiye’s ubiquitous pretzel-like snacks, at Eminonu commercial area in Istanbul, Türkiye, Wednesday, June 7, 2023. (AP)

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won reelection last month despite a battered economy and a cost-of-living crisis that experts say are exacerbated by his unconventional economic policies.

The longtime leader appointed an internationally respected former banker as finance and treasury minister and on Friday named a former co-CEO of a US-based bank as head of the central bank.

But lingering uncertainty over Erdogan’s economic direction and an apparent move to loosen government controls of foreign currency exchanges have led Türkiye’s currency to plunge to record lows against the US dollar this week.

The Turkish lira has now weakened by around 20% against the dollar since the start of the year. It has raised fears of even higher prices for people already struggling to afford basics like housing and food amid high inflation.

"I am anxious. I am unhappy. Soon my income won’t pay the rent," said Sureyya Usta, a 63-year-old who lives in Ankara.

Here’s a look at the falling value of the lira, what lies ahead for the economy and how people have been affected:

Erdogan’s economic policies

Türkiye has been plagued by a currency crisis and skyrocketing inflation since 2021, which economists say are the result of Erdogan’s unorthodox belief that raising interest rates will increase inflation.

Conventional economic thinking — and the approach being taken by central banks around the world — calls for the opposite: rate hikes to control price spikes.

Erdogan has exerted pressure on Türkiye’s central bank to lower borrowing costs.

The bank has cut its key policy rate from around 19% in 2021 to 8.5% now, even as inflation hit a staggering 85% last year. Inflation eased to 39.5% last month, according to official figures, but an independent group says the true number is more than double that.

In other policy considered to be unorthodox, economists say the government aggressively intervened in the markets to prop up the lira ahead of the elections, depleting Türkiye’s foreign currency reserves to keep the exchange rate under control.

"Pressure over the lira had been high for some time, but excessive interventions by the central bank was preventing" the currency from skyrocketing in recent weeks or months, said Ozlem Derici Sengul, an economist at the Istanbul Spinn Consultancy.

A return to ‘rational ground’?

Hours after being sworn in, Erdogan announced that Mehmet Simsek, a former Merrill Lynch banker who had previously served as his finance minister and deputy prime minister, would return to the Cabinet after a five-year break from politics.

Simsek said Türkiye had no other option but to return to "rational ground." In a sign that Erdogan’s new administration might pursue more conventional economic policies, Simsek also said there were no "shortcuts or quick fixes" but vowed to oversee Türkiye’s finances with "transparency, consistency, accountability and predictability."

In another sign, Erdogan on Friday appointed Hafize Gaye Erkan to lead the central bank, taking over from the current chief who has championed rate cuts since 2021. Erkan, a former co-CEO of a US-based bank, becomes Türkiye’s first woman central bank governor.

Economists say, however, that it's not clear to what extent Erdogan, who has ruled the country with a tight grip, will give Erkan and Simsek free rein.

"The markets are not convinced yet" of Erdogan’s return to traditional policies, Sengul said. There are uncertainties over whether Erdogan will "allow unlimited independence to the central bank and other institutions — or have another strategy," she said.

Why is Türkiye’s currency falling?

The Turkish lira tumbled to record lows against the dollar this week, first falling 7% on Wednesday and then 1.6% on Friday.

Economists say the sharp slide earlier in the week resulted from the government loosening its controls over the currency following Simsek's appointment. However, the plunge may have been steeper than what it had anticipated.

The lira weakened by a limited 0.5% on Thursday amid reports that state banks were asked to resume selling foreign currency to prop up the currency. On Friday, the lira depreciated to another all-time low of 23.54 to the dollar.

"Loose interventions, combined with some uncertainty, created an excessive depreciation in the lira in one day," Sengul said about the Wednesday drop. "The banks are currently intervening in the exchange market, that’s why we will not have another 7% depreciation."

How are people affected?

High inflation is pinching households and businesses with costlier groceries, utility bills and more. A weaker currency means Türkiye, which is dependent on imported raw materials, will have to pay more for everything from energy to grain that are priced in dollars.

Usta, the 63-year-old from Ankara, works at a firm that sells cash registry machines to boost her retirement pension but still struggles to pay her living expenses amid high inflation.

She is worried that this week’s sharp decline in the lira will lead to further price increases and even more financial uncertainty for her.

"I keep cutting back and cutting back so that I can afford to live, so I can pay for gas and electricity. But how much more can I cut back?" Usta said. "I’ve forgotten about going to the theater and the cinema — or going out to meet friends."

Usta says her rent doubled earlier this year, but the owner wants to increase it again. Moving out isn't an option because rents have skyrocketed even in her low-income neighborhood, she says.

Sengul, the economist, says the one-day currency shock is unlikely to have a huge impact. If, however, the depreciation is not contained, she warns, "market pricing behavior will dramatically deteriorate."



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.