The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
TT

The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.



Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions

This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions

This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)

Fakhri Abu Diab fought for decades to save his home. But when Israeli authorities arrived with bulldozers two years ago, he was powerless to stop them.

He and his wife now live among shards of memory: a bicycle where his bedroom stood; the garden where he planted tomatoes as a boy; a portrait of his late mother painted on a wall, based on a photograph lost in the demolition. Their mobile home, set up amid the rubble, is also marked for removal.

They are “trying to erase my memories, my childhood, my history,” he said, wiping away tears.

For decades, Israel has worked to expand the Jewish presence in annexed east Jerusalem — the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and home to major Jewish, Christian and Muslim sites. Settlers have exploited discriminatory policies and archaeological claims to evict Palestinians far from the region's war zones.

Activists say those efforts have gone into overdrive in recent years, as Israel is no longer constrained by US pressure and attention has shifted to Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

Over 260 homes and other structures were demolished in 2025, a 70% increase from three years earlier, with some neighborhoods seeing the most evictions in decades, according to Ir Amim, an Israeli anti-settlement group that closely tracks such policies. There have been at least 116 demolitions so far this year, it said.

It’s “an intensity and scope that we have never seen,” said Aviv Tatarsky, a researcher at Ir Amim. “Israel can decide, yes, this neighborhood, we want to erase it ... No one is going to stop us.”

People look from a rooftop at the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Israeli government supports settlement growth

Israel captured east Jerusalem, along with the West Bank and Gaza, in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians want all three territories for their future state, and the UN and much of the international community consider them to be illegally occupied.

Israel considers all of Jerusalem to be its unified capital and says residents are treated equally by law.

Palestinians in annexed east Jerusalem are eligible for Israeli citizenship, but unlike Jews, they must apply for it — a long, uncertain process. Most choose not to because it would recognize Israel’s claims to the city. That leaves them with few ways to challenge housing policy, largely set by Israel’s Parliament.

Rights activists say that in addition to supporting the development of major Jewish settlements, which many Israelis view as ordinary neighborhoods, authorities have severely limited the growth of Palestinian neighborhoods, making it virtually impossible to obtain housing permits.

Last year, nearly 9,000 permits were approved for Jerusalem’s Jewish residents and fewer than 700 for Palestinians, according to Bimkom, an Israeli rights group. Palestinians make up some 40% of Jerusalem's population and are concentrated in the east.

Israeli officials say the discrepancy exists because Palestinians rarely apply for permits. Many Palestinians say it’s futile.

When Palestinians build without permits, they face the threat of demolition. Settler groups meanwhile exploit an array of laws to purchase or take over Palestinian properties.

Previous US administrations have pressed Israel to slow or suspend settlement projects, viewing them as an obstacle to resolving the conflict. US President Donald Trump broke with that tradition in his first term, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

The US State Department said in a statement that it's up to Israeli authorities to set policy in Jerusalem, and that it expects them to respect due process and the rule of law.

The neighborhood is near major religious sites

Abu Diab's neighborhood, al-Bustan, extends through a valley just outside the Old City, with the dome of the Al-Aqsa Mosque visible above the towering walls. Named for the orchards that once grew there, the neighborhood is now a crowded jumble of low concrete blocks and demolition sites.

It's part of the larger district of Silwan, home to some 20,000 Palestinians and coveted by settlers because it is near major religious and archaeological sites. The mosque is the third holiest in Islam, and the hilltop where it stands is the holiest site for Jews, who refer to it as the Temple Mount because it was where the two Jewish temples stood in antiquity.

The Jerusalem municipality said the homes in al-Bustan are being demolished because they were built without permits in areas not zoned for housing. A park and public parking lot will be established there for the benefit of all residents, it said in a statement.

The municipality said it put forward plans for alternative housing in the neighborhood but that residents did not show “serious intentions” to reach an agreement.

Abu Diab has been battling demolition orders in court since 2004. Part of his home was built before 1967, but his growing family expanded it without permits because it was impossible to get them, he said.

In February 2024, police gave him and his wife minutes to pack before demolishing their home. Since then, they have lived in the mobile home, their suitcases packed.

They are among some 1,500 Palestinians in al-Bustan whose homes could be demolished at any time.

People walk past the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Settlers move in as Palestinians are evicted

A short distance away, in the congested Batan al-Hawah neighborhood, settlers are moving in as Palestinians are evicted.

Zuhair al-Rajabi and dozens of his extended family were ordered out in January, when Israel's Supreme Court ruled against them after more than a decade of legal action.

Thumbing through papers in his living room, he pulled out a document from 1966 saying the property is his. He says he has to leave by July but has nowhere to go, as rents are high in Jerusalem. “The problem, in short, is that they don’t want us here,” he said.

March marked the highest rate of state-led evictions in the neighborhood in decades, with 15 families forced out and hundreds more people at risk, according to B'Tselem, an Israeli rights group.

Israeli laws allow settlers to reclaim properties that were owned by other Jews before the 1948 war surrounding Israel's creation. Palestinians who fled or were driven from their homes in what is now Israel during that conflict are barred from returning. Authorities have also transferred state-held land to settler groups.

The Batan al-Hawah evictions show “the cooperation between settler organizations and state institutions, based on discriminatory laws, toward a shared goal — the Judaization of east Jerusalem and the replacement of Palestinian residents with Israeli settlers,” said Yair Dvir, a spokesperson for B’Tselem.

The Israeli judiciary, in a statement, said courts rule on the merits of each case based on the circumstances, applicable law and established precedent, and denied colluding with private organizations.

Daniel Luria, the executive director of Ateret Cohanim, one of the main settler organizations in east Jerusalem, said it was working to correct a “monumental historical injustice” by helping Jews to return to what had been a Yemenite and Sephardic Jewish neighborhood up until the early 20th century, when he says they were expelled by Arabs and then again by the British.

Since 2004, around 50 Jewish families have moved into the neighborhood and more are eager to join them, he said. “There's never going to be a Palestinian state,” he added.

An Israeli flag waves above the home where Khalil Basbous was evicted in January. The 68-year-old moved into a relative's house around the corner but walks past his former home every day.

“It’s mine,” he said, wiping tears from his face and softly touching an olive tree he had planted by the door. “I have no doubt that I will return.”


Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)

At first glance, Tehran’s retaliation for Israeli attacks in Lebanon might seem like a reckless act that risks rekindling a devastating regional war.

For Iran, those strikes were necessary — part of a more aggressive posturing that marks a strategic shift by its new rulers. For them, the lesson of the war has been that forceful retaliation has allowed them to survive, and even emerge with leverage against their more powerful enemies, reported the New York Times on Monday.

“Iran wants to project strength, and that they have the power to escalate,” said Omid Memarian, an Iran expert at DAWN, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank. “They are sending the message that they are ready to resume war if necessary.”

For the past decade under Iran’s previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, Tehran had been more cautious about striking Israel and the United States. In 2020, Tehran pursued only limited retaliatory strikes against Washington after the United States assassinated one of its most powerful military leaders, Qassem Soleimani. And it limited its entire retaliation to strikes on a single US base in Qatar during the 12-day war last June.

In recent weeks, Iranian officials largely tolerated Israeli strikes on its most important ally, the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah. It criticized those attacks, warning that the group should be included in the regional ceasefire it agreed upon with Washington in April. Yet as long as Israel’s strikes were contained to southern Lebanon, Iran did not respond.

Iran warned that calculus would change if Israel expanded those strikes to the southern outskirts of Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, where Hezbollah is dominant. On Sunday, Israel did just that.

“Iran’s attack in defense of Lebanon was not merely a military response; it was the formal declaration of a strategic doctrine,” said Sadegh Larijani, the chairman of Iran’s powerful Expediency Council, which advises Iran’s supreme leader.

“If any component of the Axis of Resistance is attacked, the response will extend beyond geographical borders and will alter the regional balance of power,” he said, using Iran’s term for the network of allied armed groups in the region that includes Hezbollah.

With its actions, Iran wants to show it is serious about defending its regional armed allies. That position had been undermined by its former leaders when they refrained from retaliating against Israeli attacks in 2024 that badly degraded Hezbollah and killed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, reported the New York Times.

Since the US-Israeli war began in February and killed much of Iran’s top former leadership, including Khamenei, Iran’s new rulers believe their willingness to act more aggressively — from blockading the vital Strait of Hormuz to attacking its Gulf neighbors — has been a major success, continued the report.

To them, analysts say, being more aggressive allowed them to not only survive Washington and Israel’s attacks, but to inflict economic pain and emerge with strategic leverage through control of the strait, a crucial global shipping route for oil and gas.

Iran’s new leaders have also found US President Donald Trump more responsive to their more aggressive strategy. Last week, he convinced Israel not to strike Beirut. On Monday, after Israel’s strikes on Beirut’s outskirts and Iran’s retaliation, he called for both sides to step back.

After his comments, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps quickly announced that it would halt its attacks but said it may attack again if Israel pursues strikes in southern Lebanon, a near certainty.

Such strikes may also offer Iran the opportunity to test the relationship between Trump and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said Memarian, the analyst.

“They understand there’s a gap between Israeli and US objectives,” he said, “and they want to put pressure on Trump to contain Israel.”

But the defense of Hezbollah is not only about testing or posturing. Iran assessed the group’s ability to continue attacking northern Israel during the recent war as critical to giving Iran room to focus its attacks on its Gulf neighbors, said Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian security expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Allowing Israel to weaken Hezbollah further, he said, would therefore be militarily costly for Iran in a future conflict, which it deems inevitable.

Iran also saw its retaliation as necessary, he said, because it views Israel’s attacks as part of an apparent US-Israeli strategy to try to quietly erode its strategic gains in the recent conflict even as it tries to negotiate a deal to end the war with Washington.

For weeks, US forces have been quietly escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. Many analysts describe this as a US attempt to alleviate pressure on the global economy while it tries to increase the economic pressure on Iran by reinforcing its own blockade of Iranian vessels. Iran worries that Israel’s efforts to weaken Hezbollah are another facet of that strategy.

The Iranians believe the United States and Israel “are using the ceasefire to shape the realities on the ground in a way that would erode the leverage Iran has achieved during this war,” Azizi said.

Tehran’s willingness to retaliate forcefully also shows how unlikely Iran thinks it is Trump, who is about to host the World Cup games, and faces a deepening global economic crisis ahead of midterm elections this fall, to rejoin the fray.

“They don’t think Trump is going to go to war,” said Farzan Sabet, an Iran analyst at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland. “But even if he does, they’re fairly confident they can manage it.”

*Erika Solomon for the New York Times


Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
TT

Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 

Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.

Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.

Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.

In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.

Drones Do Not Create Deterrence

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.

He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.

Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.

He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.

A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition

Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.

“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”

He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”

Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”

He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”

According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.

As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”

No Deterrent Balance Exists

For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”

He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.

“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”

Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”

He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”