How Many Russians Have Died in Ukraine? Data Shows What Moscow Hides

A woman at a cemetery in Volzhsky, outside Volgograd, Russia, on May 26, 2022, looks at the graves of Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine. (AP)
A woman at a cemetery in Volzhsky, outside Volgograd, Russia, on May 26, 2022, looks at the graves of Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine. (AP)
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How Many Russians Have Died in Ukraine? Data Shows What Moscow Hides

A woman at a cemetery in Volzhsky, outside Volgograd, Russia, on May 26, 2022, looks at the graves of Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine. (AP)
A woman at a cemetery in Volzhsky, outside Volgograd, Russia, on May 26, 2022, looks at the graves of Russian soldiers killed in the war in Ukraine. (AP)

Nearly 50,000 Russian men have died in the war in Ukraine, according to the first independent statistical analysis of Russia’s war dead.

Two independent Russian media outlets, Mediazona and Meduza, working with a data scientist from Germany’s Tübingen University, used Russian government data to shed light on one of Moscow’s closest-held secrets — the true human cost of its invasion of Ukraine.

To do so, they relied on a statistical concept popularized during the COVID-19 pandemic called excess mortality. Drawing on inheritance records and official mortality data, they estimated how many more men under age 50 died between February 2022 and May 2023 than normal.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv gives timely data on military losses, and each is at pains to amplify the other side’s casualties. Russia has publicly acknowledged the deaths of just over 6,000 soldiers. Reports about military losses have been repressed in Russian media, activists and independent journalists say. Documenting the dead has become an act of defiance, and those who do so face harassment and potential criminal charges.

Despite such challenges, Mediazona and the BBC’s Russian Service, working with a network of volunteers, have used social media postings and photographs of cemeteries across Russia to build a database of confirmed war deaths. As of July 7, they had identified 27,423 dead Russian soldiers.

"These are only soldiers who we know by name, and their deaths in each case are verified by multiple sources," said Dmitry Treshchanin, an editor at Mediazona who helped oversee the investigation. "The estimate we did with Meduza allows us to see the ‘hidden’ deaths, deaths the Russian government is so obsessively and unsuccessfully trying to hide."

To come up with a more comprehensive tally, journalists from Mediazona and Meduza obtained records of inheritance cases filed with the Russian authorities. Their data from the National Probate Registry contained information about more than 11 million people who died between 2014 and May 2023.

According to their analysis, 25,000 more inheritance cases were opened in 2022 for males aged 15 to 49 than expected. By May 27, 2023, the number of excess cases had shot up to 47,000.

That surge is roughly in line with a May assessment by the White House that more than 20,000 Russians had been killed in Ukraine since December, though lower than US and UK intelligence assessments of overall Russian deaths.

In February, the UK Ministry of Defense said approximately 40,000 to 60,000 Russians had likely been killed in the war. A leaked assessment from the US Defense Intelligence Agency put the number of Russians killed in action in the first year of the war at 35,000 to 43,000.

"Their figures might be accurate, or they might not be," Treshchanin, the Mediazona editor, said in an email. "Even if they have sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense, its own data could be incomplete. It’s extremely difficult to pull together all of the casualties from the army, Rosgvardia, Akhmat battalion, various private military companies, of which Wagner is the largest, but not the only one. Casualties among inmates, first recruited by Wagner and now by the MoD, are also a very hazy subject, with a lot of potential for manipulation. Statistics could actually give better results."

Independently, Dmitry Kobak, a data scientist from Germany’s Tübingen University who has published work on excess COVID-19 deaths in Russia, obtained mortality data broken down by age and sex for 2022 from Rosstat, Russia’s official statistics agency.

He found that 24,000 more men under age 50 died in 2022 than expected, a figure that aligns with the analysis of inheritance data.

The COVID-19 pandemic made it harder to figure out how many men would have died in Russia since February 2022 if there hadn’t been a war. Both analyses corrected for the lingering effects of COVID on mortality by indexing male death rates against female deaths.

Sergei Scherbov, a scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria, cautioned that "differences in the number of deaths between males and females can vary significantly due to randomness alone."

"I am not saying that there couldn’t be an excess number of male deaths, but rather that statistically speaking, this difference in deaths could be a mere outcome of chance," he said.

Russians who are missing but not officially recognized as dead, as well as citizens of Ukraine fighting in units of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics, are not included in these counts.

Kobak acknowledged that some uncertainties remain, especially for deaths of older men. Moreover, it’s hard to know how many missing Russian soldiers are actually dead. But he said neither factor is likely to have a huge impact.

"That uncertainty is in the thousands," he said. "The results are plausible overall."

Meduza is an independent Russian media outlet that has been operating in exile for eight years, with headquarters in Riga, Latvia. In April 2021, Russian authorities designated Meduza a "foreign agent," making it harder to generate advertising income, and in January 2023, the Kremlin banned Meduza as an illegal "undesirable organization."

Moscow has also labeled independent outlet Mediazona as a "foreign agent" and blocked its website after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.