‘Londonistan’: British Controversy over ‘Dialogue with Extremists’

Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
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‘Londonistan’: British Controversy over ‘Dialogue with Extremists’

Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)

Over the years, these two men in the picture above have symbolized the transformation of the British capital into a stronghold for Islamic extremists in the 1990s. The first one, Abu Hamza al-Masri (on the right in the picture), is currently serving a life sentence in the US after being convicted of terrorism.

As for the other man, a Syrian called Omar Bakri, he too was imprisoned for years in Lebanon on terrorism charges. He was released from prison in March of last year.

Before these two men found themselves behind bars, they, along with others, formed, for nearly two decades, a face to what critics call “Londonistan.”

While there are those who would argue that this characterization is not entirely accurate and that London is, in fact, a successful British experiment in coexistence among different religions and cultures, what appears to be certain is that since the 1990s, the British capital has transformed into a hub where a wide mix of supporters of political Islam and groups self-described as “jihadist,” yet classified as terrorist or extremist by many governments, have become active.

This phenomenon began in the Arab world and later spread to Western countries themselves.

However, how did London transform into “Londonistan”? Was the British government aware of this shift towards radicalism taking place within its borders? Did it host Islamists as a tool to manipulate them in its dealings with Middle Eastern affairs, as some suggest? Or was it unaware of the severity of its extremist “guests” until later, after they had become entrenched and started engaging in acts of violence and terrorism in both their home countries and Western nations?

The issue is being brought to the forefront by Asharq Al-Awsat, which is releasing a series of formerly classified British government documents now accessible in the National Archives in London.

These documents unveil an internal debate that took place within the British government concerning the approach to dealing with Islamists in the early 1990s.

A faction within the government advocated dialogue with them, including the extremists, on the premise that engaging in conversation could potentially resolve any conflicts between the two sides, particularly as there was believed to be “no inherent clash between Western interests and Islam,” according to proponents of this viewpoint.

Conversely, another faction raised objections to this logic and contended that there was a deliberate effort by certain British officials to downplay the existing disparities with extremist Islamists.

They emphasized the need of considering Sudan and Iran as models when engaging with political Islamist factions, indicating that the ascension of Islamists to power would likely result in their refusal to relinquish it later on, as exemplified by the regime of President Omar al-Bashir following his military coup in Khartoum in 1989, and similarly by the Iranian Islamists led by Ayatollah Khomeini after toppling the Shah’s regime in Tehran in 1979.

This debate among British officials emerged in response to the civil strife that ensued in Algeria after the annulment of elections in January 1992, which the Islamists were on the verge of winning.

British authorities observed that supporters of the “Islamic Salvation Front,” the party that had been outlawed by Algerian authorities following the annulment of the elections, were beginning to seek visas to enter the United Kingdom, presumably with the intention of seeking political asylum. The UK embassy in Algeria was unsure of how to navigate this situation and therefore sought guidance from the Foreign Office in London.

Of particular note was the response from the Foreign Office, which indicated that only the British Home Secretary had the authority to prohibit specific individuals from entering the UK.

Additionally, any bans would need to be applied to individuals by name rather than organizations, as the Islamic Salvation Front was only banned in Algeria and not in Britain, at the time.

Internal British discussions also revealed that the London government instructed the embassy in Algeria not to share information derived from visa applications submitted by supporters of the group with European authorities.

However, the embassy was allowed to inform Europeans whether an individual had been accepted or rejected, on the condition that the information provided to European countries did not stem from the visa application documents themselves regarding the person's affiliation with the Islamic Salvation Front.

Impact of Islamic fundamentalism on British politics

The visa controversy sparked a larger debate about the boundaries of engagement with Islamists and their different factions. This discussion was captured in documents that recorded correspondence between British officials, responding to the findings of a workshop that tackled the subject. However, specific details about the workshop itself are not clarified in the documents.

The initial document that captured this debate was a cable from the UK’s Ambassador to Algeria Christopher Battiscombe (1990-1994) to Mark Elliott, the Deputy Foreign Office Undersecretary (later serving as an ambassador to Israel and Norway), dated November 3, 1992.

The cable from Battiscombe prompted an extensive reply from Basil Eastwood, the then Director of the Research and Analysis Department at the Foreign Office. Eastwood penned a two-page letter to Mark Elliott, a Foreign Office official, on November 9, with the subject line: Political Islam.

In response to the discussions surrounding political Islam and the handling of extremists, Eastwood issued an “apology.”

This apology was prompted by the exchanges between Battiscombe in Algeria and the Foreign Office in London. On November 10, 1992, Elliott sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Algeria.

Amid the debate surrounding political Islam, British government documents reveal a discussion about arranging a meeting with an Algerian Islamist leader who had fled his country following the annulment of elections and became a representative of the Islamic Salvation Front in exile.

The controversy surrounding such a meeting, requested by Anwar Haddam, one of the elected deputies of the Islamic Salvation Front in the canceled 1992 elections, stems from the fact that the party was banned in Algeria on the grounds of its involvement in terrorism.

A meeting between a representative of a “terrorist” party and the British government could potentially trigger a crisis with the Algerian government, which held Britain accountable for hosting extremist Islamists and opening its doors to them.

In a letter dated October 12, 1992, F.G. Martin from the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office wrote a message to Mr. Richmond, another official in the same department, referring to receiving a request to arrange a meeting with Haddam.



Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
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Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
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Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.


In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)

In a small sewing workshop in southern Gaza, Nisreen Al-Rantisi pulls fabric from a pile and reshapes worn wedding dresses, trying to keep a fading tradition alive amid war and soaring costs.

Families said they have been struggling to find new wedding dresses and many search instead for places that refurbish gowns and other kinds of clothes for their children.

Importers cite delays, high shipping costs, and restrictions on materials, such as the crystals encrusted into the elaborate wedding dresses, as key factors behind the shortages ‌and price hikes.

Many workshops ‌have also been damaged during the conflict.

“We try ‌to ⁠reuse the old ⁠gowns that we have, produce them by fixing them a bit, work on them, wash them, arrange them, shape them,” said Rantisi, adding that work initially relied on a bicycle-powered sewing machine due to electricity shortages.

Rantisi said she used to buy the fabric for about 120 to 150 shekels ($41 to $51) before the war, but now pays around 500 shekels ($171).

“This has caused a big rise ⁠in the cost of bridal dresses and children’s gowns. We ‌are living in a vicious circle ‌from the war that affected us,” she added.

COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls ‌access to Gaza, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Most ‌of Gaza's more than 2 million people have been displaced, many now living in bombed-out homes and makeshift tents pitched on open ground, roadsides, or atop the ruins of destroyed buildings after two years of war with Israel.

HIGH PRICES BEYOND REACH ‌FOR MOST IN GAZA

Despite the hardships, some couples still find ways to celebrate, with mass weddings held in ⁠Gaza offering a ⁠rare moment of joy amid the devastation.

Shop workers say the war has driven prices beyond reach.

“Before the war, prices were reasonable for everyone,” said Rawan Shalouf, an employee at a bridal shop.

“But now, given the circumstances we’re in, the price of a dress is ridiculous.”

Across Gaza, brides and families are struggling to afford even basic wedding needs. Shahed Fayez, 21, is due to marry in about four days but has been searching in vain for a dress.

“I don’t care about its style, what’s important is that it's new,” she added.

“The cheapest dress is $1,000 or more, that's the minimum, and all we have is less than $200. The entire dowry does not cover the price of a dress.”