‘Londonistan’: British Controversy over ‘Dialogue with Extremists’

Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
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‘Londonistan’: British Controversy over ‘Dialogue with Extremists’

Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)

Over the years, these two men in the picture above have symbolized the transformation of the British capital into a stronghold for Islamic extremists in the 1990s. The first one, Abu Hamza al-Masri (on the right in the picture), is currently serving a life sentence in the US after being convicted of terrorism.

As for the other man, a Syrian called Omar Bakri, he too was imprisoned for years in Lebanon on terrorism charges. He was released from prison in March of last year.

Before these two men found themselves behind bars, they, along with others, formed, for nearly two decades, a face to what critics call “Londonistan.”

While there are those who would argue that this characterization is not entirely accurate and that London is, in fact, a successful British experiment in coexistence among different religions and cultures, what appears to be certain is that since the 1990s, the British capital has transformed into a hub where a wide mix of supporters of political Islam and groups self-described as “jihadist,” yet classified as terrorist or extremist by many governments, have become active.

This phenomenon began in the Arab world and later spread to Western countries themselves.

However, how did London transform into “Londonistan”? Was the British government aware of this shift towards radicalism taking place within its borders? Did it host Islamists as a tool to manipulate them in its dealings with Middle Eastern affairs, as some suggest? Or was it unaware of the severity of its extremist “guests” until later, after they had become entrenched and started engaging in acts of violence and terrorism in both their home countries and Western nations?

The issue is being brought to the forefront by Asharq Al-Awsat, which is releasing a series of formerly classified British government documents now accessible in the National Archives in London.

These documents unveil an internal debate that took place within the British government concerning the approach to dealing with Islamists in the early 1990s.

A faction within the government advocated dialogue with them, including the extremists, on the premise that engaging in conversation could potentially resolve any conflicts between the two sides, particularly as there was believed to be “no inherent clash between Western interests and Islam,” according to proponents of this viewpoint.

Conversely, another faction raised objections to this logic and contended that there was a deliberate effort by certain British officials to downplay the existing disparities with extremist Islamists.

They emphasized the need of considering Sudan and Iran as models when engaging with political Islamist factions, indicating that the ascension of Islamists to power would likely result in their refusal to relinquish it later on, as exemplified by the regime of President Omar al-Bashir following his military coup in Khartoum in 1989, and similarly by the Iranian Islamists led by Ayatollah Khomeini after toppling the Shah’s regime in Tehran in 1979.

This debate among British officials emerged in response to the civil strife that ensued in Algeria after the annulment of elections in January 1992, which the Islamists were on the verge of winning.

British authorities observed that supporters of the “Islamic Salvation Front,” the party that had been outlawed by Algerian authorities following the annulment of the elections, were beginning to seek visas to enter the United Kingdom, presumably with the intention of seeking political asylum. The UK embassy in Algeria was unsure of how to navigate this situation and therefore sought guidance from the Foreign Office in London.

Of particular note was the response from the Foreign Office, which indicated that only the British Home Secretary had the authority to prohibit specific individuals from entering the UK.

Additionally, any bans would need to be applied to individuals by name rather than organizations, as the Islamic Salvation Front was only banned in Algeria and not in Britain, at the time.

Internal British discussions also revealed that the London government instructed the embassy in Algeria not to share information derived from visa applications submitted by supporters of the group with European authorities.

However, the embassy was allowed to inform Europeans whether an individual had been accepted or rejected, on the condition that the information provided to European countries did not stem from the visa application documents themselves regarding the person's affiliation with the Islamic Salvation Front.

Impact of Islamic fundamentalism on British politics

The visa controversy sparked a larger debate about the boundaries of engagement with Islamists and their different factions. This discussion was captured in documents that recorded correspondence between British officials, responding to the findings of a workshop that tackled the subject. However, specific details about the workshop itself are not clarified in the documents.

The initial document that captured this debate was a cable from the UK’s Ambassador to Algeria Christopher Battiscombe (1990-1994) to Mark Elliott, the Deputy Foreign Office Undersecretary (later serving as an ambassador to Israel and Norway), dated November 3, 1992.

The cable from Battiscombe prompted an extensive reply from Basil Eastwood, the then Director of the Research and Analysis Department at the Foreign Office. Eastwood penned a two-page letter to Mark Elliott, a Foreign Office official, on November 9, with the subject line: Political Islam.

In response to the discussions surrounding political Islam and the handling of extremists, Eastwood issued an “apology.”

This apology was prompted by the exchanges between Battiscombe in Algeria and the Foreign Office in London. On November 10, 1992, Elliott sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Algeria.

Amid the debate surrounding political Islam, British government documents reveal a discussion about arranging a meeting with an Algerian Islamist leader who had fled his country following the annulment of elections and became a representative of the Islamic Salvation Front in exile.

The controversy surrounding such a meeting, requested by Anwar Haddam, one of the elected deputies of the Islamic Salvation Front in the canceled 1992 elections, stems from the fact that the party was banned in Algeria on the grounds of its involvement in terrorism.

A meeting between a representative of a “terrorist” party and the British government could potentially trigger a crisis with the Algerian government, which held Britain accountable for hosting extremist Islamists and opening its doors to them.

In a letter dated October 12, 1992, F.G. Martin from the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office wrote a message to Mr. Richmond, another official in the same department, referring to receiving a request to arrange a meeting with Haddam.



20 Years after Its Landmark Withdrawal from Gaza, Israel is Mired There

Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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20 Years after Its Landmark Withdrawal from Gaza, Israel is Mired There

Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Twenty years ago, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, dismantling 21 Jewish settlements and pulling out its forces. The Friday anniversary of the start of the landmark disengagement comes as Israel is mired in a nearly 2-year war with Hamas that has devastated the Palestinian territory and means it is likely to keep troops there long into the future.

Israel’s disengagement, which also included removing four settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s controversial attempt to jump-start negotiations with the Palestinians. But it bitterly divided Israeli society and led to the empowerment of Hamas, with implications that continue to reverberate today.

The emotional images of Jews being ripped from their homes by Israeli soldiers galvanized Israel’s far-right and settler movements. The anger helped them organize and increase their political influence, accounting in part for the rise of hard-line politicians like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

On Thursday, Smotrich boasted of a settlement expansion plan east of Jerusalem that will “bury” the idea of a future Palestinian state.

For Palestinians, even if they welcomed the disengagement, it didn’t end Israel’s control over their lives.

Soon after, Hamas won elections in 2006, then drove out the Palestinian Authority in a violent takeover. Israel imposed a closure on the territory, controlling entry and exit of goods and people. Though its intensity varied over the years, the closure helped impoverish the population and entrenched a painful separation from Palestinians in the West Bank.

Israel captured the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians claim all three territories for a future independent state.

A unilateral withdrawal enhanced Hamas' stature Israel couldn’t justify the military or economic cost of maintaining the heavily fortified settlements in Gaza, explained Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Misgav Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies think tanks. There were around 8,000 Israeli settlers and 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza in 2005.

“There was no chance for these settlements to exist or flourish or become meaningful enough to be a strategic anchor,” he said. By contrast, there are more than 500,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, most living in developed settlement blocs that have generally received more support from Israeli society, Michael said. Most of the world considers the settlements illegal under international law.

Because Israel withdrew unilaterally, without any coordination with the Palestinian Authority, it enhanced Hamas' stature among Palestinians in Gaza.

“This contributed to Hamas’ win in the elections in 2006, because they leveraged it and introduced it as a very significant achievement,” Michael said. “They saw it as an achievement of the resistance and a justification for the continuation of the armed resistance.”

Footage of the violence between Israeli settlers and Israeli soldiers also created an “open wound” in Israeli society, Michael said.

“I don’t think any government will be able to do something like that in the future,” he said. That limits any flexibility over settlements in the West Bank if negotiations over a two-state solution with the Palestinians ever resume.

“Disengagement will never happen again, this is a price we’re paying as a society, and a price we’re paying politically,” he said.

One of the first settlers longs to return Anita Tucker, now 79, was part of the first nine Jewish families that moved to the Gaza Strip in 1976. She and her husband and their three kids lived in an Israeli army outpost near what is today Deir al-Balah, while the settlement of Netzer Hazoni was constructed.

Originally from Brooklyn, she started a farm growing vegetables in the harsh, tall sand dunes. At first relations were good with their Palestinian neighbors, she said, and they worked hard to build their home and a “beautiful community.” She had two more children, and three chose to stay and raise their families in Netzer Hazoni.

She can still recall the moment, 20 years ago, when 1,000 Israeli soldiers arrived at the gate to the settlement to remove the approximately 400 residents. Some of her neighbors lit their houses on fire in protest.

“Obviously it was a mistake to leave. The lives of the Arabs became much worse, and the lives of the Jews became much, much worse, with rockets and Oct. 7,” she said, referring to the decades of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel and the date in 2023 of the Hamas attack that launched the ongoing war.

Despite the passage of time, her family still is “yearning and longing for their home,” she said. Several of her 10 grandchildren, including some who spent their early childhood in the Gaza settlements, have served in the current war and were near her old house.

“It’s hard to believe, because of all the terrible things that happened that we predicted, but we’re willing to build there again,” said Tucker.

Palestinians doubt Israel will ever fully withdraw from Gaza again After Israel’s withdrawal 20 years ago, many Palestinians described Gaza as an “open-air prison.” They had control on the inside – under a Hamas government that some supported but some saw as heavy-handed and brutal. But ultimately, Israel had a grip around the territory.

Many Palestinians believe Sharon carried out the withdrawal so Israel could focus on cementing its control in the West Bank through settlement building.

Now some believe more direct Israeli occupation is returning to Gaza. After 22 months of war, Israeli troops control more than 75% of Gaza, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of maintaining security control long term after the war.

Amjad Shawa, the director of the Palestinian NGO Network, said he doesn’t believe Netanyahu will repeat Sharon’s full withdrawal. Instead, he expects the military to continue controlling large swaths of Gaza through “buffer zones.”

The aim, he said, is to keep Gaza “unlivable in order to change the demographics,” referring to Netanyahu’s plans to encourage Palestinians to leave the territory.

Israel is “is reoccupying the Gaza Strip” to prevent a Palestinian state, said Mostafa Ibrahim, an author based in Gaza City whose home was destroyed in the current war.

Missed opportunities Israeli former Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, who was head of the country's Southern Command during the disengagement, remembers the toll of protecting a few thousand settlers.

There were an average of 10 attacks per day against Israeli settlers and soldiers, including rockets, roadside bombs big enough to destroy a tank, tunnels to attack Israeli soldiers and military positions, and frequent gunfire.

“Bringing a school bus of kids from one place to another required a military escort,” said Harel. “There wasn’t a future. People paint it as how wonderful it was there, but it wasn’t wonderful.”

Harel says the decision to evacuate Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip was the right one, but that Israel missed crucial opportunities.

Most egregious, he said, was a unilateral withdrawal without obtaining any concessions from the Palestinians in Gaza or the Palestinian Authority.

He also sharply criticized Israel’s policy of containment toward Hamas after disengagement. There were short but destructive conflicts over the years between the two sides, but otherwise the policy gave Hamas “an opportunity to do whatever they wanted.”

“We had such a blind spot with Hamas, we didn’t see them morph from a terror organization into an organized military, with battalions and commanders and infrastructure,” he said.

The Oct. 7 attack, Israel’s largest military intelligence failure to date, was not a result of the disengagement, said Harel. “The main issue is what we did in the 18 years in between.”