Over the years, these two men in the picture above have symbolized the transformation of the British capital into a stronghold for Islamic extremists in the 1990s. The first one, Abu Hamza al-Masri (on the right in the picture), is currently serving a life sentence in the US after being convicted of terrorism.
As for the other man, a Syrian called Omar Bakri, he too was imprisoned for years in Lebanon on terrorism charges. He was released from prison in March of last year.
Before these two men found themselves behind bars, they, along with others, formed, for nearly two decades, a face to what critics call “Londonistan.”
While there are those who would argue that this characterization is not entirely accurate and that London is, in fact, a successful British experiment in coexistence among different religions and cultures, what appears to be certain is that since the 1990s, the British capital has transformed into a hub where a wide mix of supporters of political Islam and groups self-described as “jihadist,” yet classified as terrorist or extremist by many governments, have become active.
This phenomenon began in the Arab world and later spread to Western countries themselves.
However, how did London transform into “Londonistan”? Was the British government aware of this shift towards radicalism taking place within its borders? Did it host Islamists as a tool to manipulate them in its dealings with Middle Eastern affairs, as some suggest? Or was it unaware of the severity of its extremist “guests” until later, after they had become entrenched and started engaging in acts of violence and terrorism in both their home countries and Western nations?
The issue is being brought to the forefront by Asharq Al-Awsat, which is releasing a series of formerly classified British government documents now accessible in the National Archives in London.
These documents unveil an internal debate that took place within the British government concerning the approach to dealing with Islamists in the early 1990s.
A faction within the government advocated dialogue with them, including the extremists, on the premise that engaging in conversation could potentially resolve any conflicts between the two sides, particularly as there was believed to be “no inherent clash between Western interests and Islam,” according to proponents of this viewpoint.
Conversely, another faction raised objections to this logic and contended that there was a deliberate effort by certain British officials to downplay the existing disparities with extremist Islamists.
They emphasized the need of considering Sudan and Iran as models when engaging with political Islamist factions, indicating that the ascension of Islamists to power would likely result in their refusal to relinquish it later on, as exemplified by the regime of President Omar al-Bashir following his military coup in Khartoum in 1989, and similarly by the Iranian Islamists led by Ayatollah Khomeini after toppling the Shah’s regime in Tehran in 1979.
This debate among British officials emerged in response to the civil strife that ensued in Algeria after the annulment of elections in January 1992, which the Islamists were on the verge of winning.
British authorities observed that supporters of the “Islamic Salvation Front,” the party that had been outlawed by Algerian authorities following the annulment of the elections, were beginning to seek visas to enter the United Kingdom, presumably with the intention of seeking political asylum. The UK embassy in Algeria was unsure of how to navigate this situation and therefore sought guidance from the Foreign Office in London.
Of particular note was the response from the Foreign Office, which indicated that only the British Home Secretary had the authority to prohibit specific individuals from entering the UK.
Additionally, any bans would need to be applied to individuals by name rather than organizations, as the Islamic Salvation Front was only banned in Algeria and not in Britain, at the time.
Internal British discussions also revealed that the London government instructed the embassy in Algeria not to share information derived from visa applications submitted by supporters of the group with European authorities.
However, the embassy was allowed to inform Europeans whether an individual had been accepted or rejected, on the condition that the information provided to European countries did not stem from the visa application documents themselves regarding the person's affiliation with the Islamic Salvation Front.
Impact of Islamic fundamentalism on British politics
The visa controversy sparked a larger debate about the boundaries of engagement with Islamists and their different factions. This discussion was captured in documents that recorded correspondence between British officials, responding to the findings of a workshop that tackled the subject. However, specific details about the workshop itself are not clarified in the documents.
The initial document that captured this debate was a cable from the UK’s Ambassador to Algeria Christopher Battiscombe (1990-1994) to Mark Elliott, the Deputy Foreign Office Undersecretary (later serving as an ambassador to Israel and Norway), dated November 3, 1992.
The cable from Battiscombe prompted an extensive reply from Basil Eastwood, the then Director of the Research and Analysis Department at the Foreign Office. Eastwood penned a two-page letter to Mark Elliott, a Foreign Office official, on November 9, with the subject line: Political Islam.
In response to the discussions surrounding political Islam and the handling of extremists, Eastwood issued an “apology.”
This apology was prompted by the exchanges between Battiscombe in Algeria and the Foreign Office in London. On November 10, 1992, Elliott sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Algeria.
Amid the debate surrounding political Islam, British government documents reveal a discussion about arranging a meeting with an Algerian Islamist leader who had fled his country following the annulment of elections and became a representative of the Islamic Salvation Front in exile.
The controversy surrounding such a meeting, requested by Anwar Haddam, one of the elected deputies of the Islamic Salvation Front in the canceled 1992 elections, stems from the fact that the party was banned in Algeria on the grounds of its involvement in terrorism.
A meeting between a representative of a “terrorist” party and the British government could potentially trigger a crisis with the Algerian government, which held Britain accountable for hosting extremist Islamists and opening its doors to them.
In a letter dated October 12, 1992, F.G. Martin from the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office wrote a message to Mr. Richmond, another official in the same department, referring to receiving a request to arrange a meeting with Haddam.
