Lebanese Ex-FM Boueiz to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam, Chehabi Held Secret Meetings with Hrawi to Demand Hariri’s Nomination as PM

Fares Boueiz and Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fares Boueiz and Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Lebanese Ex-FM Boueiz to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam, Chehabi Held Secret Meetings with Hrawi to Demand Hariri’s Nomination as PM

Fares Boueiz and Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fares Boueiz and Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

I recalled a series of interviews I had with late Lebanese President Elias Hrawi, who spent nine years in office. Among the many topics, we discussed was slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his tumultuous time in office, including his strained relations with Syria and Lebanese former President Emile Lahoud.

As I recalled those interviews, it occurred to me that I had never approached former Lebanese former Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz, who is also Hrawi’s son-in-law, about his experience during those tumultuous years. Boueiz served as foreign minister for eight years, during which Lebanon experienced local and regional upheaval.

What stood out the most for me during our interview was his remark that French former President Jacques Chirac was Hariri’s man in Paris and that then Syrian Vice President Abdulhalim Khaddam was Hariri’s man in Damascus. He also revealed that Damascus had agreed to Hariri becoming prime minister after it had reservations over him.

Divisions in Syria

Hariri’s name had been floated around to become prime minister since the time the Taif Accord was signed in 1989. His name was proposed during the term of PM Omar Karami, but his government would have faced an arduous task of dismantling the militias that were active during the 1975-90 civil war.

Given the challenges, Hariri’s nomination was postponed, Boueiz told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I believe Syria had reservations over his name. Not the whole of Syria, but some officials,” he added.

So, Karami became prime minister and his government eventually collapsed due to the economic crisis. Hariri’s name was again proposed as his replacement.

No consensus emerged over Hariri’s potential appointment. “It was a complicated situation. We understood that his appointment must be accompanied by certain conditions and after parliamentary elections are held,” Boueiz explained.

“In other words, a new parliament must have been sworn in and Hariri would not have been able to ensure the election of lawmakers who are loyal to him,” he added.

“We later found out that it was impossible for Hariri to be named ahead of the elections, which would ensure the election of a parliament that was close to Syria,” he went on to say. Rashid al-Solh then became prime minister.

Boueiz said he was opposed to the electoral law that the polls were based upon. “Whenever I brought up the issue of amending the law, I was met with total opposition. I couldn’t understand it until I finally went to Damascus and saw the whole picture,” he revealed.

“Hrawi told me that my opposition of the elections was harming his relations with Syria because ‘it believed that I was the one encouraging your positions,’” he stated.

Boueiz and several Maronite politicians eventually headed to Damascus to clear the air. The FM stood firm and clashed with Khaddam, who also held on to his position. Boueiz even threatened to resign as foreign minister due to the dispute. Seeing an impasse, Khaddam contacted chief of staff Hikmat al-Chehabi, whom Boueiz said was notoriously difficult to negotiate with.

“Chehabi informed me that it would be a shame for me to end my political career,” recalled Boueiz, saying he felt threatened. He retorted: “I cannot imagine my political future away from my people and their opinions.” The delegation then returned to Lebanon.

“Hrawi hoped that I would not put myself at loggerheads with Damascus and to not implicate him in the process,” said Boueiz.

He eventually found out why the Syrians wanted the elections to be held as soon as possible. They feared Hariri’s appointment as PM so they wanted to form a parliament that was loyal to them so that they could keep him in check.

Hrawi, for his part, supported Hariri’s appointment because he believed that no other Sunni figure knew how to tackle Lebanon’s economic problems. He believed that Salim al-Hoss, although an honest figure, did not always take the best approach and was slow to act. He was not up to the task of fixing the economy. Rashid al-Solh was not part of the equation and Omar Karami’s political career was in tatters.

So, Hariri was the best option. When Hrawi sensed that Syria had reservations over him, he directly headed to Damascus for talks with President Hafez al-Assad. He demanded Hariri’s appointment, but Assad told him to hold on.

“Two days later, Hrawi revealed to me that a strange thing had happened. Khaddam had asked that they meet him in secret. I was bewildered. Surely, Syrian intelligence would know that he had crossed into Lebanon the moment he passed the border. They would even know of his arrival at Beirut airport. How could he possibly visit Lebanon in secret? Was he conspiring against the regime?” wondered Boueiz.

“At any rate, we didn’t understand the need for secrecy. Khaddam arrived the next day and Hrawi later confided in me about what they discussed. ‘He informed me that I must insist on Assad that Hariri be named prime minister,’” he continued.

Two days later, Chehabi requested a secret meeting with Hrawi. “This was strange indeed,” said Boueiz. “It was no secret that Khaddam was involved in the Lebanese file and that he often visited Lebanon. Chehabi, on the other hand, was only involved in handling the Lebanese army and never visited Lebanon.”

Soon after the meeting was held, Hrawi revealed to Boueiz that Chehabi had also demanded that he insist on Hariri’s appointment.

“This was very odd because Chehabi did not involve himself in these issues. Hrawi told me that there appears to be a problem in Syria. It seems it was split between a camp that supported Hariri and another that didn’t. It was obvious that Khaddam and Chehabi backed Hariri, while the other camp, which we were not aware of, didn’t want him at all. In the end, one had to go back to Assad and see what he wanted,” said Boueiz.

These were the first signs of a dispute in Syria. Others emerged during an Islamic summit in Tehran in 1993. Hariri had become prime minister at that point.

Boueiz recalled how he had met with head of the Syrian Republican Guard Adnan Makhlouf at the event. “He called out to me: ‘You are the bold one.’ Then, along with several senior officers, we strolled the conference hall and he began to insult some senior Syrian officials, including Khaddam, Chehabi and Ghazi Kanaan. He told me that ‘this Hariri was buying the Syrian regime,’” meaning some officials were being bribed.

Boueiz returned to Beirut and informed Hrawi of what happened. This indicated deep divisions within the Syrian command. “This means that from now on, you must listen to Assad alone,” Boueiz advised Hrawi. “We were convinced that a major dispute was happening in Syria and that Hariri was at the heart of it.”

A problem called ‘Emile Lahoud’

I asked Boueiz about Emile Lahoud, whom Hrawi had appointed as army commander at the beginning of his tenure. Lahoud was known as a staunch Damascus ally, a position that would eventually put him at odds with Hariri.

Boueiz said Hrawi had asked him about his opinion of the various candidates for the position of army chief, including Michel Aoun and Lahoud. “Lahoud is a naval officer in a country that does not have a strong navy,” said Boueiz. “I don’t recall that Lahoud had ever waged any actual battles. Aoun, on the other hand, had seen battles his entire life.”

“I asked Hrawi why he was asking me about my opinion, and he said that it appears that late former president Rene Mouawad had promised Lahoud that he would be named army chief. The Syrians also made the same pledge.”

“Lahoud put Syria at ease because he was not politicized and didn’t really deal in politics. He communicated with Damascus on a daily basis through then deputy intelligence chief Jamil al-Sayyed. He knew in detail what Damascus wanted. From there, I believe is when trust was built between them,” Boueiz said.

“Lahoud knew early on that a camp in Syria was opposed to Hariri. He built his policies based on this. Lahoud actually had no personal problems with Hariri, and he didn’t even deal in politics. He had no reason to have differences with Hariri except for the fact that one camp in Syria did not want him,” he continued.

Chirac and Hariri

I had to ask Boueiz about Chirac’s involvement in Lebanon in support of his friend, Hariri.

“Of course, Chirac was a close friend of Hariri. When Hrawi’s term neared its end, Chirac sensed – perhaps through Hariri’s request – that he needed to act because Lahoud appeared to be the most likely successor. This would not be good for Hariri, to whom Lahoud showed unconcealed animosity,” continued the former FM.

Before the end of Hrawi’s term, Chirac visited Lebanon. During a protocol visit to the Foreign Ministry, the French leader requested that he and Boueiz share a car ride to the presidential palace.

“In the car, he told me: ‘You are Lebanon’s hope and Hariri is also Lebanon’s big hope. If you don’t reach an agreement, a military figure will be elected, and you will both be destroyed.’ I smiled at him and replied: ‘Mr. President, I want to assure you that I have no differences with Hariri. We have no personal disputes at all. But Hariri, had from the start, sought hegemony. I personally, cannot tolerate such an approach, especially when it violates the constitution, laws, norms and balances.’”

“I may have been one of the few politicians who didn’t benefit from Hariri. I feared that the decision to name Lahoud had already been taken. Chirac informed me that nothing yet had been decided. He requested that the three of us meet to put disputes behind us. I agreed.”

Later that night Boueiz, Chirac and Hariri met and the FM laid out his grievances. He explained that he viewed Lebanon from the angle of the republic, while Hariri had a different approach. He explained that he came from a legal background, while Hariri was a businessman and sometimes businessmen cross legal lines so that they can complete their affairs quickly.

He also explained the delicate sectarian balances in the country, saying he refused to allow Hariri to violate them because he would be letting down his sectarian community. He noted that Hariri had not lived in Lebanon long enough to understand these balances.

Chirac had hoped that Boueiz and Hariri would reach an understanding. Should they forge an alliance, they would be able to greatly influence the political scene. Boueiz was reluctant because he was convinced that the decision to elect Lahoud had already been taken and would not be impacted by political shifts.

“The meeting ended, and the coming days proved that I was right and that the decision over Lahoud had been made,” Boueiz said.



Jamal Mustafa: Saddam Said ‘Qassim Was Honest, But the Party Ordered His Assassination’

Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam Said ‘Qassim Was Honest, But the Party Ordered His Assassination’

Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
Jamal Mustafa Sultan.

Jamal Mustafa Sultan, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and former deputy secretary, recalled how the late Iraqi president viewed former Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qassim as an honorable and brave man even though he was involved on an attempt on his life.

In the third installment of his interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mustafa said: “In 1959, a fateful decision by Iraq’s Baath Party, led by Fuad al-Rikabi, changed the course of a young man’s life. The party planned a bold attempt to assassinate Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Qassim on Oct. 7.”

When a team member dropped out shortly before the operation, Saddam, then a little-known young man, was brought in. During the ambush on Al-Rashid Street in Baghdad, Qassim was slightly injured, and Saddam was wounded by shrapnel in his leg, said Mustafa.

After the failed attempt, al-Rikabi and other senior Baath members, including Hazem Jawad and Ali Saleh al-Saadi, fled to Syria. There, al-Rikabi kept asking about Saddam until he learned that Saddam had also escaped, organizing his secret journey to Syria on his own.

Hazem Jawad, a key Baath Party leader, recalled the moment Saddam Hussein became a full party member. In a small underground apartment in Damascus, Fuad al-Rikabi led a meeting with several party members, including himself, Ali Saleh al-Saadi, and Medhat Ibrahim Juma. “Fuad praised Saddam, calling him courageous and loyal, and proposed accepting him as a full member. We all agreed,” said Jawad, according to Mustafa.

“Saddam, a tall young man with piercing eyes and dark skin, stood before us. Fuad recited the party oath, and Saddam repeated it, officially joining the Baath Party,” he continued.

“We spent the next two hours talking over tea and cake. Before leaving, Fuad announced his trip to Cairo. Saddam also asked for permission to go to Egypt to continue his law studies. We approved, as it wasn’t safe to return him to Iraq after his involvement in the assassination attempt on Abdul Karim Qassim,” recounted Mustafa.

Saddam’s respect for Qassim

It’s uncommon for a leader to praise a predecessor who survived an assassination attempt against them, but Saddam did just that. Mustafa shared the story during a meeting.

“President Qassim, may God have mercy on him, was brave and honest,” Saddam said, according to Mustafa. “I respect him for serving Iraq with integrity.”

“We were young and impulsive. We didn’t think about the reasons behind the operation or what might happen afterward. We didn’t even consider who could replace Qassim if he were gone.”

When told that Qassim’s sister was his only surviving family member, Saddam instructed that she be given a car and financial support.

Saddam also treated former President Abdul Rahman Arif with respect, despite efforts to tarnish his legacy. Mustafa noted that campaigns to smear Arif were part of a broader attempt to justify Iraq’s invasion and undermine its independence. He urged historians to seek the truth and challenge false narratives.

Abdul Karim Qassim. (Getty Images)

Mustafa's reflection on Saddam

When asked if Saddam had made mistakes, Mustafa replied: “Mr. President worked for Iraq’s progress. Like anyone, he sometimes got things right and sometimes wrong, but his goal was always to elevate the country.”

“He had no interest in wealth. Over 20 years, investigators searched for assets linked to him—land, money, anything—but found nothing. Even his political opponent, Iyad Allawi, confirmed this. Saddam was strict about protecting public funds, and this extended to his children as well,” he added.

He also criticized the current government, accusing it of seizing land and displacing Iraqis.

“They’ve taken properties from displaced residents and given them to foreigners, including Iranians, Pakistanis, and Afghans. Areas like Jurf al-Sakhar and Al-Awja have been emptied, with residents banned from returning. Some lands are controlled by foreign military intelligence, impacting not just Iraq but the region. Christians have also lost properties to militias,” noted Sultan.

He shared his own losses: “My family’s land, passed down for generations, was confiscated. An orchard over 250 years old and another property from my great-grandfather, over 200 years old, were taken simply because we’re linked to the former regime. Even if a child in our family registers property now, it’s immediately seized.”

He added: “My family and others have lost everything. While some managed to sell or keep a few properties, all of ours were taken.”

Criticism of Moqtada al-Sadr, Iraq's sectarian divide

Mustafa expressed disappointment in Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr after the fall of Saddam’s regime.

“Moqtada knows the truth about who killed his father. He attended investigation meetings and knows the details. His father, Mohammad al-Sadr, had influence and even criticized the regime in Friday sermons. Despite warnings, he refused official protection before his assassination,” he said.

On claims that Saddam’s government was Sunni-dominated, Mustafa disagreed.

“At that time, we were all Iraqis. There was no emphasis on Sunni, Shiite, or Christian identities. Our shared Iraqi identity came first, and positions in the government, military, or party were based on merit. For example, Tariq Aziz, a Christian, held top roles, including foreign minister and deputy prime minister. Sectarianism wasn’t a factor,” he said.

He criticized the current leadership, accusing it of destroying Iraq’s unity.

“Today’s politics aim to change Iraq’s demographics and weaken the country. Millions of Iraqis have been displaced, not just one group but people from all regions. Over 10 million now live abroad. This isn’t a coincidence—it’s a deliberate effort to break Iraq’s unity and control its future,” noted Mustafa.

Returning to Iraq

When asked if he hopes to return to Iraq, Mustafa said: “Since 2003, all the governments in Iraq have been installed by the US occupation and are aligned with Iran to further its agenda in the region, even through militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. After the occupation began, Iran-backed militias targeted Iraq’s scientists, doctors and pilots, which led to over 10 million Iraqis fleeing the country. The human cost of this is immense and unacceptable.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Of course, I want to return to Iraq. Every patriotic Iraqi who loves their country wants to return. It’s just a matter of time. We hope, God willing, that Iraq will be liberated and strong again, and when that happens, my family and I will be among the first to return.”

Mustafa also criticized Iran’s growing influence in the region: “People here are talking about Iran’s control over four Arab capitals: Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sanaa. These countries are falling apart, with militias making the decisions, not governments. The policies being followed harm these nations’ interests and their Arab identity.”

He said Saddam quickly recognized a broader plot to destabilize Iraq and the region.

“Saddam saw Iraq as a barrier to a project aimed not only at Iraq, but at the entire Arab world, threatening their existence and role,” he said.

Mustafa also blamed Iran for starting the Iraq-Iran war, citing Tehran’s clear policy of exporting its revolution, as stated in its constitution.

When asked about reports that Iraqi intelligence proposed assassinating Iran's Supreme Leader Khomeini during his stay in Baghdad, Mustafa confirmed it but explained why Saddam rejected the idea.

“Saddam was a noble and honorable man. He would never allow harm to come to a guest, especially through betrayal. He would never consider or permit such a thing.”