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Boueiz: Rift with Gaddafi, Saddam due to Provocative Message, Assassination Plot

Colonel Gaddafi alongside Arab leaders, including President Hosni Mubarak, President Chadli Bendjedid and King Hassan II, during the inauguration of a reservoir for the waters of the Great Man-made River in Suluq, south of Benghazi in 1991. (Getty Images)
Colonel Gaddafi alongside Arab leaders, including President Hosni Mubarak, President Chadli Bendjedid and King Hassan II, during the inauguration of a reservoir for the waters of the Great Man-made River in Suluq, south of Benghazi in 1991. (Getty Images)
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Boueiz: Rift with Gaddafi, Saddam due to Provocative Message, Assassination Plot

Colonel Gaddafi alongside Arab leaders, including President Hosni Mubarak, President Chadli Bendjedid and King Hassan II, during the inauguration of a reservoir for the waters of the Great Man-made River in Suluq, south of Benghazi in 1991. (Getty Images)
Colonel Gaddafi alongside Arab leaders, including President Hosni Mubarak, President Chadli Bendjedid and King Hassan II, during the inauguration of a reservoir for the waters of the Great Man-made River in Suluq, south of Benghazi in 1991. (Getty Images)

When President Elias Hrawi assumed office, Lebanon was facing severe challenges, with a fragmented state and crumbling institutions. Despite the circumstances, then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz rejected the approach to deal with Lebanon as a weak country and a quasi-state.

He restored the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the glow it had when it was in the custody of a brilliant minister, Fouad Boutros, who is highly admired by Boueiz.

The minister rejected the language of dictations imposed Lebanon, and refused to devote the country as an arena for settling scores. What further strengthened his role was his direct relationship with President Hafez al-Assad.

I asked Boueiz about the diplomatic incident that led to the severing of relations with Libya.

He said: “One day, the Libyan ambassador comes to me to convey a message from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The letter was a green cardboard book inlaid with gold or gold ink and weighed about 10 or even 12 kilograms. He gave me the book as if it were a fateful international treaty, so I opened it and read a line that talks about “the conspiracy of the Jews and Christians against the Arab nation...” I read these words, closed the book and threw it into the arms of the ambassador, saying: Tell Colonel Gaddafi that this book is totally unacceptable. Tell him: We are the real Arabs. The Christians of Lebanon restored the Arab renaissance after 450 years of Turkification and the disappearance of this language. They preserved the Arabic language in their monasteries and through its printing presses and monks. Tell Colonel Gaddafi: These are the ones who created the Arab political thought...”

Boueiz added that he asked the ambassador for an immediate letter of apology, or consider himself “persona non grata”. He gave him and the Libyan embassy staff 48 hours to leave the country.

“Indeed, the delegation left Lebanon and I went to the Council of Ministers. The authority to expel an ambassador falls within the powers of the foreign minister; but the power to sever relations requires a cabinet decision. So I asked the Council of Ministers to cut the relations, and this is what happened,” the former minister recounted.

- Rules and principles

Boueiz said that his decision was not based on a sectarian stance, but rather an attempt to recall the rules and principles.

“Days passed, and whenever I would go to a conference abroad, the Lebanese ambassador would come to me to tell me that the Libyan ambassador had called him and that the Libyan foreign minister wanted to meet with me. My answer was always the same: I will not meet him unless he is provided with a letter of apology.”

The minister told Asharq Al-Awsat that he faced pressure in Lebanon over this issue.

“It’s the Lebanese commercial mind. Lebanon exports apples to Libya. I am from an area where apples are grown. But I used to answer that our national dignity is more important than apples...”

The rift lasted for at least two years, Boueiz said, until the Lebanese ambassador to Cairo told him that the Libyan foreign minister wanted to meet him and convey a letter of apology.

The ambassador informed Boueiz of the content of the letter, which he described as “acceptable”. Relations with Libya were consequently restored.

_ Al-Sadr Case

Boueiz said that during his tenure at the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, he did not receive any information on the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, except for undocumented and unconfirmed reports.

He recounted: “The story that we have received, which is not confirmed, states that during the war, Colonel Gaddafi had asked Imam Musa al-Sadr that the Shiites in Lebanon engage in a war against the Christians... But Imam Musa al-Sadr used the money (which Libya provided for this purpose) for social and charitable reasons. He built schools and hospitals there... It seems that Palestinian and Lebanese parties complained to Gaddafi when he asked them: How did you not win over these Christians? Gaddafi summoned Imam al-Sadr and told him: What did you do with all this aid... Al-Sadr gave him a list of social and other institutions...Then, Abdullah Al-Senussi, the intelligence chief, entered and kidnapped Imam Al-Sadr, and it is said that they hid him somewhere in the desert. Later, they sent a delegation to Rome with a sheikh wearing a turban to prove that Sadr went to Italy after Libya.”

-Saddam Hussein and the assassination of Taleb al-Suhail

There is an expressive story that happened with Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Boueiz said: “There was a senior Iraqi tribal leader in Lebanon named Taleb Al-Suhail, who was an opponent of Saddam’s regime and resided in the Raouche area of Beirut. Three people came to his house... shot and killed him and then fled. The police chased them until they reached the Iraqi embassy, where they sought refuge, and the police could not enter it due to diplomatic immunity.”

The former minister told Asharq Al-Awsat that he immediately summoned the Iraqi ambassador, asking him to hand over the culprits, otherwise he would consider him “persona non grata”.

He said he was sure that the Iraqi diplomat would not hand them over, and that they were intelligence men coming from Baghdad.

“The next day, I received a call from Beirut Airport at eight in the morning. It was the Public Prosecutor of the Cassation Court, Judge Mounif Oweidat. He told me: Your Excellency, the entire staff of the Iraqi embassy has been arrested while trying to flee.”

Boueiz asked for the names of the arrested people to find out that three of them were not diplomats. He then requested the immediate release of the ambassador and all the diplomats, while the wanted persons were referred to the judiciary and sentenced with imprisonment. One of them died in jail from cancer, he noted.

- A letter of apology

Similar to what happened with Libya, at every conference Boueiz went to, he would be approached by his Iraqi counterpart, who would ask him for a meeting.

“I can only accept a letter of apology,” the Lebanese minister used to reply.

“I knew that Saddam would not apologize for the matter (the assassination of Al-Suhail). One day, our ambassador in Jordan called me to tell me that the Iraqi ambassador conveyed a letter from Saddam Hussein... Indeed, I found the content of the letter acceptable.”

Boueiz noted that Hussein did not use the apology word, but described what happened as a mistake and whoever did it “will bear responsibility.” He also denied any role for the Iraqi state in the crime. The bilateral relations were then mended.

-Yasser Arafat and the complex relationship with Hafez al-Assad

According to Boueiz, Arafat’s relationship with Syria was complicated. There was a kind of hatred towards the Palestinian leader.

“In Syria, if President Hafez al-Assad hates a person, it means that the entire regime hates him. They had some kind of picture of Arafat. They accuse him of being dishonest, and that he will not spare any opportunity for... an unacceptable political settlement.”

- Ding Xiaoping

I asked Minister Boueiz about his meeting with Deng Xiaoping, who laid the foundation for the Chinese renaissance.

He replied: “I was greatly touched by what he said to me during one of my visits to China in the early nineties. I was amazed at the way China emerged from Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and the growth of the Chinese economy.”

The former foreign minister quoted the Chinese leader as saying: “We realized that Marxism is an economic doctrine that is no longer viable, and that it has fallen. We saw that Leninism is a dictatorial political doctrine that has outlived its time. We also realized that Stalinism is a police security doctrine that is also outdated. But we cannot get out of the three doctrines without the country collapsing into chaos. We have seen before us the example of Russia; when Gorbachev abolished these three beliefs together, and Russia collapsed as a whole. So, we decided to gradually eradicate these beliefs, starting with Marxism, to make way for economic renaissance and people’s development, and the trend towards more freedoms and democracy will gradually follow.”

Boueiz said that he conveyed this opinion to Hafez al-Assad during one of the meetings, saying that Syria, too, may be in a situation similar to China, which means that if it begins with economic renaissance and freedom, it will gradually get out of these situations.

“I think that this matter greatly touched President Assad, although he was very far from giving priority to the economic issue, but it impacted him as an idea. This prompted him request my help for Syria to join the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, on the grounds that this partnership would open the door to economic development and help Syria grow and develop, and preventing it from descending into chaos,” the former Lebanese minister stated.

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.