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Lost in Translation? Climate Experts Aim to Break Language Barrier

Representation photo: A general view shows almost dried up Lake Zicksee near Sankt Andrae, as another heatwave is predicted for parts of the country, in Austria, August 12, 2022. REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger/
Representation photo: A general view shows almost dried up Lake Zicksee near Sankt Andrae, as another heatwave is predicted for parts of the country, in Austria, August 12, 2022. REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger/
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Lost in Translation? Climate Experts Aim to Break Language Barrier

Representation photo: A general view shows almost dried up Lake Zicksee near Sankt Andrae, as another heatwave is predicted for parts of the country, in Austria, August 12, 2022. REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger/
Representation photo: A general view shows almost dried up Lake Zicksee near Sankt Andrae, as another heatwave is predicted for parts of the country, in Austria, August 12, 2022. REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger/

Indian researcher Sabir Ahamed took a linguist's help to translate the term "just transition" into Bengali for his new study on the impact of coal mine closures on local people, as countries start to shift from fossil fuels to clean energy.
Ahamed settled on the somewhat poetic "kalo theke aalo", which literally means "from darkness to hope", after consulting the language expert for a phrase his target audience of coal communities in India's state of West Bengal would understand.
"It's catchy. It is not a direct translation but people do associate 'kalo' with coal so it gives an immediate context," said Ahamed, 45, who explained that there is no equivalent of just transition or even climate change in the Bengali language.
"Besides, I wanted to show there is hope, that there is a way out (of coal)," added Ahamed, who is based in Kolkata in eastern India and works with Pratichi India Trust, a research and advocacy group.
The concept of just transition is complex, even in English, Thomson Reuters Foundation said.

The UN's International Labor Organization (ILO) defines it as "greening the economy in a way that is as fair and inclusive as possible to everyone concerned, creating decent work opportunities and leaving no one behind".
Ahamed's research is among just a handful of efforts to make jargon-heavy climate change and energy transition dialogue - so far restricted to English-speaking think tanks and experts in India - accessible to people who will be impacted the most.
"What is the purpose of doing research if we cannot communicate the findings or the analysis to the communities or stakeholders?" Ahamed added. "I research for action."
India is the world's second-largest coal producer and at least 13 million people in the nation depend on the industry for a living, said a 2021 report by the National Foundation for India, a philanthropic organization focused on social justice.
Many are at risk of losing jobs and incomes as India builds its renewable energy capacity, just transition experts warn.
However, communication about the country's future move away from fossil fuels - and what this might entail - has yet to reach the people whose lives will be most affected, analysts and activists warned.
"The dialogue around just transition is limited to echo chambers," said Mayank Aggarwal, who heads the just transition vertical for Indian consulting firm Climate Trends.
Aggarwal has this year launched a podcast on just transition in Hindi and used social media platform X - formerly known as Twitter - to host debates about it in the language, which is widely spoken and understood in India's mining areas, he said.
"We want to reach out to people who actually matter, who don't know what just transition is. We want them to understand the issue and be an important stakeholder in the discussion."
The problem is far from unique to South Asia - even the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has tried to make its global findings easier to understand in recent years after criticism from scientists about jargon being a barrier.
MIND THE GAP
In recent months, think tanks have enlisted comics, poets and musicians to better communicate climate change threats to the public, with a broader aim of making the issue more accessible and widely understood as many people remain unaware.
Apart from spreading the knowledge more widely that extreme weather events such as heatwaves, droughts and cyclones are fueled by climate change, using local languages will also encourage people to demand political action, campaigners said.
While general community outreach by climate and energy NGOs and researchers in India and neighboring Bangladesh - where most people speak Bengali - is done in local languages, efforts are now being made to break down and translate technical terms.
In Bangladesh - which is considered one of the world's most climate-vulnerable nations - activist group YouthNet for Climate Justice has started posting Bengali commentary on social media about the reports of the IPCC, for example.
The activists, who have in the past campaigned for the cancellation of upcoming coal-based power plants in coastal areas, now want community radio stations to discuss climate and energy issues in local dialects of Bengali.
"Climate-related information hardly ever seeps into the community and we are working to bring it close to the people," said Sohanur Rahman, executive coordinator of YouthNet.
In a bid to reach more people in India's coal regions, the Just Transition Research Centre (JTRC) at the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, rolled out four fellowships last year - with one in Hindi, one in Bengali and two in English.
Researcher Ahamed was awarded one of the fellowships - which aimed to assess the impact of mine closures on coal communities.
The next leg of the program will focus on renewable energy - and with new projects coming up in India's western and southern states, fellowships will be offered in languages spoken in those regions - Gujarati and Tamil - "to strengthen impact and reach" of research studies, the organizers said.
"Just transition is a complicated process, and it is important that coal communities understand its dynamics," said Pradip Swarnakar, an academic who heads the JTRC.
During recent visits to coal hubs in India, Context found jobs for local communities are shrinking as mines use outsourced workers - and that with no other skills, many people are resorting to illegally scavenging coal to eke out a living.
"Officials are discussing India's net-zero targets but there is no awareness about this among people, so they don't even demand skills for a future beyond coal," said Pinaki Roy, who teaches children in the coal hub of Jharia in eastern India.
LITERALLY SPEAKING
Climate change and just transition can often feel like distant and irrelevant problems to communities in India and Bangladesh because they are mainly presented and discussed in English, said activists who work with such people on the ground.
And literal translations of terms from English to local languages fail to convey the threat or persuade people to care and engage, according to climate experts and researchers.
Ismet Jarin of the Bangladesh-based NGO Awaj Foundation, which supports garment workers, said the country's fashion industry was becoming greener and more sustainable, but stressed that workers who have long been calling for better wages and conditions are unaware of how this shift would impact them.
"It is important that they can see the connection between climate and their rights, and we are working to convey the message to them in a language they understand," she said.
"We try to use examples that workers can relate to - of seasons changing, disasters and climate hazards becoming more frequent, how the fashion industry is adapting and how workers will cope as the world adjusts to these changes," Jarin added.
It's an aim shared by the Indian researcher Ahamed.
"The world is moving away from coal but there is no information about it at the ground level," he said.
"I want to reach out to (local communities) by writing in Bengali, and motivate others to do the same."

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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 sparked a wave of hope for a brighter future in Syria. But 100 days into the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies, the political assessment of the new leadership remains mixed.

Before diving into the performance of the new authorities, it's important to recognize the scale of the challenges facing Syria. The country is deeply fragmented—politically and regionally—still grappling with foreign influence and various forms of external occupation. The economic toll is staggering.

Reconstruction is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, and more than half the population remains displaced inside and outside the country. According to the United Nations, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 16.7 million people—roughly three out of four—depend on humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, any political actor stepping in after Assad faces an uphill battle.

Yet, the new administration has managed to score some diplomatic wins. Despite its controversial background, the al-Sharaa-led government has succeeded in easing some international concerns and opening lines of communication with key regional and global players.

Several governments have formally recognized the new authority and begun to engage with it. The European Union and the United Kingdom have notably suspended sanctions on selected sectors and entities. France, once a vocal critic of Damascus, recently welcomed al-Sharaa to Paris.

However, Washington has yet to outline a coherent Syria policy under President Donald Trump. While the US has not objected to the Biden administration’s January 2025 move to ease restrictions on Syria’s energy and financial sectors, the broader sanctions remain in place.

Still, the first 100 days under the new leadership offer, at best, cautious optimism. The fundamental questions lie in the administration’s broader political and economic orientation, as well as its vision for Syria’s fractured society. There is no guarantee yet that the country is on a path toward long-term stability.

State Institutions, Security Forces

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership—dominated by former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—moved swiftly to consolidate control over state institutions and security bodies during the transitional phase.

Following the regime’s collapse, an interim government was formed in December 2024, composed almost entirely of HTS members or close affiliates. The caretaker administration held power until a new cabinet was installed at the end of March 2025.

Al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, has since appointed new ministers, governors, and security officials—many of whom have ties to HTS or allied armed factions. In a sweeping overhaul of the country’s military and intelligence apparatus, the new authorities established a Syrian army under their command.

Senior leadership positions were handed to HTS veterans, including long-time commander Marhaf Abu Qusra, who was promoted to general and named defense minister.

Beyond the security sphere, the leadership has moved to entrench its influence over Syria’s economic and social sectors. Key appointments have been made across professional syndicates, chambers of commerce, and civil society organizations—often bypassing elections and installing loyalists from within HTS's inner circle.

The moves suggest a systematic effort to centralize power and reshape Syria’s state apparatus under the new order, raising questions about the future of pluralism and institutional independence.

The absence of a comprehensive democratic process has cast a shadow over Syria’s early post-Assad transition, undermining key initiatives meant to lay the foundation for the country’s future—including the much-anticipated Syrian National Dialogue Conference.

Critics say the conference, billed as a cornerstone for participatory dialogue, was marred by poor planning, limited representation, and rushed sessions that left little room for meaningful debate. Political and civil society actors voiced frustration at being sidelined, warning that the process risked entrenching exclusion rather than fostering unity.

Similar concerns were raised over the interim constitution signed by al-Sharaa. The charter faced sharp criticism over the opaque selection of its drafting committee and the lack of public consultation.

New authorities established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs in late March under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tasked with overseeing political events and activities, the secretariat is also responsible for shaping national policy strategies and coordinating their implementation. One of its more controversial roles includes repurposing the assets and structures of the defunct Baath Party and former National Progressive Front coalition.

The creation of the body signals an effort by the al-Sharaa administration to centralize political planning and regain control over the ideological tools once wielded by the Assad regime—this time under a new banner.

Neoliberal Agenda for the Economy

Syria’s new leadership has also quietly adopted a sweeping neoliberal economic model—without public consultation or parliamentary debate—signaling a long-term shift in the country’s economic trajectory, despite the government's interim mandate.

Since taking power, the al-Sharaa administration has rolled out policies that go beyond the scope of a transitional government. The economic vision, rooted in privatization, market liberalization, and austerity, has drawn sharp criticism for deepening inequality and placing additional strain on already struggling Syrians.

Key state assets are being sold off to the private sector, subsidies for bread and household gas have been slashed, and spending cuts have hit essential public services—measures that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Analysts say the policies largely benefit Syria’s emerging economic elite and business networks aligned with the new ruling class.

In a controversial move, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced the dismissal of nearly one-third of the public-sector workforce.

Officials claimed the cuts targeted employees who were “receiving salaries without performing any actual duties.”

No official figures have been released on the total number affected, but some workers were placed on paid leave for three months pending further evaluation of their employment status.

The decision sparked a wave of protests from laid-off and suspended workers in cities across the country, highlighting growing discontent with the government’s top-down reforms and raising questions about the social cost of its economic overhaul.

Since the start of the year, the al-Sharaa administration has repeatedly pledged to raise public sector wages by 400%, setting a new minimum salary at 1,123,560 Syrian pounds—roughly $86.

While welcomed in principle, the measure remains unimplemented and falls far short of meeting basic living needs. By the end of March 2025, the minimum monthly expenses for a family of five in Damascus were estimated at 8 million pounds, or about $666.

Meanwhile, the government’s decision to reduce tariffs on more than 260 Turkish products has triggered backlash from local producers, particularly in the struggling industrial and agricultural sectors.

Critics say the move has undercut domestic output and opened the floodgates to cheaper Turkish imports. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, Turkish exports to Syria rose by 31.2% in the first quarter of 2025, reaching $508 million, up from $387 million in the same period last year.

Political Fragmentation and Rising Sectarian Tensions

The new government has also made little headway in addressing Syria’s deep political and social fractures.

Efforts to build bridges with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast and to engage Druze communities in the southern province of Sweida have largely faltered, facing both logistical hurdles and grassroots resistance.

Recent protests in Sweida, sparked by opposition to the interim constitution and broader government policies, highlight the growing public unrest.

The surge in violence along Syria’s coastal regions, where hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, has further inflamed sectarian tensions and raised alarms over the country’s fragile stability.

While the latest wave of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was initially triggered by remnants of the former Assad regime targeting civilians and security personnel, rights monitors say the government’s response has fueled further sectarian division.

Under the pretext of rooting out so-called regime “holdouts,” retaliatory violence has escalated, often blurring the line between former loyalists and the broader Alawite community.

Analysts warn that this narrative risks fostering collective blame and deepening intercommunal resentment.

Despite efforts by the al-Sharaa administration to de-escalate tensions, it has largely failed to prevent the violence from spiraling. Clashes and reprisals have continued, particularly affecting Alawite-populated areas, where community members have accused security forces of indiscriminate crackdowns.

Authorities in Damascus have described the incidents as isolated and attributed them to “undisciplined elements,” but critics say the lack of accountability and failure to investigate abuses have only emboldened perpetrators.

Despite pledges to usher in a new era of accountability, the al-Sharaa administration has failed to establish a comprehensive process to prosecute individuals and groups involved in war crimes committed over the past decade.

Rights advocates say such a mechanism could have helped prevent the current wave of retaliatory violence and sectarian polarization, but political observers argue that meaningful justice would likely expose actors the new leadership is reluctant to confront.

Regional Powers Stir the Pot

Amid the internal fragmentation, external actors—most notably Iran, Israel—have sought to exploit the country’s ethnic and sectarian divisions to serve their strategic interests.

Israeli officials have stepped up rhetoric in recent weeks, signaling a willingness to intervene militarily under the pretext of “protecting” Syria’s Druze minority. While the move is seen by many as an attempt to extend Tel Aviv’s influence in southern Syria, key Druze political and social leaders have largely rejected such overtures, reaffirming their national identity and support for Syria’s territorial unity.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to entrench its presence in areas vacated by Assad’s forces, drawing criticism from opposition groups who accuse Iran of exacerbating sectarian fault lines to solidify its influence.

Despite a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Turkish military operations have persisted in the northeast, targeting Kurdish-controlled territories in apparent defiance of diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region.

Finally, what began in December 2024 with widespread optimism is now clouded by political ambiguity, social unrest, and a lack of clear direction—casting doubt on whether Syria’s post-Assad era can deliver the change many had hoped for.