100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 sparked a wave of hope for a brighter future in Syria. But 100 days into the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies, the political assessment of the new leadership remains mixed.

Before diving into the performance of the new authorities, it's important to recognize the scale of the challenges facing Syria. The country is deeply fragmented—politically and regionally—still grappling with foreign influence and various forms of external occupation. The economic toll is staggering.

Reconstruction is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, and more than half the population remains displaced inside and outside the country. According to the United Nations, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 16.7 million people—roughly three out of four—depend on humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, any political actor stepping in after Assad faces an uphill battle.

Yet, the new administration has managed to score some diplomatic wins. Despite its controversial background, the al-Sharaa-led government has succeeded in easing some international concerns and opening lines of communication with key regional and global players.

Several governments have formally recognized the new authority and begun to engage with it. The European Union and the United Kingdom have notably suspended sanctions on selected sectors and entities. France, once a vocal critic of Damascus, recently welcomed al-Sharaa to Paris.

However, Washington has yet to outline a coherent Syria policy under President Donald Trump. While the US has not objected to the Biden administration’s January 2025 move to ease restrictions on Syria’s energy and financial sectors, the broader sanctions remain in place.

Still, the first 100 days under the new leadership offer, at best, cautious optimism. The fundamental questions lie in the administration’s broader political and economic orientation, as well as its vision for Syria’s fractured society. There is no guarantee yet that the country is on a path toward long-term stability.

State Institutions, Security Forces

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership—dominated by former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—moved swiftly to consolidate control over state institutions and security bodies during the transitional phase.

Following the regime’s collapse, an interim government was formed in December 2024, composed almost entirely of HTS members or close affiliates. The caretaker administration held power until a new cabinet was installed at the end of March 2025.

Al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, has since appointed new ministers, governors, and security officials—many of whom have ties to HTS or allied armed factions. In a sweeping overhaul of the country’s military and intelligence apparatus, the new authorities established a Syrian army under their command.

Senior leadership positions were handed to HTS veterans, including long-time commander Marhaf Abu Qusra, who was promoted to general and named defense minister.

Beyond the security sphere, the leadership has moved to entrench its influence over Syria’s economic and social sectors. Key appointments have been made across professional syndicates, chambers of commerce, and civil society organizations—often bypassing elections and installing loyalists from within HTS's inner circle.

The moves suggest a systematic effort to centralize power and reshape Syria’s state apparatus under the new order, raising questions about the future of pluralism and institutional independence.

The absence of a comprehensive democratic process has cast a shadow over Syria’s early post-Assad transition, undermining key initiatives meant to lay the foundation for the country’s future—including the much-anticipated Syrian National Dialogue Conference.

Critics say the conference, billed as a cornerstone for participatory dialogue, was marred by poor planning, limited representation, and rushed sessions that left little room for meaningful debate. Political and civil society actors voiced frustration at being sidelined, warning that the process risked entrenching exclusion rather than fostering unity.

Similar concerns were raised over the interim constitution signed by al-Sharaa. The charter faced sharp criticism over the opaque selection of its drafting committee and the lack of public consultation.

New authorities established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs in late March under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tasked with overseeing political events and activities, the secretariat is also responsible for shaping national policy strategies and coordinating their implementation. One of its more controversial roles includes repurposing the assets and structures of the defunct Baath Party and former National Progressive Front coalition.

The creation of the body signals an effort by the al-Sharaa administration to centralize political planning and regain control over the ideological tools once wielded by the Assad regime—this time under a new banner.

Neoliberal Agenda for the Economy

Syria’s new leadership has also quietly adopted a sweeping neoliberal economic model—without public consultation or parliamentary debate—signaling a long-term shift in the country’s economic trajectory, despite the government's interim mandate.

Since taking power, the al-Sharaa administration has rolled out policies that go beyond the scope of a transitional government. The economic vision, rooted in privatization, market liberalization, and austerity, has drawn sharp criticism for deepening inequality and placing additional strain on already struggling Syrians.

Key state assets are being sold off to the private sector, subsidies for bread and household gas have been slashed, and spending cuts have hit essential public services—measures that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Analysts say the policies largely benefit Syria’s emerging economic elite and business networks aligned with the new ruling class.

In a controversial move, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced the dismissal of nearly one-third of the public-sector workforce.

Officials claimed the cuts targeted employees who were “receiving salaries without performing any actual duties.”

No official figures have been released on the total number affected, but some workers were placed on paid leave for three months pending further evaluation of their employment status.

The decision sparked a wave of protests from laid-off and suspended workers in cities across the country, highlighting growing discontent with the government’s top-down reforms and raising questions about the social cost of its economic overhaul.

Since the start of the year, the al-Sharaa administration has repeatedly pledged to raise public sector wages by 400%, setting a new minimum salary at 1,123,560 Syrian pounds—roughly $86.

While welcomed in principle, the measure remains unimplemented and falls far short of meeting basic living needs. By the end of March 2025, the minimum monthly expenses for a family of five in Damascus were estimated at 8 million pounds, or about $666.

Meanwhile, the government’s decision to reduce tariffs on more than 260 Turkish products has triggered backlash from local producers, particularly in the struggling industrial and agricultural sectors.

Critics say the move has undercut domestic output and opened the floodgates to cheaper Turkish imports. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, Turkish exports to Syria rose by 31.2% in the first quarter of 2025, reaching $508 million, up from $387 million in the same period last year.

Political Fragmentation and Rising Sectarian Tensions

The new government has also made little headway in addressing Syria’s deep political and social fractures.

Efforts to build bridges with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast and to engage Druze communities in the southern province of Sweida have largely faltered, facing both logistical hurdles and grassroots resistance.

Recent protests in Sweida, sparked by opposition to the interim constitution and broader government policies, highlight the growing public unrest.

The surge in violence along Syria’s coastal regions, where hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, has further inflamed sectarian tensions and raised alarms over the country’s fragile stability.

While the latest wave of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was initially triggered by remnants of the former Assad regime targeting civilians and security personnel, rights monitors say the government’s response has fueled further sectarian division.

Under the pretext of rooting out so-called regime “holdouts,” retaliatory violence has escalated, often blurring the line between former loyalists and the broader Alawite community.

Analysts warn that this narrative risks fostering collective blame and deepening intercommunal resentment.

Despite efforts by the al-Sharaa administration to de-escalate tensions, it has largely failed to prevent the violence from spiraling. Clashes and reprisals have continued, particularly affecting Alawite-populated areas, where community members have accused security forces of indiscriminate crackdowns.

Authorities in Damascus have described the incidents as isolated and attributed them to “undisciplined elements,” but critics say the lack of accountability and failure to investigate abuses have only emboldened perpetrators.

Despite pledges to usher in a new era of accountability, the al-Sharaa administration has failed to establish a comprehensive process to prosecute individuals and groups involved in war crimes committed over the past decade.

Rights advocates say such a mechanism could have helped prevent the current wave of retaliatory violence and sectarian polarization, but political observers argue that meaningful justice would likely expose actors the new leadership is reluctant to confront.

Regional Powers Stir the Pot

Amid the internal fragmentation, external actors—most notably Iran, Israel—have sought to exploit the country’s ethnic and sectarian divisions to serve their strategic interests.

Israeli officials have stepped up rhetoric in recent weeks, signaling a willingness to intervene militarily under the pretext of “protecting” Syria’s Druze minority. While the move is seen by many as an attempt to extend Tel Aviv’s influence in southern Syria, key Druze political and social leaders have largely rejected such overtures, reaffirming their national identity and support for Syria’s territorial unity.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to entrench its presence in areas vacated by Assad’s forces, drawing criticism from opposition groups who accuse Iran of exacerbating sectarian fault lines to solidify its influence.

Despite a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Turkish military operations have persisted in the northeast, targeting Kurdish-controlled territories in apparent defiance of diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region.

Finally, what began in December 2024 with widespread optimism is now clouded by political ambiguity, social unrest, and a lack of clear direction—casting doubt on whether Syria’s post-Assad era can deliver the change many had hoped for.



In Finland, Radioactive Spent Nuclear Fuel Soon to Be Buried Underground

Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
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In Finland, Radioactive Spent Nuclear Fuel Soon to Be Buried Underground

Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)

The elevator display reads "433", the number of meters below ground. The doors slide open, revealing the entrance to what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel.

Blasted into 1.9 billion-year-old stable bedrock in Eurajoki, southwest Finland, the geological repository for spent nuclear waste -- dubbed Onkalo which means "cave" in Finnish -- is nearly ready to start operations.

Countries have been wrestling with what to do with dangerous nuclear by-products since the first plants were built in the 1950s. Currently, most of it is in temporary storage.

Final repositories are being built in other countries, including neighboring Sweden and France, but Finland is expected to be first to open an underground storage solution.

The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is due to give approval in its final assessment in June, after which an operating license can be granted.

"We hope we can start the operation either at the end of this year or most probably at the beginning of next year," said Philippe Bordarier, chief executive of nuclear operator Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO).

His voice echoed in the damp tunnel where the spent nuclear fuel will be buried in holes drilled into the bedrock, where it will remain harmfully radioactive for thousands of years.

The waste currently cooled in water pools at an interim storage site, at the nearby Olkiluoto power plant next to the Baltic Sea, will be first to be deposited, Bordarier said.

With space for 6,500 tons of uranium, Onkalo is aimed at providing permanent storage for spent fuel from Finland's five nuclear reactors -- three of them located in Olkiluoto.

Nuclear waste management company Posiva began building the site in 2004, with the cost now estimated at one billion euros ($1.16 billion).

- 'Forever'-

Spent fuel is planned to be deposited in Onkalo's massive network of tunnels for 100 years, but operations may be extended if new nuclear reactors are built.

Subsequently, the vault will be sealed to provide safe storage for at least 100,000 years.

"Basically, it needs to be safe forever," noted Lauri Parviainen, a Posiva chemist who showed reporters around the facilities.

The fuel will be highly radioactive for "tens of thousands of years", he said.

After 100,000 years, they will be "about the same level as the uranium ore of which the fuel is made."

Above ground, the spent nuclear fuel will be encapsulated in highly corrosion-resistant copper canisters.

The canisters will be lowered into holes drilled in the tunnels, before the holes are filled with bentonite clay to seal them, Parviainen explained.

"So if the bentonite stays in place, we are safe," he said.

Once each 300-meter-long disposal tunnel is filled, it will be sealed with a steel-reinforced concrete plug.

- Long-term risks -

Jarkko Kyllonen, an expert on nuclear safety at Finland's nuclear regulator STUK, has assessed risk scenarios for the Onkalo project stretching up to a million years into the future.

Considering the "hazard potential of the waste, the first 10,000 years are very important for keeping the capsules intact," he told AFP.

The main long-term risks are corrosion of the copper canisters or earthquakes during future ice ages, which could potentially damage the capsules and cause radioactive fuel to leak, Kyllonen said.

But the results of various risk assessments conducted over the years have been "positive".

While France's plans for a similar underground nuclear tomb have met with strong opposition, Onkalo has received broader backing in Finland.

There was some opposition locally when the plans were first introduced in the 1970s, but "people have gotten used to it, and they trust the assessments made by STUK", Matti Kojo, social sciences professor at Lut University, told AFP.

"At the moment, support for nuclear power is at a historically high level in Finland," he noted.

The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation remains critical of the project, however, insisting that nuclear waste poses a long-term, serious risk.

"No one can guarantee the safety of Onkalo for thousands of years," director Tapani Veistola told AFP in an e-mail.

- Finland's nuclear push -

Under Finnish law, nuclear waste produced in Finland has to be deposited in the country, Climate and Environment Minister Sari Multala told AFP.

"Before the legal change in 1994, the spent nuclear fuel was exported to, for example, Russia," she said.

Increasing nuclear power in Finland has been a priority for the right-wing government, and the country is considering building so-called small modular reactors (SMRs).

How the spent nuclear fuel from future SMRs would be managed "has not been decided yet," Multala said. An assessment should be completed by March next year, she added.


Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
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Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)

Iran and the United States are in discussions to extend ‌their ceasefire so as to start negotiations on issues including Tehran's nuclear program, where Washington insists Iran must not be able to make a nuclear weapon.

While much of Iran's uranium enrichment infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged when Israel and the US bombed it in June, a large part of the highly enriched uranium it amassed is thought to have survived. That is the biggest US concern ahead of nuclear talks.

On Friday Trump said in a social media post that Iran must agree that the enriched uranium buried underground after earlier US strikes be "unearthed" and destroyed in coordination with Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog.

WHAT IS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM?

One of two fissile materials, along with plutonium, with which one can make the core of a nuclear bomb. While plutonium is usually extracted from the spent fuel of a nuclear reactor, requiring large and highly visible infrastructure, uranium can be enriched using centrifuges that have a much smaller footprint. Two of Iran's three enrichment sites that are known to have been operating when Israel and the ‌US attacked in ‌June were underground. The above-ground one was clearly destroyed.

Uranium is highly enriched when it ‌has ⁠reached 20% purity, and ⁠weapons-grade as of around 90%.

Modern reactors generally use fuel enriched to up to 5%, but some use fuel enriched to higher levels. The ones that power US nuclear submarines reportedly use fuel enriched beyond 90%.

HOW MUCH DOES IRAN HAVE?

Iran has not informed the UN nuclear watchdog of the fate of its enriched uranium since the June attacks or let its inspectors return to the sites where it was stored.

The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates Iran had these amounts when the first Israeli bombs fell on June 13:

- 440.9 kg enriched to up to 60%

- 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%

- 6,024.4 kg enriched to ⁠up to 5%

- 2,391.1 kg enriched to up to 2%

According to an IAEA yardstick, ‌the amount at 60% is enough, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear weapons. ‌The 20% stock would be enough for one and the 5% could produce 12. How much has survived is unclear. IAEA chief ‌Rafael Grossi has said his agency believes "a bit more than 200 kg" of the 60% stock is stored at a ‌tunnel complex in Isfahan that appears to have been largely unharmed by the June attacks. Some was also at the Natanz nuclear site, he said.

WHY THE CONCERN? US concern has been focused on the 60% material because that would be easiest and thus quickest to make a bomb with. Washington wants it gone. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

As the enrichment level of uranium increases, it becomes exponentially easier to enrich ‌further. Getting from 60% to 90% is easier than getting from unenriched to 5%.

President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of a nuclear deal between Iran and ⁠major powers that kept Tehran ⁠at a far greater distance from being able to produce an atom bomb than it is at now. The US withdrawal in 2018 caused the deal to unravel, and Iran quickly expanded its atomic program.

Under that 2015 deal, Iran did not enrich beyond 3.67%.

Even at 90%, however, it takes more steps to produce the core of a bomb. When it is enriched, the uranium is in gas form. It must then be turned into metal for use in a weapon.

CAN YOU MOVE IT?

Yes. Iran moved enriched material between sites under IAEA monitoring before the June attacks.

Under the 2015 deal and a precursor to it, Iran's stocks of uranium enriched to up to 20% were diluted or turned into reactor fuel plates and shipped out of the country.

Moving nuclear material like highly enriched uranium internationally is a sensitive but relatively routine procedure.

"It requires some precaution but it can be moved," Grossi told PBS in March when asked about the 60% material.

WILL IRAN GIVE IT UP? Iran's supreme leader has issued a directive that the 60% material should not be sent abroad, two senior Iranian sources said last week.

Iranian sources say Tehran might agree to send half of it to a third country, receiving uranium enriched to 5% in return, and dilute the other half inside Iran.


Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

 Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
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Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

 Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)

Repeated Israeli strikes on the medieval Beaufort Castle and its surroundings east of Nabatieh have revived debate over one of southern Lebanon’s most sensitive sites due to its elevated position overlooking Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon.

For decades, the Crusader fortress was a commanding military position and a battlefield etched into Israeli and Lebanese memory. Now, as fighting escalates in the south, it is back at the center of events. Military assessments say its battlefield value remains, despite major changes in warfare over recent decades.

The renewed focus on Beaufort Castle comes as Israel intensifies strikes around the site and the heights overlooking Nabatieh. The attacks have raised fresh questions about the military value of a position that has remained present in major confrontations in southern Lebanon since Israel's 1982 invasion.

Heritage landmark

Beaufort Castle, known in Arabic as Qalaat al-Shaqif, is one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent historical and heritage landmarks, and among the most important Crusader castles in the Levant.

The Crusaders named it Beaufort, meaning “beautiful fortress.” It later fell to Salaheddine after a long siege. The Crusaders then retook it for a period, and the Knights Templar inhabited it, before the Mamluks, led by Sultan al-Zahir Baybars, seized it in 1268.

Smoke rises from Beaufort Castle following strikes, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 27, 2026. (Reuters)

Although the Romans first built initial fortifications at the strategic site, the Crusaders greatly expanded it and built most of its existing structures.

Since 2024, the castle has held “enhanced protection” status under the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Lebanon's Arnoun municipality said in a statement.

The municipality warned that repeated Israeli strikes could damage the castle and urged Lebanese authorities and relevant international organizations to act to protect the landmark and prevent further harm.

Battlefield advantage

Claiming the castle has long been seen as a battlefield advantage. In the 1970s, it came under heavy Israeli airstrikes after the Palestine Liberation Organization used it as a position to fire at Israel. In 1982, it was the scene of one of the fiercest battles between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies. Israel occupied it until 2000.

Retired Brigadier General Bassam Yassine said Beaufort Castle’s importance today is little different from the value that made it a focus of battles since the 1982 invasion. The site, he said, remains one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent commanding military positions.

“Beaufort Castle has been present in all wars and battles with Israel from 1982 until today because of its strategic location,” Yassine told Asharq Al-Awsat, saying it offers a commanding view over wide areas of southern Lebanon and northern occupied Palestine.

“Beaufort Castle overlooks the settlement of Metula, which is less than four kilometers away. It overlooks the area between the Litani and Zahrani rivers and is considered the highest hill in this sector,” he said.

The site gives whoever controls it a major military advantage, Yassine said.

“From Beaufort Castle, one can observe Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, where the Israeli army is present today. That is why it cannot leave it outside its control if it wants to remain in the area where it is deployed,” he said.

Yassine said this importance is not new. Before Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it controlled hills and heights around the area, including Beaufort Castle, to secure battlefield superiority and maintain observation over its surroundings.

Destroyed buildings are pictured in the village of Kfar Kila in southern Lebanon as seen from across the border in the Upper Galilee region of northern Israel on May 29, 2026, with the Crusader-period Beaufort Castle pictured in Lebanon in the background. (AFP)

Asked which sectors the castle exposes, he said: “It directly overlooks Yohmor al-Shaqif, eastern Zawtar, western Zawtar, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. All these areas are exposed from the castle.”

“It also protects forces on the Yohmor and Zawtar axes, and provides cover for troops deployed in Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, and across this entire sector,” he added.

Yassine said the castle’s military value also lies in its defensive terrain.

“If any resistance force managed to infiltrate the castle and possess anti-armor missiles there, it would become very difficult to remove it from the site or destroy it because of the geography of the location,” he explained.

He said Israel had faced that problem before, during the period of Palestinian armed presence in the south.

“The Israelis tried many times to destroy the castle during the Palestinian period, but they did not succeed because of its geography,” he said.

Yassine said the site includes old historical passages and tunnels.

“The castle has tunnels that reach the Litani River below. They have existed since the Crusader era and are not newly built tunnels, which gives the site additional defensive value,” he said.

Control of the castle does not mean control of the area

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Bahaa Halal said Beaufort Castle is one of southern Lebanon’s most important military and geopolitical sites because of its strategic location.

“Israeli military doctrine views Beaufort Castle as a key point for achieving visual and intelligence superiority, which forms part of fire superiority, as it allows the monitoring of movements between south and north of the Litani, the tracking of routes toward the western Bekaa and Iqlim al-Tuffah, as well as monitoring the operational environment of attack drones and FPV aircraft,” Halal told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Any “resistance force that is able to deploy freely around Beaufort Castle gains a tactical advantage in missile maneuvering, managing ambushes and concealing combat infrastructure inside the mountainous terrain,” he added, making the area a constant Israeli security concern.

“Israel can theoretically reach the surroundings of Beaufort Castle through air cover, prior destruction and special forces. But there is a major difference between reaching the area and maintaining stable control,” he remarked.

Holding it, he said, would require secure supply lines, fire control over the castle’s surroundings, preventing flanking moves and ambushes, and ensuring permanent superiority in observation.

Such conditions are difficult to secure in an area geographically connected to Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar, Iqlim al-Tuffah and the valleys leading to the Litani, he stressed.