Arafat Chose to Fight for 6 Months... Moscow’s Position Was his Greatest Disappointment 

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes recollections of influential players during 1982 Israeli invasion of Beirut. 

Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)
Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)
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Arafat Chose to Fight for 6 Months... Moscow’s Position Was his Greatest Disappointment 

Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)
Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)

On this day in 1982, Beirut was besieged by the Israeli army and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat boarded a ship that took him to his new exile in Tunisia. The Palestinian Liberation Organization’s loss of its last front with Israel would leave its mark on the Palestinians and Lebanon.

As Israel tightened its siege of Beirut, Arafat took a secret decision to carry on fighting for six months until regional and international stances emerged. He was forced to leave Lebanon after 88 days, marking an end of what he described as the “longest Arab-Israeli war.”

The greatest disappointment to the Palestinian resistance and its allies in the Lebanese National Movement came from their Soviet ally. Moscow had refused to deliver a serious warning or send a destroyer off the Lebanese coast or a ship to evacuate the wounded.

Arafat’s insistence that he leave Lebanon by sea, not through Damascus, reflected the extent of the differences between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) Ahmed Jibril recalled that Arafat had bluntly told him that the Syrian leadership will not be credited for him holding out for three months in Beirut.

Asharq Al-Awsat will publish a series of features highlighting the significant developments and recollections of influential players during that heated summer of 1982.

From a building in east Beirut, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon observed Arafat as he boarded the ship that would take him to Tunisia. He wrongly believed that had broken the Palestinian resistance and that it would fade away in exile. The invasion failed in luring Lebanon to strike a peace deal with Israel. The current Lebanon has an even more hardline position towards Israel.

Against the backdrop of the war, Syria and Iran will lay the foundation of their alliance. Hezbollah would be born in Lebanon. Syria, which had withdrawn its troops from Beirut in wake of the invasion, would redeploy them years later, before again being forced to pull them out in 2005 after the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

In the besieged city, I was determined to record the testimonials of influential political and security figures. I tried to obtain Arafat’s testimony, but he turned down the offer, saying he didn’t want the Palestinian people to be punished “because of his memories.”

In Tunisia, Arafat told me: “What do you want me to recount? To tell you about Sabri al-Banna (Abou Nidal), who was hosted by three Arab capitals, Baghdad, Damascus and Tripoli, and who was obsessed with assassinating Palestinians, not Israelis?”

“Do you want me to tell you about the so-called intifada in Fatah that was backed by Syria and funded by Libya? Or do you want me to complain about the practices of Palestinian groups that tarnished our image of resistance or led to our labeling as terrorists? I’m not saying that Fatah was faultless. We all made mistakes, but we always tried not to lose our way and lose our cause.”

“The Palestinian people have been punished a lot. They were punished for clinging on to their cause and for firing the first shot. (...) The PLO was punished for adopting a hard line and punished when it adopted a moderate approach. Do you want the Palestinian people to be punished because of my memoirs? I don’t want to open old wounds.”

“As I was leaving Beirut, a journalist asked me: ‘Where to?’ I replied: ‘To Jerusalem. We are preparing for our date in Palestine and Jerusalem. We don’t have any other place to be.’”

The KGB general and Iran

In 1980, Palestinian ambassador to Tehran and Fatah central committee member Hani al-Hassan received an urgent call to head to Beirut. Upon his arrival, Arafat told him they were headed to a meeting at the Soviet embassy. Hassan understood that he needed to voice Arafat’s views. He knew how influential the Soviets were in the Palestinian revolution. He knew of the consequences of refusing delicate Soviet proposals.

Other Fatah members at the meeting included Salah Khalaf (Abou Ayad) and Khalil al-Wazir (Abou Jihad). The Soviets were represented by General “Alexander” who was the KGB official overseeing operations in the Middle East. The insistence that Palestinian leaders, not their representatives, be present at the meeting meant that Moscow expected the talks to yield a decision.

General “Alexander” spoke about the situation in the region, especially Iran, in wake of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan. He said the time had come for the Palestinians to cooperate with the Soviets to facilitate the Communist Party’s control of Iran. The Soviet Union wanted to expand its power in the region and Iran was a significant prize given its geographic location and resources.

Hassan was surprised with the proposal and asked to be excused from the meeting, but Arafat refused. Hassan said he would not stand against the Iranian revolution that had “offered us several major services,” referring to its severing of Iranian-Israeli relations that were forged under the shah.

Tensions soon erupted and the Soviet general declared that the Palestinians “won’t be able to do anything without us.” Hassan replied: “If the Soviets enter Iran, then Israel’s strategic value will grow a million-fold to the West. So, don’t even think about it. For our part, we will ensure that every effort is made to form good Iranian-Soviet relations.”

Hassan believed that the meeting exposed how the Soviets dealt with the situations in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan and future conflicts in these countries.

Meeting in a Soviet forest

Another significant meeting was held years earlier. In the early 1970s, head of the PFLP’s External Operations Wadie Haddad met with KGB chief Yuri Andropov in a forest on the outskirts of Moscow. The meeting was held in utmost secrecy because Haddad at the time had been planning plane hijacking operations for years. Haddad asked for weapons from the Soviets, and they were smuggled to him off the coast of Aden, Yemen.

The first high-level contacts between Moscow and the Palestinian revolution took place in 1968 at the suggestion of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser and Arafat traveled to Moscow together on a secret visit. Two years later, a Soviet envoy met with Arafat in Jordan and the relations between the Palestinians and Soviets came out to the open.

Moscow realized the importance of relations with the Palestinians so it forged ties that allowed it in a few years to wield influence in Palestinian political and security decisions. Moscow formed close ties with the Palestinian left, including the PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and leftists in the Fatah movement.

These relations led the Palestinian resistance and allied parties in Lebanon to rule out the possibility of Israel invading Beirut. It had already launched its invasion on June 6, 1982, and was advancing on the capital. On the day of the invasion, the Fatah and Lebanese National Movement met in Beirut. Present were Abou Ammar, Abou Jihad, Abou Ayad, Abou al-Walid, Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party George Hawi and Secretary General of the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon Mohsen Ibrahim.

They discussed the possibility that the invasion could go beyond southern Lebanon, especially with Sharon as defense minister. They never predicted, however, that the Israeli forces would advance on Beirut and reach its outskirts because Syrian troops were in the capital and any clash with the Israelis could lead to a full-scale war between them. They believed that Israel would not provoke Syria, an ally of Moscow.

They were proven wrong when the Israeli army was met with little resistance and eventually besieged Beirut. It was later revealed that the Soviets and their allies did not have information about the Israeli plans. The Syrians were also in the dark.

Meeting with Bashir Gemayel

When the Israeli forces reached the Chouf area in Mount Lebanon and appeared intent on Beirut, a secret meeting was held between Abou Ammar al-Hassan, head of the Lebanese Forces Bashir al-Gemayel and Lebanese military intelligence chief Johnny Abdo. Gemayel wanted to hold the meeting to deliver a message to Arafat that the Palestinians must lay down their arms and leave Lebanon. “I am ready to secure a safe and dignified exit. I want an immediate answer before the Israelis reach Beirut,” he said. Hassan suggested that they take their conversation to the balcony because they feared Abdo’s house would be wiretapped.

Hassan noticed how worried Gemayel appeared. He told him: “Let me speak to you frankly. I follow you and it is my duty to follow you. I know you have presidential ambitions, but you won’t achieve them this way. You were the one who paved the way for the Syrians so that they could strike the Palestinians. Now, you have brought in the Israelis so that they can strike them both.”

“At the end of this game, we will both be struck, and you will be finished. Lebanon is enticing. Neither the Israelis, nor the Syrians will pull out. You are opposed to both of them. Let me repeat, you are mistaken in thinking this is the way that will lead you to the presidency. Your odds will be better if you decide to side with us and the Lebanese National Movement.”

“Who will agree to hosting the Palestinian fighters? Jordan, Syria or others? He vowed that he will ensure that a small number of fighters would remain and they would answer to the Lebanese army. The game slipped from his hands when the Israelis reached Beirut.”

Hassan later informed Mohsen about the meeting. Mohsen then met with Arafat and Hawi. They were primarily concerned with determining whether Moscow could stop the invasion. Hawi, with his close ties to the Soviets, believed that striking the Palestinian revolution was a red line for both sides the Soviets and Communists. After a month or so, he realized that everything was permissible, and nothing was off limits. Arab countries had no way of influencing international powers.

Hawi was hoping Moscow would threaten Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. He hoped they would send a naval vessel off the coast of Beirut or at least evacuate the wounded. Soviet ambassador to Beirut Alexander Soldatov could promise nothing of the sort. Hawi kept relaying these disappointing stances to Arafat. Hawi and others could not believe that the Soviets would stand idly by as Israel invaded Lebanon.

Arafat was dealt a crushing blow during a meeting with Soldatov. The ambassador told Arafat to leave Beirut, even if he had to board an American destroyer. Arafat was incredulous and refused to leave. He would eventually relent when it appeared that the Soviets would not support him or stand against the Israelis.



Ghalibaf: Ambitious ‘Public Face’ of Post-Ali Khamenei Iran

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Ghalibaf: Ambitious ‘Public Face’ of Post-Ali Khamenei Iran

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)

Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the key negotiator and one of the most high-profile figures in the epublic's leadership as it enters a new phase after the US-Israeli war.

A pillar of the Iranian establishment for some three decades and one of its most prominent non-clerical figures, Ghalibaf, 64, had spearheaded the war effort and led the high-stakes negotiating process that culminated with an agreement announced Monday to halt the hostilities.

Ghalibaf survived more than five weeks of US-Israeli attacks on Iran that killed supreme leader Ali Khamenei, top security official Ali Larijani and a host of other key figures.

He came into public view for the first time in weeks in April to lead the Iranian delegation in talks in Islamabad with the United States, meeting Vice President JD Vance, the highest-level contact between the two foes since before the 1979 revolution.

An image published on social media by Iranian embassies abroad put Ghalibaf center stage in the Iranian negotiating team, looking animated and gesturing with his hand, as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi busied himself with teacups.

The workings of the Iranian leadership without Khamenei, who dominated it for nearly four decades, remain unclear.

Khamenei's son Mojtaba was named as his successor but has yet to appear publicly after he was reportedly wounded in an airstrike.

"Following Larijani's assassination, Ghalibaf has emerged as the new public face of the regime's war effort and diplomacy," said Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

"But we shouldn't overstate the extent to which he's in the driver's seat: He still answers to higher powers in Tehran," he added.

These include Mojtaba Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, the ideological arm of Iran's military, where Ghalibaf was a key figure as aerospace forces commander, Sabet said.

- 'Professional bargainer' -

While the trip to Islamabad was Ghalibaf's first appearance in public since before the war, he has kept a high profile online with almost daily social media posts, mixing commentary on recent developments and the negotiations with threats of harsh retaliation should the fighting resume.

His posts on X in idiomatic American English have garnered wide attention and raised questions over who is actually writing them, given Ghalibaf is not known to be a fluent English speaker.

Referring to threats of a ground invasion, a post on Ghalibaf's X account said on April 1: "You come for our home... you're gonna meet the whole family. Locked, loaded and standing tall. Bring it on."

The IranWire news site has said the posts appeared to have been written by a former adviser based in the United States, but this has not been confirmed.

While the Islamabad talks failed, The Washington Post reported that Ghalibaf left a striking impression on the US delegation after years when Washington never dealt directly with key Iranian decision makers.

Ghalibaf "impressed the American team as a refined and professional bargainer -- and potential leader of a new Iran", said the Post.

In a sign of his expanding sway, he was appointed in May to oversee Iran's vital relationship with China, the biggest buyer of Iranian oil.

- 'Ambitious and opportunistic' -

Ghalibaf's varied experience, which spans military and civilian life, has seen him work as a commander in the Revolutionary Guards, Tehran police chief, Tehran mayor and now speaker of parliament.

It is unclear if he is fully trusted by the new hardline hierarchy of the Guards.

Known to be fiercely ambitious, he has stood for the Iranian presidency on multiple occasions but has never been successful, most notably in 2005 when ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, little-known at the time, took the job.

A qualified pilot, Ghalibaf is known for boasting that he is able to captain jumbo jets.

Human rights groups have accused Ghalibaf, in his various functions, of playing a key role in suppressing protests, from the 1999 student demonstrations to the 2009 Green movement that erupted after a disputed election, right up to the nationwide protests that peaked in January 2026, just before the latest war.

"As a politician, he's shown himself to be ambitious and opportunistic, but also cautious, a trait that has helped him advance his career to the top of the country's power structure without getting purged like so many others have been," said Sabet.


What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
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What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)

Washington: The New York Times

The United States and Iran said they were close to reaching a deal toward ending the war that has upended the Middle East for more than three months and disrupted the global economy.

Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has said that an agreement had “never been closer.”

US officials signaled on Friday that a potential framework deal could be signed within days.

According to two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement, Tehran and Washington have agreed to a preliminary deal that would end the fighting, reopen the crucial Strait of Hormuz and lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Both the US and Iran have sought to frame the emerging deal as a diplomatic victory.

Yet the agreement appears to push many of the thorniest issues to a 60-day negotiation period, including Iran’s nuclear program, about which major differences remain and both sides have so far held firm to longstanding red lines.

A deal would cap a week of diplomatic talks punctuated by airstrikes and Israel’s ongoing campaign in southern Lebanon.

What’s in the deal?

The two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement gave a broad outline of the agreement. The United States has not confirmed these details:
Iran would open the Strait of Hormuz for the passage of ships and the United States would lift the naval blockade on Iran’s ports in the Arabian Gulf.

Iran and the United States would start negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The negotiations would last a maximum of 60 days and the war would stop on all fronts, including Lebanon, for that period.

During the 60-day negotiation period, Iran and countries in the region would discuss the future management of the strait.

The two Iranian officials said the next phase of talks would include discussion of the lifting of American sanctions, including on Iran’s oil sales and international banking transactions, in exchange for concessions on the Iranian nuclear program.

Speaking on state television Friday, Araghchi said there would be a two-part agreement to end the war: The first would be the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington, and the second would be for a lasting peace deal. “The nuclear issue has been left for the second round and a final agreement,” Araghchi said.

Araghchi added that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen as part of the initial agreement between the US and Iran, but the economically vital waterway would not return to its prewar status.

He told Iranian state television that all commercial ships would be guaranteed safe passage, but said Tehran would maintain its control of the passage and would eventually charge a “service fee” for vessels passing through, an arrangement the Trump administration had previously warned against.

Framework for Nuclear Talks

According to US officials and diplomats, there are four major points of negotiation on a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran:

1. A lengthy suspension of uranium enrichment
The United States has demanded for months that Iran agree to conduct no uranium enrichment for at least 20 years. The Iranians have countered by offering a 10-year halt, but American officials believe Tehran would settle for 15 years.

2. Iran’s current stockpile of enriched uranium is diluted, or “downblended”
The United States would work with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN inspection body, to dilute or “downblend” Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, according to two US officials familiar with the negotiations. American officials envision an active role in handling the nuclear material. Iranian officials say the United States would serve only as an observer.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said repeatedly in recent weeks that any agreement would have to cover all 11 tons of enriched uranium in Iran’s possession, not just the half-ton of near-bomb-grade fuel.

The Iranians have not talked publicly about whether they are willing to give up their entire existing stockpile. But if it was downblended, rather than shipped outside the country, Iran’s leaders could say they still have possession of the fuel.

3. Iran dismantles its nuclear sites
The United States has demanded that Iran dismantle its three major nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan. The United States struck all three nearly a year ago, severely damaging them.

Iran has discussed dismantling two facilities but insists on leaving one open, in part to demonstrate it has not surrendered what it views as a “right to enrich.” That could prove problematic: Critics of the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran focused on its failure to close down Fordo, a deep underground site, which the Iranians later revived to produce near-bomb-grade fuel.

4. Iran agrees to “snap” inspections
The United States wants international inspectors to be able to conduct “snap” inspections, anytime and anyplace inside Iran. It is not clear if the Iranian government will agree. Many of the nuclear sites are inside Revolutionary Guards military bases, where inspectors have frequently been barred at the gates.


Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
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Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)

Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant has yet to begin operations on the country’s Mediterranean coast, but Israeli media outlets supportive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have intensified warnings that the project could pave the way for a major Russian nuclear presence in the Middle East.

Those concerns over Egypt’s capabilities, as well as its regional partnerships, which have grown since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, are unlikely to subside, according to experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat.

They said that the rhetoric is tied to Israeli domestic politics, electoral competition and efforts to create new security threats for Israeli voters, while also exerting pressure on Cairo and its partners at a time when Israel is seeking to capitalize on tensions between Washington and Moscow.

Although Egypt’s nuclear program dates back to a 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union, the country’s first nuclear power project effectively began on Nov. 19, 2015, when Egypt and Russia signed an agreement to build the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in the Matrouh governorate on the Mediterranean coast. The project is valued at $30 billion, including a $25 billion Russian loan that Egypt is due to begin repaying in October 2029 over a 35-year period at an annual interest rate of 3%.

The plant, which is designed to generate 4,800 megawatts of electricity, will comprise four nuclear reactors. It is expected to operate for more than 60 years and is projected to supply about 10% of Egypt’s electricity needs once its first reactor comes online, currently expected between late 2027 and mid-2028.

Israeli website Natziv.net recently claimed that El Dabaa is more than an electricity-generation project, describing it as “a potential nuclear foothold for Moscow” in the Middle East. The outlet said Russia’s financing of 85% of the project’s cost - about $25 billion - along with its responsibility for fuel supplies and nuclear waste management for 60 years, could create a “long-term strategic dependence” on Moscow.

The website also warned about plans for a Russian industrial zone near the Suez Canal, describing it as a permanent presence at a key global trade hub and a sign of Cairo’s drift away from the West toward a Russia-China axis within the BRICS group, which Egypt joined in January 2024.

Despite the project’s civilian nature, the outlet claimed that the infrastructure and expertise acquired through El Dabaa could one day provide Egypt with a shorter path toward military nuclear options or fuel enrichment capabilities.

It suggested that any radioactive leak could affect Israel’s coastline and desalination facilities, while closer Egyptian-Russian ties could narrow Israel’s strategic room for maneuver and weaken traditional US influence in the region.

Similar arguments appeared in an analysis published last week by Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that the plant’s first reactor could begin operating in 2027.

It described the notion that El Dabaa is solely an energy project as a “grave misreading,” portraying it instead as a slow-moving strategic encirclement effort in which “Israel is not incidental to the picture, but the target.”

Raouf Saad, Egypt’s former ambassador to Russia and a former assistant foreign minister, said the reports should be read within their political context. He added that Netanyahu has sought to disrupt efforts toward regional peace and has repeatedly attempted to provoke Egypt since the Gaza war, without success.

Saad dismissed the Israeli allegations as “naive and transparent” aimed at warning the United States about Russia’s return to the region, saying they reflected the weakness of Netanyahu’s position rather than any genuine security threat.

Retired Major General Samir Farag, a military and strategic analyst, said such reports are part of recurring attempts to manufacture crises and are likely to intensify as Israel approaches elections.

“Netanyahu-aligned media outlets have long tried to convince the Israeli public that Egypt seeks to acquire nuclear capabilities and pursue militarization,” Farag said, describing the claims as an effort to exploit the issue politically and divert attention from Israel’s actions in the region.

While Egypt has not officially responded to the allegations, officials and analysts continued to stress that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate right under international law.

They noted that Egypt is fully committed to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the El Dabaa project, like the country’s Inshas Nuclear Center, is subject to comprehensive oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.