On this day in 1982, Beirut was besieged by the Israeli army and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat boarded a ship that took him to his new exile in Tunisia. The Palestinian Liberation Organization’s loss of its last front with Israel would leave its mark on the Palestinians and Lebanon.
As Israel tightened its siege of Beirut, Arafat took a secret decision to carry on fighting for six months until regional and international stances emerged. He was forced to leave Lebanon after 88 days, marking an end of what he described as the “longest Arab-Israeli war.”
The greatest disappointment to the Palestinian resistance and its allies in the Lebanese National Movement came from their Soviet ally. Moscow had refused to deliver a serious warning or send a destroyer off the Lebanese coast or a ship to evacuate the wounded.
Arafat’s insistence that he leave Lebanon by sea, not through Damascus, reflected the extent of the differences between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) Ahmed Jibril recalled that Arafat had bluntly told him that the Syrian leadership will not be credited for him holding out for three months in Beirut.
Asharq Al-Awsat will publish a series of features highlighting the significant developments and recollections of influential players during that heated summer of 1982.
From a building in east Beirut, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon observed Arafat as he boarded the ship that would take him to Tunisia. He wrongly believed that had broken the Palestinian resistance and that it would fade away in exile. The invasion failed in luring Lebanon to strike a peace deal with Israel. The current Lebanon has an even more hardline position towards Israel.
Against the backdrop of the war, Syria and Iran will lay the foundation of their alliance. Hezbollah would be born in Lebanon. Syria, which had withdrawn its troops from Beirut in wake of the invasion, would redeploy them years later, before again being forced to pull them out in 2005 after the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
In the besieged city, I was determined to record the testimonials of influential political and security figures. I tried to obtain Arafat’s testimony, but he turned down the offer, saying he didn’t want the Palestinian people to be punished “because of his memories.”
In Tunisia, Arafat told me: “What do you want me to recount? To tell you about Sabri al-Banna (Abou Nidal), who was hosted by three Arab capitals, Baghdad, Damascus and Tripoli, and who was obsessed with assassinating Palestinians, not Israelis?”
“Do you want me to tell you about the so-called intifada in Fatah that was backed by Syria and funded by Libya? Or do you want me to complain about the practices of Palestinian groups that tarnished our image of resistance or led to our labeling as terrorists? I’m not saying that Fatah was faultless. We all made mistakes, but we always tried not to lose our way and lose our cause.”
“The Palestinian people have been punished a lot. They were punished for clinging on to their cause and for firing the first shot. (...) The PLO was punished for adopting a hard line and punished when it adopted a moderate approach. Do you want the Palestinian people to be punished because of my memoirs? I don’t want to open old wounds.”
“As I was leaving Beirut, a journalist asked me: ‘Where to?’ I replied: ‘To Jerusalem. We are preparing for our date in Palestine and Jerusalem. We don’t have any other place to be.’”
The KGB general and Iran
In 1980, Palestinian ambassador to Tehran and Fatah central committee member Hani al-Hassan received an urgent call to head to Beirut. Upon his arrival, Arafat told him they were headed to a meeting at the Soviet embassy. Hassan understood that he needed to voice Arafat’s views. He knew how influential the Soviets were in the Palestinian revolution. He knew of the consequences of refusing delicate Soviet proposals.
Other Fatah members at the meeting included Salah Khalaf (Abou Ayad) and Khalil al-Wazir (Abou Jihad). The Soviets were represented by General “Alexander” who was the KGB official overseeing operations in the Middle East. The insistence that Palestinian leaders, not their representatives, be present at the meeting meant that Moscow expected the talks to yield a decision.
General “Alexander” spoke about the situation in the region, especially Iran, in wake of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan. He said the time had come for the Palestinians to cooperate with the Soviets to facilitate the Communist Party’s control of Iran. The Soviet Union wanted to expand its power in the region and Iran was a significant prize given its geographic location and resources.
Hassan was surprised with the proposal and asked to be excused from the meeting, but Arafat refused. Hassan said he would not stand against the Iranian revolution that had “offered us several major services,” referring to its severing of Iranian-Israeli relations that were forged under the shah.
Tensions soon erupted and the Soviet general declared that the Palestinians “won’t be able to do anything without us.” Hassan replied: “If the Soviets enter Iran, then Israel’s strategic value will grow a million-fold to the West. So, don’t even think about it. For our part, we will ensure that every effort is made to form good Iranian-Soviet relations.”
Hassan believed that the meeting exposed how the Soviets dealt with the situations in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan and future conflicts in these countries.
Meeting in a Soviet forest
Another significant meeting was held years earlier. In the early 1970s, head of the PFLP’s External Operations Wadie Haddad met with KGB chief Yuri Andropov in a forest on the outskirts of Moscow. The meeting was held in utmost secrecy because Haddad at the time had been planning plane hijacking operations for years. Haddad asked for weapons from the Soviets, and they were smuggled to him off the coast of Aden, Yemen.
The first high-level contacts between Moscow and the Palestinian revolution took place in 1968 at the suggestion of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser and Arafat traveled to Moscow together on a secret visit. Two years later, a Soviet envoy met with Arafat in Jordan and the relations between the Palestinians and Soviets came out to the open.
Moscow realized the importance of relations with the Palestinians so it forged ties that allowed it in a few years to wield influence in Palestinian political and security decisions. Moscow formed close ties with the Palestinian left, including the PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and leftists in the Fatah movement.
These relations led the Palestinian resistance and allied parties in Lebanon to rule out the possibility of Israel invading Beirut. It had already launched its invasion on June 6, 1982, and was advancing on the capital. On the day of the invasion, the Fatah and Lebanese National Movement met in Beirut. Present were Abou Ammar, Abou Jihad, Abou Ayad, Abou al-Walid, Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party George Hawi and Secretary General of the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon Mohsen Ibrahim.
They discussed the possibility that the invasion could go beyond southern Lebanon, especially with Sharon as defense minister. They never predicted, however, that the Israeli forces would advance on Beirut and reach its outskirts because Syrian troops were in the capital and any clash with the Israelis could lead to a full-scale war between them. They believed that Israel would not provoke Syria, an ally of Moscow.
They were proven wrong when the Israeli army was met with little resistance and eventually besieged Beirut. It was later revealed that the Soviets and their allies did not have information about the Israeli plans. The Syrians were also in the dark.
Meeting with Bashir Gemayel
When the Israeli forces reached the Chouf area in Mount Lebanon and appeared intent on Beirut, a secret meeting was held between Abou Ammar al-Hassan, head of the Lebanese Forces Bashir al-Gemayel and Lebanese military intelligence chief Johnny Abdo. Gemayel wanted to hold the meeting to deliver a message to Arafat that the Palestinians must lay down their arms and leave Lebanon. “I am ready to secure a safe and dignified exit. I want an immediate answer before the Israelis reach Beirut,” he said. Hassan suggested that they take their conversation to the balcony because they feared Abdo’s house would be wiretapped.
Hassan noticed how worried Gemayel appeared. He told him: “Let me speak to you frankly. I follow you and it is my duty to follow you. I know you have presidential ambitions, but you won’t achieve them this way. You were the one who paved the way for the Syrians so that they could strike the Palestinians. Now, you have brought in the Israelis so that they can strike them both.”
“At the end of this game, we will both be struck, and you will be finished. Lebanon is enticing. Neither the Israelis, nor the Syrians will pull out. You are opposed to both of them. Let me repeat, you are mistaken in thinking this is the way that will lead you to the presidency. Your odds will be better if you decide to side with us and the Lebanese National Movement.”
“Who will agree to hosting the Palestinian fighters? Jordan, Syria or others? He vowed that he will ensure that a small number of fighters would remain and they would answer to the Lebanese army. The game slipped from his hands when the Israelis reached Beirut.”
Hassan later informed Mohsen about the meeting. Mohsen then met with Arafat and Hawi. They were primarily concerned with determining whether Moscow could stop the invasion. Hawi, with his close ties to the Soviets, believed that striking the Palestinian revolution was a red line for both sides the Soviets and Communists. After a month or so, he realized that everything was permissible, and nothing was off limits. Arab countries had no way of influencing international powers.
Hawi was hoping Moscow would threaten Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. He hoped they would send a naval vessel off the coast of Beirut or at least evacuate the wounded. Soviet ambassador to Beirut Alexander Soldatov could promise nothing of the sort. Hawi kept relaying these disappointing stances to Arafat. Hawi and others could not believe that the Soviets would stand idly by as Israel invaded Lebanon.
Arafat was dealt a crushing blow during a meeting with Soldatov. The ambassador told Arafat to leave Beirut, even if he had to board an American destroyer. Arafat was incredulous and refused to leave. He would eventually relent when it appeared that the Soviets would not support him or stand against the Israelis.
