Arafat Chose to Fight for 6 Months... Moscow’s Position Was his Greatest Disappointment 

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes recollections of influential players during 1982 Israeli invasion of Beirut. 

Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)
Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)
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Arafat Chose to Fight for 6 Months... Moscow’s Position Was his Greatest Disappointment 

Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)
Smoke billows from strikes during the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. (Getty Images)

On this day in 1982, Beirut was besieged by the Israeli army and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat boarded a ship that took him to his new exile in Tunisia. The Palestinian Liberation Organization’s loss of its last front with Israel would leave its mark on the Palestinians and Lebanon.

As Israel tightened its siege of Beirut, Arafat took a secret decision to carry on fighting for six months until regional and international stances emerged. He was forced to leave Lebanon after 88 days, marking an end of what he described as the “longest Arab-Israeli war.”

The greatest disappointment to the Palestinian resistance and its allies in the Lebanese National Movement came from their Soviet ally. Moscow had refused to deliver a serious warning or send a destroyer off the Lebanese coast or a ship to evacuate the wounded.

Arafat’s insistence that he leave Lebanon by sea, not through Damascus, reflected the extent of the differences between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) Ahmed Jibril recalled that Arafat had bluntly told him that the Syrian leadership will not be credited for him holding out for three months in Beirut.

Asharq Al-Awsat will publish a series of features highlighting the significant developments and recollections of influential players during that heated summer of 1982.

From a building in east Beirut, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon observed Arafat as he boarded the ship that would take him to Tunisia. He wrongly believed that had broken the Palestinian resistance and that it would fade away in exile. The invasion failed in luring Lebanon to strike a peace deal with Israel. The current Lebanon has an even more hardline position towards Israel.

Against the backdrop of the war, Syria and Iran will lay the foundation of their alliance. Hezbollah would be born in Lebanon. Syria, which had withdrawn its troops from Beirut in wake of the invasion, would redeploy them years later, before again being forced to pull them out in 2005 after the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

In the besieged city, I was determined to record the testimonials of influential political and security figures. I tried to obtain Arafat’s testimony, but he turned down the offer, saying he didn’t want the Palestinian people to be punished “because of his memories.”

In Tunisia, Arafat told me: “What do you want me to recount? To tell you about Sabri al-Banna (Abou Nidal), who was hosted by three Arab capitals, Baghdad, Damascus and Tripoli, and who was obsessed with assassinating Palestinians, not Israelis?”

“Do you want me to tell you about the so-called intifada in Fatah that was backed by Syria and funded by Libya? Or do you want me to complain about the practices of Palestinian groups that tarnished our image of resistance or led to our labeling as terrorists? I’m not saying that Fatah was faultless. We all made mistakes, but we always tried not to lose our way and lose our cause.”

“The Palestinian people have been punished a lot. They were punished for clinging on to their cause and for firing the first shot. (...) The PLO was punished for adopting a hard line and punished when it adopted a moderate approach. Do you want the Palestinian people to be punished because of my memoirs? I don’t want to open old wounds.”

“As I was leaving Beirut, a journalist asked me: ‘Where to?’ I replied: ‘To Jerusalem. We are preparing for our date in Palestine and Jerusalem. We don’t have any other place to be.’”

The KGB general and Iran

In 1980, Palestinian ambassador to Tehran and Fatah central committee member Hani al-Hassan received an urgent call to head to Beirut. Upon his arrival, Arafat told him they were headed to a meeting at the Soviet embassy. Hassan understood that he needed to voice Arafat’s views. He knew how influential the Soviets were in the Palestinian revolution. He knew of the consequences of refusing delicate Soviet proposals.

Other Fatah members at the meeting included Salah Khalaf (Abou Ayad) and Khalil al-Wazir (Abou Jihad). The Soviets were represented by General “Alexander” who was the KGB official overseeing operations in the Middle East. The insistence that Palestinian leaders, not their representatives, be present at the meeting meant that Moscow expected the talks to yield a decision.

General “Alexander” spoke about the situation in the region, especially Iran, in wake of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan. He said the time had come for the Palestinians to cooperate with the Soviets to facilitate the Communist Party’s control of Iran. The Soviet Union wanted to expand its power in the region and Iran was a significant prize given its geographic location and resources.

Hassan was surprised with the proposal and asked to be excused from the meeting, but Arafat refused. Hassan said he would not stand against the Iranian revolution that had “offered us several major services,” referring to its severing of Iranian-Israeli relations that were forged under the shah.

Tensions soon erupted and the Soviet general declared that the Palestinians “won’t be able to do anything without us.” Hassan replied: “If the Soviets enter Iran, then Israel’s strategic value will grow a million-fold to the West. So, don’t even think about it. For our part, we will ensure that every effort is made to form good Iranian-Soviet relations.”

Hassan believed that the meeting exposed how the Soviets dealt with the situations in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan and future conflicts in these countries.

Meeting in a Soviet forest

Another significant meeting was held years earlier. In the early 1970s, head of the PFLP’s External Operations Wadie Haddad met with KGB chief Yuri Andropov in a forest on the outskirts of Moscow. The meeting was held in utmost secrecy because Haddad at the time had been planning plane hijacking operations for years. Haddad asked for weapons from the Soviets, and they were smuggled to him off the coast of Aden, Yemen.

The first high-level contacts between Moscow and the Palestinian revolution took place in 1968 at the suggestion of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser and Arafat traveled to Moscow together on a secret visit. Two years later, a Soviet envoy met with Arafat in Jordan and the relations between the Palestinians and Soviets came out to the open.

Moscow realized the importance of relations with the Palestinians so it forged ties that allowed it in a few years to wield influence in Palestinian political and security decisions. Moscow formed close ties with the Palestinian left, including the PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and leftists in the Fatah movement.

These relations led the Palestinian resistance and allied parties in Lebanon to rule out the possibility of Israel invading Beirut. It had already launched its invasion on June 6, 1982, and was advancing on the capital. On the day of the invasion, the Fatah and Lebanese National Movement met in Beirut. Present were Abou Ammar, Abou Jihad, Abou Ayad, Abou al-Walid, Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party George Hawi and Secretary General of the Communist Action Organization in Lebanon Mohsen Ibrahim.

They discussed the possibility that the invasion could go beyond southern Lebanon, especially with Sharon as defense minister. They never predicted, however, that the Israeli forces would advance on Beirut and reach its outskirts because Syrian troops were in the capital and any clash with the Israelis could lead to a full-scale war between them. They believed that Israel would not provoke Syria, an ally of Moscow.

They were proven wrong when the Israeli army was met with little resistance and eventually besieged Beirut. It was later revealed that the Soviets and their allies did not have information about the Israeli plans. The Syrians were also in the dark.

Meeting with Bashir Gemayel

When the Israeli forces reached the Chouf area in Mount Lebanon and appeared intent on Beirut, a secret meeting was held between Abou Ammar al-Hassan, head of the Lebanese Forces Bashir al-Gemayel and Lebanese military intelligence chief Johnny Abdo. Gemayel wanted to hold the meeting to deliver a message to Arafat that the Palestinians must lay down their arms and leave Lebanon. “I am ready to secure a safe and dignified exit. I want an immediate answer before the Israelis reach Beirut,” he said. Hassan suggested that they take their conversation to the balcony because they feared Abdo’s house would be wiretapped.

Hassan noticed how worried Gemayel appeared. He told him: “Let me speak to you frankly. I follow you and it is my duty to follow you. I know you have presidential ambitions, but you won’t achieve them this way. You were the one who paved the way for the Syrians so that they could strike the Palestinians. Now, you have brought in the Israelis so that they can strike them both.”

“At the end of this game, we will both be struck, and you will be finished. Lebanon is enticing. Neither the Israelis, nor the Syrians will pull out. You are opposed to both of them. Let me repeat, you are mistaken in thinking this is the way that will lead you to the presidency. Your odds will be better if you decide to side with us and the Lebanese National Movement.”

“Who will agree to hosting the Palestinian fighters? Jordan, Syria or others? He vowed that he will ensure that a small number of fighters would remain and they would answer to the Lebanese army. The game slipped from his hands when the Israelis reached Beirut.”

Hassan later informed Mohsen about the meeting. Mohsen then met with Arafat and Hawi. They were primarily concerned with determining whether Moscow could stop the invasion. Hawi, with his close ties to the Soviets, believed that striking the Palestinian revolution was a red line for both sides the Soviets and Communists. After a month or so, he realized that everything was permissible, and nothing was off limits. Arab countries had no way of influencing international powers.

Hawi was hoping Moscow would threaten Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. He hoped they would send a naval vessel off the coast of Beirut or at least evacuate the wounded. Soviet ambassador to Beirut Alexander Soldatov could promise nothing of the sort. Hawi kept relaying these disappointing stances to Arafat. Hawi and others could not believe that the Soviets would stand idly by as Israel invaded Lebanon.

Arafat was dealt a crushing blow during a meeting with Soldatov. The ambassador told Arafat to leave Beirut, even if he had to board an American destroyer. Arafat was incredulous and refused to leave. He would eventually relent when it appeared that the Soviets would not support him or stand against the Israelis.



Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.