Cluster Munition Deaths in Ukraine Pass Syria, Fueling Rise in a Weapon the World Has Tried to Ban 

Ali Mansour, 43, who lost his eyes and hands to a cluster bomb in 2019, holds up his arm at a camp in Idlib province, Syria, on July 19, 2023. (AP)
Ali Mansour, 43, who lost his eyes and hands to a cluster bomb in 2019, holds up his arm at a camp in Idlib province, Syria, on July 19, 2023. (AP)
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Cluster Munition Deaths in Ukraine Pass Syria, Fueling Rise in a Weapon the World Has Tried to Ban 

Ali Mansour, 43, who lost his eyes and hands to a cluster bomb in 2019, holds up his arm at a camp in Idlib province, Syria, on July 19, 2023. (AP)
Ali Mansour, 43, who lost his eyes and hands to a cluster bomb in 2019, holds up his arm at a camp in Idlib province, Syria, on July 19, 2023. (AP)

More than 300 people were killed and over 600 wounded by cluster munitions in Ukraine in 2022, according to an international watchdog, surpassing Syria as the country with the highest number of casualties from the controversial weapons for the first time in a decade.

Russia’s widespread use of the bombs, which open in the air and release scores of smaller bomblets or submunitions as they are called, in its invasion of Ukraine — and, to a lesser extent, their use by Ukrainian forces — helped make 2022 the deadliest year on record globally, according to the annual report released Tuesday by the Cluster Munition Coalition, a network of non-governmental organizations advocating for a ban of the weapons.

The deadliest attack in Ukraine, according to the the country's prosecutor general’s office, was a bombing on a railway station in the town of Kramatorsk that killed 53 people and wounded 135.

Meanwhile, in Syria and other war-battered countries in the Middle East, although active fighting has cooled down, the explosive remnants continue to kill and maim dozens of people every year.

The long-term danger posed to civilians by explosive ordnance peppered across the landscape for years — or even decades after fighting has ceased — has come under a renewed spotlight since the United States announced in July that it would provide them to Ukraine to use against Russia.

In Syria, 15 people were killed and 75 wounded by cluster munition attacks or their remnants in 2022, according to the coalition's data. Iraq, where there were no new cluster bomb attacks reported last year, saw 15 people killed and 25 wounded. In Yemen, which also had no new reported attacks, five people were killed and 90 were wounded by the leftover explosives.

The majority of victims globally are children. Because some types of these bomblets resemble metal balls, children often pick them up and play with them without knowing what they are.

Among the casualties are 12-year old Rawaa al-Hassan and her 10-year-old sister, Doaa, whose family has lived at a camp near the village of Ain Sheeb in northern Syria’s opposition-held Idlib province since being displaced from their hometown in Hama province six years earlier.

The area where they live in Idlib had frequently come under airstrikes, but the family had escaped from those unharmed.

During the holy Islamic month of Ramadan last year, as the girls were coming home from school, their mother Wafaa said, they picked up an unexploded bomblet, thinking it was a piece of scrap metal they could sell.

Rawaa lost an eye, Doaa, a hand. In a cruel irony, the girls’ father had died eight months earlier after he stepped on a cluster munition remnant while gathering firewood.

The girls “are in a bad state, psychologically” since the two tragic accidents, said their uncle Hatem al-Hassan, who now looks after them and their mother. They have difficulty concentrating, and Rawaa often flies off the handle, hitting other children at school.

“Of course, we’re afraid, and now we don’t let them play outside at all anymore,” he said.

Near the village of Ram Hamdan, also in Idlib, Ali al-Mansour, 43, was tending his sheep one day in 2019 with his 5-year-old son in tow when the child handed him a metal object that looked like a toy and and asked him to take it apart.

“I tried to take it apart and it wasn't working, so I hit it with a rock, and it exploded on me,” al-Mansour said. He lost his eyes and his hands. Without a breadwinner, his family now lives on handouts from relatives.

Scattered submunitions often strike shepherds and scrap metal collectors, a common post-conflict source of livelihood, said Loren Persi, one of the editors of the Cluster Munition Coalition’s annual report. They also lurk in the fields where truffle hunters forage for the lucrative delicacy, he said.

Efforts to clear the explosives have been hampered by lack of funding and by the logistics of dealing with the patchwork of actors controlling different parts of Syria, Persi said.

Some 124 countries have joined a United Nations convention banning cluster munitions. The US, Russia, Ukraine and Syria are among the hold-outs.

Deaths and injuries from cluster munition remnants have continued for decades after wars ended in some cases — including in Laos, where people still die yearly from Vietnam war-era US bombing that left millions of unexploded cluster bomblets.

Alex Hiniker, an independent expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade, said casualties had been dropping worldwide before the 2011 uprising turned civil war in Syria.

“Contamination was being cleared, stockpiles were being destroyed,” she said, but the progress “started reversing drastically” in 2012, when the Syrian government and allied Russian forces began using cluster bombs against the opposition in Syria.

The numbers had dropped off as the war in Syria turned into a stalemate, although at least one new cluster bomb attack was reported in Syria in November 2022. But they quickly spiked again with the conflict in Ukraine.

US officials have defended the decision to provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as necessary to level the playing field in the face of a stronger opponent and have insisted that they will take measures to mitigate harm to civilians. This would include sending a version of the munition with a reduced “dud rate,” meaning fewer unexploded rounds left behind after the conflict.

State Department officials did not respond to a request for additional comment.

Hiniker said she and others who track the impacts of cluster munitions are “baffled by the fact that the US is sending totally outdated weapons that the majority of the world has banned because they disproportionately kill civilians.”

The “most difficult and costly part” of dealing with the weapons, she said, “is cleaning up the mess afterwards.”



Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
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Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)

What’s the most dangerous mission someone could take on? A meeting between Saddam Hussein’s envoy and Osama bin Laden in Sudan. US intelligence under President George W. Bush soon found out about it.

This meeting became a key justification used by Washington to invade Iraq, taking advantage of the post-9/11 atmosphere in the US after al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, attacked New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

In truth, there was no reason for bin Laden to influence Saddam Hussein’s future. The two men came from very different worlds. Saddam was the president of a major country in the region, not a faction leader.

He belonged to a secular party, choosing a Christian, Tariq Aziz, as foreign minister—a rare decision in the Middle East. Saddam also wasn’t known for playing along in decisions where he wasn’t in control.

But the decision to meet in Khartoum still cost Saddam, even though the meeting was a failure. A former Iraqi intelligence officer said US forces later seized a document showing that the Iraqi envoy advised against working with bin Laden, advice that was followed.

The 1990s in Sudan were extremely risky. During this time, President Omar al-Bashir’s regime made three major blunders: hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, sheltering international fugitive Carlos the Jackal, and involving Ali Osman Taha, the regime’s second-in-command, in an assassination attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

A rare photo shows Omar al-Bashir and Osama bin Laden in Sudan.

Bin Laden didn’t dwell much on the events in Khartoum in August 1994, when French commandos arrested Carlos and took him to France, where he still sits in prison.

Moreover, the al-Qaeda leader couldn’t foresee Sudan’s regime forcing him out of the country.

The regime, however, had no option but to reduce the risks. Bashir dismissed top security officials and decided to expel the “Arab Afghans.”

One day, Bashir and his deputy informed Hassan al-Turabi that bin Laden’s departure had been arranged. They then visited bin Laden, and a military plane flew him to Afghanistan.

The Taliban then gave bin Laden a safe haven, though Mullah Omar never imagined this would lead to his regime's downfall. In the late 1990s, questions about bin Laden were common when speaking with Sudanese officials.

In an interview, Bashir said that bin Laden came to Sudan after the Afghan war to invest in roads, airports, and agriculture—industries his family had been involved in for a long time.

According to Bashir’s statements, bin Laden didn’t have followers or networks in Sudan, just a small group of close aides who stayed out of the public eye.

But the US had made him a global threat, seeing him everywhere, even after he left Sudan, despite knowing he lived in isolation in a distant country.

While Bashir downplayed it, he had met bin Laden several times during his stay in Khartoum, and it's unlikely he was unaware of the ties between bin Laden and Sudanese security officials.

Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi reaffirmed Bashir’s claims of bin Laden having been building roads and airports.

“He wasn’t involved in public or intellectual circles and stayed out of the media. We talked about Afghanistan, and I shared our concerns that after the Soviets left, the fighters would be skilled in destruction but not in building a stable society, much like the French Revolution,” said al-Turabi at the time.

“I told him (bin Laden) Kabul fell before they were ready to establish a Muslim society as they envisioned,” added al-Turabi.

When asked who pushed for Osama bin Laden’s exit from Sudan, he said: “It was the British, acting on behalf of the Americans.”

“Saudi Arabia didn’t apply direct pressure—they’re always polite. Bin Laden felt his presence was straining relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which have very close ties. With about half a million Sudanese working in Saudi Arabia, none were expelled. Bin Laden didn’t want to harm that relationship,” he explained.

Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, entering a dangerous new phase. Soon after, the Taliban took over and welcomed him. Within two years, bombings at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led Washington to blame bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden’s home in Sudan. (Asharq Al-Awsat file)

The accusation was repeated after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. Bin Laden made statements suggesting he was at war with the US, but no one expected him to bring the fight to American soil on September 11, 2001.

When President Bush justified the Iraq invasion, he listed allegations against Saddam, including weapons of mass destruction, repression, and mass graves.

The most controversial claim was that Saddam’s regime was cooperating with al-Qaeda. However, the US administration did not provide evidence for this claim, and no concrete proof of a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was presented.

Curiosity about the contact between Saddam and bin Laden had journalists setting out to find more information.

While answers couldn’t be obtained from Saddam’s opponents or his former colleagues, insights from Iraqi intelligence were available.

Salim al-Jumaili, head of the American Affairs Division in Iraqi intelligence, who was involved in the initial outreach to bin Laden, agreed to talk.

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, marked by a security agreement that limited interference and intelligence activities.

Saddam praised Saudi Arabia and King Fahd for their support during the Iran-Iraq War. According to a former Iraqi official, King Fahd tried hard to resolve the situation and return to negotiations after the invasion, but Saddam had gone too far.

The invasion led to the collapse of the security agreement. As news spread about Iraqi opposition groups contacting Saudi Arabia, Iraqi intelligence suggested canceling the agreement, but Saddam refused.

When reports about these contacts continued, Saddam demanded monthly updates.

Eventually, he believed Saudi Arabia was backing efforts to overthrow him and ordered intelligence to “act strongly to undermine the American military presence in Saudi Arabia.”

“When the president issues such an order, all security agencies must try to fulfill it. At that time, I managed the Syria division and had connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, specifically Adnan Okla’s group,” said al-Jumaili.

“Adnan’s brother, Abdul Malik, told us that the Brotherhood had links with bin Laden and could deliver our message. I met Abdul Malik in Baghdad, and he agreed to help. I gave him a message saying we shared a goal of removing US forces from the region and were open to cooperation. We provided about $10,000 for travel expenses,” he revealed.

“The contact returned after a month or so and reported that bin Laden’s stance was very rigid. Bin Laden said the Iraqi regime was infidel and responsible for the presence of US forces in the region, and he was not interested in meeting or cooperating with us. This was in the early 1990s, before al-Qaeda’s actions escalated to the level of September 11.”

“I also heard from Farouk Hijazi, head of external operations, that bin Laden gave a similar response through another channel,” added al-Jumaili.

Al-Jumaili later discovered that Farouk Hijazi had visited Khartoum and met with bin Laden, arranged by al-Turabi.

“Hijazi informed the president that no cooperation with al-Qaeda took place. This is what Bush referred to when he mentioned the president sending an envoy to bin Laden. Bush likely knew there was no real cooperation but didn't mention it to justify the invasion,” al-Jumaili said.

Hassan al-Turabi. (AFP)

Another source, who requested anonymity, said bin Laden showed some flexibility regarding the Iraqi regime during his meeting with Hijazi.

Bin Laden “requested that if there were to be any cooperation, his camps be set up outside Iraqi control and that he have freedom in choosing targets and timing.”

Saddam, after learning of this, was told by Hijazi that cooperating with bin Laden would be complex and risky. Saddam then decided to end the matter entirely.

The consequences of that risky meeting are clear.

Saddam was executed, and Hijazi, who had fled to Syria, was captured at the Syrian-Iraqi border and also executed. Years later, US forces tracked down and killed bin Laden in Pakistan.

Cities sometimes take dangerous risks beyond their means and end up facing harsh realities.

Khartoum paid the price for harboring wanted figures and was punished before it could address the damage.

Some believe that under Bashir, Khartoum aimed to become a center of anti-Western activity, while al-Turabi wanted it to be a hub for political Islam, like Khomeini’s Iran. Both men pushed Sudan beyond its limits.