Syrians Feel Growing Pressure from Türkiye’s Anti-Migrant Political Wave 

People stroll at the main shopping and pedestrian street of Istiklal which is decorated with Turkish flags to mark the Victory Day, in Istanbul, Türkiye August 30, 2023. (Reuters)
People stroll at the main shopping and pedestrian street of Istiklal which is decorated with Turkish flags to mark the Victory Day, in Istanbul, Türkiye August 30, 2023. (Reuters)
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Syrians Feel Growing Pressure from Türkiye’s Anti-Migrant Political Wave 

People stroll at the main shopping and pedestrian street of Istiklal which is decorated with Turkish flags to mark the Victory Day, in Istanbul, Türkiye August 30, 2023. (Reuters)
People stroll at the main shopping and pedestrian street of Istiklal which is decorated with Turkish flags to mark the Victory Day, in Istanbul, Türkiye August 30, 2023. (Reuters)

Anti-migrant sentiment, economic woes and political pressures are leading some of the 3.3 millions Syrians living in Türkiye to plan a return to Syria or seek shelter in Europe, according to migrants interviewed by Reuters.

They are concerned that rhetoric against migrants may rear up in campaigning for March local elections, echoing efforts to tap into nationalist sentiments during May's general elections.

Many of those now living in Istanbul face a more immediate worry - authorities' Sept. 24 deadline for them to leave the city if they are registered in other Turkish provinces.

One 32-year-old Syrian said he is saving up to pay smugglers and plans to go to Belgium. Hardship caused by Türkiye’s rampant inflation and anti-migrant rhetoric motivated his decision.

"We are blamed and scapegoated for the worsening economy. Discrimination is rising. It is becoming impossible for us to live here," he told Reuters, declining to give his name for security reasons.

The 32-year-old is among those affected by Sunday's deadline because he was registered in southeastern Sanliurfa province.

According to rights groups, racist violence against Syrians is increasing and authorities have adopted a tougher policy on migrants not registered in Istanbul, stoking migrants' fears.

Another Syrian man, a 33-year-old teacher, said he could no longer afford to live in Türkiye after 10 years spent in Istanbul with his two children, with his expenses exceeding his income.

"I decided to return to Syria because of the bad financial situation in Türkiye. I know the situation is bad in Syria too but here it's worse for me," he said, declining to be named.

It was not possible to quantify the number of Syrians currently planning to leave for Europe or return to Syria.

Türkiye is home to 3.3 million Syrians with temporary protection permits, according to Turkish authorities. Istanbul has the highest Syrian population with more than 532,000.

While Syrians were assigned to provinces throughout Türkiye, many went to Istanbul due to more job opportunities. Authorities said it was unclear how many such people there were in the city.

Deadline to move

Adem Maarastawi, a 29-year-old Syrian activist working in Istanbul, is registered in central Türkiye’s Kirsehir province.

As Sept. 24 approaches, he fears being sent to Kirsehir.

"I struggled to build a life here. How can I rebuild my life from scratch in another city?" he said, adding that he looked for a job in more than 30 cities before settling in Istanbul.

Experts believe anti-migrant sentiment will dominate opposition campaigning for the March votes, as it did in the May elections, and worry this could lead to more physical and verbal violence against migrants including more social media hostility.

"Anti-migrant rhetoric is likely to rise before the March elections," said Deniz Sert, associate professor of international relations at Ozyegin University.

Local government expert Ali Mert Tascier said opposition parties are likely to use anti-migrant rhetoric, with municipalities being the main players in managing migrants.

During campaigning for the May elections, the main opposition CHP vowed to send Syrians back. It declined to comment on its migration perspective for the local votes.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been fiercely critical of the opposition's stance, telling a conference this week that Türkiye’s hosting of refugees would continue unchanged.

However, ahead of the May elections, Erdogan played up his plans to repatriate a million Syrian refugees.

"We will continue to pursue our voluntary return policy. It is, however, inappropriate to use migrants for political gain," said Osman Nuri Kabaktepe, Istanbul head of Erdogan's AK Party.

But Maarastawi said he feared such campaigning would lead to a deterioration in the situation for migrants.

"I believe everything will just worsen for us as a result of more populist discourse during the local elections," he said.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.