A Month after Prigozhin’s Suspicious Death, the Kremlin Is Silent on His Plane Crash and Legacy

A portrait of the owner of mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin decorates an informal street memorial near the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on Saturday, Aug. 26, 2023. (AP)
A portrait of the owner of mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin decorates an informal street memorial near the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on Saturday, Aug. 26, 2023. (AP)
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A Month after Prigozhin’s Suspicious Death, the Kremlin Is Silent on His Plane Crash and Legacy

A portrait of the owner of mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin decorates an informal street memorial near the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on Saturday, Aug. 26, 2023. (AP)
A portrait of the owner of mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin decorates an informal street memorial near the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on Saturday, Aug. 26, 2023. (AP)

Why Yevgeny Prigozhin's private jet plummeted into a field northwest of Moscow is still a mystery. The Russian military leaders he tried to oust with his armed rebellion remain in power. His mercenary army is under new management.

And President Vladimir Putin, whose authority was badly dented by the short-lived mutiny, seems as strong as ever, with Prigozhin's fiery death sending a chilling message to anyone challenging him.

A month after Prigozhin was killed in a suspicious plane crash, the Kremlin seems to be succeeding in keeping the demise of the profane and outspoken Wagner chief as low-key as possible — a strategy underlined by Putin's absence at his funeral and troops keeping the media from entering Porokhovskoye Cemetery in St. Petersburg for his Aug. 29 burial.

Prigozhin’s funeral was “the culmination of a covert operation aimed at his elimination,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. It was conducted under the strict oversight of security agencies, “shrouded in secrecy and involved deceptive tactics,” she noted.

Makeshift street memorials sprouted in several cities honoring the 62-year-old Prigozhin, but they have been quietly removed by authorities. Recruitment billboards for the Wagner Group had vanished shortly after the rebellion fizzled.

In a further indignity, someone stole a violin that was left on his grave, a nod to the mercenary group's namesake, German composer Richard Wagner. Another man tried but failed to steal a sledgehammer placed there — another Wagner symbol after the group boasted of using such a tool to beat traitors to death.

Now, a surveillance camera is mounted on a nearby tree and a 24-hour guard monitors Prigozhin's well-tended grave, which on Friday was covered in flowers and written tributes. Cemetery workers say there is a steady trickle of visitors.

FROM BAKHMUT SUCCESS TO MUTINY'S FAILURE Prigozhin's greatest wartime accomplishment — the Wagner-spearheaded capture of the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut in May after months of bloody combat — is under threat. Kyiv's troops are seeking to reclaim it in their counteroffensive in order to deal a psychological blow to Russia.

Still, the private army that once counted tens of thousands of troops is a precious asset the Kremlin wants to exploit, and Russian officials are pondering the possibility of sending some Wagner fighters back to Ukraine.

Prigozhin launched the June 23-24 rebellion, bent on ousting the Russian Defense Ministry's leadership that he blamed for mistakes in pressing the war in Ukraine. His mercenaries took over Russia's southern military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and then rolled toward Moscow before abruptly halting the mutiny.

Putin denounced them as “traitors,” but the Kremlin quickly negotiated a deal ending the uprising in exchange for amnesty from prosecution. The mercenaries were offered a choice to retire from the service, move to Belarus or sign new contracts with the Defense Ministry.

Exactly two months after the rebellion's start, a plane carrying Prigozhin and his top lieutenants crashed on Aug. 23 while flying from Moscow to St. Petersburg, killing all 10 people aboard.

An investigation was launched but no findings have been released. Moscow rejected an offer from Brazil, where the Embraer business jet was built, to join the inquiry.

A preliminary US intelligence assessment concluded an intentional explosion caused the crash, and Western officials have pointed to a long list of Putin foes who have been assassinated. The Kremlin called allegations he was behind the crash as an “absolute lie.”

The day after the crash, Putin gave a dry eulogy for Prigozhin in brief televised remarks, saying he had known him since the early 1990s. Prigozhin was “a man of difficult fate” who had “made serious mistakes in life,” he said, without displaying any emotion.

Asked last week why the official investigation hasn’t yielded any results, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded tersely that it’s a “difficult probe.”

AFTER THE CRASH, A RECKONING Despite any damage done to Putin by the rebellion, Prigozhin's death was a powerful signal to Russian elites about challenging his authority.

Russian officials, meanwhile, moved quickly to take control of the company’s personnel and assets.

Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Yunus-Bek Yevkurov led a delegation to Syria, Libya, Central African Republic and other countries where Wagner has operated to tell their leaders that the Defense Ministry will take over the job.

“The death of Wagner’s leaders allows the Kremlin to establish control over the mercenaries in Africa,” said Africa expert Alexandra Fokina in a recent analysis. “Africa’s strategic importance for Russia is rising, and Moscow will likely try to ‘nationalize’ those assets without the loss of efficiency.”

That doesn't necessarily mean Wagner mercenaries in Africa will be placed under the control of the Defense Ministry. Instead, Fokina said the Kremlin could allow some of them to operate autonomously as a private entity under new, government-appointed leadership.

“By maintaining such hybrid model, Moscow would be able to continue using the mercenaries in the ‘gray zone,’ officially keeping a distance from Wagner’s activities in the region,” Fokina said.

Wagner’s African operations hinged heavily on personal contacts developed by Prigozhin and his lieutenants, links that could be broken if the Defense Ministry tries to take full control, she noted.

“Choosing an appointee from the ranks of ‘Russia instructors’ working in Africa would allow the Kremlin to rely on the existing channels of communication with the local leadership,” she said.

Whether all Wagner mercenaries come under the government's command or some are allowed to operate privately, Moscow is likely to retain its clout in Africa.

"Russia’s appeal as a security guarantor and military partner remains intact, irrespective of the fate of the Wagner Group,” Mathieu Droin and Tina Dolbaia wrote in an analysis published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In Belarus, the field camps that housed several thousand Wagner troops after the mutiny have shrunk following Prigozhin’s death. Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko said they could be offered contracts with his military.

Other Wagner forces could return to Ukraine under the auspices of Russia’s National Guard, according to messaging app channels linked to the mercenary group, although there is no official confirmation of such a plan.

PRIGOZHIN FOES STILL IN POWER — FOR NOW The military leaders Prigozhin cursed and castigated in profane videos last spring — Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and chief of the General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov — remain in power and have effectively secured their positions despite his calls for their ouster.

“Shoigu and Gerasimov seem very much to have won,” said Mark Galeotti, a London-based Russia expert who heads the consulting firm Mayak Intelligence. “Their position was saved precisely by Prigozhin’s mutiny.”

He noted that while Shoigu and Gerasimov were “phenomenally unpopular figures within the military” and widely blamed for mishandling the war, they also are very useful to the Kremlin as a “lightning rod, attracting all the criticism, rather than Putin himself.”

Shoigu attended Putin's talks this month with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and accompanied Kim as he inspected Russia's nuclear-capable strategic bombers and a warship on a visit that fueled Western concerns of a possible deal for Moscow to tap Pyongyang's huge munitions arsenals for use in Ukraine.

Gen. Sergei Surovikin, whom Prigozhin had mentioned as a possible replacement for Gerasimov, vanished from public view after the mutiny and eventually was dismissed as air force chief after a two-month investigation into his possible connection to the mutiny — a sign authorities worked methodically to uproot any dissent in the ranks.

Shoigu and Gerasimov also removed other senior officers who appeared too ambitious or defiant, including Maj. Gen. Ivan Popov, commander of the 58th army in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region who was dismissed after speaking out about challenges faced by his troops amid Kyiv's counteroffensive.

Surovikin was appointed air defense coordinator for the Commonwealth of Independent States, an alliance of former Soviet nations. While it's a token job with no power or influence and clearly a humiliating demotion, the fact he wasn't booted from the military altogether signaled the investigation hadn’t implicated him in any serious wrongdoing.

Earlier this month, Surovikin was seen in Algeria as part of a Russian military delegation.

Galeotti emphasized that despite the demotion, Surovikin has kept his rank. If Putin reshuffles the military leadership, he might return with a senior job.

“Surovikin is now in a position in which he has no power and no prestige but also no responsibilities. He can’t screw things up,” Galeotti said in a recent podcast.

A successor to Shoigu could make Surovikin a new chief of the General Staff, he said, adding: “They don’t have many truly able figures.”



As Israel Expands Strikes on Beirut, Delivery Drivers Steer Clear of Danger

 People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
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As Israel Expands Strikes on Beirut, Delivery Drivers Steer Clear of Danger

 People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)
People who work as delivery drivers for the Toters delivery app stand outside a delivery center in Beirut, Lebanon, March 18, 2026. (Reuters)

Lebanese food courier Hamza Hareb now keeps his distance if he spots a car with tinted windows while on a delivery run in Beirut. Hezbollah is rumored to use such cars, and Hareb wants to steer clear of any Israeli strikes targeting the armed group.

Israel has expanded its air campaign to new parts of Beirut in recent days, hitting apartments and downing entire buildings in strikes it says are targeting Hezbollah, which pulled Lebanon into the regional war on March 2 by firing into Israeli territory.

On Wednesday, Israel struck different neighborhoods in the heart of Beirut, leaving mounds of rubble hundreds of meters away from government buildings, restaurants and roads usually clogged with traffic.

As residents of the capital stay home in fear, they are ordering delivery for dinner - and drivers like Hareb are navigating a maze ‌of risks to ‌make it happen.

"Of course, we are afraid. That is ever-present," said Hareb, one ‌of ⁠3,000 couriers in ⁠Beirut who work for Toters, among Lebanon's most popular delivery apps.

Like most gig workers, Toters drivers are paid per delivery. For many, the job is an economic lifeline in the heavily indebted country, which is suffering from years of economic crisis and political instability following a financial collapse in 2019.

"You don't know when the strikes will come, so we have adapted to everything," Hareb said.

'NAVIGATING INTO UNCERTAINTY'

Israel sometimes issues evacuation warnings before striking, telling residents to leave the area. But three of Wednesday's four strikes on Beirut came without notice.

"Right now they're increasingly ⁠striking without warning, and of course this is instilling a sense of ‌fear among us (since) we spend most of our time out ‌in the street," Hareb told Reuters.

If Beirut is rocked by an unexpected strike, drivers pull over to figure out which ‌neighborhood was targeted and how to amend their routes if needed. If an evacuation warning is issued, ‌drivers pass it on through work channels so colleagues can avoid targeted areas.

Toters' director of operations Roland Ghanem said the company did not deliver to neighborhoods that fall within Israel's evacuation orders and has barred drivers from using risky roads near possible targets.

"These drivers navigate into uncertainty... just to make sure that others can still have access to food ‌and basic needs," Ghanem said. "They understand that behind every order, there is a family that has been displaced, or an elderly person that cannot go to ⁠the store and get ⁠some food, or just a regular person trying to get through the day."

WORKING IN A WAR

Israeli strikes have killed nearly 1,000 people and displaced another million across Lebanon, according to Lebanese authorities.

For some drivers, the war has hit close to home - literally. Mahmoud al-Benne, 34, had to flee his home in Beirut's southern suburbs earlier this month when Israel issued a blanket evacuation order for the entire area and began bombing it heavily.

But he still needs to work.

"Whether you are displaced or not displaced, you need to earn money," Benne said. "You have responsibilities. We are in a state of war, but at the end of the day we want to work."

Marie Katanjian stands out among her colleagues as a rare female delivery driver. Her husband delivers for Toters and she was inspired to do the same.

"We have to work in this situation because we have families. We're helping each other out, hand in hand," she said.

Still, she's yearning to drive safely through her city's streets again.

“We want the war to end, so we can take a breath.”


What Remains of Hezbollah’s Military Arsenal?

Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
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What Remains of Hezbollah’s Military Arsenal?

Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)
Damage after a rocket fired by Hezbollah toward Nahariya (Reuters)

The rockets that Hezbollah continues to fire, since its decision to join what it calls a support war for Iran, have surprised observers with their intensity and type, particularly in Israel.

Israeli media have expressed astonishment that the group still retains such military capabilities, despite the ongoing war against it since September 2023.

Previous Israeli assessments suggested that a large part of Hezbollah’s arsenal had been eroded during the last war and the bombardment campaigns that followed, which continued for 15 months against its depots and positions.

However, the pace of launches since the start of the new round of fighting has raised serious questions about the actual size of this arsenal, its sources, how it has been preserved, where the remaining stockpiles are located, and how they are managed and used under these complex conditions.

This comes as the Lebanese army had also seized a considerable portion of these weapons in the area south of the Litani River.

Questions also extend beyond the military stockpile to Hezbollah’s ability to fill leadership vacancies after assassination operations that targeted hundreds of its commanders and fighters, and how large numbers of these fighters have been able to reach and take part in ground combat in border villages and towns.

Secret storage sites

Most military experts believe these fighters have not left their towns and villages during this period, keeping their weapons in private facilities that have not been raided.

Riad Kahwaji, a researcher and writer on security and defense affairs, said Israeli estimates indicate that between 50% and 70% of Hezbollah’s arsenal was destroyed during the previous war and subsequent operations over the past 15 months.

He added that if the group possessed around 100,000 rockets, as prevailing narratives claim, then even if 70% were eliminated, about 30,000 would remain, which is not a small number.

He added that the arsenal in the Bekaa Valley has not yet been used.

On the locations of the rockets and storage sites, Kahwaji told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel had often destroyed the entrances to some tunnels, whether in the south or along the eastern mountain range, but had not been able to destroy them entirely, meaning their contents likely remain intact.

This, he said, explains talk of intentions to reach these tunnels through ground operations to seize them.

Kahwaji also said Hezbollah had not cooperated with the Lebanese army, either south or north of the Litani River. As a result, most army raids targeted sites identified by Israel and the mechanism committee, meaning many other locations remain untouched.

He added that Hezbollah fighters had not left south of the Litani and remained with their weapons in private facilities that the Lebanese army had refused to enter, which had long cast doubt on claims that the area had been fully cleared. Recent developments, he said, showed that this was not the case.

Kahwaji added that Hezbollah also has facilities for manufacturing Katyusha and Grad rockets and assembling drones. He noted that most of the rockets fired recently belong to these types, which the group possesses in large quantities.

By contrast, the number of long-range missiles in its possession is limited, although some have been fired as far as 150 km into Israel. He also pointed to smuggling operations that had taken place via Syria to bolster its arsenal with guided missiles such as the Kornet.

Tunnels and underground centers

Retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou, a lecturer in geopolitics, said it was not surprising that Hezbollah still possesses such an arsenal and capabilities despite what it has faced over the past two years and the closure of the Syrian border.

He noted that from 2006 to 2023, over 17 years, Hezbollah had dug tunnels and underground facilities and stockpiled weapons arriving from Iran via Damascus and Aleppo airports, before being transported by land into Lebanon around the clock.

Israel, he said, had been unable to effectively target these supply lines over the years, intercepting only about 50%, according to Israeli sources.

Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah had made extensive preparations at all levels, not only in terms of weapons, but also logistically and medically.

Although Israel destroyed a large portion of these weapons and facilities during the last war, and supply lines through Syria have since been cut, some capabilities remain intact.

He added that while the Lebanese army in the south had raided sites it was able to identify, other locations likely remain undiscovered.

He said rockets currently being fired are launched either from the Bekaa Valley or areas north of the Litani River, as battlefield developments indicate that much of the area south of the Litani was in fact largely devoid of weapons.


Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
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Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year

Within Iran’s ruling structure in Tehran, the post of intelligence minister is far from a routine cabinet role. The ministry, established after the 1979 revolution, is a central pillar of the security system, overseeing a wide network of intelligence operations at home and abroad.

While the president formally nominates the minister, the appointment is effectively decided with the Supreme Leader's approval, placing the role within a security structure closely tied to his office.

From this position, conservative cleric Esmail Khatib rose to lead Iran’s intelligence apparatus in 2021, after more than four decades in the Islamic Republic’s security and judicial institutions.

His career ended dramatically during the Iran-Israel war. On the 19th day of the conflict, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the Israeli air force had carried out a strike in Tehran that killed Khatib.

The Israeli military said Khatib oversaw an apparatus responsible for espionage and covert operations, and played a role in suppressing protests inside Iran.

The announcement came days after his name surfaced outside Iran, when the US State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on several senior Iranian officials linked to the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader’s office, including Khatib.

For years, Khatib operated largely in the shadows within intelligence institutions. He moved to the center of the Iran-Israel confrontation as the shadow conflict between the two sides escalated in recent years.

The announcement of his death added his name to a list of figures from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council killed in the conflict, including Secretary Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Pakpour, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

From seminary to state institutions

Esmail Khatib was born in 1961 in Qaenat, South Khorasan province, eastern Iran. In the mid-1970s, he moved to the seminary in Qom, where he studied Islamic jurisprudence under senior clerics.

His teachers included Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Mojtaba Tehrani. He also attended jurisprudence lessons taught by Ali Khamenei before he became the supreme leader. This religious path was common for clerics who entered state institutions after the 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khatib quickly joined the new system. At 19, he enlisted in the Revolutionary Guards and worked in intelligence and operations units during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Reports indicate he was wounded, later placing him among recognized veterans, a status that carries political weight in Iran.

Entry into the intelligence ministry

In the mid-1980s, after the creation of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in 1983, Khatib moved to the new body, which became Iran’s main civilian intelligence agency. He worked in several departments, including foreign affairs and intelligence analysis.

He gained prominence in the 1990s when he was appointed head of intelligence in Qom province.

Qom, a stronghold of the clerical establishment, is among Iran’s most sensitive provinces due to its religious institutions. Managing security there required navigating complex balances among clerics and political factions.

Khatib held the post for more than a decade, during a period marked by political tensions in the city, including developments linked to senior cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, once seen as a potential successor to Ruhollah Khomeini before being sidelined.

Closer to the center of power

Over time, Khatib moved into roles closer to decision-making centers. In 2010, he joined the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a unit responsible for his security and protection, a position reserved for senior intelligence officials.

Two years later, he was appointed head of the judiciary’s protection and intelligence center, tasked with monitoring judicial institutions and ensuring their political loyalty.

He remained in the role until 2019, during the tenure of judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani. With Ebrahim Raisi’s later appointment as head of the judiciary, ties between the two men strengthened.

The Astan Quds phase

In 2019, Khatib moved to Astan Quds Razavi in Mashhad, one of Iran’s largest economic and religious institutions, which oversees the Imam Reza shrine.

He took charge of security and protection within the organization, part of a network of institutions directly linked to the supreme leader’s office. He remained there until 2021, when he returned to the intelligence ministry, this time as its head.

Intelligence minister

In August 2021, after Ebrahim Raisi was elected president, he nominated Khatib as intelligence minister. As is customary, the appointment came after approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had the final say on sensitive security posts.

Khatib became the eighth intelligence minister since the ministry’s establishment. He took office as Iran faced multiple security challenges, including sabotage at nuclear facilities, assassinations of scientists and officials, and an escalating intelligence confrontation with Israel.

Iran’s political landscape shifted after President Ebrahim Raisi died in May 2024 in a helicopter crash in the northwest. After subsequent elections, President Masoud Pezeshkian formed a new government.

Khatib was among the few ministers to retain his post. Pezeshkian renominated him, a move analysts said reflected the sensitivity of the role.

His retention drew criticism from some political and reformist circles that had hoped for changes in the leadership of security agencies.

Rivalry within the security apparatus

At the start of his tenure, Khatib worked to manage a key issue within the security establishment, the complex relationship between the intelligence ministry and its parallel counterpart, the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization.

The two bodies have overlapping mandates and often compete over major security files. Khatib sought to improve coordination, particularly in countering what the system described as foreign infiltration. The balance, however, remained complicated, reflecting ties to different power centers.

Protests and sanctions

Khatib’s tenure saw one of Iran’s largest protest waves in the past decade. In 2022, demonstrations erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini while in the morality police custody.

Security agencies, including the intelligence ministry, played a central role in responding through arrests, investigations and the pursuit of activists.

Khatib echoed the official line, describing the protests as driven by foreign interference and accusing the United States, Britain and Israel of involvement.

In September 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on Khatib and the ministry, accusing it of running cyberattack networks targeting governments and companies in multiple countries, including Albania.

Security failures

Despite repeated announcements of dismantling espionage networks, Iran’s security apparatus faced criticism over several failures.

Among the most notable was a deadly attack in Kerman in 2024 during a ceremony marking the anniversary of Qassem Soleimani’s killing, which left dozens dead.

Assassinations inside Iran, including those targeting figures linked to the so-called resistance axis, also exposed vulnerabilities.

These incidents sparked debate within Iran’s elite over the system’s ability to counter external infiltration.

Criticism intensified after the killing of numerous Iranian officials, including military commanders and nuclear scientists, during the 12-day war in June, amid reports of extensive intelligence breaches.

End of a security career

Throughout his career, Esmail Khatib remained largely out of the spotlight. He was not a mass political figure, but a security official who rose steadily through state institutions.

The Iran-Israel war in 2026, however, thrust him into the center of the confrontation. The Israeli announcement of his killing on the 19th day of the war ended a career spanning more than 40 years in the security services.

Whether seen as a major intelligence blow or another chapter in the regional conflict, Khatib’s trajectory reflects a common path within Iran’s complex security establishment: a cleric who began in the seminary, joined the Revolutionary Guards in the early years of the revolution, and rose through the ranks to one of the most sensitive posts in the Iranian state.