Israeli Veteran Calls 1973 War a Necessary ‘Slap in the Face'

A sign warning against landmines from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is placed at a field at a position near the Syrian border in the Israel-occupied Golan Heights on September 5, 2023. (AFP)
A sign warning against landmines from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is placed at a field at a position near the Syrian border in the Israel-occupied Golan Heights on September 5, 2023. (AFP)
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Israeli Veteran Calls 1973 War a Necessary ‘Slap in the Face'

A sign warning against landmines from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is placed at a field at a position near the Syrian border in the Israel-occupied Golan Heights on September 5, 2023. (AFP)
A sign warning against landmines from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is placed at a field at a position near the Syrian border in the Israel-occupied Golan Heights on September 5, 2023. (AFP)

A decorated Israeli veteran of tank battles on the Syrian front in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Avigdor Kahalani remembers the conflict, despite its heavy toll, as a "slap in the face" Israel badly needed.

The twin attack by Egypt and Syria on October 6 caught Israel by surprise on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar -- Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement -- when the nation comes to a virtual standstill.

When the fighting erupted, Kahalani was a 29-year-old lieutenant-colonel commanding the 77th tank battalion in the Golan Heights that overlook Syria.

He had only just returned to active duty after spending a year in hospital for follow-up treatment of severe burns he had suffered in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.

That war had seen Israel conquer the Golan Heights, Sinai, West Bank and east Jerusalem, dramatically redrawing the regional map -- but also creating what was later deemed a dangerous sense of complacency.

As soon as the new war broke out on two fronts, Kahalani knew that Israeli forces were badly outnumbered, the 79-year-old recalled in an interview with AFP at his home in Tel Aviv.

Syria had eight to 10 times more tanks than Israel and "their tanks were better than ours", he said.

"All of a sudden we understood that it's a total war, we're losing territory," he recalled, adding that within 24 hours the Syrian forces "had conquered almost all of the Golan Heights".

'Critical moment'

Within three days, the Israeli forces seemed on the verge of defeat, with Syrian forces directly threatening Israel's core territory.

But, in a dramatic turn of events on the battlefield, Kahalani's unit and battalions of the 7th Armored Brigade were able to halt the Syrian momentum.

"I had to lead the attack to reconquer the hills from where we could stop them," the former tank commander said.

After days of fierce fighting, the Syrians retreated.

"That was a critical moment, when you've strained every muscle in your body, after four days of combat with nearly no food, without sleep, with just a few ammunition rounds left in your tank.

"You utilize every muscle, every thought, to be better than them, to win," said Kahalani, who is celebrated as a living legend in Israel and regularly speaks with young conscripts.

In 1975, Kahalani received the Medal of Valor, Israel's highest military distinction. The citation honored his "wondrous leadership and personal heroism in a difficult and complicated battle, whose outcome changed the course of the Golan Heights campaign".

Wake-up call

After the initial floundering, Israel, mobilizing all reserve units and supported by a US airlift, was able to redress the battlefield situation.

Israeli forces counter-attacked Egypt and crossed the Suez Canal, while in the north its soldiers retook the Golan. Fighting ended with a UN-validated ceasefire on October 25.

Both sides suffered heavy losses in the three weeks of fighting. More than 2,600 Israeli soldiers were killed and more than 9,500 Arab troops were dead and missing.

Many historians argue that Israel's 1967 victory had instilled a sense of invulnerability among its political and military leadership.

So, despite the heavy losses, Kahalani, who lost a brother in the conflict, argues the 1973 war was a necessary wake-up call.

Its effect was like "a very strong slap in the face", he said, arguing that it "brought our sanity back to a certain extent".

"Had the reservists been mobilized two days earlier, it's likely that the war could have been avoided," he said.

But members of then-prime minister Golda Meir's government were "hesitant," Kahalani noted, "even when they had all the indications that there was about to be a war".

The shock of Israel's unpreparedness changed everything, he said of the deep soul-searching and high-profile resignations that followed.

'Moment of truth'

A year after the war, a commission was set up to investigate Israel's level of military preparedness and its reaction to the outbreak of the war.

The army's top commander David Elazar and the head of military intelligence Eli Zeira resigned. Meir, while not directly implicated by the commission, stepped down as prime minister in 1974.

Kahalani stayed in the army, reaching the rank of brigadier general, before resigning and joining the Labour Party in 1992.

He later left to form a centrist party and served as public security minister in Benjamin Netanyahu's first government from 1996-1999.

To Kahalani, the 1973 war was the trigger that pushed Israel to develop more sophisticated weapons, such as the Iron Dome missile defense system, and to achieve the military technological edge it enjoys today.

But above all, the conflict served as a timely warning of Israel's "existential problem" which Kahalani argues is now embodied by arch-enemy Iran.

Israel charges that Iran, whose leaders have called repeatedly for its destruction, is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, a goal Tehran denies.

"The moment of truth will come, I have no illusions," Kahalani said of a potential showdown with Iran.

When that day comes, he said, he hopes that "Israel will have courageous leadership".



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
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Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.