Israel Considered ‘Pre-emptive Strike’ against Egypt, Syria Hours before October Attack

The Israeli military censor’s finalization of the news received by the Maariv newspaper (Maariv archive)
The Israeli military censor’s finalization of the news received by the Maariv newspaper (Maariv archive)
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Israel Considered ‘Pre-emptive Strike’ against Egypt, Syria Hours before October Attack

The Israeli military censor’s finalization of the news received by the Maariv newspaper (Maariv archive)
The Israeli military censor’s finalization of the news received by the Maariv newspaper (Maariv archive)

Fifty years ago, specifically on Oct. 3, 1973, then Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, David Elazar, met with the editors of Hebrew newspapers and told them: “No war will break out soon... You can sleep peacefully.”

The journalists felt reassured, except for one: The editor-in-chief of the Maariv newspaper, Aryeh Disenchik. His military correspondent, Jacob Ayers, was confident that war was coming. He had a brother serving in the army and was monitoring Egyptian movements on the western end of the Suez Canal. He knew that those were not mere exercises, but preparations for an imminent war.

Disenchik decided to cover the news in a spirit that contradicted the reassurances conveyed by the Chief of Staff.

Ayers prepared a story entitled, “Suspicious Movements of the Egyptian Army,” in which he spoke about build-ups of Egyptian tanks and missile batteries and excessive movement of aircraft in the air, and concluded with a sentence that read: “The Israeli army is alert to these movements and stands in front of them with high preparedness.”

He sent the article to the military censor, who crossed out almost all of the lines except for the last sentence.

Twenty-two years after that incident, in 1995, Ayers served as editor-in-chief of the newspaper. He printed a copy of the paper on which the news was written, along with what had been crossed out by the military censorship, and hung it on the wall behind his office. He wanted to recall his journalistic achievement, which had been suppressed by the censorship, but also insisted, on every occasion, to apologize to the public, because he adhered to the law by submitting the news to censorship.

This incident was one of the forgotten stories in the Israeli political arena, but is making a strong comeback, after researchers Ephraim Lapid (worked as army spokesman from 1984-1989) and Ron Gabayan (served in the army spokesman’s department from 2016-2022) decided to teach it in colleges.

The two researchers prepared a study on the role of the Israeli Army Spokesperson’s Department during that war, within the framework of the official Israeli decision to release a large amount of secret documents about the October War or “Yom Kippur.”

The Israeli government also took a decision three years ago to release most of the documents related to the October War, when it marked its 50th anniversary.

At the beginning of September 2022, the Israeli State Archive published the contents of 1,400 document files, and about 1,000 Photographs, 850 audio recordings and video clips, and more than 250 brief notes.

Israel also revealed the diary of the office of then Prime Minister Golda Meir, which covered the pre and post-war period, until the Separation of Forces Agreement in 1974. The diary revolved around the political and military aspects and international and regional diplomatic communications conducted by the Prime Minister’s office at the time, as documented by Eli Mizrahi, who served as director of the office. The journal contained 3,500 files with hundreds of thousands of pages.

The Israeli Mossad also published a book, for the first time in its history, about the circumstances of the 1973 war, under the title, “Some Day When We’ll Be Allowed to Tell.”

The accounts reflected the contradictory positions expressed by the various bodies that played a role in the October War, regarding what is known in Israel as “the corruption of great negligence.”

Israeli information about the Egyptian and Syrian mobilizations was dealt with “arrogance” in Tel Aviv. The head of military intelligence, Eli Zaira, stated during a consultation session with the Prime Minister - 28 hours before the war - that he had a complete copy of the plan prepared by the Syrian army against Israel, and a summary of the attack plan prepared by the Egyptian army.

According to Israeli documents, Zaira was confident that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, did not intend to fight Israel, and that all military movements undertaken by their armies constituted a show-muscle in front of Israel.

The Army Chief of Staff, Elazar, approved this opinion, as did Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Even when the Mossad issued a war warning at six o’clock on Oct. 6, Dayan objected to the mobilization of reserve forces, arguing such matter will spark an uproar against Israel and will greatly cost the economy.

Hours after Zaira downplayed the Egyptian-Syrian movements, the documents reveal that the Israeli political and military leaders were discussing, in another meeting on the morning of Oct. 6, specifically at eight o’clock, that is, six hours before the outbreak of the war, the possibility of launching a proactive strike against Egypt and Syria.

But Prime Minister Meir said: “My heart supports a war like this, but my mind sees it as harm to Israel before the international community.”

She added: “If it turns out that the Egyptians and Syrians do not actually intend to go to war, this will be an adventure by Israel that will lead to deaths and injuries, for nothing.” Defense Minister Moshe Dayan agreed.

Another official account, this time sourced from the book issued by the Mossad, states that Mossad chief Zvi Zamir informed Prime Minister Golda Meir, two years before the war, that is, in the fall of 1971, of Sadat’s intentions to fight Israel, and even told her about basic aspects of the Egyptian president’s strategy.

Zamir relied in his information on “the chief Mossad spy, Ashraf Marwan,” who was known as “The Angel.” The book indicates that Meir was so impressed by the depth of the information that she told him: “One day, when it can be revealed that you conveyed this information to me, you and your team will receive a medal.”

The Mossad book also indicates that Zamir “was able to obtain minutes of Sadat’s meetings with Soviet officials in Moscow in 1971, in which he told them that he was determined to restore all of Sinai, and not just part of it, either through diplomatic negotiations or through war with Israel.”



As Trump Seeks to Be a Peacemaker, Netanyahu Leaves Washington without Breakthrough on Gaza Deal

 Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, left, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, right, arrive for a meeting at the Pentagon, Wednesday, July 9, 2025, in Washington. (AP)
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, left, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, right, arrive for a meeting at the Pentagon, Wednesday, July 9, 2025, in Washington. (AP)
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As Trump Seeks to Be a Peacemaker, Netanyahu Leaves Washington without Breakthrough on Gaza Deal

 Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, left, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, right, arrive for a meeting at the Pentagon, Wednesday, July 9, 2025, in Washington. (AP)
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, left, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, right, arrive for a meeting at the Pentagon, Wednesday, July 9, 2025, in Washington. (AP)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s trip to Washington this week netted President Donald Trump another nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize he covets, but the ceasefire the US leader sought for the war in Gaza didn't emerge.

Despite Trump throwing his weight behind a push for a 60-day truce between Israel and Hamas, no breakthrough was announced during Netanyahu's visit, a disappointment for a president who wants to be known as a peacemaker and has hinged his reputation on being a dealmaker.

“He prides himself or being able to make deals, so this is another test case,” said Rachel Brandenburg, the Israel Policy Forum's Washington managing director and senior fellow.

Trump’s ability to strike a ceasefire deal in the 21-month war will reveal the boundaries of his influence with Netanyahu, especially after their recent joint strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities that both leaders touted at the White House this week.

Beyond the back-to-back meetings Trump and Netanyahu had at the White House this week, there was little public evidence of progress at a time when the Republican US president is pushing to end the fighting.

‘Closer than we’ve been,’ but challenges remain

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Thursday that when it comes to a ceasefire in Gaza, “we’re closer than we’ve been in quite a while and we’re hopeful, but we also recognize there’s still some challenges in the way.”

Rubio, who spoke to reporters while traveling in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, also said that Trump “wants to see a ceasefire and we’ve invested a lot of time and energy.”

Beyond ending the bloodshed, ending the war in Gaza would give Trump more leeway to strike some of the broader agreements he seeks in the Middle East, such as expanding the Abraham Accords that started in his first term and normalizing relations with Syria’s new government.

“He wants to be the one who gets hostages home and see the war in Gaza end so he can move on to some of these bigger deals,” Brandenburg said.

Even if a truce is reached, Netanyahu has promised fighting will continue if necessary until Hamas is destroyed. The group, meanwhile, has conditioned the release of the remaining hostages on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, a stipulation Israel has been unwilling to accept.

Trump-Netanyahu relationship sees a rebound

It’s unclear how much pressure Trump put on Netanyahu in their private talks this week. But the two leaders came into the visit seeming more aligned than ever — at least for now — fresh off the president having twice come to the Israeli leader’s assistance.

Trump made the risky move to join Israel’s attacks on Iran last month, delivering pivotal US firepower while alarming world leaders and some of Trump’s “America first” supporters. Trump also inserted himself into Israel’s domestic affairs, calling for Netanyahu’s yearslong corruption trial to be thrown out.

That’s a marked turnaround in their relationship, which had appeared somewhat strained in recent years.

Trump shocked some of his fellow Republicans and staunch supporters of Israel by publicly criticizing Netanyahu not long after Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, setting off the conflict.

He said that Netanyahu “was not prepared” for the attack from Hamas and that Netanyahu had “let us down” just before the US killed top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in 2020.

Even during his last visit to the White House earlier this year, Netanyahu seemed caught off guard when Trump announced the US would hold talks with Iran over its nuclear deal rather than embrace Netanyahu’s push for military pressure.

With their military objectives aligning for a time on Iran, the Israeli leader has worked to foster a warmer relationship.

In a video he released after the US strikes, Netanyahu spoke — in English instead of Hebrew — of the “unshakeable alliance” between their countries while repeatedly praising Trump.

“His leadership today has created a pivot of history that can help lead the Middle East and beyond to a future of prosperity and peace,” Netanyahu said.

Netanyahu tries the charm offensive on Trump

In his visit to Washington this week, the Israeli leader also showed he knows how to praise the president in a way that matters greatly to him when he unveiled a letter in front of reporters and cameras to announce he had nominated him for a Nobel Peace Prize.

Those gestures, though, may only carry him so far as Trump pushes for a deal that Netanyahu may not be able to accept.

“I think if Netanyahu stands in the way too much for too long of the sort of loftier objectives Trump has set out for himself,” Brandenburg said, “Netanyahu will be cast aside as more of a problem than an asset.”

Netanyahu, like many Israelis, believes Trump is the greatest friend they have ever had in the White House and is deeply grateful for the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites last month.

But the Israeli leader is also under mounting public pressure to end the war as hostages languish in captivity and more Israeli soldiers are killed in guerrilla-style attacks.

Israel’s military success against Iran has given him some political capital, but if he ends the war while leaving Hamas intact, he will have broken his repeated promise of “total victory.”

His far-right coalition partners have threatened to bolt if he does that, sparking early elections that could end his nearly unbroken 16 years in power and leave him more vulnerable to long-standing corruption charges.

That may prove too heavy a price for delivering the kind of lasting ceasefire sought by Trump and demanded by Hamas. Instead, Netanyahu, who is seen as a masterful politician by friends and foes alike, is expected to thread the needle.

In a video statement on Thursday, Netanyahu said that he would agree to a “temporary” 60-day ceasefire in return for the release of half the hostages remaining in Gaza, many of whom are believed dead, and that he would begin negotiations on ending the war.

But he conditioned any lasting ceasefire on Hamas giving up its arms – something the fighters have refused to do as long as Israel occupies parts of Gaza.

If Hamas can be disarmed through negotiations, “so much the better,” Netanyahu said. “If it is not achieved through negotiations in 60 days, we will achieve it in other ways — by using force.”