Ashraf Marwan... The Man of a Single Story

Ashraf Marwan... The Man of a Single Story
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Ashraf Marwan... The Man of a Single Story

Ashraf Marwan... The Man of a Single Story

When the Israeli intelligence service (Mossad) published last month, a book that partly deals with the October 1973 War, it included two documents related to the meeting of Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of the late Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the information secretary of his predecessor, President Anwar Sadat, with the head of the Mossad.

“The Angel,” “Babylon” and most frequently “the In-Law,” are code names that were given for “the spy”, who leaked to the Israelis the date of the Egyptian attack.

Marwan’s name gradually emerged over the years through memoirs by Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Golda Meir (1969-1974), Chief of Military Intelligence Eli Zaira (1972-1974), and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan (1967- 1974).

However, the Mossad book presented for the first time a document that states that the Israeli intelligence body refuses to consider Marwan a “double agent,” and rejects Egypt’s description of him as a “national hero, who succeeded in conveying the most important information about the Israeli enemy.”

For the Mossad, Marwan was loyal to Israel.

In the face of the Israeli narratives, Egypt maintained an official silence. However, a well-informed Egyptian source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that ongoing Israeli discussions about the spy “reflect competition between the security services in Israel,” stressing that everyone in Tel Avivi is “trying to justify themselves by attempting to appear as heroes.”

Dr. Tariq Fahmy, professor of political science and specialist in Israeli affairs, said that the “recycling of the Israeli narrative,” whether regarding the October War or Marwan, represents “an embodiment of the military and intelligence failure in Israel.”

Major General Nasr Salem, former head of the Egyptian Army’s reconnaissance service and professor of strategic sciences at the Military Academy for Postgraduate Studies, said that Marwan is “an Egyptian hero who participated in implementing the strategic deception plan through which Egypt preempted the war.”

He also considered that he “participated in removing the head of the Israeli Mossad from the operations management team in Tel Aviv, hours before the outbreak of the war.”

The British Court of Public Inquiry ruled in July 2010 that Marwan died of an “unknown cause,” and that evidence provided by the police and witness testimonies “do not support any hypothesis regarding his death.”

The investigations did not accuse any party of being behind Marwan’s death on Wednesday, June 27, 2007, when he fell to his death from the balcony of his house in an upscale neighborhood in London, at the age of 63.

His wife, Mona Gamal Abdel Nasser, accused the Israeli Mossad of assassinating him.

The scene of Marwan’s funeral increased the mystery surrounding him, as it was arranged by official agencies, in the presence of senior statesmen, led by Gamal Mubarak, the son of the Egyptian president at the time.



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.