Egypt & Israel: Cold Peace or Enduring Understanding?

On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)
On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)
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Egypt & Israel: Cold Peace or Enduring Understanding?

On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)
On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)

When Egyptian soldiers crossed the Suez Canal, and their Syrian counterparts stormed the Golan Heights on the afternoon of October 6, 1973, perhaps they did not foresee the intricate calculations and unprecedented transformations that would follow the military clashes.

Nevertheless, to varying degrees, these events shaped the course of politics and diplomacy, ushering the region into a new era known as the “post-October” period, where Arab destinies intersected with the strategies of major powers.

Around half a century has passed since the “last of the battles” between Egypt and Israel, during which nearly 45 years of peace have prevailed between the two countries.

Some describe this peace as “cold” since it remains limited to official relations without extending to popular normalization.

The “psychological barrier” towards Israel persists, untouched by the years of peace, yet others view the resilience of the Cairo-Tel Aviv peace amid internal transformations and regional storms as a success in its own right.

On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty.

However, bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel continue to remain confined to official aspects, whether in diplomacy or security, while economic relations have taken an upward trajectory over the past two decades.

The US has sought to encourage both countries to enhance cooperation beyond the political stalemate and Egyptian popular resistance to normalization.

This was achieved through the 2004 Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreement in Egypt, allowing duty-free access to the US market for goods produced with at least 10.5% Israeli inputs.

Despite some business leaders attempting to break the “silence barrier” in relations between the two countries, the volume of trade between them has remained limited, totaling $270 million annually in the past year.

Israel exports goods worth $150 million to Egypt, while importing $115 million, according to official Israeli statistics from the Ministries of Industry and Trade, and Economics.

Updated Egyptian data on this matter remains unavailable.

In addition to “limited” economic cooperation, relations between the two nations have managed to overcome a series of crises, some of which were related to security incidents, such as border skirmishes.

The most recent incident was in June last year and resulted in the deaths of 3 Israeli soldiers and one Egyptian security personnel.

A statement from the Egyptian army stated that they were “pursuing smugglers on the border with Israel.”

This incident was not the first of its kind. In October 1985, the “Ras Burqa” operation occurred, executed by the Egyptian soldier Suleiman Khater, resulting in the deaths of seven Israelis in a border area between the two countries.

In November 2004, Egypt protested the killing of three Egyptian Central Security Forces personnel after an Israeli tank fired a shell across the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

In August 2011, an Israeli airstrike along the Egyptian border south of Rafah led to the deaths of five Egyptian border guards, for which Israel later issued a formal apology.

Relations between the two countries have also endured regional conflicts, including the wars in Lebanon (1982 and 2006), the Palestinian uprisings (1987 and 2000), and repeated Israeli aggressions on the Gaza Strip.

Egypt has managed to utilize its communication with Tel Aviv to halt these aggressions on several occasions, marking Egyptian success on both regional and international fronts.

Despite changes in Egypt’s government system and shifts in Israel’s leadership, relations between the two nations have maintained a degree of stability.

However, this has not succeeded in altering the popular stance in Egypt, which remains opposed to normalization with Israel.

This sentiment reached its peak following the events of January 25, 2011, when enraged protesters entered an annexed apartment of the Israeli embassy, removed the Israeli flag from the top of the building.

Additionally, Egypt terminated a long-term agreement through which it supplied natural gas to Israel after the pipeline crossing the border was subjected to frequent acts of sabotage.

Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, a professor of political science and former dean of the “Arab Research Institute,” attributes the resilience of the peace relationship between Egypt and Israel to the former’s commitment to its international obligations.

He also highlights what he refers to as “political realism,” considering regional and international circumstances.

In statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ahmed points out that the relationship between the two parties indeed appears to be a “cold peace.”

According to Ahmed, this peace has remained confined to official frameworks, with the minimum necessary for security and diplomatic arrangements being upheld.

However, it has never transitioned into a “warm peace,” at least not at the popular level.

On the other hand, Ahmed believes that Egyptian popular rejection of normalization with Israel “remains strong” and describes it as a “remarkable stance.”

This reflects the commitment of the Arab regime not to normalize relations until the Palestinian issue is resolved.

Ahmed points out that Egyptian authorities have “never attempted at any stage since signing the peace agreement with Israel to pressure unions and parties to change their positions or attempt to brainwash their citizens into accepting normalization with Israel.”



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.