Mohammed Deif, the Voice of War

An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)
An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)
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Mohammed Deif, the Voice of War

An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)
An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)

In a clear, loud, direct voice and a shadowy image, the commander of Hamas' al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammed "Abu Khaled" Deif, announced the start of "al-Aqsa Flood" operation against Israel, putting it under fire for several hours.

Israel has not experienced a similar situation since the Egyptian crossing in 1973, with rockets falling on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem after al-Qassam fighters took control over several Israeli settlements and sites.

Hamas members set out and took control of Israeli sites, killing Israelis and taking others hostages, following the orders of Deif, who proved once again that he had the highest Palestinian say in launching or ending a war.

Who is Deif?

No one knows Deif except his family and a small group of Hamas members. Most of them do not know the whereabouts of the man Israel has been pursuing for decades as No. 1 wanted individual.

Currently, there are three pictures of Deif: a very old one, another of him masked, and an image of his shadow.

Even Israel, which boasts that it has the most powerful intelligence in the world, does not have a recent picture of the commander.

In January 2011, Deif's mother died. All Hamas leaders attended the funeral except for him. It is unknown whether he attended, as some say he was there, while others claim he didn't show up for security reasons. Some also claim he was at the burial disguised as an older man.

He is described as intelligent, quick-witted, and does not like appearing in public. He does not use technology and rarely broadcasts audio messages, only to announce the beginning of a new battle with Israel.

Deif has not appeared in public places for nearly three decades, or as those asked by Asharq Al-Awsat in Gaza say: "If we had looked at him, we would not have known him."

Deif's high sense of security may explain how Israel has been incapable of finding him.

The commander has been wanted by Israel since the mid-nineties when former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres asked Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to arrest him before Arafat expressed his surprise at the name as if he did not know him.

Peres later admitted that he discovered that Arafat was protecting him, hiding him, and lying about him.

Israel tried to kill him more than once and wounded him twice.

Mohamed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri, dubbed Deif, was born in 1965 to a Palestinian refugee family from al-Qubeiba and settled in the Khan Yunis camp in the southern Gaza Strip.

Deif grew up in a very low-income family and was forced to leave school temporarily to support his family. He worked with his father in spinning and upholstery, then established a small poultry farm and worked as a driver.

The commander's friends in his neighborhood say he was gentle, had a good sense of humor, and a good heart.

Deif joined the Hamas movement at the end of 1987. He returned to school and received his education at the Islamic University of Gaza, where he graduated in 1988 after obtaining a bachelor's degree in science.

During this time, Deif created the Islamic theater group al-Ayedun, as he is known for his passion for acting. He played several theatrical roles, including historical figures.

Deif was responsible for the technical committee during his Islamic University Student Council activity.

Israel arrested him in 1989, and he spent 16 months in prison without trial on charges of working in the movement's military apparatus.

After his release, Deif and other figures began establishing al-Qassam Brigades.

During the 1990s, he supervised and participated in countless operations against Israel.

The Palestinian Authority arrested him in May 2000 at the request of Israel. He had a good relationship with the Authority, and his arrest was part of the understanding.

In 2002, he assumed command of al-Qassam after the assassination of its commander-in-chief, Salah Shehadeh.

In 2001, Israel first attempted to assassinate Deif. A second attempt was made a year later when an Apache helicopter fired two missiles at his vehicle, wounding him. Hamas leader and doctor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi treated him at an undisclosed location.

In 2003, an Israeli plane attempted to assassinate Deif and some Hamas leaders in a house in Gaza. But the missile hit the wrong floor.

Three years later, a high-explosive missile hit a house where he met with Al-Qassam leaders. Once again, Deif survived, but Israel said he was seriously injured.

Israeli officials believe Deif can't walk and has lost one of his eyes. But Hamas has not confirmed or denied those claims.

Deif dispatched two recordings in recent years, using a silhouette dark image. Years later, he emerged masked while standing on his feet.



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
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Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.