Mohammed Deif, the Voice of War

An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)
An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)
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Mohammed Deif, the Voice of War

An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)
An old photo of Mohammed Deif (AFP)

In a clear, loud, direct voice and a shadowy image, the commander of Hamas' al-Qassam Brigades, Mohammed "Abu Khaled" Deif, announced the start of "al-Aqsa Flood" operation against Israel, putting it under fire for several hours.

Israel has not experienced a similar situation since the Egyptian crossing in 1973, with rockets falling on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem after al-Qassam fighters took control over several Israeli settlements and sites.

Hamas members set out and took control of Israeli sites, killing Israelis and taking others hostages, following the orders of Deif, who proved once again that he had the highest Palestinian say in launching or ending a war.

Who is Deif?

No one knows Deif except his family and a small group of Hamas members. Most of them do not know the whereabouts of the man Israel has been pursuing for decades as No. 1 wanted individual.

Currently, there are three pictures of Deif: a very old one, another of him masked, and an image of his shadow.

Even Israel, which boasts that it has the most powerful intelligence in the world, does not have a recent picture of the commander.

In January 2011, Deif's mother died. All Hamas leaders attended the funeral except for him. It is unknown whether he attended, as some say he was there, while others claim he didn't show up for security reasons. Some also claim he was at the burial disguised as an older man.

He is described as intelligent, quick-witted, and does not like appearing in public. He does not use technology and rarely broadcasts audio messages, only to announce the beginning of a new battle with Israel.

Deif has not appeared in public places for nearly three decades, or as those asked by Asharq Al-Awsat in Gaza say: "If we had looked at him, we would not have known him."

Deif's high sense of security may explain how Israel has been incapable of finding him.

The commander has been wanted by Israel since the mid-nineties when former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres asked Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to arrest him before Arafat expressed his surprise at the name as if he did not know him.

Peres later admitted that he discovered that Arafat was protecting him, hiding him, and lying about him.

Israel tried to kill him more than once and wounded him twice.

Mohamed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri, dubbed Deif, was born in 1965 to a Palestinian refugee family from al-Qubeiba and settled in the Khan Yunis camp in the southern Gaza Strip.

Deif grew up in a very low-income family and was forced to leave school temporarily to support his family. He worked with his father in spinning and upholstery, then established a small poultry farm and worked as a driver.

The commander's friends in his neighborhood say he was gentle, had a good sense of humor, and a good heart.

Deif joined the Hamas movement at the end of 1987. He returned to school and received his education at the Islamic University of Gaza, where he graduated in 1988 after obtaining a bachelor's degree in science.

During this time, Deif created the Islamic theater group al-Ayedun, as he is known for his passion for acting. He played several theatrical roles, including historical figures.

Deif was responsible for the technical committee during his Islamic University Student Council activity.

Israel arrested him in 1989, and he spent 16 months in prison without trial on charges of working in the movement's military apparatus.

After his release, Deif and other figures began establishing al-Qassam Brigades.

During the 1990s, he supervised and participated in countless operations against Israel.

The Palestinian Authority arrested him in May 2000 at the request of Israel. He had a good relationship with the Authority, and his arrest was part of the understanding.

In 2002, he assumed command of al-Qassam after the assassination of its commander-in-chief, Salah Shehadeh.

In 2001, Israel first attempted to assassinate Deif. A second attempt was made a year later when an Apache helicopter fired two missiles at his vehicle, wounding him. Hamas leader and doctor Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi treated him at an undisclosed location.

In 2003, an Israeli plane attempted to assassinate Deif and some Hamas leaders in a house in Gaza. But the missile hit the wrong floor.

Three years later, a high-explosive missile hit a house where he met with Al-Qassam leaders. Once again, Deif survived, but Israel said he was seriously injured.

Israeli officials believe Deif can't walk and has lost one of his eyes. But Hamas has not confirmed or denied those claims.

Deif dispatched two recordings in recent years, using a silhouette dark image. Years later, he emerged masked while standing on his feet.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.