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12 Years After Gaddafi’s Death, What Do We Know about His Family?

An archive photo of Gadhafi, his wife Safiya and his sons Saif Al-Arab, Khamis and Al-Muatasem (Getty images)
An archive photo of Gadhafi, his wife Safiya and his sons Saif Al-Arab, Khamis and Al-Muatasem (Getty images)
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12 Years After Gaddafi’s Death, What Do We Know about His Family?

An archive photo of Gadhafi, his wife Safiya and his sons Saif Al-Arab, Khamis and Al-Muatasem (Getty images)
An archive photo of Gadhafi, his wife Safiya and his sons Saif Al-Arab, Khamis and Al-Muatasem (Getty images)

What happened to the family of the man, who ruled Libya with an iron fist for more than four consecutive decades? During the 12 years that followed the overthrow of the regime of the late President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, his family did not meet even once, and his seven children were separated, either by death, or imprisonment, or voluntary exile.

Three of Gaddafi’s sons, namely Al-Muatasem, Saif Al-Arab and Khamis, were killed during the “uprising” that toppled the rule, while two other, Saif Al-Islam and Al-Saadi, were put on trial, before they received pardon from the Libyan authorities. The latter left for Türkiye, according to some reports.

Between pursuit and arrest

Khamis Gaddafi, who was commanding the 32nd Brigade in the city of Zliten, was killed during a NATO air strike in August 2011. Earlier the same year, a similar attack led to the death of Saif al-Arab, Gaddafi’s youngest son, after his house in Tripoli’s upscale Gharghur neighborhood was targeted. He was 29 years-old.

Contrary to his siblings, Saif al-Arab did not assume any leadership role, distanced himself from politics and avoided appearing in public events.

Muatasem, the fourth son of Gaddafi, who worked as a Libyan National Security Advisor, was killed along with his father, in the city of Sirte.

Gaddafi’s daughter, Aisha, disappeared from sight along with her brother Muhammad, the late Libyan leader’s eldest son from his first wife. They are reportedly residing in the Sultanate of Oman. Last week, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee agreed to remove Aisha’s name from the travel ban lists, while keeping her on the asset freeze sanctions lists.

Gaddafi’s widow, Safiya Ferkash, currently lives in Cairo. Last year, she appealed a decision by a Malta court ordering the Bank of Valletta to return to Libya some 95 million euros ($100 million) deposited by Gaddafi’s late son Muatassem.

Ferkash and her lawyers said in their appeal that the courts lacked jurisdiction and could not decide the case over the funds.

As for Hannibal Gaddafi, he fled Libya to Syria, where he was kidnapped and transferred to a prison cell in Lebanon. Several campaigns and diplomatic efforts have so far failed to secure his release.

Saif al-Islam and the dream of returning to power

Saif al-Islam, the second son of Gaddafi, is the only family member who is still seeking to return to power. He reportedly moves between the cities of the southern region of Libya, hoping that the circumstances will allow him to run in the elections. His brother, Al-Saadi, currently lives in Türkiye and has no declared political activity.

Saif al-Islam was arrested in November 2011 by an armed brigade, while he was trying to flee outside Libya towards Niger. A Libyan court in Tripoli issued a death sentence against him in absentia, after accusing him of “suppressing the Libyan revolution.” Amnesty International had previously called on the Libyan authorities to hand over Saif al-Islam and former intelligence director Abdullah al-Senussi to the International Criminal Court, on charges of “committing crimes against humanity.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Khaled Al-Zaidi, Saif Al-Islam’s attorney, said that the man’s “chances are great” in the upcoming presidential elections.

Saif al-Islam has spent the past 12 years in self-imposed exile inside the country. He has not spoken to Libyans directly since his last controversial speech, which he delivered during the NATO-backed “revolution” in February 2011. However, Al-Zaidi confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that his client will address the people directly when the final lists for the presidential elections are announced.

“In this case, he will go out and speak... When his electoral candidacy is accepted, he will go out to the Libyans and talk about the future of the country... Choosing the right timing is important,” he stated.

Although those close to Saif al-Islam claim that he enjoys complete freedom of movement, he has never been seen in the eastern and western regions.

Al-Zaidi said in this regard: “He has contacts with all the leaders,” pointing out that his client was based in Libya, not just the south.

The lawyer also rejects the reports that claimed that Saif al-Islam’s candidacy for the elections was a collective decision by the family.

He explained: “Talk about the family’s mandate is incorrect. It is not the family’s decision... This is the people’s choice.”

Hannibal Gaddafi

According to observers, Saif al-Islam is also working for the release of his younger brother, Hannibal, who is currently detained in Lebanon.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, Saif’s lawyer submitted a request to the Syrian Public Prosecutor to reopen the investigation into the kidnapping of Hannibal from Syrian territory, and his subsequent transfer to Lebanon.

Al-Zaidi explained to Asharq Al-Awsat that he recently visited Syria and filed a complaint against Hassan Yaqoub, who is accused of kidnapping Hannibal from the country in 2018, on the grounds that he is a “political refugee and was under the protection of the Syrian authorities.”

In this regard, he said: “He was kidnapped in Syria, and transferred against his will and by all means of torture to Lebanon.”

In his complaint over what he described as crimes of kidnapping, torture, and the forced disappearance of Hannibal Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam - represented by his lawyer - said that armed elements affiliated with Hassan Mohammad Yaqoub, a former Lebanese deputy, abducted Hannibal inside Syrian territory on December 11, 2015.

He also pointed to “torture, violence, and death threats against him,” citing a video showing mutilation and bruises on his face and body.

The 12-page lawsuit, a copy of which was obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, called on the Syrian Attorney General to intervene urgently and address all concerned parties in order to release Hannibal, who was “arbitrarily” detained by the Lebanese state authorities, and to hold Lebanon legally responsible for his personal safety.

In a press conference held last August, on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the absence of Imam Musa al-Sadr, Yaqoub accused Gaddafi and his supporters of being involved “in the kidnapping of his father.”

Yaqoub’s father is Sheikh Muhammad Yaqoub, one of Imam Musa al-Sadr's companions, who was last seen in Libya on August 31, 1978, after he arrived there by official invitation. The former deputy did not respond to Asharq Al-Awsat’s attempt to contact him.

According to Bassam Mawlawi, the Lebanese Minister of the Interior, Hannibal received medical care in a hospital in Lebanon after he went on a hunger strike to protest his imprisonment.

Hannibal had always caused trouble during his father’s rule. In 2008, he stirred a diplomatic crisis, which led to Libya’s severance of relations with Switzerland, after being accused and his wife, Aline, of ill-treating a Tunisian maid and a Moroccan servant during their stay in Geneva.

Al-Saadi, the football player

When the Libyan House of Representatives approved presidential and national Assembly election laws, Al-Saadi Gaddafi said on X that Libya “is now in the right direction... This is a promising beginning.”

The report of the Committee of Experts for the year 2023 showed a copy of a power of attorney signed by Al-Saadi for one of his assistants, regarding an apartment he owns in Canada, and revealing his current residence in the Turkish city of Istanbul.

Al-Saadi, who was a professional football player in the Libyan and Italian teams, during his father’s rule, also worked as a Special Forces commander. He was acquitted in 2018 of the charge of killing former football coach Bashir Al-Rayani, a case that emerged before his father’s regime was overthrown in 2011.

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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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100 Days of Al-Sharaa's Presidency: Syria’s Gains and Losses

Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrians watch Ahmed al-Sharaa's speech at al-Rawda Café in Damascus (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 sparked a wave of hope for a brighter future in Syria. But 100 days into the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies, the political assessment of the new leadership remains mixed.

Before diving into the performance of the new authorities, it's important to recognize the scale of the challenges facing Syria. The country is deeply fragmented—politically and regionally—still grappling with foreign influence and various forms of external occupation. The economic toll is staggering.

Reconstruction is estimated to cost between $250 billion and $400 billion, and more than half the population remains displaced inside and outside the country. According to the United Nations, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and 16.7 million people—roughly three out of four—depend on humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, any political actor stepping in after Assad faces an uphill battle.

Yet, the new administration has managed to score some diplomatic wins. Despite its controversial background, the al-Sharaa-led government has succeeded in easing some international concerns and opening lines of communication with key regional and global players.

Several governments have formally recognized the new authority and begun to engage with it. The European Union and the United Kingdom have notably suspended sanctions on selected sectors and entities. France, once a vocal critic of Damascus, recently welcomed al-Sharaa to Paris.

However, Washington has yet to outline a coherent Syria policy under President Donald Trump. While the US has not objected to the Biden administration’s January 2025 move to ease restrictions on Syria’s energy and financial sectors, the broader sanctions remain in place.

Still, the first 100 days under the new leadership offer, at best, cautious optimism. The fundamental questions lie in the administration’s broader political and economic orientation, as well as its vision for Syria’s fractured society. There is no guarantee yet that the country is on a path toward long-term stability.

State Institutions, Security Forces

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership—dominated by former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—moved swiftly to consolidate control over state institutions and security bodies during the transitional phase.

Following the regime’s collapse, an interim government was formed in December 2024, composed almost entirely of HTS members or close affiliates. The caretaker administration held power until a new cabinet was installed at the end of March 2025.

Al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, has since appointed new ministers, governors, and security officials—many of whom have ties to HTS or allied armed factions. In a sweeping overhaul of the country’s military and intelligence apparatus, the new authorities established a Syrian army under their command.

Senior leadership positions were handed to HTS veterans, including long-time commander Marhaf Abu Qusra, who was promoted to general and named defense minister.

Beyond the security sphere, the leadership has moved to entrench its influence over Syria’s economic and social sectors. Key appointments have been made across professional syndicates, chambers of commerce, and civil society organizations—often bypassing elections and installing loyalists from within HTS's inner circle.

The moves suggest a systematic effort to centralize power and reshape Syria’s state apparatus under the new order, raising questions about the future of pluralism and institutional independence.

The absence of a comprehensive democratic process has cast a shadow over Syria’s early post-Assad transition, undermining key initiatives meant to lay the foundation for the country’s future—including the much-anticipated Syrian National Dialogue Conference.

Critics say the conference, billed as a cornerstone for participatory dialogue, was marred by poor planning, limited representation, and rushed sessions that left little room for meaningful debate. Political and civil society actors voiced frustration at being sidelined, warning that the process risked entrenching exclusion rather than fostering unity.

Similar concerns were raised over the interim constitution signed by al-Sharaa. The charter faced sharp criticism over the opaque selection of its drafting committee and the lack of public consultation.

New authorities established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs in late March under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Tasked with overseeing political events and activities, the secretariat is also responsible for shaping national policy strategies and coordinating their implementation. One of its more controversial roles includes repurposing the assets and structures of the defunct Baath Party and former National Progressive Front coalition.

The creation of the body signals an effort by the al-Sharaa administration to centralize political planning and regain control over the ideological tools once wielded by the Assad regime—this time under a new banner.

Neoliberal Agenda for the Economy

Syria’s new leadership has also quietly adopted a sweeping neoliberal economic model—without public consultation or parliamentary debate—signaling a long-term shift in the country’s economic trajectory, despite the government's interim mandate.

Since taking power, the al-Sharaa administration has rolled out policies that go beyond the scope of a transitional government. The economic vision, rooted in privatization, market liberalization, and austerity, has drawn sharp criticism for deepening inequality and placing additional strain on already struggling Syrians.

Key state assets are being sold off to the private sector, subsidies for bread and household gas have been slashed, and spending cuts have hit essential public services—measures that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Analysts say the policies largely benefit Syria’s emerging economic elite and business networks aligned with the new ruling class.

In a controversial move, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade announced the dismissal of nearly one-third of the public-sector workforce.

Officials claimed the cuts targeted employees who were “receiving salaries without performing any actual duties.”

No official figures have been released on the total number affected, but some workers were placed on paid leave for three months pending further evaluation of their employment status.

The decision sparked a wave of protests from laid-off and suspended workers in cities across the country, highlighting growing discontent with the government’s top-down reforms and raising questions about the social cost of its economic overhaul.

Since the start of the year, the al-Sharaa administration has repeatedly pledged to raise public sector wages by 400%, setting a new minimum salary at 1,123,560 Syrian pounds—roughly $86.

While welcomed in principle, the measure remains unimplemented and falls far short of meeting basic living needs. By the end of March 2025, the minimum monthly expenses for a family of five in Damascus were estimated at 8 million pounds, or about $666.

Meanwhile, the government’s decision to reduce tariffs on more than 260 Turkish products has triggered backlash from local producers, particularly in the struggling industrial and agricultural sectors.

Critics say the move has undercut domestic output and opened the floodgates to cheaper Turkish imports. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, Turkish exports to Syria rose by 31.2% in the first quarter of 2025, reaching $508 million, up from $387 million in the same period last year.

Political Fragmentation and Rising Sectarian Tensions

The new government has also made little headway in addressing Syria’s deep political and social fractures.

Efforts to build bridges with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast and to engage Druze communities in the southern province of Sweida have largely faltered, facing both logistical hurdles and grassroots resistance.

Recent protests in Sweida, sparked by opposition to the interim constitution and broader government policies, highlight the growing public unrest.

The surge in violence along Syria’s coastal regions, where hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, has further inflamed sectarian tensions and raised alarms over the country’s fragile stability.

While the latest wave of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was initially triggered by remnants of the former Assad regime targeting civilians and security personnel, rights monitors say the government’s response has fueled further sectarian division.

Under the pretext of rooting out so-called regime “holdouts,” retaliatory violence has escalated, often blurring the line between former loyalists and the broader Alawite community.

Analysts warn that this narrative risks fostering collective blame and deepening intercommunal resentment.

Despite efforts by the al-Sharaa administration to de-escalate tensions, it has largely failed to prevent the violence from spiraling. Clashes and reprisals have continued, particularly affecting Alawite-populated areas, where community members have accused security forces of indiscriminate crackdowns.

Authorities in Damascus have described the incidents as isolated and attributed them to “undisciplined elements,” but critics say the lack of accountability and failure to investigate abuses have only emboldened perpetrators.

Despite pledges to usher in a new era of accountability, the al-Sharaa administration has failed to establish a comprehensive process to prosecute individuals and groups involved in war crimes committed over the past decade.

Rights advocates say such a mechanism could have helped prevent the current wave of retaliatory violence and sectarian polarization, but political observers argue that meaningful justice would likely expose actors the new leadership is reluctant to confront.

Regional Powers Stir the Pot

Amid the internal fragmentation, external actors—most notably Iran, Israel—have sought to exploit the country’s ethnic and sectarian divisions to serve their strategic interests.

Israeli officials have stepped up rhetoric in recent weeks, signaling a willingness to intervene militarily under the pretext of “protecting” Syria’s Druze minority. While the move is seen by many as an attempt to extend Tel Aviv’s influence in southern Syria, key Druze political and social leaders have largely rejected such overtures, reaffirming their national identity and support for Syria’s territorial unity.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to entrench its presence in areas vacated by Assad’s forces, drawing criticism from opposition groups who accuse Iran of exacerbating sectarian fault lines to solidify its influence.

Despite a power-sharing agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Turkish military operations have persisted in the northeast, targeting Kurdish-controlled territories in apparent defiance of diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region.

Finally, what began in December 2024 with widespread optimism is now clouded by political ambiguity, social unrest, and a lack of clear direction—casting doubt on whether Syria’s post-Assad era can deliver the change many had hoped for.