How the US Strikes a Delicate Balance in Responding to Attacks on Its Forces by Iran-Backed Militias

This image from video provided by the Department of Defense shows a Nov. 8, 2023, airstrike on a weapons warehouse. center, in eastern Syria. (Department of Defense via AP)
This image from video provided by the Department of Defense shows a Nov. 8, 2023, airstrike on a weapons warehouse. center, in eastern Syria. (Department of Defense via AP)
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How the US Strikes a Delicate Balance in Responding to Attacks on Its Forces by Iran-Backed Militias

This image from video provided by the Department of Defense shows a Nov. 8, 2023, airstrike on a weapons warehouse. center, in eastern Syria. (Department of Defense via AP)
This image from video provided by the Department of Defense shows a Nov. 8, 2023, airstrike on a weapons warehouse. center, in eastern Syria. (Department of Defense via AP)

Iranian-backed militants in Iraq and Syria have long battled with US and coalition forces, launching sporadic attacks against bases in the region where troops are deployed to fight ISIS group insurgents.

But since Oct. 17, as civilian deaths in Israel's war against Hamas began to skyrocket, there has been a dramatic spike in attacks by Iran's proxies, operating under the umbrella name of the “Islamic Resistance” in Iraq.

While most of the more than five dozen attacks have been largely ineffective, at least 60 US personnel have reported minor injuries. Most often those have been traumatic brain injuries from the explosions, and all troops have returned to duty, according to the Pentagon.

In response to the attacks, the US has walked a delicate line. The US military has struck back just three times as the Biden administration balances efforts to deter the militants without triggering a broader Middle East conflict.

A look at the attacks and the US response:

ATTACKS — WHEN, WHERE, WHY

According to the Pentagon, Iranian-backed militants have launched 61 attacks on bases and facilities housing US personnel in Iraq and Syria since Oct. 17. Of those, 29 have been in Iraq and 32 in Syria.

The US has about 2,000 US forces in Iraq, under an agreement with the Baghdad government, and about 900 in Syria, mainly to counter IS but also using the al-Tanf garrison farther south to keep tabs on Iranian proxies moving weapons across the border.

The latest jump in attacks began 10 days after Hamas' Oct. 7 incursion into Israel, where at least 1,200 people were killed. Israel’s blistering military response has killed thousands of civilians trapped in Gaza and fueled threats of retaliation by a range of Iran-backed groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Yemen-based Houthis, and militants in Iraq and Syria.

Those threats escalated after an Oct. 17 blast at a Gaza hospital killed hundreds of civilians. Hamas blamed Israel for the explosion, but Israel has denied it, and both Israeli and US officials have blamed it on a missile misfire by Islamic Jihad.

The bulk of the attacks on bases and facilities have been with one-way suicide drones or rockets, and in most cases, there were no injuries and only minor damage. A significant number of the injuries, particularly the traumatic brain injuries, were in the initial attacks between Oct. 17 and 21 at al-Asad air base in Iraq and al-Tanf. One US contractor suffered a cardiac arrest and died while seeking shelter from a possible drone attack.

WHO ARE THESE GROUPS?

With a power vacuum and years of civil conflict following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, militias grew and multiplied in Iraq, some supported by Iran. A decade later, as the ISIS extremist group swept across Iraq, a number of Iran-backed militias came together under the Popular Mobilization Forces umbrella group and fought ISIS.

The groups included the Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Brigades and Kataeb Hezbollah, or Hezbollah Brigades — a separate group from the Lebanese Hezbollah. A number of the Iraqi militias also operate in Syria, where Iran supports the government of Bashar al-Assad against opposition groups in the uprising-turned-war that began in 2011.

After the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, a group of the Iran-backed factions branded itself under the new “Islamic Resistance” in Iraq name, and began the latest spate of attacks on bases housing US forces in Iraq and Syria.

The attacks put Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in a difficult position. While he came to power with the Iranian-backed groups' support, he also wants continued good relations with the US and has backed the ongoing presence of American troops in his country.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a meeting with al-Sudani this month, warned of consequences if Iranian-backed militias continued to attack US facilities in Iraq and Syria. Sudani then traveled to Tehran and met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a meeting US officials suggested was a positive development.

An official with one of the Iranian-backed militias said Sudani put “great pressure” on the militias not to carry out attacks during Blinken's visit. In return, he said, Sudani promised to push the Americans not to retaliate aggressively against militias that have carried out the strikes. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment publicly.

PROPORTIONAL OR NOT ENOUGH?

Since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, the Biden administration has moved warships, fighter jets, air defense systems and more troops into the Middle East in a campaign to discourage militant groups from widening the conflict.

But the US military response to the attacks on its forces has been minimal. On Oct. 27, US fighter jets struck two weapons and ammunition storage sites in eastern Syria near al-Boukamal that were used by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iranian-backed groups. On Nov. 8, fighter jets dropped bombs on an IRGC weapons storage facility near Maysulun in Deir Ezzor. And on Nov. 12, US airstrikes targeted a training facility and a safe house in the Bulbul district of Mayadin. US officials said IRGC-related personnel were there and likely struck, but provided no details.

There are concerns within the administration that more substantial retaliation could escalate the violence and trigger more deadly attacks. The Pentagon says the strikes have degraded the group's military stockpiles and made the sites unusable.

But critics argue that the US response pales in comparison with the 60 attacks and American injuries, and — more importantly — has obviously failed to deter the groups.

IRAQ GOVERNMENT SENSITIVITIES

Though nearly half of the attacks have been on US bases in Iraq, the US has conducted retaliatory airstrikes only against locations in Syria.

The Pentagon defends the strike decisions by saying the US is hitting Iranian Revolutionary Guard sites, which has a more direct impact on Tehran. Officials say the goal is to pressure Iran to tell the militia groups to stop the attacks. They also say the sites are chosen because they are weapons warehouses and logistical hubs used by the Iran-linked militias, and taking them out erodes the insurgents' attack capabilities.

A key reason the US is concentrating on Syria, however, is that the US doesn't want to risk alienating the Iraqi government by striking within its borders — potentially killing or wounding Iraqis.

In early January 2020, the US launched an airstrike in Baghdad, killing Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s elite Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iran-backed militias in Iraq. The strike frayed relations with the Iraqi government and spawned demands for the withdrawal of all US forces from the country.

The US considers its presence in Iraq as critical to the fight against ISIS, its ability to support forces in Syria and its ongoing influence in the region. Military leaders have worked to restore good relations with Baghdad, including providing ongoing support for Iraqi forces.



Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
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Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
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Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.


In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
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In War‑Scarred Gaza, Brides Turn to Refurbished Wedding Dresses

 Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)
Palestinians attend a mass wedding for 50 couples organized by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation in Gaza City, May 11, 2026. (Reuters)

In a small sewing workshop in southern Gaza, Nisreen Al-Rantisi pulls fabric from a pile and reshapes worn wedding dresses, trying to keep a fading tradition alive amid war and soaring costs.

Families said they have been struggling to find new wedding dresses and many search instead for places that refurbish gowns and other kinds of clothes for their children.

Importers cite delays, high shipping costs, and restrictions on materials, such as the crystals encrusted into the elaborate wedding dresses, as key factors behind the shortages ‌and price hikes.

Many workshops ‌have also been damaged during the conflict.

“We try ‌to ⁠reuse the old ⁠gowns that we have, produce them by fixing them a bit, work on them, wash them, arrange them, shape them,” said Rantisi, adding that work initially relied on a bicycle-powered sewing machine due to electricity shortages.

Rantisi said she used to buy the fabric for about 120 to 150 shekels ($41 to $51) before the war, but now pays around 500 shekels ($171).

“This has caused a big rise ⁠in the cost of bridal dresses and children’s gowns. We ‌are living in a vicious circle ‌from the war that affected us,” she added.

COGAT, the Israeli military agency that controls ‌access to Gaza, did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Most ‌of Gaza's more than 2 million people have been displaced, many now living in bombed-out homes and makeshift tents pitched on open ground, roadsides, or atop the ruins of destroyed buildings after two years of war with Israel.

HIGH PRICES BEYOND REACH ‌FOR MOST IN GAZA

Despite the hardships, some couples still find ways to celebrate, with mass weddings held in ⁠Gaza offering a ⁠rare moment of joy amid the devastation.

Shop workers say the war has driven prices beyond reach.

“Before the war, prices were reasonable for everyone,” said Rawan Shalouf, an employee at a bridal shop.

“But now, given the circumstances we’re in, the price of a dress is ridiculous.”

Across Gaza, brides and families are struggling to afford even basic wedding needs. Shahed Fayez, 21, is due to marry in about four days but has been searching in vain for a dress.

“I don’t care about its style, what’s important is that it's new,” she added.

“The cheapest dress is $1,000 or more, that's the minimum, and all we have is less than $200. The entire dowry does not cover the price of a dress.”