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Does Open Confrontation between Washington, Armed Factions Embarrass Iraqi Diplomacy?

US Marines inspect a homemade rocket launcher that was found in the desert near a military base in western Iraq (File- Reuters)
US Marines inspect a homemade rocket launcher that was found in the desert near a military base in western Iraq (File- Reuters)
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Does Open Confrontation between Washington, Armed Factions Embarrass Iraqi Diplomacy?

US Marines inspect a homemade rocket launcher that was found in the desert near a military base in western Iraq (File- Reuters)
US Marines inspect a homemade rocket launcher that was found in the desert near a military base in western Iraq (File- Reuters)

Iraq’s official statement condemning the recent US bombing of a number of armed faction bases west and southwest of Baghdad did not rise to the level of an official protest, according to Iraqi parties that are opposed to the US presence in the country.

The Iraqi government’s statement was carefully written, using diplomatic rhetoric, which gave the impression that the Iraqi government was walking a tightrope between the United States on the one hand and the pro-Iranian armed factions on the other.

While Iraq repeatedly reiterated its need for the US-led international coalition, in addition to its adherence to the strategic framework agreement signed between Baghdad and Washington in 2009, it cannot allow further escalation with these factions for emotional reasons related to the war in Gaza.

“We vehemently condemn the attack on Jurf al-Nasr, executed without the knowledge of Iraqi government agencies. This action is a blatant violation of sovereignty and an attempt to destabilize the security situation,” Basem al-Awadi, spokesperson for the Iraqi government, said in the statement.

Stressing that the attack was carried out without the knowledge of the Iraqi government seemed to be a message of protest to Washington regarding its lack of coordination, despite the strategic framework agreement between the two countries. It also appeared to be a message of reassurance to the armed factions that the government had not given Washington the green light in any way.

Moreover, the government statement reiterated its need for the international coalition, saying that the presence of the international forces in Iraq supported “the work of our armed forces through training, rehabilitation, and counseling.”
“The recent incident represents a clear violation of the coalition’s mission to combat ISIS on Iraqi soil,” the statement added.

Meanwhile, remarks issued by several Iraqi Shiite leaders ranged between a severe tone and repeated calls for the government to implement the Parliament’s decision issued in 2020, pertaining to the removal of American forces from the country.

Hadi Al-Amiri, the leader of the Al-Fatah Alliance, and Qais Al-Khazali, the head of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, called for the expulsion of the US forces, while the leader of the State of Law coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, condemned the US attacks but left some space for diplomatic action.
“The Iraqi government is committed to protecting diplomatic missions,” he said in a statement.

During a meeting with US Ambassador Helena Romanski, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein did not deliver a diplomatic letter of protest. This was seen by many Iraqi parties that even if Baghdad condemned the attacks, its diplomatic tone did not reach the level of official protest.

In this regard, experts and political analysts question whether Baghdad’s balanced tone would help maintain the rules of engagement between the armed factions and the United States within acceptable limits without reaching the bone-breaking stage.
Such an escalation would constitute a great embarrassment to the Iraqi government, in the event the factions bomb the US embassy or the United States directly targets some of the leaders of these groups. Then, the scene will change, so will the rules of engagement.

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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.