Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.



Jenin Camp: A War on People, Not Just Gunmen

Israeli army drops leaflets over Jenin refugee camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Israeli army drops leaflets over Jenin refugee camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Jenin Camp: A War on People, Not Just Gunmen

Israeli army drops leaflets over Jenin refugee camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Israeli army drops leaflets over Jenin refugee camp (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Mahmoud Al-Rakh hesitated before setting foot in the Jenin refugee camp where he was born and raised—now reduced to rubble and a death trap by Israeli forces.

After much deliberation, he finally mustered the courage to enter, slipping in under the cover of a group of journalists who, after lengthy discussions, had also decided to venture inside. They all knew the risks: gunfire, injury, arrest, or even death.

The road leading from Jenin’s famous Cinema Roundabout to the camp’s entrance offered a grim preview of what lay ahead. Near the government hospital at the street’s end, heavily armed Israeli soldiers had turned the camp’s main entrance into a military outpost.

But local residents, camp youths, and journalists advised that there was another way in—through the back of the hospital. What they found inside was nothing short of shocking.

There was no one in Jenin. No authorities, no residents, no fighters. As the saying goes, you could hear a pin drop.

Only Israeli soldiers remained, standing amid the vast rubble—silent witnesses to a history of resilience, battles, lives, and untold stories. They lurked in wait, and it seemed their ultimate vision was to erase Palestinian presence and claim the place as their own.

In the distance, visitors can spot signs planted by Israeli soldiers, bearing Hebrew names like “Yair Axis”—a desperate attempt to impose new identities on the land.

Israel’s campaign was not merely a fight against armed militants. It was a war on the land, the people, history, the present, and even the Palestinian narrative.

Israel’s military assault on the Jenin refugee camp, launched on January 21, marked the beginning of an expanded campaign across the West Bank after officially designating it a war zone.

Dubbed operation “Iron Wall,” the assault signaled a shift in Israel’s approach, drawing clear parallels to its 2002 operation during the Second Intifada, when it swept through the entire West Bank.

The latest offensive began with drone strikes targeting infrastructure in Jenin, followed by a large-scale ground invasion involving special forces, Shin Bet operatives, and military police. Aerial bombardments continued throughout the operation.

Twenty-five days later, Israel had killed 26 Palestinians, wounded dozens, and forcibly displaced all 20,000 residents—every single one.

Asharq Al-Awsat asked journalist Ahmed Al-Shawish about what the Israelis are doing inside the camp now.

He replied that Israeli forces were setting up permanent military outposts in areas inaccessible to us—a confirmation of the defense minister’s earlier statement that they had no plans to withdraw.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally announced the operation, saying it had been approved by the security cabinet as “another step toward achieving our goal: strengthening security in the West Bank.”

He added: “We are systematically and decisively acting against Iran’s axis—whether in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or the West Bank.”

The decision to attack Jenin had already been made; the timing was the only question.

Israeli leaders waited for the Gaza ceasefire to take hold, then shifted focus to the West Bank three days later.

Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar had advised the security cabinet that broader measures were needed to reshape the situation and eliminate militant groups in the West Bank.

He warned against complacency, arguing that the recent drop in attacks was “misleading and deceptive” and did not reflect the true scale of what he called “the growing terrorist threat on the ground.”