Ghassan Salameh to Asharq Al-Awsat: Elements for Resolving Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Unavailable Yet

Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.
Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.
TT

Ghassan Salameh to Asharq Al-Awsat: Elements for Resolving Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Unavailable Yet

Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.
Ghassan Salameh speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat in Paris.

At the end of every year, we always pause to assess the developments that took place over the past months and what impact they will have on the coming year. Asharq Al-Awsat sat down with Lebanese former minister Ghassan Salameh in Paris to review 2023 and discuss what 2024 has in store. 

Sitting down with Salameh, who had worked with the United Nations in Iraq, Libya and Myanmar, is an enriching experience in itself given his extensive experience and long career. Asharq Al-Awsat sat with him for an in-depth assessment of the situation in the region and the world. 

Quick glance at 2023 

What are the key moments that stood out for you in 2023? 

The year 2023 was a lot more positive on the economic level than was predicted in 2022, which was very negative. We witnessed China’s return to the global market and weak growth in western countries as the world combated rising inflation. 

The war on Ukraine continued unabated in 2023. Ukraine launched its counteroffensive against Russia in Donbas, and it ended in failure. Ukraine has only really reclaimed few of its territories. This has weakened the position of the Ukrainian president, who is staring down the barrel of a gun, so to speak. 

Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeded in crushing the revolt by the Wagner chief, who had taken everyone by surprise. Two months later, he was killed in a plane accident. Putin continues to bank on time, which he believes is in his favor. Russia has the capabilities to secure the needs of its army, while Ukraine can only rely on foreign assistance in providing it with gear and weapons. 

Turning to Africa, 2023 witnessed the return of military coups that took place in eight of its countries. So, democracy in Africa is on the decline. Another development is the expulsion of French forces from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and others. So, France’s influence there is also on the decline. 

The world is meanwhile bracing for elections in over 60 countries, including the United States, India, South Africa and others. The European Union will be voting for a new European parliament. All of this will impact foreign policies as they become intertwined with electoral interests. 

Diseases of Arab countries 

Varied and numerous crises are sweeping the region, from Lebanon to Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia and Sudan. Is there a common factor that is leading to this turmoil and is there a solution to it? 

There are several common factors to these crises, but each country also has its own unique elements. One of the common elements is the massive population growth that took place in these countries in the 20th century. The rise dipped slightly in the 21st century. The generation produced by the population explosion is now in its 20s and 30s and they are struggling to find jobs. 

We are primarily paying the price for this population explosion. The unemployed youth, who have earned their education at universities, have grown frustrated with the lack of opportunities. 

This is the general sentiment across the Arab world, from Morocco to Iraq. Another factor that has fueled the crises are the so-called Arab Spring revolts that had an impact on nearly half of the Arab world, including Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and others, and had brought with them hopes for change. The hopes were dashed, and the revolts were a failure. Perhaps those hopes were never real in the first place. 

The youths in particular had high hopes that change was possible. Regimes that they sought to change replaced the hope they clung onto. These regimes are even more controlling than the ones toppled by the Arab Spring. Civil wars were also another product of these failed revolts, and they continue to rage to this day in Yemen and Syria. 

Fate of ‘Lebanese formula’ 

Let’s turn to Lebanon, which is racking up one crisis after another, from financial, constitutional, institutional, social, political and the list goes on. I have a radical question: Are the successive crises a sign that the so-called “Lebanese formula” is no longer viable? Can there be a replacement? 

My reply won’t be any less radical. Circumstances would have it that I played a modest role in drafting the Taif Accord. I worked alongside the Arab committee that was seeking to resolve the Lebanese civil war in 1989. I want to stress that it never occurred to us at the time that we were working on reaching the best constitutional model suitable for Lebanon. We were only seeking an end to war, an end to the severe shelling, destruction and death. In short, we were seeking a transitional formula that would end the war. 

So, I see this unshakable attachment to the Taif as misguided. We had hoped that post-war Lebanon would embark on a period of peace, stability and prosperity that would allow its people to come up with the system that they were hoping for. It is necessary to address this issue because some officials have turned the Taif Accord into some sort of holy book. It is not holy. It is beneficial and it was beneficial back then. I was proud to have been part of drafting it. 

A second point: A country that needs a year, or two or three to elect a president every time the post is vacant; or needs months and months to form a government; and then needs months and months to reach an agreement on extending the term of the army commander and naming an employee as head of the Central Bank are all signs that this country is suffering from a system that does not work for it. 

The current system doesn’t favor the Lebanese people. This is my radical answer to your radical question. 

So, what’s the substitute? The challenge is finding the right time and circumstances to broach this issue. Lebanon needs a degree of internal stability and foreign support to change hearts and minds that would pave the way for a new system. These conditions are not available. But in the meantime, I am not opposed to temporary solutions, such as electing a president from among the candidates who are running, or forming a government with whatever is at hand. 

The new president and government’s priority must be restoring normal work at state institutions and then tackling the constitutional issue: Do they want a more decentralized system or more centralized one? The Taif Accord does speak of decentralization, but some parties fear that it would lead to the fragmentation of the state. 

Gaza war and two-state solution 

Turning to the war on Gaza. I have three questions: How can this conflict be resolved? Are powers being serious about again floating the two-state solution or are they deluding the Palestinians? Can we count on the Americans being serious about reaching a political solution? 

I will ask my own questions here: Are the Palestinians ready to play this historic role of forming a viable Palestinian state? My answer is no. Hamas is not accepted and the Palestinian Authority is incapable. So, we are now confronted with Palestinian vacuum. There is a need to turn to a new, credible and acceptable Palestinian party. 

On the other side of the divide, we need an Israeli party. At the moment, that party is unavailable. We have a very extremist government that is very openly against the two-state solution. This position is not voiced by extremist ministers, like Bezalel Smotrich, alone, but even by its prime minister. The war cabinet is also very extremist. 

A solution needs a mediator between the Israelis and Palestinians. The only mediator who can pressure Israel is the United States. It deployed aircraft carriers to deter Israel’s enemies and decided to add 14 billion dollars to the 4 billion it already pays Israel every year. It is also preventing the UN Security Council from voting on a resolution that enjoys the support of the remaining 14 members. So, Washington has the real means to pressure Israel that any other party, including Europe and China, do not. 

The problem, however, is that the mediator – the US – is missing. Why? Because US President Joe Biden, back from when he was a senator and throughout 40 years of his life, has completely sided with Israel’s interests. This did not change when he became president. Biden is a greater Israel supporter than any one of his aides. I am not saying this from mere observation, but from actual knowledge. 

Biden’s hands are tied because he is entering the final year of his first term in office and is engaged in an electoral battle. Some voices from among the youth are urging him to be less extreme in this conflict. On the other hand, he needs funding that may or will be provided from sources that urge him to continue this unyielding support for Israel. 

Given the above, the solution is out of reach. I fear that the war will spill over into the West Bank, where tensions are high and over 300 Palestinians have been killed. The war may also spread to southern Lebanon. Some officials in Israel are claiming that conditions are ripe to wage a war on Lebanon. 

More and more voices in Israel are calling for war on Lebanon, including defense minister Yoav Gallant. But in spite of their support for Israel’s war on Gaza, the Americans are opposed to opening a new front with Lebanon. Biden informed them of this during the first week of the conflict and again some two weeks ago when more threats were made against Lebanon. The danger here is that Israel doesn’t always abide by America’s wishes.  



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
TT

Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.