Scenarios in Iran in 2024: Regional Openness to Confront Sanctions

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)
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Scenarios in Iran in 2024: Regional Openness to Confront Sanctions

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei meets with members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership in February 2023. (Supreme leader’s website)

Iran is hoping to continue in 2024 its policy of improving relations with its neighbors and consolidating economic cooperation with regional countries and its allies in an effort to ease the impact of the American and European sanctions and keep its nuclear negotiations alive as the US presidential elections draw near.

Unless Joe Biden’s administration makes an offer that upends the equation, Tehran and Washington will likely continue to exchange messages through their channels without really achieving a diplomatic breakthrough over the nuclear deal until the winner of the elections is announced on November 5.

The new American administration will take office in January 2025 and soon after, Iran will be gearing up to hold presidential elections in spring. President Ebrahim Raisi is likely to run again given the support he enjoys from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran is expected to continue its uranium enrichment at high levels and its “catch and release” policy with the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent the file from being referred to the UN Security Council. The possibility that it may change course and head towards producing a nuclear weapon remains on the table if Iran decides to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and put the nuclear deal out of its misery.

The war on Gaza and its repercussions and the Russian-Ukrainian war will continue to impact Iran’s nuclear and diplomatic negotiations with the US and its western allies.

As it stands, the war on Gaza and conflict in Ukraine will help ease the pressure off Tehran when it comes to the nuclear file or even reining in the Revolutionary Guards’ development of ballistic missiles and drones or backing armed factions that are loyal to its ideology.

The strategy of teetering on the edge of a confrontation with the US and Israel, while exerting maximum pressure through armed groups will be at the top of Iran’s policies. So far, Tehran has steered clear of direct responsibility to avoid the consequences of the attacks on American forces or threats to marine navigation. Iran says it supports these groups, but claims they make their own decisions independently of it.

So, the nuclear file and economic sanctions will continue to dictate Iran’s foreign policy and internal balances.

Elections

Iran is set to hold parliamentary elections in March, marking one of the most important dates on its calendar. The elections will pit the Iranian street against their rulers some 529 days after the eruption of popular protests in wake of the death of Mahsa Amini.

The electoral campaign kicks off days after the 44th commemoration of the Iranian revolution. People will elect 290 lawmakers for a four-year term. Iran will also hold elections for the Assembly of Experts for Leadership. It is unclear how much the alliances of reformists and moderates or even conservative critics of the Iranian president will be able to change the balance of power in the parliament, including the ouster of its speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

The legislative elections are unlikely to lead to marked change in the political scene given the authorities’ insistence on unifying the directions of the government and parliament, with the decision-making powers that directly answer to Khamenei.

Khamenei and political powers are keen on increasing the voter turnout given the low numbers that showed up for the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections. The polls witnessed the lowest ever turnout in four decades.

The last parliamentary elections witnessed a turnout of 42.5 percent and 25.4 percent in Tehran. The turnout in the presidential elections reached 48.8 percent and 26 percent in Tehran or one in four eligible voters took part. The turnout in the capital was the lowest across the country.

Reconciling the street and ballot boxes will be an arduous task, especially in wake of the protests over Amini’s death in police custody in September 2022. The authorities’ crackdown on the protests left over 500 people dead. The consequences of the crackdown persist to this day. Rulers blamed western forces for allegedly stoking the unrest and riots. The authorities ultimately view voter turnout as a “test” of the legitimacy of the regime, which it is missing more than ever before.

Khamenei’s successor

Along with the parliamentary elections, attention will be focused on the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, which is formed of influential clerics. One of the assembly’s main duties is selecting a successor to the supreme leader if he is no longer capable of carrying on the duties entrusted to him by the assembly. The assembly has been facing serious criticism that it was neglecting its duty to oversee the performance of the supreme leader.

The assembly elections will be very significant next year as Khamenei turns 85 in April. Some clerics affiliated with the moderate and conservative movement, all of whom are former executive members of the body, including former President Hassan Rouhani, are keen on running in the elections.

After Rouhani’s term as president ended, he did not become a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, whose members are chosen by the supreme leader. He will run in the Tehran province, while Raisi sought to avoid a battle in the capital and instead registered his candidacy in the southern Khorasan province. Raisi and Hassan Khomeini, who is backed by the reformist and moderate movement, are possible candidates for the position of supreme leader.



Gebran Bassil: From Joseph Aoun’s Fierce Opponent to Supporter

MP Gebran Bassil and members of his bloc after naming Nawaf Salam as prime minister. (Reuters)
MP Gebran Bassil and members of his bloc after naming Nawaf Salam as prime minister. (Reuters)
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Gebran Bassil: From Joseph Aoun’s Fierce Opponent to Supporter

MP Gebran Bassil and members of his bloc after naming Nawaf Salam as prime minister. (Reuters)
MP Gebran Bassil and members of his bloc after naming Nawaf Salam as prime minister. (Reuters)

Head of Lebanon’s Free Patriotic Movement MP Gebran Bassil has demonstrated his ability to change his stances and adapt to changes in the country.

This was clearly shown when he backed Joseph Aoun’s election as president when he had initially been a staunch opponent of the former army commander.

Bassil had accused Aoun of being “disloyal” and of “violating the law” when he was army chief. This animosity led the FPM leader to object to his running for president, saying it was a constitutional violation.

However, Bassil quickly changed his stance and backed Aoun, because his “movement’s natural position is by the president.” The MP also said Aoun’s inaugural speech resonates with the FPM and that it was keen to see his pledges materialize.

The change in stance reflects the FPM’s reluctance to stand alone in the opposition as Lebanon approaches parliamentary elections next year. As it stands, the FPM has lost the majority of its allies, including Hezbollah.

Bassil recently acknowledged the losses, saying: “The FPM must get used to being in an independent position, without any allies or enemies.”

The FPM had won 18 seats in the 2022 elections. The number has now dropped to 13 after the resignation and sacking of some members of the FPM.

Later, the FPM would also make a last-minute change in throwing its support behind Nawaf Salam’s appointment as prime minister, when it was initially reluctant to do so.

Hezbollah viewed the change as “spiteful”, describing it as an “ambush” and accusing others of attempting to exclude it from power.

Member of the FPM’s Strong Lebanon bloc Jimmy Jabbour explained that Bassil opted to support Aoun because “of our conviction of the importance of the position of the presidency.”

“We must respect the position by standing by the president,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The FPM didn’t have a specific candidate for the presidency, he remarked, adding that Bassil “did not want to run for post at the moment.”

The MP said that a “new positive chapter has been opened” and the FPM is eager to ensure that Aoun’s term is a success.

It does not want to squander the international support to Lebanon amid the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah and the changes in the region, he added.

On whether the FPM will be represented in the new government, Jabbour said it was “only natural” that the blocs that supported Salam’s appointment be present in the new cabinet.

“At the end of the day, however, the formation of the government lies in the hands of the president and prime minister,” he stated.

Moreover, he stressed that were it not for the FPM’s support, Salam would not have been named PM.

Former FPM member lawyer Antoine Nasrallah said he was not surprised when Bassil switched to supporting Aoun’s presidency.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he added: “Throughout his political career, Bassil has been known to take contradictory positions and to be either hostile or friendly with various political forces, depending in whether they serve his interests and agendas.”

“So, we were expecting him to behave the same way with Joseph Aoun,” he noted.

“Bassil’s ultimate goal is the presidency, and he will do the impossible to achieve it,” he said.

Furthermore, Nasrallah explained that Bassil will “shower Aoun’s term with support and affection because he is aware that Aoun will eliminate his popularity ... should he remain hostile to him.”

“The FPM has become a political party that relies on clientelism. It believes that it can still have a piece of the cake because it is fully aware that a move to the opposition will mean its end,” he added.

Former President Michel Aoun – Bassil's father-in-law – had named Jospeh Aoun as army commander in 2017. The latter had always been viewed as loyal to the then president.

People who were closely following Joseph’s Aoun appointment told Asharq Al-Awsat that Bassil had been vehemently against it, but the president insisted.

After the appointment, the president tried to ease the tensions between the army chief and his son-in-law.

During the October 2019 anti-government protests, Bassil was very critical of the army commander because he was allowing the demonstrators to block roads, claiming he was even following American orders and that he had turned against the president.