Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
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Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP

Few things grab the attention of Arab leaders who are friendly to Washington more than America’s military presence in the region. Even the slightest drawdown greatly worries and often drives them to assume the worst about US intentions.

A calm assessment of America’s changing geopolitical priorities, followed by an understanding of how the United States has sought to adjust its military posture in the region, should ease the worries of Arab partners, or at least some of them.

While it is true that the United States has reached fatigue in the Middle East given its costly interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the more powerful driver behind reducing military investments in the region is the US strategic prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.

Checking China and countering Russia requires more resources than previously allocated to each respective theater, and given that US resources are limited, they must be brought in from other places. By any objective account, the United States had an oversized presence in the Middle East, which made the region a natural candidate for a reduced US military footprint.

The view of US abandonment of the Middle East has needlessly dominated policy and emotions in the region. It remains baseless. So long as the region contains strategic natural resources including high percentages of oil and gas, and so long as the export of those resources is crucial for the wellbeing of the international economy, the United States will care about the region and devote resources to maintain stability in that vital part of the world. The question now is how the United States can preserve its interests, strengthen its partnerships, and commit to its stabilizing mission in the region with fewer resources at its disposal.

There’s no doubt that Washington has struggled with this question at the policy level – the conflict between Israel and Hamas is just the latest example of the limitations of US Middle East policy. But what’s encouraging is that the US Department of Defense has stepped up and proposed some creative ideas regarding the future of America’s military presence in the region. Enter dynamic force employment.

The concept of dynamic force employment was officially introduced in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Implemented in the Middle East more than anywhere else lately, it seeks to reduce routine deployments to provide flexibility and make peacetime force movements more agile without compromising on combat readiness. Current commander of US Air Forces Central Command, Lt. Gen. Greg Guillot, argued that “dynamic force employment deployments demonstrate the ability to move combat capability into theater just in time for when it is required, not just in case it might be needed.”

Dynamic force employment also better protects US forces from Iran’s threat of missiles and unmanned aerial systems. In his posture statement on March 15, 2022, former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie correctly noted that “distributing forces more broadly outside of the most significant Iranian threat ranges not only enhances survivability but also demonstrates an increased capability to rapidly mass combat effects...”

And that’s precisely what CENTCOM has demonstrated in its approach to the region over the past few weeks and months. We’ve seen the United States deploy additional military assets including aircraft carriers, warships, and fighter aircraft to respond to the rising threat of Iran’s threat network. These resources had to come from other regions including Europe and even from military bases in the United States.

Dynamic force employment shouldn’t suggest that the United States has switched to a strategy of offshore balancing or that it is about to gradually give up its forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East. An effective posture that contributes to the missions of deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation must have an element of forward deployment.

To deter Iran, the United States must have assets in theater to affect the decision-making calculus of the leadership in Tehran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. To be sure, US deterrence against Iran has been contested. But it would be even less effective without immediate and powerful American means of punishment in theater that could prevent Iran from quickly establishing facts on the ground in a crisis.

To reassure partners, the United States needs visible and permanent military power in the region. Regional partners feel a lot more reassured by the constant basing of American troops and equipment on their soil because it reflects a certain level of US commitment to their security. Also, to effectively conduct security cooperation, the United States needs troops and trained personnel in the region to advise and assist their counterparts. The entire enterprise of security cooperation is about building trust and personal relationships, and you simply cannot do that remotely.

How much forward presence is necessary to effectively pursue all three of these missions is always hard to know. One also has to recognize that when it comes to posture, there is an inherent tension between deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation.

While security cooperation doesn’t need a large US footprint – it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else – partners will always prefer a robust and sizable presence. With respect to deterrence, it is virtually impossible to know how much US firepower is enough to be effective because the concept itself is incredibly hard to measure and evaluate (it also depends on several other variables including credibility and consistency) and because Iran consistently operates below the threshold of war.

Dynamic force employment is supposed to smartly balance between all three missions by keeping a forward-deployed presence while putting a bigger premium on maintaining access, investing in adaptability, and building resilience. This is particularly challenging because regional partners could decide to reduce US access if they see that Washington is further drawing down its physical presence.

Access becomes even more important to the United States as tensions with Iran grow and the likelihood of war increases. The first few moments of a potential confrontation or even military crisis between the United States and Iran require a high degree of US operational flexibility, which can only be enabled by access.

In the end, any US discussion of posture, be it in the Middle East or elsewhere, should be informed first and foremost by strategy. Strategy drives posture, not the other way around. There is no point in debating numbers of American troops and capabilities in the Middle East if Washington doesn't have a clear idea of what objectives it wants those troops and capabilities to achieve.

But even when that moment of clarity in US Middle East strategy comes, Washington should always remember that the regional partners get a vote. Without their access and permission, the United States can do very little in the Middle East.



West Bank’s Displaced Palestinians Hold Little Hope for Post-Netanyahu Era

A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)
A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)
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West Bank’s Displaced Palestinians Hold Little Hope for Post-Netanyahu Era

A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)
A general view shows extensive demolitions in a neighborhood of Tulkarem refugee camp, near the city of Tulkarem in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, on November 11, 2026. (AFP)

After Israeli forces pushed him and thousands of others out of the West Bank refugee camp of Tulkarem last year, Adel Darsieh held onto his hope of returning home, but it is fading fast.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed no return for the displaced people from the camp near the northern city of Jenin.

He is now fighting for his political life after his party lost seats in Israel's general election last month and former general Gadi Eisenkot was tasked with trying to form a new government.

But even the prospect of an end to Netanyahu's rule is not enough to lift Darsieh's hopes.

"Whether it's this government or a new one, what does it change?" said the 64-year-old. "They're two sides of the same coin."

The Israeli military carried out a major operation in the north of the occupied Palestinian territory in early 2025, during a temporary ceasefire in Hamas-ruled Gaza, having vowed to root out extremists.

Shortly before the election, Netanyahu announced that no one removed from Tulkarem would be allowed back.

For Palestinian families, it is a second form of displacement. The Tulkarem camp was set up in 1950 for refugees who fled or were forced out during the creation of the state of Israel two years earlier. The West Bank has been occupied by Israel since 1967.

"Successive generations have lived through displacement without being able to return to their homes. If our grandparents and parents couldn't return, how can we believe that our return will be possible?" Darsieh said.

According to UN figures, the Israeli operation launched last year displaced 12,100 people from the Tulkarem camp.

- 'Empty stomachs' -

With the Israeli military keeping up periodic operations around the region, Darsieh is living near the camp in a modest, makeshift home with a sheet metal roof. His wife uses a wheelchair.

He went to receive trays of mansaf, a dish of rice, meat and fermented yoghurt, prepared by Fazaa Kitchen, a solidarity group that serves food to the displaced.

Working from the building of the Wadi al-Hawarith charity, volunteers in orange jackets fill, seal and package portions of food in an assembly line.

The group prepares and distributes some 1,200 meals to 400 families.

"If we weren't cooking, families would be going to bed with empty stomachs," said the organization's head, Hussein al-Sheikh Ali, 60, who himself is displaced.

He described Israel's actions in the West Bank since the Gaza war -- a conflict launched in response to the unprecedented attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023 -- as "collective punishment".

Netanyahu's now-caretaker government, which includes far-right figures, rapidly expanded Israeli settlements in the West Bank which are considered illegal under international law.

"Some Palestinians hope that a new Israeli government might emerge with a less extremist, more moderate tone," Ali said.

"Yet the fear remains that the same policies towards the Palestinians will persist, even if the political figures themselves change."

Faisal Salama, who heads Tulkarem camp's popular committee, which represents residents, called Netanyahu's decision to stop residents returning illegal.

But he held out guarded hope for an end to military operations. He pointed to how Israel, soon after the election, ended an operation in Hebron that displaced 3,000 Palestinians, which was launched after gunmen shot dead two Israeli soldiers.

- 'Scale of suffering' -

Even if residents could return, much of the camp has been destroyed. Houses have been razed, buildings emptied and businesses burnt down.

Eisenkot, who commanded forces in the West Bank during the second Intifada, a Palestinian uprising from 2000 to 2005, has sought to appeal to a broad spectrum including liberals but has only taken some distance from Netanyahu on security.

Eisenkot backs the existence of the major settlements but has also spoken out forcefully against extremist settlers who have attacked Palestinians with virtual impunity.

Beth Oppenheim, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said a consensus has emerged among Jewish Israelis on key policies on the West Bank, including opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state.

Still, she said that Eisenkot as prime minister could be more flexible on allowing a return to Tulkarem.

"I think that given the political atmosphere in Israel today, this will be done through a security pretext," she said.

"They would make the case that this is necessary to stabilize the situation in the West Bank and that having people displaced could create the conditions for unrest," she said.

For Asia Assaf, 44, a Fazaa Kitchen volunteer whose home was destroyed in March 2025, political debates are far away from her daily concerns.

"One cannot truly grasp the scale of suffering until one has experienced it firsthand," she said.


Spy Scandal and Midterm Defeat Heat Up Trump’s Asia Visit

US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)
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Spy Scandal and Midterm Defeat Heat Up Trump’s Asia Visit

US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump waves as he attends a midterm campaign rally at Salina Regional Airport in Salina, Kansas, US, November 1, 2026. (Reuters)

US President Donald Trump heads to Asia this week, reeling from a midterm election drubbing and Chinese spy allegations that have raised the stakes for his latest face-to-face with Beijing's powerful leader, Xi Jinping.

Trump will first visit Manila for meetings with Southeast Asian and other regional leaders on Tuesday before jetting to Shenzhen for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, where he will meet the Chinese president and hold three-way discussions with Xi and Russia's Vladimir Putin.

With a fragile trade-war truce between the US and China extended to early next year, and more Trump-Xi talks due in December at the G20 in Miami, some analysts had initially billed the Shenzhen meeting as a low-stakes summit.

But a backlash against Trump's Republican Party in this month's midterms and criticism that his administration failed to act on intelligence that Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who has close ties to Trump, had an affair with a suspected Chinese spy, have muddied those expectations.

"With less reason to worry about market reactions or electoral fallout, (Trump) may be more willing to consider disruptive measures," said Ruby Osman, a senior policy adviser on China at the Tony Blair Institute, a London-based think tank.

Washington has already signaled such willingness ahead of the meeting, urging China to live up to its commitments ‌made under the truce ‌agreed between Trump and Xi a year ago.

Chinese analysts say they are particularly concerned that the Nvidia saga, including ‌allegations that ⁠restricted semiconductors were ⁠diverted to Chinese customers, will now harden US attitudes towards China.

US House Speaker Mike Johnson said last week there was growing consensus in Congress on further limiting Chinese access to advanced chips after the scandal, and Democrats are expected to press hard on the issue when they take over the House and Senate majorities in January.

China has said the United States has fabricated the spy narrative to justify a technological blockade.

Zhu Feng, director of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University, said the spat could also speed up "the decoupling of AI" between the world's two superpowers even as they try to cooperate on mitigating the technology's risks.

Trump is not expected to directly raise the spy allegations with Xi, one senior US administration said on condition of anonymity, adding that the Nvidia situation "should not really have any bearing on the trip".

TRUMP'S LEGACY

Rather than picking fresh fights with China, Trump may want to ⁠focus on legacy-building endeavors such as denuclearization agreements with Beijing and Moscow, or securing another meeting with North Korea's secretive ‌leader, Kim Jong Un.

Trump sees the unprecedented summit with Xi and Putin as possibly providing movement towards ‌an agreement on nuclear arms control. But that is a non-starter for China, which has far fewer warheads than the others, Chinese analysts said.

Trump may also seek to enlist Putin ‌and Xi's support in setting up a future meeting with Kim, who has close ties to the Chinese and Russian leaders.

The president will be focused on "building his ‌legacy," said Victor Cha at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US think tank. A big part of that is his North Korea diplomacy, which he has devoted a lot of time to over his two terms, Cha added.

The proposed three-way meeting has drawn comparisons, particularly in Russia, with the 1945 Yalta Conference between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union that formalized spheres of influence, set the stage for the post-World War Two order and became shorthand for great-power deals imposed on smaller countries.

Such a framing is particularly worrisome for Ukraine, engaged in a ‌four-year war with Russia. Trump is not expected to raise Ukraine at the meeting, the senior US official said.

'A LOT TO LOSE'

Xi could also seek to take advantage of Trump's political weakness after his election humbling, analysts ⁠say.

Top of Beijing's wish list is ensuring ⁠that the US president doesn't approve a $14 billion arms package to Taiwan, which China claims as its own. Trump has said he is holding the arms back as a "negotiating chip" with China.

But with China's export engine humming, simply buying time may be enough for Beijing, said Jonathan Czin, a foreign policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, a US-based think tank.

"Xi just needs Trump to remain reluctant to revert toward a more competitive posture toward China for as long as possible. China will take whatever time it can get to fortify itself for the next round in the contest," said Czin, who formerly worked at the Central Intelligence Agency and as director for China at the US National Security Council.

Beijing will be acutely aware that whoever succeeds Trump when his term ends in two years time, may be less accommodating, said Czin and Osman.

Trump's Democratic predecessor, Joe Biden, repeatedly angered China with comments over human rights issues and a pledge that the US would defend Taiwan if Beijing attacked. Many of Trump's potential Republican successors, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, are also seen as more hawkish on China.

Both leaders will also be wary of reigniting a trade row that threatened to tank the global economy and financial markets last year, said Kurt Tong, a former senior State Department official now with the Asia Group think tank.

Despite the frustration the US has voiced on Chinese implementation of the terms of the truce, Tong expects it will be further extended beyond its January 10 expiration.

"The two sides are quite incentivized to maintain this fragile stability ... despite also having some disagreements," added senior China analyst Chim Lee at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

"They both have quite a lot to lose."


‘A Moral Red Line’? World on Cusp of Autonomous Weapons Revolution

Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)
Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)
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‘A Moral Red Line’? World on Cusp of Autonomous Weapons Revolution

Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)
Pedestrians look on as a van, displaying a screen asking for a Treaty on AI Weapons, drives through Westminster in London, Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2026. (AP)

Lethal autonomous weapons powered by artificial intelligence are set to revolutionize warfare but there is no proper regulatory or legal framework governing the new technology.

A conference starting Monday at the United Nations in Geneva will discuss how to establish curbs and prohibitions on such weapons, called killer robots by some.

But some analysts doubt the discussions at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) will keep pace with the fast-changing weapons.

AFP looks at three key questions ahead of the conference.

- What are LAWS? -

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) "can identify, select, and engage a target without the intervention of a human operator in the execution of these tasks," said Jean-Marc Rickli, head of global and emerging risks at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Autonomous weapons have long existed. An anti-personnel mine "is an autonomous weapon in the sense that it explodes when someone steps on it," said Laure de Roucy-Rochegonde of the Centre for Geopolitics of Technology at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).

But with the proliferation of AI-enhanced drones, such weapons are now "capable of selecting and engaging a target that was not predetermined, adapting to their environment without human intervention," said Rickli.

So the critical issue for potential regulators lies in determining the level of human control over the decision to employ such a weapon.

The United States refers to an "appropriate levels of human judgement" in the use of autonomous weapons.

France maintains that a human must remain in the decision-making loop and bans "lethal autonomous weapons systems" (LAWS) but permits "partially autonomous" systems known as PLAWS.

"The human role is always ensured through what is termed 'appropriate control' by a military commander -- a concept that varies in scope depending on the system's criticality and the operational context," said Rear Admiral Vincent Sebastien, deputy director of the French defense ministry's Agency for Defense Artificial Intelligence (AMIAD).

- The ethical issues?

"We are now dangerously close to crossing a moral red line: the autonomous targeting of humans by machines," UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and International Committee of the Red Cross president Mirjana Spoljaric warned in a joint statement in August.

But analysts said the Geneva discussions, while important, will touch only part of the issue.

Today, the diminishing role of humans is being driven by the growing use of AI in analysis and targeting.

Rickli said the scope of the agenda in Geneva is "very narrow".

"It fails to encompass the full range of issues surrounding AI on the battlefield" -- an area where its use is expanding, particularly in target generation.

He said this was seen in the US-Israeli war against Iran this year "where the Americans engaged as many as 1,000 targets per day" inside Iran.

"There are a host of problems and unacceptable risks associated with targeting and decision-support systems," added de Roucy-Rochegonde. "Part of this debate concerns systems that are already widely deployed on the battlefield."

"What kind of human supervision is required to ensure that the operator is genuinely exercising their own judgement rather than simply providing a rubber stamp for the machine's recommendations?" she asked.

- How quickly is the situation changing?

The autonomous weapons to be discussed in Geneva are not yet in widespread use, although analysts have noted that they have been deployed by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, as well as US attacks in Iran.

But the spread is inevitable.

"Autonomy will very quickly become a reality on the battlefield," warned rear admiral Sebastien.

"Autonomous weapon systems are not part of a distant future -- a race towards greater autonomy in weapons systems is already well underway," Guterres and Spoljaric said in their statement.

Yet significant doubts and dangers remain, Dario Amodei, head of the AI giant Anthropic, warned this year: "Today, frontier AI systems are simply not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons."

But ultimately, the incentive for major powers is too strong.

Swarms of autonomous drones -- which "aim to neutralize an adversary through saturation" -- would be highly effective, and some states view them as a crucial strategic advantage, said Rickli.

In January, the Chinese defense ministry described swarms of autonomous drones as the "new face of warfare."

"In an era of sharp military competition, the first state to normalize fully autonomous lethal strikes will reset expectations for everyone else," said Gerald Mako, a research affiliate of Cambridge University in the Small Wars Journal.