From the PKK’s Mountain Ascent to Laying Down Arms

Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)
Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)
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From the PKK’s Mountain Ascent to Laying Down Arms

Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)
Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)

Nestled in the tri-border region between Iraq, Türkiye, and Iran, the Qandil Mountains have long been shrouded in myth. Difficult to reach due to geography and security, the legends surrounding them gradually took on the weight of truth—especially after Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters established their base there in the early 1990s.

Now, the group is dismantling its structures and laying down arms, following a call by its jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has been imprisoned on Türkiye’s Imrali Island since 1999.

After more than six weeks of attempts to reach PKK insiders in Ankara, Erbil, Sulaimaniyah, Berlin, London, Qamishli and Baghdad, this investigative report evolved from tracing the past and future of the Kurdish “revolutionary” group into a window onto a broader political standoff—one where neither side appears ready to offer trust or guarantees for lasting peace in a region scarred by decades of conflict.

Verifying the real story of Qandil proved one of the most complex challenges of this investigation. Contradictory narratives persist—between what the PKK presents as partial truth, and what is propagated by Turkish authorities or rival Kurdish factions. But despite the scarcity of independent sources, eyewitnesses and individuals close to the Qandil story helped piece together the clearest picture yet of what is unfolding under the shadow of those mountains.

When the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani met his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in March 2008 to discuss the fate of the PKK, the conversation took a sharp turn.

“I am Recep Tayyip Erdogan, not a prophet,” the Turkish leader said, according to Kamran Qaradaghi, a close adviser to Talabani who was present during the meeting.

At the time, Qaradaghi had stepped down as chief of staff at the Iraqi presidency but joined Talabani on the visit to Ankara at the president’s request “to make use of his ties with the Turks,” as Qaradaghi recalls.

Talabani had sought clear answers from Erdogan about the PKK, which Ankara considers a terrorist group. The question he posed was blunt: “Mr. Erdogan, if thousands of fighters come down from Qandil Mountain and we send them into Türkiye, where would they go — to prison, or to their homes?”

According to Qaradaghi, Talabani never got a straight answer.

Qaradaghi recalled the shift in Talabani’s tone as Erdogan refused to give a clear answer about whether PKK militants laying down arms would face prison or freedom.

Realizing he had hit a wall, Talabani changed tactics.

“Are you a good Muslim, Mr. Erdogan?” he asked.

“Of course,” Erdogan replied without hesitation.

“And do you follow the example of the Prophet Muhammad?” Talabani continued.

“No true Muslim would not,” Erdogan responded, now looking slightly perplexed.

Then came Talabani’s clincher: “So why don’t you do what the Prophet did, as the Qur’an says: ‘Enter in peace, secure and safe’?”

Erdogan shot back: “I am Recep Tayyip Erdogan, not the Prophet Muhammad.”

The 2008 meeting between Erdogan and Talabani ended without a breakthrough. Back then, PKK fighters holed up in the Qandil Mountains—where the borders of Iraq, Türkiye

and Iran converge—were already growing disillusioned after three failed ceasefire attempts with the Turkish state.

Seventeen years later, on February 27, 2025, jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan issued a dramatic call: he urged the PKK, which he founded, to lay down arms, end its armed struggle with Ankara and dissolve the group altogether.

But many of those interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat for this report—revisiting key moments in the decades-old Kurdish-Turkish conflict—say the process is likely to be long and fraught with uncertainty.

Even the most hardline among them, including self-described Stalinists, admit the world, and particularly the Middle East, is undergoing unprecedented change.

The physical distance between Ankara and the Qandil Mountains is around 1,000 miles. But the political gap between Erdogan and the PKK’s mountain leadership may be even wider.

PKK cadres believe the ball is now in Erdogan’s court. Yet the Turkish president, known for absorbing high expectations, appears to be playing for time—signaling he wants more before offering a definitive response.

And history suggests the wait could stretch even further. It has before.

This time, Ocalan appears serious about disarmament. The jailed Kurdish leader, once a Marxist revolutionary, has shifted ideologically—embracing the decentralist philosophy of Murray Bookchin—and is said to have been worn down by years of isolation.

“He’s a political actor who learns, adapts and evolves,” said one source familiar with his thinking.

Erdogan, by contrast, is seen as seeking a major victory—“but on his own terms,” according to multiple figures with knowledge of the PKK file in Ankara and Qandil, both supporters and critics.

Black Box

The Qandil Mountains have long been wrapped in myth. With access restricted by both security concerns and forbidding geography, folklore often fills the void left by the lack of verifiable facts. Among the most persistent claims: that PKK fighters recruit children and abduct young men and women into their ranks.

PKK supporters dismiss such accusations as part of a “propaganda war deeply rooted in Turkish state policy.” But security and political officials in both Erbil and Ankara insist the allegations are credible.

Mohammed Arsan, a Kurdish writer sympathetic to the PKK, claims intelligence agencies have worked hard to craft a narrative aimed at discrediting the group. “This is an orchestrated campaign,” he said.

The PKK first arrived in the mountains in 1991, according to Qaradaghi, who joined the Kurdish revolution in the mid-1970s and later observed the rugged Qandil range up close.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he said the group capitalized on the chaos following the First Gulf War and the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein’s regime.

“But the real expansion came after 1992,” Qaradaghi said, “when fighters slipped through Iranian territory and crossed the Turkish border, eventually establishing themselves in Qandil.”

Kurdish fighters quickly realized they had secured a rare strategic position in the Qandil Mountains — a natural fortress.

“It’s a harsh, fortified terrain, nearly impossible for ground forces to penetrate,” said Qaradaghi, a longtime observer of the region.

Reaching the area from the nearby town of Raniya, northeast of Sulaimaniya, requires crossing seven mountain peaks on foot, he added — a journey that highlights the natural defenses the group came to rely on.

Much like traditional Leninist parties, the PKK initially structured itself around a rigid ideological core, guided by Ocalan from his prison cell on Imrali Island, where he has been held since 1999.

Over time, however, the group evolved.

“The structure became more flexible,” said Kamal Jumani, a Kurdish journalist based in Europe who specializes in PKK affairs and has visited Qandil multiple times.

“The PKK began as a Marxist-Leninist organization but gradually developed its own independent ideology—democratic confederalism,” he said.

Qandil, he added, serves as the party’s de facto headquarters—“the place where its political and military strategies are shaped and executed.”

At the top of the PKK is the Executive Council of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella organization that encompasses the PKK and its sister parties in Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, according to Jumani.

The KCK oversees strategic decision-making and political coordination across these branches. In line with the PKK’s gender equality principles, it operates under a co-leadership model, headed jointly by Cemil Bayik and Bese Hozat.

On the military front, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) serve as the PKK’s armed wing. The unit was led for years by veteran commander Murat Karayilan, while Bahoz Erdal has played a prominent historical role. In addition to military operations, the HPG also implements key decisions—from diplomacy to local governance—in areas under the party’s influence.

Over time, the PKK’s decision-making process has shifted, shaped by Ocalan’s ideological vision of democratic confederalism. “The party is now run collectively from Qandil,” Jumani said.

Qandil: A Regional Watchtower

Nearly five decades after first trekking through Qandil in 1974, Qaradaghi still recalls the mountain range as a kind of “paradise” for eco-tourism—a land of rare birds, wild abundance, and untapped mineral wealth nestled within the offshoots of the Zagros Mountains.

Back then, he climbed seven peaks on foot from the town of Raniya, northeast of Sulaimaniya, to reach the remote terrain. “It’s a rugged, fortified region,” Qaradaghi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It was hard to reach—and easy to hold.”

Qandil lies at the heart of what was once known as “Greater Kurdistan.”

Historically, it served as a borderland between the Ottoman Empire and Persia’s Badfars province. Today, it functions as a regional watchtower, perched at the intersection of Iraq, Türkiye and Iran.

With the arrival of PKK fighters in the early 1990s, Qandil was transformed. What began as a guerrilla outpost grew into a self-contained enclave—complete with a command hierarchy and sprawling infrastructure.

The group established schools to teach the ideology of Ocalan, along with medical depots, training camps, political offices, and media hubs. There are courts, prisons, and facilities to prepare operatives for missions abroad.

According to PKK sympathizer Arsan, the group built at least seven cemeteries in Qandil, the oldest two within the mountains and the rest scattered between Zab and the broader Zagros range. He estimates that more than 1,000 PKK fighters are buried there.

Today, around 5,000 militants remain in the mountains, although the International Crisis Group places the number closer to 7,000.

Demographically, Qandil’s fighters reflect the broader Kurdish diaspora, drawing members from Türkiye, Iraq, Iran and Syria. A Kurdish intelligence officer in Erbil said this diversity influences internal dynamics.

“Iranian and Syrian recruits tend to focus on their own countries’ issues, unlike the more hardline Turkish and Iraqi cadres,” the officer said.

But a senior PKK official rejected that view. “The PKK’s decisions are made pragmatically,” he said. “They depend on region, country, political context, and the party’s interest. We adapt to where we operate.”

Around Qandil, many describe the range as the capital of a fully formed partisan society—home to partizans, a term used for members of resistance and guerrilla movements.

‘Mountain law’: Inside the PKK’s Strict Code of Armed Struggle

Qandil has become more than just a stronghold — it is a fortress for partizans governed by the unwritten rules of armed struggle.

“Everything runs according to guerrilla warfare discipline,” said Jabar al-Qadir, a Kurdish researcher from Kirkuk. “Movements like these rely on guerrilla tactics, especially in rugged terrain.”

Former affiliates familiar with life inside Qandil described it as a world ruled by rigid systems — “like living in a real-life version of Squid Game,” one said, requesting anonymity.

“Every mistake has consequences. Every act of betrayal leads to punishment. The solitary cells were rarely empty.”

The PKK’s internal discipline is enforced through what is often referred to as “mountain law,” a strict code that governs behavior, loyalty, and dissent.

In a 2007 interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Osman Ocalan — brother of the PKK founder— revealed he had been imprisoned for three years within Qandil, including three months in solitary confinement, after proposing reforms to the party’s structure.

Osman was later publicly denounced by PKK military commander Duran Kalkan, a Turkish national, who called him “defeatist” in a statement to the pro-PKK Firat news agency.

Strict regulations govern nearly every aspect of life in the mountains. Romantic relationships, sexual activity, and even marriage are banned. According to the PKK’s internal doctrine, emotional attachment is seen as a distraction from revolutionary struggle and a threat to collective discipline.

“There’s an official manual,” one source said. “Love is treated as a weakness that undermines the cause.”

The Syrian front: Erdal’s Shadow over the Kurdish Fight against ISIS

On the Syrian front, Mazloum Abdi — commander of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — is widely seen as a protégé of Bahoz Erdal, one of the PKK’s most prominent military leaders.

Abdi, a Syrian Kurd, came under Erdal’s wing in his early twenties, according to a PKK source in Qandil. “He left the PKK and returned to Syria in September 2014, when ISIS began attacking Kurdish towns and villages,” the source said.

But the enduring connection between the two men has fueled speculation — and contradictions — about Erdal’s influence over Kurdish affairs in Syria. Some believe he played a pivotal role in empowering the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, since its founding in 2003.

Kurdish activists inside and outside the PKK sphere say Erdal often falls into contradictions when assessing the situation in Syria.

Just five months after Syria’s uprising began in 2011, Erdal declared that “Bashar al-Assad and his supporters have lost all legitimacy.”

That statement came at a time when Syrian Kurds were rising up in force, galvanized by the assassination of prominent Kurdish opposition figure Mashaal Tammo in October 2011.

In the months that followed, forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pulled out of Kurdish towns and villages in the country’s north, leaving a power vacuum.

Stepping in were units affiliated with the PYD, which swiftly moved to establish what it called “administrative entities” — a framework that became the backbone of Kurdish self-rule in Syria.

The PYD, often described as the Syrian sibling of the PKK, is ideologically aligned with Qandil through the umbrella of the KCK, the transnational network that links Kurdish movements in Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

A Kurdish intelligence officer familiar with the PKK file says the Assad regime’s withdrawal from Kurdish areas in northern Syria was not a retreat, but part of a tacit deal.

“Handing over those areas to the PYD was a calculated move,” he said. “In return, the party stayed neutral during the Syrian uprising and distanced itself from other Kurdish factions.”

At the start of the 2011 revolution, Syrian Kurds were eager to rise up. Under Assad’s rule, many lived without basic civil rights.

Even simple acts—such as holding a Kurdish wedding with traditional dabkeh dancing—required prior approval from state security. Newborns couldn’t be given Kurdish names; the state would assign Arabic ones instead.

In a previous interview, Erdal claimed he did not return to Syria after the uprising—except briefly in 2014 for “family reasons.” But that year also marked the rise of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the PYD’s armed wing, which later formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Erdal’s role in Syria has remained deliberately ambiguous. He is believed to have been instrumental in shaping the PKK’s military strategy and establishing its combat units. Some reports even claim he helped form covert armed groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), which carried out suicide car bombings in Türkiye over the past two decades.

A PKK source in Qandil denies any connection. “That theory is impossible,” he said. “The Hawks see the PKK as not radical enough to respond to Türkiye’s attacks or to break Ocalan out of prison.”

Ocalan, often referred to as “Apo”—meaning “uncle” in Kurdish and Turkish—remains the symbolic leader of the broader Kurdish movement.

Iran

Iran was not part of the picture when the PKK was founded. It began as a Marxist movement fighting for a “Greater Kurdistan,” then shifted to demands for “autonomy,” and now champions a “democratic confederation.” But its path into the regional equation began not through Tehran, but Damascus.

Following Türkiye’s 1980 military coup led by General Kenan Evren, PKK fighters fled to Syria and Lebanon. There, they quickly became part of the region’s anti-imperialist bloc. Ironically, PKK founder Ocalan lived in the same apartment building as Türkiye’s military attaché in Damascus, according to late Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, who told a Turkish TV station in 2011: “No one would have imagined he was living there.”

The PKK’s early ties to Iran were not direct but routed through Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, which hosted Ocalan and allowed the group to run training camps near Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.

In 1992, a year after Iraq’s Kurds rose up against Saddam Hussein, the United States and its allies enforced the so-called “Line 36” no-fly zone to protect Kurdish areas in northern Iraq. But tensions among the Kurds themselves remained.

The two main Kurdish parties in Iraq—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) headed by Masoud Barzani—joined forces to fight the PKK in the Qandil mountains. “Some 2,000 PKK fighters surrendered,” said Qaradaghi.

“They were brought down from the mountains and Talabani sent them to Zaleh,” a region in western Iran near the Iraqi-Kurdish border.

Sensing an opportunity, Iran moved quickly. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) offered the wounded fighters food, medicine, and training. Once recovered, Qaradaghi said, they were routed back to Qandil through a path that looped around the Turkish-Iraqi-Iranian triangle—back to the same mountains Talabani had emptied.

But Iranian support came with strings attached. Tehran expected the PKK’s Iranian offshoot, PJAK, to refrain from carrying out attacks inside Iran.

Was Talabani wrong to choose Zaleh as a haven for the defeated PKK fighters? Qaradaghi argues the late president’s decision was strategic. Talabani had initially planned to house them in a heavily fortified military base between Sulaymaniyah and Dukan, “but he feared Turkish airstrikes. So he opted for Zaleh,” which Turkish jets would avoid striking for fear of violating Iranian airspace.

PKK and Iran: A Shadowy Alliance

The PKK’s relationship with Iran is cloaked in secrecy, shaped by an intricate web of people, places and overlapping interests. Over the years, Turkish and Kurdish media outlets such as Darka Mazi—meaning “Path of Hope” in Kurdish—have circulated claims that Tehran struck a deal with the PKK as early as 1986.

Independent journalistic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that no formal agreement exists, but rather a series of tactical understandings over the years, benefiting both sides.

For Iran, the PKK represents a double-edged sword: a destabilizing nationalist movement with potential to stir unrest among Iran’s own Kurdish population, yet also a strategic buffer against Turkish ambitions in the tri-border region linking Iran, Iraq and Türkiye.

“There’s no written agreement,” said Kurdish analyst Jabbar Qadir. “But the two sides share positions that have led to a kind of quiet coordination.” Iran, he added, has offered logistical concessions that avoid provoking Ankara, while the PKK has largely refrained from causing trouble on Iranian soil—even though it established an Iranian offshoot, PJAK, whose mandate includes countering the influence of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran.

Qadir situates the PKK’s role within what is now referred to as the “Axis of Resistance,” a term Iran uses to describe its regional alliance. Still, he insists the group has not become an Iranian proxy. “The PKK has its own financial means and procures its weapons independently. It’s not reliant on Iranian funding like Tehran’s other militias.”

Tensions flared in 2010 and 2011 when PJAK stepped up its attacks on Iranian forces, prompting heavy retaliation. But the eruption of Syria’s civil war in 2011 created new priorities. Both sides needed to conserve strength and focus on their respective agendas in Syria, leading to a quiet de-escalation pact.

By late 2015, the PKK’s standing within the Axis of Resistance had shifted dramatically amid the battles against ISIS. A senior Shi’ite commander in an Iran-backed faction said Iranian officials were struck by the PKK’s discipline and combat effectiveness.

“They viewed the PKK fighters as more organized, committed and fierce than others—almost on par with Hezbollah,” he said. “Their fierce battles to liberate Sinjar from ISIS even impressed the US-led coalition, which began coordinating with them.”

As ISIS spread deeper into Iraq, Qassem Soleimani—the powerful IRGC commander—coordinated PKK operations within a broad network of militias stretching from Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Kurdish fighters were deployed along critical supply corridors linking Iran to Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.

The most sensitive stretch lies along the horizontal axis between Qandil, Sinjar and northeastern Syria. Sources familiar with the matter say the PKK capitalised on its central role in Sinjar’s liberation and its alliance with local Yazidi groups. Together, they formed an armed force known as the Sinjar Protection Units, or YBS.

The Final Act: How Ocalan’s Vision Shifted After Decades in Isolation

Few expected it. When the PKK announced its 12th Congress would be held on May 5–7, 2025, it marked a stunning departure from the group’s long-standing secrecy. What would once have been a covert meeting of a handful of cadres turned into a historic public gathering of hundreds of party leaders.

“The world is changing, and the PKK had to listen—even if reluctantly,” said Deniz Caner, a Turkish researcher close to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

But how did Ocalan, the party’s jailed leader, arrive at this moment—more than four decades after launching an armed struggle? Qadir, who met Ocalan in Damascus in the mid-1990s “at the height of his leadership,” believes that over 25 years in prison forced a deep rethinking. “He came to see his party’s model as rooted in Cold War logic,” Qadir said, referencing Öcalan’s latest message to supporters.

Caner, who has closely tracked the group’s ideological evolution, described the PKK’s transformation as cyclical: “The party sheds its skin every 20 years. It has already undergone two major transitions, and this is the third—shaped by the Iran-Iraq war, the fall of Saddam Hussein, the rise of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Arab Spring, the emergence of ISIS, and the Syrian revolution.”

Shwan Taha, a former Kurdish MP and academic who served in Iraq’s federal parliament from 2006 to 2010, said Ocalan’s change of heart also reflected shifts in modern warfare. “He came to realize that the mountains of Qandil stand no chance in an age of technological warfare,” he said. Taha added that Ocalan was also likely influenced by the Beirut suburb “Pager Operation,” after which Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated.

“Dissolving the party,” Taha said, “could ultimately save the Kurds from disappearing forever.”

Other factors also played a role in Ocalan’s apparent pivot. According to Qaradaghi, two key developments shaped his decision: “First, the deep isolation of his detention in İmralı prison. And second, that this peace overture came not from Erdogan, as in the past, but from Devlet Bahceli”—leader of Türkiye’s far-right Nationalist Movement Party.

It appears Ocalan is not the only one undergoing a shift—or being compelled to. On the other side, Erdogan may also need a new dynamic to secure a constitutional change that would allow him to seek a third presidential term. That would require forging broader, more agile alliances—an unlikely feat without a sweeping, multi-party deal.

Such a deal would need to satisfy nationalists seeking cultural and economic reforms, and Kurds demanding a greater political role—many of whom increasingly lean toward opposition parties.

Still, Caner disagrees with the theory that Erdogan is simply maneuvering for internal gains. “Erdogan isn’t chasing victory just to offset domestic crises,” she said.

Lowering the Qandil Flag

PKK officials have offered shifting explanations for their disarmament. Over time, their rhetoric moved from giving up arms to halting war while keeping weapons in reserve—coupled with hardline statements from affiliated parties like Iran’s PJAK.

Yet the greatest operational freedom remains in Syria, where the Kurdish-led SDF is seen by analyst Shwan Taha as “the biggest winner”—the surviving offspring, as he put it, “after the mother was sacrificed.”

From the outset, Qadir predicted that PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains would prolong the disarmament phase until Türkiye took concrete steps to recognize Kurdish cultural rights.

According to Arsan, Ocalan set clear conditions: constitutional amendments to grant cultural rights, legislation to enable the PKK’s transition into legal politics in Türkiye—and, above all, his own release.

“No fighter will give up their weapon unless those conditions are met,” Arsan said. Some PKK commanders reportedly heard directly from Ocalan that “Erdogan agreed to everything.”

Such hopes, however, may be overly optimistic, says Caner. “Meeting demands like these is unlikely,” she said, adding that “even if a genuine deal emerges, implementation could take years.”

Independent media sources say surprises remain possible. “At most,” one source noted, “Ocalan may be moved to a more suitable house on İmralı Island—under tight security.”

PKK spokesman Zagros Hiwa denied any formal agreement with the Turkish state, written or otherwise. “These are unilateral goodwill gestures aimed at finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue,” he said.

The Fate of the Mountain and the Gun

When asked about the future of the Qandil Mountains after a potential PKK withdrawal, Hiwa said: “These historic heights could play a decisive role not just for the Kurdish people, but for the peoples of the Middle East as a whole.”

But Jabbar Qadir warned that both regional governments and the international coalition fear that, if vacated, Qandil could become a haven for extremists. Iran, in particular, “is working to prevent hostile groups from taking root there,” he said.

Ankara, for its part, appears unwilling to jeopardize fragile progress. Iran’s influence in the talks between Ocalan and Erdogan has become largely peripheral.

Caner estimated that about 30% of the PKK’s positions in Qandil lie within Iranian territory, where several of the group’s top leaders are based. Resolving this sensitive piece of the puzzle may require “military intervention inside Iran with US and Israeli backing—an unpredictable scenario,” she said.

At the individual level, options include reintegrating fighters into their home countries—Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—or relocating them to a European country willing to take them in. In Türkiye, however, around 50 senior PKK figures are blacklisted from return and will not be included in any reintegration lists.

Throughout this 40-year story, Ocalan has been both its beginning and end. The man who once scattered clandestine pamphlets in Ankara and Istanbul in the mid-1970s—while envisioning a “Greater Kurdistan”—is now scripting the closing act for Qandil.

Asked what the PKK stands to gain from peace, sources repeatedly answered: “The Kurdish fighter is simply tired of war.” But none of this might have happened had Ocalan not decided to lay down the mountain’s guns and embrace the kind of pragmatism he long mastered.

In a final message to this investigation, spokesman Hiwa sounded far from optimistic: “Türkiye will not change its mindset toward the Kurds, and it has done nothing that matches Ocalan’s initiative.”

Hiwa’s tone echoed the bitter history of failed ceasefires and aborted reconciliations. Yet Qaradaghi still hopes to one day return to the seven peaks he visited half a century ago—this time as a tourist.

Others fear they may never hear another word from Ocalan again—his voice silenced on an island in the Sea of Marmara, whose waves have long kept the secrets and sorrows of the Turkish people.



What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian Nuclear-linked Site Threatened by Trump?

A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
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What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian Nuclear-linked Site Threatened by Trump?

A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS
A satellite view shows vehicles at an entrance to Pickaxe Mountain tunnels, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 21, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

US President Donald Trump has threatened to attack a site linked to Iran's nuclear program known as Pickaxe Mountain, a fortified facility buried deep underground near one of Tehran's main nuclear sites.

"We're going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to be ready," Trump said in a July 13 interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show.

The threat reflects escalating tensions as Tehran and Washington trade fire in the Gulf, setting back efforts to end the conflict.

Here's what we know about Pickaxe Mountain:

WHERE IS IT?

Pickaxe Mountain is located 220 km (140 miles) south of Tehran and 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Natanz nuclear complex.

The Natanz site, where two of Iran's uranium enrichment plants were located, was bombed during the war started by the United States and Israel on February 28, and during last year's 12-day war.

The tunnel facility under construction at Pickaxe Mountain wasn't targeted in either of those wars, according to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a US-based think-tank focused on nuclear non-proliferation.

The peak rises to some 1,600 meters above sea level. There were two enrichment plants in operation at Natanz - one above and one below ground.

The UN nuclear watchdog has said the above-ground one was destroyed. The other, underground one was likely at least badly damaged.

WHAT'S THE HISTORY OF THE SITE?

The site is ⁠linked to Iran's ⁠nuclear program, which has long caused tension between the West and Iran, which denies seeking an atomic bomb.

Construction of the facility at Pickaxe Mountain began in 2020, according to ISIS, following what Iranian authorities reported at the time as an explosion caused by an act of sabotage at the Natanz facility.

Iran said at the time the Natanz sabotage had caused significant damage that could slow the development of advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges.

In September that year, Iran's then-nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, said Iran had started building "a more modern, larger and more comprehensive hall in all dimensions in the heart of the mountain near Natanz" for making advanced centrifuges.

Rafael Grossi, the chief of the UN nuclear watchdog, in an ⁠interview with PBS Frontline in March, noted that Iran had previously announced its intention to have nuclear activity at Pickaxe Mountain.

"This was part of their quite systematic intention to put their most sensitive facilities underground," Reuters quoted him as saying.

FILE PHOTO: A satellite view shows tunnel entrances at Pickaxe Mountain, of the Natanz nuclear facility, near Natanz, Iran, June 30, 2026. Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

WHAT HAS IRAN BUILT THERE?

ISIS, which has analyzed satellite imagery of the site, says it features two pairs of entrances, which are assumed to lead to one facility estimated to be at least 100 meters under the mountain.

The physical defensive measures consist primarily of a large security perimeter and the extensive hardening of tunnel entrances, ISIS said in a July 14 report.

The pair of eastern tunnel portal entrances have been partially backfilled since the wars to obstruct ground vehicle access but they have not been sealed fully, the ISIS report said.

Sam Lair, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, who also reviewed recent satellite imagery of the site, told Reuters that increasing the strength of the tunnel entrances would complicate "targeting with penetrating munitions like bunker busters.”

IS THE SITE FUNCTIONING AND WHAT COULD IT BE USED FOR?

Trump, in his July 13 ⁠remarks, said Washington was watching Pickaxe ⁠Mountain closely.

"We see no activity there. They're not doing well with their nuclear situation. Every time we hear about it, we blow it up. So they don't like talking about it. But we'll probably give Pickaxe a shot relatively soon," he said.

ISIS, in its report, said its assessment "is that the facility is not yet operational, but construction continues,” and that it was unclear when it could be operational, based on satellite imagery alone.

"It is also unclear if Iran still plans on installing a large-scale assembly facility, given the destruction of Iran’s centrifuge program, including Iran’s ability to make centrifuge components needed for an assembly plant.

"Nonetheless, if Iran starts to rebuild its centrifuge manufacturing capability, it could plan to install a smaller centrifuge assembly facility in Pickaxe Mountain able to serve a nuclear weapons program," ISIS said.

HOW MIGHT THE SITE BE ATTACKED?

Experts assess the deeply buried complex is beyond the reach of the most powerful bunker buster bombs in the US arsenal.

ISIS said the site "would be more suitable for ground forces to attack or sabotage.”

"However, vulnerabilities may also exist that can be exploited by deep earth penetrating weapons via aerial attacks," it said.

Lair said: “We can infer that there are ongoing activities at Pickaxe Mountain the Iranians wish to continue but are still concerned enough about a potential attack that they are taking steps to bolster their defenses.”


Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
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Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)

Andy Burnham got to the top through a mix of patience and risk-taking.

A decade ago, Burnham abandoned a 20-year climb up the Labour Party ladder in London to head north and run for mayor of Greater Manchester. A month ago, he returned to Parliament by winning a risky special election. On Monday, he will become Britain’s 59th prime minister.

The sudden downfall of Prime Minister Keir Starmer after just two years in office has swept the 56-year-old Burnham into office — unelected and largely untested. He will enter No. 10 Downing St. carrying the heavy weight of expectation, and big questions about how he will shoulder it.

“A whole range of people across the Labour movement and in the country have projected onto Andy Burnham their hopes and their fantasies about how the country should be run and what Labour should stand for and what Andy Burnham stands for,” said Joshi Herrmann, founder of Manchester news site The Mill, who has covered Burnham for years.

“He has got lots of people’s hopes up.”

Burnham has made his name in Manchester, but he was born in Liverpool, and grew up in a commuter village between the rival northwest English cities.

His father worked as a British Telecom engineer and his mother as a receptionist, and he was raised in a close-knit Catholic family.

Burnham and his brothers were the first generation of their family to go to university. And not just any university — Burnham attended Cambridge, one of the country’s oldest and most prestigious institutions.

“He needed a lot of persuading to apply because he felt that as a working-class boy, going off to Cambridge wasn’t for him,” Stephen Harrington, Burnham’s former English teacher at St. Aelred’s Catholic High School, told the BBC. “He didn’t believe in himself. But he did it, and the rest is history.”

Burnham has said he felt out of place at Cambridge, where many of his classmates had gone to posh private schools in the more affluent south of England. But he got a degree in English and met his future wife, Dutch fellow student Marie-France Van Heel, now a marketing executive. The couple married in 2000 and have a son and two daughters.

After graduating, Burnham worked as a journalist at trade magazines before becoming a researcher and adviser to Labour politicians.

Elected to Parliament for the Manchester-area district of Leigh in 2001, he rose through the government ranks under Labour Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. He served in Brown’s Cabinet between 2007 and 2010 as chief secretary to the Treasury, culture secretary and health secretary.

A formative experience came in 2009, when he was heckled at a commemoration of the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster, when 97 Liverpool football fans were crushed to death. Bereaved families had fought for years to overturn a false narrative offered by police that unruly fans had been to blame.

Burnham became a champion for the families and helped push for a new inquest, an apology and a law that imposes a duty of candor on public officials to tell the truth about tragedies whatever the impact on their reputation.

After Labour lost power in 2010, Burnham ran for leadership of the party that year and in 2015, losing both times. He quit Parliament in 2017, a low ebb for Labour nationally, to run for mayor of Greater Manchester.

Being mayor played to his strengths: an ability to bring people together, a sharp eye for opportunities and a wide streak of pragmatism. His approach became known as “Manchesterism,” a brand of business-friendly socialism that aims to harness private and public money to invest in areas like transport, housing and infrastructure.

Manchester was a former manufacturing powerhouse — known as the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution — that had been hollowed out as British industry crumbled. During his tenure the city boomed, with skyscrapers blooming on vacant post-industrial sites. Burnham won praise for taking a piecemeal public transport system under public control and improving it.

He shed suit and tie for jeans and dark T-shirts, spoke about his love for Oasis, The Smiths and New Order and spent spare time playing football or spinning 1990s tunes during DJ battles.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, he harangued Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson over what he called a “London-centric” approach to the crisis that was punishing northern cities. That’s when he gained the nickname King of the North, a “Game of Thrones”-inspired nod both to his championing of his home region and his political ambition.

He has said he saw his work in central government as “unfinished business,” and got his chance when Starmer was pushed to resign by Labour colleagues alarmed at the party’s unpopularity.

But Burnham still needed a seat in Parliament. A Labour lawmaker agreed to resign, triggering a special election for the Manchester-area district of Makerfield. Burnham trounced the candidate from anti-immigration party Reform UK, cementing his credentials as a winner.

In the subsequent contest to replace Starmer as Labour leader, he was the only candidate.

He’s promising to restore hope Now he says he will deliver “a new politics based on unity and hope” and “an economy that works for everybody,” no matter where they live. A key plank is giving regional leaders more powers, and he plans to move part of the prime minister’s office to a “No. 10 North” in Manchester.

Herrmann said Burnham has clear strengths, especially an ability to tell a persuasive story and a sense of empathy that many politicians lack.

He added that the incoming prime minister has “a set of principles about trying to make the country fairer, trying to bring people out of poverty, that he really does believe in.”

Critics claim Burnham’s politics are vague on key points, such as where the money will come from to pay for his pledges. He will face many of the same political and economic challenges that stymied Starmer, including a sluggish economy, overstretched public services and a cost-of-living squeeze. He has little experience of foreign policy issues, from the Ukraine war to dealing with US President Donald Trump.

And running a country of 70 million is a lot different from overseeing a region of 3 million.

But Sacha Lord, a Manchester music entrepreneur who served as Burnham’s nighttime economy adviser, said the politician has a steely side that will help him rise to the occasion.

“He’s not scared of locking horns with people,” Lord said. “Everybody thinks Andy’s this nice, cheeky-chappy guy. But trust me, when he wants something ... he tends to get it.”


How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
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How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)

Yemen’s leadership viewed an Iranian aircraft’s attempt to land at Sanaa airport last Monday as more than an aviation incident that could be overlooked to avoid further escalation.

It saw the attempted landing as a direct challenge to state sovereignty and an effort to impose a new political and military reality outside the country’s legitimate institutions at a time of unprecedented regional tension.

Unlike in previous crises, the government responded through a coordinated mix of calculated military action, organized political measures, and legal and diplomatic efforts. It also sought to avoid a wider confrontation that it believed Tehran wanted in order to turn Yemen once again into an arena for regional conflict.

From the first hours of the crisis, Yemen’s leadership emphasized a central message: defending sovereignty does not conflict with pursuing peace, and the state can enforce the law without abandoning its responsibility to protect civilians or preserve the prospects of a political settlement.

The targeting of Sanaa airport’s runway to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing was therefore the final step in a long series of political and legal measures that preceded the use of force.

The government said it had exhausted all official channels to operate the airport and had offered alternatives to ensure the continuation of civilian flights via Yemenia Airways, the national carrier legally authorized to operate them.

What distinguished the government’s handling of the crisis was that it did not merely respond to the incident but also sought to shape the political narrative surrounding it.

From the outset, official statements stressed that the dispute was not over the operation of Sanaa airport or citizens’ ability to travel. It concerned an attempt to seize one of the state’s most important sovereign powers: control over its airspace and international ports of entry.

The Yemeni leadership repeatedly said the problem was not the aircraft itself, but the operation of international flights without the approval of the legitimate authorities, in violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and UN Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

The government also said it had proposed practical solutions before the escalation, including transporting the Houthi delegation from Tehran aboard an aircraft chartered by Yemenia Airways.

It said the group rejected the offer, strengthening the government’s argument before the international community that it had resorted to force only after exhausting other options.

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi said the priority was to protect civilian lives and public property and avoid widening the confrontation in a way that would serve Iran’s goal of drawing Yemen into regional conflicts.

The message was intended to reassure the public and show that the military decision remained subject to careful political calculations rather than emotional reactions.

The government’s continuous meetings and the formation of a national crisis-management team also reflected a shift toward a unified approach combining military, political, diplomatic and media efforts.

This gave the official response greater coherence than in previous crises.

Domestic, International Support

Observers say the Yemeni government also succeeded in turning the crisis from a confrontation between itself and the Houthis into an issue concerning respect for the sovereignty of a UN member state.

Domestically, the House of Representatives, the Shura Council, the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission and the National Bloc of Political Parties and Components quickly declared their full support for the measures taken by the PLC.

They described the incident as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty rather than merely a political dispute.

The significance of this alignment was that it came from official institutions and political parties affiliated with the legitimate authorities, giving the leadership political cover against attempts to portray it as lacking internal consensus in its handling of the crisis.

Internationally, Yemen’s diplomatic efforts appeared to have preceded the UN Security Council meeting, after the government succeeded in persuading several major powers to adopt positions close to its account of the incident.

The United States described the Iranian landing as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty and linked it to the possible transfer of military experts and equipment to the Houthis, saying this would breach Security Council resolutions.

Britain said any flights conducted without the approval of the legitimate government constituted a violation of international law and called for an investigation through UN mechanisms.

France went further, linking the incident to what it described as Iran’s destabilizing conduct in the region.

It renewed its call for an end to the transfer of military equipment to the Houthis while reaffirming its support for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty.

Although the United Nations maintained its traditional call for de-escalation, it also stressed the need to respect Yemen’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, giving the government additional political support in defending its position.

Multiple Messages

The legitimate Yemeni authorities’ handling of the Iranian aircraft crisis can be seen as an attempt to deliver three parallel messages.

The first was directed at Iran: Yemen was no longer an open arena where new realities could be imposed through air traffic or sovereign ports of entry, and any attempt to bypass state institutions would face practical measures, even as the government remained committed to peace.

The second message was aimed at the Houthis: using civilian suffering or Sanaa airport as political leverage would not lead to recognition of authorities operating in parallel to the state.

The government would not allow sovereign powers to be established outside its institutions.

The third message had an international dimension.

The government called on the Security Council to move from condemnation to deterrence by strictly enforcing sanctions and council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2140 and 2216.

It said continued tolerance of violations would encourage their repetition.

Despite the political and diplomatic gains achieved by the legitimate authorities, however, the crisis has not ended in practical terms.

It remains tied to the international community’s ability to translate condemnation into measures that prevent similar incidents and ensure respect for the Yemeni state’s sovereignty over all land, sea and air entry points.

The continuing efforts of UN envoy Hans Grundberg, alongside international positions supporting de-escalation, also reflect growing recognition that preserving the fragile truce requires addressing the roots of the crisis.

These include ending the Houthi coup and preventing humanitarian issues and sovereign ports of entry from being used as tools of conflict.

For the Yemeni government, observers say, the crisis was more a political test than a military one.

Through its response, it sought to establish a new equation: defending sovereignty does not contradict the pursuit of peace, and the state can combine restraint with resolve while respecting international law and asserting its authority.