عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

Mohammed bin Salman in Nine Years: Domestic Growth and Global Engagement

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receives the pledge of allegiance as crown prince at Al-Safa Palace in Makkah. (SPA)
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receives the pledge of allegiance as crown prince at Al-Safa Palace in Makkah. (SPA)
TT
TT

Mohammed bin Salman in Nine Years: Domestic Growth and Global Engagement

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receives the pledge of allegiance as crown prince at Al-Safa Palace in Makkah. (SPA)
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receives the pledge of allegiance as crown prince at Al-Safa Palace in Makkah. (SPA)

Nine years have passed since the royal decree issued by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz, appointing Prince Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince.

The prince’s presence in a leadership role that reflects the pulse and ambitions of Saudi youth, alongside the guidance of the king, helped launch a domestic vision that accelerated economic and social development while strengthening Saudi Arabia’s position as a leading actor in addressing the region’s shifting landscape, in addition to expanding its global reach and influence.

Fundamental transformations

Over the years, the Kingdom has witnessed turning points marked by positive developments and fundamental transformations. These were not merely superficial changes, but efforts to shape new directions that redefine the concept of success in the 21st century. The objective extended beyond change within Saudi Arabia itself to efforts aimed at shifting the broader region from conflict toward development.

Among the latest manifestations of that approach has been work to calm several regional conflicts and create opportunities for peace. In parallel, Saudi Arabia has become an influential international destination on the global map, according to numerous studies, commentaries, and research addressing major international issues and regional transformations.

As a result, the Kingdom has hosted dozens of summits and hundreds of high-level meetings on key global issues, particularly political ones. The king and crown prince have also met a large number of world leaders, with nearly 120 visits recorded in recent years.

From an early stage, the Saudi crown prince led a drive to expand the Kingdom’s engagement with the world on multiple fronts, including economic and cultural ties. Political openness has also emerged as a defining feature of recent years, reaching levels not previously seen in Saudi Arabia or the wider region.

Many observers say that Riyadh’s policies under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in recent years have strengthened the Kingdom’s role in complex international issues and helped bring various parties to the negotiating table, including through efforts to promote peace through dialogue.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Chinese president during one of his visits to Saudi Arabia (SPA).

International standing

Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has been the only Middle Eastern country to host the leaders of the United States, China and Russia within a span of just a few months, despite intensifying geopolitical tensions worldwide.

This period has been marked by a series of global crises, from the war in Ukraine and trade and economic disputes to the war in Gaza and tensions across the Middle East. The developments have positioned Saudi Arabia as a key actor influencing international policies, reflected in the scale, number and level of diplomatic visits and consultations with the Kingdom, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, as well as the international summits and meetings held on Saudi soil aimed at achieving peace.

International mediation

Saudi diplomacy has also played an active role in recent years. Under the direction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who also serves as prime minister, the Kingdom hosted US-Ukrainian talks as part of efforts to address the crisis, drawing on its balanced relations with various parties.

These efforts also included meetings in Diriyah and Jeddah last year involving the United States, Russia and Ukraine. The initiatives reflect an increasingly international orientation in Saudi foreign policy centered on peace efforts, ceasefires and ending wars, including continued mediation initiatives and promoting dialogue as a primary solution during the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

Saudi Arabia has also directed the provision of multiple forms of humanitarian assistance and relief support, as well as mediation efforts aimed at securing the release of prisoners.

Commenting on those efforts, Michael Mitchell, a regional spokesperson for the US State Department, previously told Asharq Al-Awsat that the world had become closer than ever to reaching a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine following negotiations hosted by Saudi Arabia. He expressed Washington’s appreciation for the Kingdom’s role in advancing ongoing diplomatic efforts and hosting key talks, while reaffirming the US commitment to working with all relevant parties to achieve lasting peace in Ukraine.

The Palestinian issue

The Palestinian issue has witnessed diplomatic momentum described as unprecedented in decades. In recent months and years, Saudi Arabia has pushed many countries to recognize a Palestinian state, bringing the total number of recognizing states to 149, according to the Palestinian Foreign Ministry.

The Saudi crown prince has also reiterated the Kingdom’s position that normalization with Israel would not proceed without the establishment of a Palestinian state. Saudi Arabia has hosted Arab and Islamic countries in Riyadh on two consecutive occasions to unify positions and increase pressure on the international community.

The Kingdom also chaired the committee formed by the summit, led an international coalition supporting the two-state solution, and presided over an international conference on the issue in New York.

In remarks previously made to Asharq Al-Awsat, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa praised what he described as “Saudi Arabia’s firm positions, which contributed to shaping international consensus toward recognizing a Palestinian state and providing all possible support, given that its realization within the framework of a two-state solution represents the foundation of peace, security and stability in the Middle East.”

Supporting Syria’s recovery

The Kingdom began expanding its support for Syria after it announced in late December 2025 that a Saudi delegation led by an adviser to the Royal Court had visited Damascus and met with Ahmad Al-Sharaa, then the “leader of the new administration” and now Syria's president.

Saudi air and land bridges continued to deliver aid to the Syrian people, alongside humanitarian, medical and development projects. By the end of last year, those projects had increased by more than 100 percent compared with 2024, reaching more than 103 initiatives with a total cost approaching $100 million.

Saudi Arabia also welcomed Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa three times during the year. The Kingdom pushed for the lifting of US sanctions on Syria, which the US president announced from Riyadh in May at the request of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Additional support included paying roughly $15 million in Syrian debt to the World Bank and covering part of Syrian government employees’ salaries through a joint initiative with Qatar and the United Nations.

Regional initiatives

Saudi diplomatic initiatives have also extended to multiple regional crises. These include efforts to end the Yemeni crisis and hosting Yemeni parties, including southern groups, while facilitating the first consultative meeting on the southern issue and providing a framework for dialogue on the matter this year.

Saudi Arabia also supported evacuation operations in Sudan, hosted the Jeddah platform on Sudan, and continued humanitarian assistance. More recently, high-level Saudi-US discussions led by the Saudi crown prince and the US president have focused on efforts to resolve the Sudanese crisis.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Riyadh in December 2023 (SPA).

Summits and consensus

Alongside its expanding regional and international role, Saudi Arabia has also played a significant role on the Arab and Islamic fronts during the nine years since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman assumed his position.

Under his direction, the Kingdom hosted seven Arab and Islamic summits between 2018 and 2024. These included the Dhahran Arab Summit in April 2018, the Makkah Summit in Support of Jordan in June 2018, the Emergency Arab Summit in Makkah in May 2019, the Arab-China Summit in December 2022, the Jeddah Arab Summit in May 2023, the Joint Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit in November 2023, and a follow-up summit in November 2024.

Last year, Saudi Arabia also strengthened its defense and strategic capabilities through a defense agreement with Pakistan stipulating that any attack on either country would be considered an attack on both. The Kingdom also signed a defense agreement with Washington during a historic visit to the United States in November 2025, in addition to expanding cooperation with major international powers including China, Russia and European countries.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Donald Trump in Washington in November 2025 (SPA).

“A great dawn” in relations with the United States

US President Donald Trump praised the leadership of the Saudi crown prince, saying, “The Saudi crown prince best represents our strong allies,” and adding that “a great dawn” awaits the Middle East.

Trump also described Saudi Arabia as “the heart and center of the world,” and said Riyadh was on track to become a global business hub.

During the crown prince’s visit to Washington late last year, the two countries signed a wide-ranging package of agreements that included a strategic defense agreement, the Kingdom’s second defense agreement signed in 2025, along with a package of defense sales, cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, a strategic partnership in artificial intelligence, a framework for securing supply chains for uranium and minerals, and measures to accelerate investment.

The US president also announced the designation of Saudi Arabia as a major non-NATO ally and praised Saudi negotiating capabilities, describing the Saudis as “great negotiators.”

Most Viewed

 
 
Features

Gaza’s Diabetes Patients Face a War Without Respite

Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT
TT

Gaza’s Diabetes Patients Face a War Without Respite

Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Diabetes patients in the Gaza Strip are fighting two battles without respite - the fallout from an Israeli offensive that began nearly three years ago despite a ceasefire announced almost a year ago, and a daily struggle to secure medication as Israel tightens restrictions on the entry of drugs and other medical supplies, despite appeals from UN and health organizations.

The war has forced people with chronic illnesses to use expired medication as access to safe treatment has dwindled.

Habib Abu Daqqa, 11, who was diagnosed with diabetes a year before the war, has spent more than three months at Nasser Medical Complex after falling into a coma following an injection of expired diabetes medication.

His mother, Maysaa Abu Daqqa, who also has diabetes, told Asharq Al-Awsat that her son has become severely distressed and needs regular, safe treatment before he can leave the hospital.

She resorted to the expired injection because of his condition, despite warnings from some doctors, while others had told her it could still be used. He subsequently developed diabetic ketoacidosis and was admitted to intensive care.

Before the war, she recalled, both had reliable access to medication and appropriate food and followed regular treatment and dietary plans. She attributed their deteriorating health partly to the period of famine in Gaza.

In 2024, the Palestinian Health Ministry estimated that around 350,000 people with chronic illnesses in Gaza lacked necessary healthcare, including about 71,000 diabetes patients, 225,000 people with hypertension and 45,000 with cardiovascular disease.

Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, 14, who has Type 1 diabetes, also required intensive care after medication shortages forced him to take expired drugs.

“Before the war, I had access to all kinds of medication, especially insulin,” Abdel Aal told Asharq Al-Awsat. Suitable food was also readily available.

“I spent eight days in intensive care. I saw death,” he recalled, adding that expired medication and substitutes left him severely fatigued.

Wafaa Washah, 36, a Jabalia refugee camp resident displaced to Khan Younis who has had diabetes for 13 years, explained that economic hardship and her husband’s unemployment had deprived her of suitable food and even clean drinking water.

She recounted that she nearly slipped into a coma several times after using expired medication because no alternatives were available. During the famine, shortages of food, particularly flour, left her suffering frequent dizziness and fever.

Farah Lafi, 19, noted that the crisis extends beyond insulin to glucose test strips needed for frequent blood-sugar monitoring. She estimated that expired medications retain only about 30% of their effectiveness, undermining patients’ daily activity and ability to function.

Ibrahim Dhair, a diabetes consultant at hospitals in southern Gaza, described diabetes patients as among those hardest hit by severe drug shortages. Much of the available medication is expired and can lead to complications including diabetic ketoacidosis and admission to intensive care.

Even when insulin is available, proper refrigeration poses another problem, he explained. Many residents live in tents without basic services, while extreme heat can spoil medicines that must be stored at specific temperatures.

Dhair added that doctors sometimes issue guidance on how to manage available medicines, but with stocks continuing to run out, he described the current situation as a crisis beyond the healthcare system’s capacity to handle.

Features

From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
TT
TT

From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.

Features

Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
TT
TT

Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.