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Can Sudan Survive?

Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
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Can Sudan Survive?

Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP

The year 2023 began on a seemingly optimistic note for Sudan. Its leading generals, Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Hemedti of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had endorsed a framework agreement to create a civilian transitional government. Tragically, at year end, Sudan faces de facto division like Libya. Its capital is destroyed, ethnic killing rages, 5.5 million Sudanese are displaced and 18 million are experiencing acute hunger.

This is a far cry from what the Sudanese people, the United States and others envisioned following the April 2019 ouster of President Bashir and subsequent formation of a predominantly civilian transitional government. What went wrong? The kleptocratic state created by Bashir proved powerful and enduring despite his ouster. Civilian political actors became increasingly fractious and failed to connect with the women and youth who led the 2018-19 revolution. When the transitional government tried to transition some control of the economy from military hands, Generals Burhan and Hemedti staged a coup in October 2021.

Post-coup, the United Nations, African Union and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) jointly tried to facilitate a new accommodation between civilian political actors and the generals. The United States supported this effort. The process led to an agreement to establish a new civilian transitional government in April 2023. However, the contentious issue of integration of the RSF and SAF into one army remained unresolved and spoilers took advantage.

On April 15, fighting broke out between SAF and RSF in and around the capital, Khartoum. It quickly spread. At year’s end, the RSF controls four of the five states of Darfur in the west and significant portions of Kordofan in the south as well as much of greater Khartoum. The SAF dominates most areas east of the White Nile. Sudan is de facto divided.

The world has not ignored this new crisis in Sudan. The United States and Saudi Arabia quickly organized negotiations in Jeddah seeking a ceasefire and humanitarian access to displaced Sudanese. Despite the generals’ promises of a ceasefire, fighting continued. Negotiations were suspended. Other external actors also tried their hand at mediation. However, Burhan’s rump government rejected African Union efforts citing the AU’s post-coup suspension of Sudan as evidence of bias. Burhan rejected the IGAD quartet effort claiming its Kenyan leadership favored the RSF. He also stymied any role for the UN’s mission in Sudan. Egypt convened a meeting of neighboring states but that effort failed to stop the fighting. The most horrendous result of the expanding conflict was the slaughter of ethnic Masalit by the RSF and its nomadic tribal allies. Such killing and raping continues to spread unchecked or uncheckable by RSF leadership.

In October 2023, the United States and Saudi Arabia resumed the Jeddah talks and soon secured SAF and RSF agreement to discuss confidence building measures toward establishing a permanent ceasefire. However, the Sudanese generals quickly reverted to their maximalist demands of the other and the fighting continued. IGAD convened an extraordinary summit on December 3 and reportedly generals Burhan and Hemedti agreed to meet within 15 days to discuss a 30-day ceasefire. No sooner had Burhan returned from the summit than his Foreign Ministry began undermining the summit’s outcome. Peace efforts seem to be deadlocked.

Despite recent RSF territorial gains, the fighting also seems headed for deadlock. Can the SAF or RSF decisively defeat the other? While the generals may still believe so, Sudan’s history suggests otherwise. Its prior 38 years of civil war resulted in the country’s partition, not military victory.

Is further division of Sudan what anyone – Sudanese or outside party - really wants? Whose interests are served by such an outcome? Certainly not the interests of the majority of Sudanese who will continue to suffer and die if fighting continues. Certainly not the interests of the United States and Europe which want the ethnic killing to stop, humanitarian relief to flow and democratic governance in Sudan. And hopefully not Sudan’s neighbors who either fear a spillover of insecurity or want to invest in Sudan’s vast mineral, agricultural and commercial potential. Can investments really be secure if two armed camps continue to fight?

For the fighting and current de facto division to end, compromises need to be made among all parties’ interests. Where to begin? Probably not with Sudan’s generals who are still seeking military victory and offering no plausible path to peace. Perhaps begin with those who are enabling the continued fighting. Recently appointed UN Secretary General Special Envoy Ramtane Lamamra has the experience and gravitas necessary to engage all parties connected to the conflict to stop the fighting and open space for a political solution. The imminent appointment of an IGAD special envoy could also help, provided there is unity of effort with Lamamra. Perhaps a non-official “track two” effort could also be helpful in finding a formula that satisfies enough of each parties’ interests to end the fighting and find a political path to re-unify Sudan. However, true national unification will require the support of the vast majority of the Sudanese people. That means the civilian political and grassroots movements, which are becoming increasingly unified, need to be at the center of any formula for lasting peace and stability. Since independence, Sudan mostly experienced military rule and it became a brittle state. Cobbling together another military-dominated government and hoping for a different outcome is futile.

Might the United States and Europe support such an interests-based approach entailing many compromises? Might they be better able to achieve the security, humanitarian and governance objectives of the Sudanese people by doing so? Could they support deals cut by Sudan’s generals and civilian leaders with the country’s regional partners? In other words, could they compromise some of their interests if those fueling and fighting the war are willing to do the same?

Sudan’s survival depends on ending the fighting. That requires adroit diplomacy, facilitated by a trusted, disinterested party, to secure compromises of both Sudanese and external interests.

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Damascus’ Mazzeh 86 Neighborhood, Witness of The Two-Assad Era

Members of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent stand near the wreckage of a car after what the Syrian state television said was a "guided missile attack" on the car in the Mazzeh area of Damascus, Syria October 21, 2024. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
Members of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent stand near the wreckage of a car after what the Syrian state television said was a "guided missile attack" on the car in the Mazzeh area of Damascus, Syria October 21, 2024. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
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Damascus’ Mazzeh 86 Neighborhood, Witness of The Two-Assad Era

Members of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent stand near the wreckage of a car after what the Syrian state television said was a "guided missile attack" on the car in the Mazzeh area of Damascus, Syria October 21, 2024. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
Members of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent stand near the wreckage of a car after what the Syrian state television said was a "guided missile attack" on the car in the Mazzeh area of Damascus, Syria October 21, 2024. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi

In the Mazzeh 86 neighborhood, west of the Syrian capital Damascus, the names of many shops, grocery stores, and public squares still serve as a reminder of the era of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his late father, Hafez al-Assad.

This is evident in landmarks like the “Al-Hafez Restaurant,” one of the prominent features of this area. Squares such as “Al-Areen,” “Officers,” and “Bride of the Mountain” evoke memories of the buildings surrounding them, which once housed influential officials and high-ranking officers in intelligence and security agencies. These individuals instilled fear in Syrians for five decades until their historic escape on the night of the regime’s collapse last month.

In this neighborhood, the effects of Israeli bombing are clearly visible, as it was targeted multiple times. Meanwhile, its narrow streets and alleys were strewn with military uniforms abandoned by leaders who fled before military operations arrived and liberated the area from their grip on December 8 of last year.

Here, stark contradictions come to light during a tour by Asharq Al-Awsat in a district that, until recently, was largely loyal to the former president. Muaz, a 42-year-old resident of the area, recounts how most officers and security personnel shed their military uniforms and discarded them in the streets on the night of Assad’s escape.

He said: “Many of them brought down their weapons and military ranks in the streets and fled to their hometowns along the Syrian coast.”

Administratively part of Damascus, Mazzeh 86 consists of concrete blocks randomly built between the Mazzeh Western Villas area, the Mazzeh Highway, and the well-known Sheikh Saad commercial district. Its ownership originally belonged to the residents of the Mazzeh area in Damascus. The region was once agricultural land and rocky mountain terrain. The peaks extending toward Mount Qasioun were previously seized by the Ministry of Defense, which instructed security and army personnel to build homes there without requiring property ownership documents.

Suleiman, a 30-year-old shop owner, who sells white meat and chicken, hails from the city of Jableh in the coastal province of Latakia. His father moved to this neighborhood in the 1970s to work as an army assistant.

Suleiman says he hears the sound of gunfire every evening, while General Security patrols roam the streets “searching for remnants of the former regime and wanted individuals who refuse to surrender their weapons. We fear reprisals and just want to live in peace.”

He mentioned that prices before December 8 were exorbitant and beyond the purchasing power of Syrians, with the price of a kilogram of chicken exceeding 60,000 Syrian pounds and a carton of eggs reaching 75,000.

“A single egg was sold for 2,500 pounds, which is far beyond the purchasing power of any employee in the public or private sector,” due to low salaries and the deteriorating living conditions across the country,” Suleiman added.

On the sides of the roads, pictures of the fugitive president and his father, Hafez al-Assad, were torn down, while military vehicles were parked, awaiting instructions.

Maram, 46, who previously worked as a civilian employee in the Ministry of Defense, says she is waiting for the resolution of employment statuses for workers in army institutions. She stated: “So far, there are no instructions regarding our situation. The army forces and security personnel have been given the opportunity for settlement, but there is no talk about us.”

The neighborhood, in its current form, dates back to the 1980s when Rifaat al-Assad, the younger brother of former President Hafez al-Assad, was allowed to construct the “Defense Palace,” which was referred to as “Brigade 86.” Its location is the same area now known as Mazzeh Jabal 86.

The area is divided into two parts: Mazzeh Madrasa (School) and Mazzeh Khazan (Tank). The first takes its name from the first school built and opened in the area, while the second is named after the water tank that supplies the entire Mazzeh region.

Two sources from the Mazzeh Municipality and the Mukhtar’s office estimate the neighborhood’s current population at approximately 200,000, down from over 300,000 before Assad’s fall. Most residents originate from Syria’s coastal regions, followed by those from interior provinces like Homs and Hama. There was also a portion of Kurds who had moved from the Jazira region in northeastern Syria to live there, but most returned to their areas due to the security grip and after the “Crisis Cell” bombing that killed senior security officials in mid-2012.

Along the main street connecting Al-Huda Square to Al-Sahla Pharmacy, torn images of President Hafez al-Assad are visible for the first time in this area in five decades. On balconies and walls, traces of Bashar al-Assad’s posters remain, bearing witness to his 24-year era.