Iraq Is on the Right Path in 2024

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani casts his vote in Baghdad during the provincial council elections. (Prime Minister's office)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani casts his vote in Baghdad during the provincial council elections. (Prime Minister's office)
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Iraq Is on the Right Path in 2024

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani casts his vote in Baghdad during the provincial council elections. (Prime Minister's office)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani casts his vote in Baghdad during the provincial council elections. (Prime Minister's office)

With hearts filled with hope, Iraqis pray that the new year will bring an end to Gaza's plight at a time when this enclave is witnessing a comprehensive war with a risk of a regional spillover.

We have not and will not abandon the Palestinian cause. We have mentioned on several occasions that the Palestinians should have their own state with Jerusalem as its capital. Since day one of the war in the Palestinian territories, we have stood alongside Gazans by providing humanitarian aid, diplomatic and political support.

This senseless war has posed significant challenges for the entire region and the danger of expanding the area of conflict still looms over. Efforts must be united in order to prevent the Zionist entity from exploiting international support to wage a comprehensive war that engulfs the whole region.

We, as Arab and Islamic countries, must work to mobilize a regional consensus to maintain stability and prosperity for the countries and peoples of the region by deepening partnerships and consolidating common interests.

In Iraq, from the first day of this government, we have adopted the approach of productive diplomacy and established the principle of a strong and capable Iraq in cultivating foreign relations with regional countries and the international community.

Iraq ought to regain its historical and natural leadership role in the region and the world, as this is our destiny. We must assume this role until the desired development that our people yearn for is achieved. We are making exceptional efforts on several levels to improve the security and living conditions of citizens, and Iraqis have already begun to have a sense of security and stability that they lost for many decades.

We incorporated the slogan “Iraq First” in the heart of our actions and thoughts, while making crucial and important decisions. The government is constitutionally the legitimate elected representative that is responsible for formulating state policy and defending Iraq’s interests, most important of which is protecting Iraq’s sovereignty. The state must have the upper hand in not allowing any party to undermine its status and capabilities of protecting diplomatic missions, facilities and public and private properties.

During the past year, we worked to achieve five priorities in the government program, which are addressing poverty, tackling unemployment, combating financial and administrative corruption, delivering services and economic reform. We quickly sought for the Iraqis to see the achievements at these levels so that they would know that their government is serious about improving their lives and solving their problems without delay.

We will stay the course and embark on work on the decades-delayed infrastructure projects and development and rehabilitation programs for the public servants. To put the development process back on track, the government increased the pace of implementation of existing projects, which are more than 7,000, not to mention the implementation of new projects that hold high development and service values.

The government has completed the implementation of dozens of strategic and development projects, most notably the Grand Al-Faw Port and Karbala Refinery, and we have laid the foundation stone for the railway project between Basra and Shalmaja, which will enhance connectivity with neighboring Iran.

We have set in mind to move forward with the strategic Development Road project, which will make Iraq a center for global trade between the east and west of the world. In addition, there are projects of integrated network of main roads overpasses and bridges to address traffic congestion and facilitate commutation and movement from the far south to the far north.

In the gas sector, we signed contracts for the fifth licensing round and a contract with the giant French company TotalEnergies to implement four huge oil, gas and renewable energy projects. We launched the sixth licensing round, and this is largely due to our government’s efforts to end the abhorrent practice of burning gas.

The path of development and entrepreneurship makes it imperative on us to bring about fundamental reforms by cutting bureaucracy, creating an advanced investment environment for Arab and foreign investors, and establishing the Iraq Development Fund, which aims to create an integrated investment environment. In order to complete the picture, we have drawn up a strong agenda to enhance the participation of the private sector in major projects.

We faced the corruption pandemic that has been spreading its venom in Iraq over the past decades, and we have come a long way in tracking down and recovering the stolen funds and the perpetrators of these crimes that are no less dangerous than terrorism.

We have taken many measures to control the unrealistic rise in the exchange rate of the dollar against the dinar by diversifying foreign currency reserves to increase the volume of our international trade with friendly and brotherly countries.

We fulfilled our pledge to hold provincial council elections, which were held up since 2013, including the elections of Kirkuk province, which have not been held since 2005. This city is considered a miniature Iraq with its multiple components and the sensitivity of its internal political situation. This is considered a tour de force for this government as it safeguards an important constitutional pillar of the principle of decentralization.

We prepared all the security, financial and logistical requirements for the success of the elections. Indeed, on December 18, we witnessed a smooth voting process with the success of our security plan without imposing a curfew, blocking roads, or closing airports. Provincial councils are a cornerstone for any democratic decentralized system and an institution needed by local governments, which represent the second executive arm in the state after the ministries.

We also intend in the new year to conduct the first population census in Iraq for the first time since 1997, as we believe that building a strong database is the basis for accurate and successful government planning.

In the face of the great challenge of climate change, and confronting the drought that threatens Iraq, we have formulated a climate strategy that extends to 2030 and will include reducing gas emissions to minimize environmental damage and motivate farmers to use modern irrigation techniques and the use of renewable energies. Iraq had a remarkable and important presence at COP28 in Dubai.

Since swearing in, our mission has not been easy, as the challenges required from us, and remain to demand perseverance, endurance, determination, and above all, an undoubted belief in Iraq’s greatness and its deservingness to be a leading prosperous country in the Middle East and the world.

Iraqis are eagerly awaiting the chimes of bells of the new year, and with the same vigor and determination, we will continue the process of development, peace and entrepreneurship that we have begun. Iraq will always remain an impenetrable barrier to those who wish to disrupt this process. Happy new year to Iraqis, Gazans, Palestinians, the peoples of the Arab nation, and the world.



Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
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Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)

Sweida, a province in southern Syria, is teetering on the brink after days of deadly violence and clashes between local communities and government security forces, an unrest that signals deeper turmoil across the war-battered country.

The latest flare-up has laid bare tensions that go beyond the provincial borders, raising concerns about the future of coexistence and civil peace in a region long known for its rich tapestry of religious, social, and cultural diversity.

While the Syrian government in Damascus seeks to reassert control over all of its territory, local groups are renewing calls for greater recognition of their rights and “distinct identity.” The result is a fragile and combustible equation in a strategically vital region.

Sweida has long been a flashpoint, shaped by decades of uneasy relations between Druze communities and neighboring Bedouin tribes. That legacy of mistrust now intersects with a crumbling economy, a lack of essential services, the rise of armed factions, and a newly entrenched central authority in Damascus, factors that together threaten to turn the province into a flashpoint for wider instability.

Competing narratives have further muddied the waters, with each side offering starkly different versions of recent events, accounts that are often shaped not just by what happened in the past few days, but by long-standing grievances and buried animosities. The deepening rift and absence of trust among local communities highlight just how far Syria remains from reconciliation.

As pressure builds, observers warn that without a sustainable political solution that acknowledges local demands while maintaining national cohesion, Sweida may be a harbinger of further unrest in Syria’s uncertain future.

Power Struggles and Fractured Alliances

In Syria’s Sweida, power is fragmented among a complex web of religious authorities, influential families, and rival armed factions, a fractured landscape that reflects the broader divisions tearing at the country.

Local leadership is split between traditional Druze clerical authorities and prominent families, each with their own loyalties and varying degrees of influence on the ground. Political rivalries run deep, and military factions are equally divided, some aligning with the government in Damascus, while others openly challenge it.

Among the most prominent pro-government groups is the “Madafat al-Karama” faction led by Laith al-Balous, son of the late Druze leader Sheikh Wahid al-Balous. He is seen as a key ally of Damascus, alongside Suleiman Abdel-Baqi, commander of the “Ahrar Jabal al-Arab” group.

On the opposing side are factions such as the “Military Council in Sweida” and “Liwa al-Jabal” (Mountain Brigade), which collectively field around 3,000 fighters. These groups are seen as aligned with the views of influential Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been increasingly critical of the central government.

A newer alliance has also emerged under the banner of “Counter-Terrorism Forces” or the “Syrian Brigade Party,” bringing together factions such as “Dir’ al-Tawhid,” “Forces of Al-Ulya,” “Sheikh al-Karama,” “Saraya al-Jabal,” and “Jaysh al-Muwahideen.” This coalition formally severed ties with Damascus following Sheikh Hijri’s speech on July 15, in which he rejected the government’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement with local notables.

Also active in the province is the “Men of Dignity Movement,” a relatively large faction led by Abu Hassan Yehya al-Hajjar. Though not officially aligned with the new coalition, the group is also staunchly opposed to the Syrian government.

The growing number of factions and rival power centers has deepened instability in Sweida.

Bedouin Tribes in Sweida Say They Are Marginalized, Blamed and Forgotten

Even after government forces withdrew and a fragile ceasefire took hold in Sweida, clashes reignited, this time between Druze residents and Bedouin tribes, underscoring the deep and historical grievances simmering beneath the surface of the country’s sectarian fault lines.

The Bedouin, who see themselves as long-marginalized stakeholders in the region, say they have been caught in the crossfire - blamed for violence they did not initiate and excluded from political life and public services.

“We are the perpetual scapegoats,” said Mohammad Abu Thulaith, a lawyer and member of the Sweida Tribal Council. A descendant of one of the Bedouin tribes long at odds with the Druze population, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Bedouins are the weakest link in the local power struggle.”

The sense of injustice voiced by Abu Thulaith runs deep and is rooted in historical narratives. According to his account, the Druze - who migrated to the Jabal al-Arab area around two centuries ago - gradually expanded their influence, curbing the pastoral livelihoods of the Bedouin, particularly livestock herding. This, he said, led to the forced migration of nearly half of the Bedouin tribes from the mountain region toward Jordan, rural Damascus, and Daraa.

He cited the example of Saad Hayel al-Surour, a former speaker of the Jordanian parliament, who remains a Syrian citizen to this day. His father, Hayel al-Surour, once headed the Syrian parliament before the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt.

Many in the Bedouin community consider themselves the original inhabitants of the land, victims of what they describe as “a prolonged injustice” that denied them citizenship rights, political representation, and even basic services.

Abu Thulaith argues that the source of current tensions must be addressed at its roots. “We are blamed because the other side does not dare confront the real actors behind the violence,” he said, referring to armed groups operating in the area.

He called on the Druze tribal leadership - often referred to as “the people of the mountain” - to assume responsibility for protecting the Bedouin community and ending decades of exclusion. “We’ve suffered from a double injustice,” he said. “One at the hands of the Assad regime and Baathist rule, and the other from our neighbors. We have no access to employment, no political representation, and we’re deprived of the most basic public services.”

Despite the mounting frustration, Abu Thulaith insists that the Bedouin do not seek confrontation. “We don’t have the means to fight,” he said. “All we want is to live in peace with our neighbors. No one can erase the other. Since the fall of the former regime, tribal communities have hoped the state would step in to offer protection and ensure the most basic rights.”

As tensions in Sweida continue to spiral, voices like Abu Thulaith’s are demanding a deeper national conversation about identity, land, and the future of Jabal al-Arab - one that addresses long-neglected wounds before they erupt into further conflict.

Druze Grapple with a Perpetual Identity Crisis

For Syria’s Druze minority, identity is not just a question of culture or belief, it is a matter of survival. That fear of erasure has long shaped their political instincts, social structures, and geographic presence in the country.

“The Druze, like many minorities, live with a constant sense of threat,” said Khaldoun Al-Nabbouani, a professor of political philosophy at the University of Paris and a native of Sweida. “This persistent anxiety drives them to close ranks around their identity in a collective effort of self-preservation.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Nabbouani explained that the community’s inward turn is not only symbolic or cultural - it also manifests demographically. “Just as the Alawites are concentrated in the coastal mountains, the Druze have built their stronghold in Jabal al-Arab. It reflects a broader pattern among minorities to cluster in specific regions where they can reinforce their social cohesion and safeguard a perpetually anxious identity.”

That reflex dates back centuries. The very formation of the Druze sect, he said, was a political and cultural rebellion against traditional Islam. “Since its inception, the community has developed a deep need for internal solidarity and social insulation,” he said. “Even today, that’s visible in things like marriage practices - interfaith unions remain extremely rare.”

This insularity, he noted, extends to the political realm. The community has historically resisted the appointment of governors or officials from outside the Druze fold, a trend dating back to the 1930s and continuing into recent decades. One of the more controversial examples was the appointment of a non-Druze governor under the government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa, which sparked uproar, resignation, and a political standoff before the governor ultimately returned.

Tensions between the Druze and the central government are nothing new. Under President Adib Shishakli in the early 1950s, relations with Damascus deteriorated sharply. Shishakli accused the Druze of plotting against the state and in 1954 ordered artillery strikes on Jabal al-Arab, an assault that killed civilians, displaced families, and left deep scars that still echo in local memory.

When the Baath Party seized power in 1963, Damascus shifted tactics, pursuing what Al-Nabbouani described as a policy of “soft containment.” Symbolic appointments of Druze figures to government positions were coupled with tight security oversight in Sweida, a strategy aimed at managing rather than integrating the province.

As new waves of unrest ripple through southern Syria, the Druze community once again finds itself wrestling with existential questions caught between historical trauma, present instability, and an uncertain future.